Libyan-Chadian border war

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Libyan-Chadian border war
Territories controlled by Libya and Oueddeis GUNT during the Chad Civil War
Territories controlled by Libya and Oueddeis GUNT during the Chad Civil War
date 1978-1987
place Chad
output Victory of Chad
Parties to the conflict

Political system of the Libyan Arab JamahiriyaPolitical system of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Libya

ChadChad Chad France Supported by: United States Egypt Sudan Zaire
FranceFrance 

United StatesUnited States 
EgyptEgypt 
SudanSudan 
ZaireZaire 

Commander

Muammar al-Gaddafi
Chalifa Haftar
Massoud Abdelhafid

Hissène Habré
Hassan Djamous

losses

7,500 dead

1000 dead

The Libyan-Chadian border war is a series of hostilities between Libyan and Chadian armed forces in Chad from 1978 to 1987. Libya had been involved in Chadian domestic politics since 1969 - before Muammar al-Gaddafi came to power - after the Chadian civil war in 1968 had also covered the northern part of Chad. During the Libyan-Chadian war, Libya intervened four times in Chad (1978, 1979, 1980–1981 and 1983–1987). Gaddafi was supported by one or more factions in the Chadian civil war, while the opponents received support from France , which intervened three times militarily to prevent the overthrow of the Chadian government (1978, 1983 and 1986).

From 1978 onwards, Libya provided its Chadian allies with weapons, artillery and air support, but without directly supporting its Chadian allies with ground troops. This scheme only changed in 1986, when all Chadian factions united against the occupation of northern Chad by Libyan forces. This deprived the Libyan armed forces of their infantry , precisely at the time when they were faced with a well-equipped motorized army with armor-piercing weapons, anti-aircraft weapons and capable of breaking the superior Libyan firepower. This part of the war in which the Libyan forces were defeated and driven from Chad is also known as the Toyota War .

Gaddafi's motive to intervene militarily in Chad originally consisted of the plan to annex the Aouzou Strip . According to a non-ratified treaty from the colonial era, he declared this northern border strip of Chad to be part of Libya. In 1972, according to the historian Mario Azevedo, the following motives were added: the creation of a dependent state in Libya's “abdomen” - an Islamic republic, modeled on its Libyan People's Republic, which would be closely tied to Libya and its control over the Aouzou- Stripes would secure the expulsion of the French from the region and the use of Chad as a base to expand its influence in Central Africa.

prehistory

Cast of the Aouzou strip

The beginning of Libyan interference in Chad can be dated back to 1968, when the Muslim National Liberation Front of Chad ( FROLINAT ) launched its guerrilla war against the Christian President François Tombalbaye in the northern district of the Borkou-Ennedi- prefecture during the Chadian civil war . Tibesti (BET) expanded. The Libyan King Idris I felt obliged to support FROLINAT because of the good historical connections on both sides of the border. However, in order not to endanger relations with France, the former colonial and now protecting power of Chad, Idris limited the support of FROLINAT to providing shelter for the rebels in Libya and only supplying them with non-lethal goods.

All of that changed with the Libyan coup d'état of September 1, 1969, which overthrew King Idris and brought Muammar al-Gaddafi to power. Gaddafi claimed the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad based on an unratified treaty between the former colonial powers France (Chad) and Italy (Libya). This claim was made earlier when King Idris tried to occupy the Aouzou Strip in 1954 but was repulsed by French colonial forces.

Although he originally had doubts about FROLINAT, from 1970 Gaddafi recognized the benefits of this organization for his purposes and began to equip, train and financially support the rebels with the support of the Warsaw Pact , especially of the GDR . On August 27, 1971, Gaddafi was already daring enough to attempt a coup d'etat against Chadian President Tombalbaye, which only narrowly failed. This action was probably triggered by Libyan fear of a Christian-Muslim reconciliation between the civil war parties, since the Chadian government had offered Muslim politicians half of the cabinet seats on July 24. Although this development was rejected by FROLINAT, Gaddafi saw it as a threat to his influence in Chad.

On the day of the failed coup, Tombalbaye broke off all diplomatic contacts with Libya, offered all Libyan opposition groups shelter in Chad and, in turn, claimed the Libyan province of Fezzan , based on alleged "historical rights". Gaddafi responded by recognizing FROLINAT as the only legitimate government in Chad on September 17. In October, the Chadian Foreign Minister Hassan Baba presented Libya's expansionist ideas to the UN .

Through French pressure on Libya and through the mediation of Hamani Diori , the then President of Niger , the two countries resumed diplomatic relations on April 17, 1972. Shortly afterwards, Tombalbaye broke off diplomatic relations with Israel and may have secretly accepted the cession of the Aouzou strip to Libya on November 28; In return, Gaddafi paid the Chadian president £ 40 million . In addition, both states signed a friendship agreement. Gaddafi withdrew the support of FROLINAT and forced its leader Abba Siddick to relocate his headquarters from Tripoli to Algiers . The good relations were underscored by Gaddafi's state visit in March 1974 to the Chadian capital N'Djamena and the establishment of a joint bank to provide Chad with investments.

Six months after the treaty was signed in 1972, Libyan troops entered the Aouzou Strip and set up an air base north of Aouzou, protected by surface-to-air missiles. A civil administration based in al-Kufra was established and Libyan citizenship was granted to the area's few thousand inhabitants. From then on, the Aouzou strip was shown as Libyan territory on Libyan maps.

The exact conditions under which Libya took over the Aouzou Strip are still controversial and unclear. The existence of a secret agreement between Tombalbaye and Gaddafi was alleged in 1988 when Gaddafi presented an alleged copy of a letter in which Tombalbaye recognized the Libyan claims. Contrary to this, scholars like Bernard Lanne have argued that there never was a formal agreement and that Tombalbaye found it advantageous simply not to mention the occupation of part of its land. In addition, Libya was unable to produce the original when the Aouzou Strip case was heard by the International Court of Justice in 1993 .

Expansion of the uprising

The peaceful phase did not last long, however, because on April 13, 1975, Tombalbaye was put out of office and replaced by General Félix Malloum . One of the reasons for the coup was Tombalbaye's appeasement policy towards Libya. Gaddafi saw the coup as a threat to his influence in Chad and thereupon resumed support for FROLINAT.

In April 1976 there was a Gaddafi-supported assassination attempt on Malloum, and in the same year Libyan armed forces began to advance into central Chad with the FROLINAT troops.

The Libyan activities also led to conflicts within FROLINAT, which in the meantime had been renamed the “Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North” (CCFAN). In October 1976 there was therefore a split into an anti-Libyan minority under Hissène Habré, who called themselves the “Armed Forces of the North” (FAN) , and a majority loyal to Gaddafi under Goukouni Oueddei. Shortly thereafter, this group was renamed “ People's Armed Forces ” (FAP).

During these years Gaddafi's support was moral and arms deliveries were limited. That changed from February 1977, when the Libyans equipped Goukounis men with hundreds of AK-47 assault rifles, dozen of bazookas , 81- and 82-mm mortars and recoilless cannons. This armament enabled the FAP to attack the bases of the Chadian Army (FAT) in Bardaï and Zouar (Province of Tibesti) and in Ounianga Kebir (Province of Borkou) in June. With these attacks, Goukouni managed to take full control of Tibesti Province, as Bardaï surrendered on July 4th and Zouar was evacuated. The FAT lost 300 men and large quantities of military goods fell into the hands of the rebels. The attack on Ounianga failed, which was also due to the French military advisors there.

Also in 1977, when it became clear that the Aouzou Strip was being used by Libya as a base to penetrate even further into Chad, General Felix Malloum decided to bring the Aouzou occupation as a subject before the UN and the OAU . Malloum also knew that he needed more allies, which is why he signed a formal agreement in September with Hissène Habré, the leader of the anti-Libyan faction FAN. This agreement was kept secret until January 22, 1978, when a formal agreement in principle was signed. Subsequently, a government of national unity was established on August 29, 1978, with Habré as prime minister . The Halloum-Habré Accord was also actively supported by Sudan and Saudi Arabia , as both feared a radicalized Chad under the control of Gaddafi and saw in Habré, as a Muslim and credible anti-colonialist fighter, the only way to thwart Gaddafi's plans.

course

Libyan escalation

The Malloum-Habré Accord was viewed by Gaddafi as a serious threat to his influence in Chad. He responded immediately by raising Libyan interference to unprecedented levels. For the first time, Libyan ground troops also took part in attacks by the FAP, when it attacked the last posts of the Chadian government in the north, namely in Faya-Largeau, Fada and Ounianga Kebir, from January 29, 1978 in the so-called Ibrahim Abatcha offensive. The attacks were a complete success and Goukouni and the Libyans took full control of the BET prefecture.

The decisive conflict between Libyan FAP forces and Chadian government troops took place with the battle for Faya-Largeau in the capital of the BET prefecture. The city, defended by 5,000 soldiers, fell on February 18 after heavy fighting against 2,500 FAP fighters and probably 4,000 Libyans. The Libyans do not seem to have fought themselves, but stuck to the usual pattern: they supplied heavy weapons, artillery and air support. The rebels were also much better equipped than before, including Strela-2 anti-aircraft missiles .

Goukoundi had taken 2,500 prisoners. With these successes, as well as the successes in 1977, he succeeded in reducing the troop strength of the Chadian army by around 20%. In particular, the nomadic national guard (French Garde Nationale et Nomade) GNN of the Chadian army was severely decimated by the fall of Fada and Faya-Largeau. Goukouni also used these successes to strengthen his position in FROLINAT; During a congress in Faya-Largeau in March, supported by the Libyans, it was possible to unite the main factions of the rebels, who in turn elected Goukouni as the new General Secretary of FROLINAT.

Malloum's reaction to the Goukouni-Gaddafi offensive was the renewed severance of diplomatic relations with Libya on February 6 and the submission of Libyan participation in the fighting to the United Nations Security Council , as well as the renewed discussion of the Libyan occupation of the Aouzou strip. However, on February 19, after the fall of Faya-Largeau, Malloum was forced to agree to a ceasefire and withdraw the protest. The ceasefire was also agreed because Libya had stopped Goukouni's advance at the insistence of France, which at the time was a major arms supplier to Libya.

On February 24, 1978, Malloum and Gaddafi agreed to resume diplomatic relations in Sabha, Libya, where an international peace conference was held, mediated by Nigerien President Seyni Kountché and the Sudanese Vice-President. Under massive pressure from France, Sudan and Zaire , Malloum was finally forced to sign the Benghazi Agreement on March 27, which FROLINAT officially recognized and agreed to another ceasefire. One of the main terms of the treaty was the creation of a united Libyan-Nigerien military committee tasked with implementing the treaty. In doing so, Chad legitimized Libyan interference in its territory. The treaty also contained another passage in the interests of Libya, as it called for the end of any French military presence in Chad. This treaty was a good vehicle for Gaddafi to strengthen his protégé Goukouni, while it significantly weakened Malloum's prestige, particularly in southern Chad, where his concessions were seen as evidence of his weak leadership.

On April 15, just a few days after the armistice had been agreed, Goukouni left Faya-Largeau and left a garrison of 800 Libyans there. Relying on Libyan arms and air support, he ambushed a small FAT garrison and began an advance on the capital, N'Djamena.

However, this advance was opposed by newly arrived French troops. As early as 1977, after Goukouni's first attack, Malloum had asked for the French army to return to Chad, but President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing initially put him off to await the French elections in March 1978. France also feared for its profitable trade relations with Libya. In the end, however, the rapid progress of the advance left the French president with no choice but to approve the Tacaud operation in February 1978, which brought 2,500 French soldiers to Chad in April to protect the capital against the rebels.

The decisive clash of the armies was the battle of Ati , a small town about 350 km northeast of N'Djamena. The town's garrison, consisting of 1,500 soldiers, was attacked on May 19 by the FROLINAT rebels, armed with artillery and modern weapons. However, the garrison was reinforced in good time by the arrival of a Chadian task force and by the French Foreign Legion and the third regiment of the French marine infantry. In a two-day battle, the FROLINAT was repulsed with heavy losses, a victory that was confirmed by another victory at Djedaa in June. The FROLINAT had to admit its defeat and fled north after losing 2,000 men. Their modern weapons have been left behind. The decisive role in these battles was played by absolute French air supremacy, as the Libyan air force pilots refused to fight the French.

Libyan troubles

Only a few months after the failed offensive against the capital, serious disputes rocked FROLINAT, destroyed its internal unity and weakened Libyan influence in Chad. On the night of August 27, 1978, Ahmat Acyl and his Volcan Army , a splinter group of FROLINAT, attacked Faya-Largeau with the support of Libya, apparently an attempt to overthrow Gaddafi's Goukouni as FROLINAT general secretary and to replace him with Acyl. The shot backfired, however, as Goukouni responded by kicking all Libyan military advisors out of Chad and seeking an understanding with France.

The reasons for the rift between Gaddafi and Goukouni were political and ethnic. The FROLINAT was divided into Arabs like Acyl and Tubus like Goukouni and Habré. This ethnic division was also reflected in a different approach to Gaddafi and his green book . Goukouni and his men were reluctant to comply with Gaddafi's demands to adopt his green book as FROLINAT's official policy. They had first tried to play for time and postpone the question until all rebel factions were completely united. When that happened and Gaddafi put pressure on the acceptance of his green book again, the differences of opinion in the Revolutionary Council became evident. Many proclaimed their loyalty to the original direction from 1966 when Ibrahim Abatcha was appointed FROLINAT's first general secretary, while others, including Acyl, fully supported Gaddafi's ideas.

In N'Djamena, on the other hand, the simultaneous presence of two armies, namely the FAN of Prime Minister Habré and the FAT of President Malloum, led to quarrels and finally, after the Battle of N'Djamena, the collapse of the state and the rise of the northern elite to power. At the Battle of N'Djamena on February 12, 1979, a dispute escalated into a serious skirmish between Habrés and Malloum's troops for a trivial reason and intensified again when, from February 19, Goukouni's men on Habré's side against the FAT Recordings. It is estimated that by March 16, when the first international peace negotiations took place, 2,000–5,000 men had died and 60,000–70,000 residents had fled the capital. The heavily decimated Chadian army fled the capital. In the south of the country it reorganized itself under the leadership of Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué . During the fighting, the French armed forces remained passive and even indirectly helped Habré's men by forcing the bombing of the Chadian Air Force to stop.

Finally, an international peace conference in was Kano ( Nigeria ) held, attended by Chad's neighbors, as well as Malloum for the Chadian army Habré for FAN and Goukouni for FAP. On March 16, the Kano Agreement was signed by all parties involved, as a result of which Malloum resigned and was replaced by a state council chaired by Goukouni. This happened due to French and Nigerian pressure on Goukouni and Habré, with the aim of both moving to share power; the French saw this primarily as part of their strategy of severing all ties between Goukouni and Gaddafi. A few weeks later these factions formed the transitional government of national unity (French Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition) GUNT , which was held together primarily by the common desire to drive Libya out of Chad.

Despite the Kano Agreement, Libya was angry that none of the leaders of the Volcan Army were involved and that Libyan claims to the Aouzou Strip had not been acknowledged. As early as April 13, there were minor military activities by the Libyans in northern Chad and support for the secessionist movements in southern Chad, but a bigger reaction did not take place until June 25, when the education ultimatum to the GUNT issued by the neighboring states of Chad a broader, more comprehensive coalition expired. On June 26, 1979, 2,500 Libyan soldiers entered Chad with an attack in the direction of Faya-Largeau. The Chadian government asked France for help. The Libyan armed forces were first stopped by Goukouni's militiamen and then forced to retreat by French reconnaissance planes and bombers. In the same month, the factions not considered by the GUNT formed a counter-government The Front of Joint Provisional Action (FACP) in northern Chad with the support of the Libyan military.

The fighting with Libya, the threat of an economic boycott by Nigeria and international pressure finally led to a new international peace conference in Lagos in August , in which all eleven political groups represented in Chad took part. On August 21, a new agreement was signed, as a result of which a new GUNT was formed, which included all political groups. The French troops were to leave Chad and be replaced by a multinational African peacekeeping force. The new GUNT took office in November, with Goukouni as President, Kamouguè as Vice-President, Habrè as Defense Minister and Acyl as Foreign Minister. Despite Habrè's participation, the new GUNT had enough pro-Libyan members to please Gaddafi.

Libyan intervention

Libyan MiG-23 on a tarmac in Faya Largeau, Chad, 1980

From the beginning it was evident that Habrè was isolating himself from the other members of the GUNT and viewing them with suspicion. Habrès' hostility to Libyan influence in Chad was combined with his ambition and ruthlessness: observers estimated that the warlord would never settle for anything other than the highest position in the state. In this context, it was assumed that sooner or later there would be an argument between Habré and the pro-Libyan representatives, as well as between Habré and Goukouni.

As expected, the clashes between Habré's FAN and pro-Libyan armed forces in the capital gradually escalated. Finally, on March 22, 1980, another vain cause triggered the second battle of N'Djamena. Within ten days, the fighting between Habrés FAN and Goukounis FAP, who both had 1,000-1,500 men stationed in the city, claimed thousands of lives and caused half the city's population to flee. The few remaining French soldiers who finally left on May 4th, as well as the Zairean peacekeeping forces, behaved neutrally.

While the FAN was supported economically and militarily by Sudan and Egypt , shortly after the fighting began, Goukouni received support from Kamougué's FAT, Acyl's CDR and also received Libyan artillery. On June 6th, FAN took control of Faya-Largeau. This alarmed Goukouni, so that on June 15 he signed a friendship treaty with Libya. The treaty gave Libya a free hand in Chad and legitimized the Libyan presence in the country: this was already evident in the first article of the treaty, which stated that both countries pledged to jointly defend themselves and the threat to one of the two countries was automatically seen as a threat to the other has been.

From October, Libyan armed forces deployed to Aouzou operated by airlift together with Goukouni's men and retook Faya-Largeau. The city then served as a deployment point for tanks , artillery and armored vehicles before they made their way south to N'Djamena.

An attack that began on December 6, led by Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks and coordinated by advisers from the Soviet Union and the GDR, led to the fall of the capital on December 16. The Libyan armed forces, estimated between 7,000 and 9,000 regular troops, as well as the paramilitary Pan-African Islamic Legion , 60 tanks and armored vehicles were transported through 1,100 kilometers of desert from the Libyan border to Chad, partly by air or with the help of tanks -Transport vehicles, partly by their own power. The border itself was in turn 1,000 to 1,100 kilometers from Libya's main bases on the Mediterranean coast. The Libyan intervention demonstrated impressive logistical ability and rewarded Gaddafi with his first military victory, as well as a substantial political achievement.

Although he was forced into exile and his troops had been pushed into the border areas with Darfur , Habré was nonetheless indomitable; on December 31st he announced in Dakar that he would continue the fight against the GUNT as a guerrilla.

Libyan withdrawal

On January 6, 1981, a joint message was read out in Tripoli, in which Gaddafi and Goukouni stated that they had decided to work towards full unity between the two countries. The plan of unification provoked strong negative reactions in the rest of Africa and was instantly condemned by France, which on January 11th immediately offered other states to reinforce the French garrisons there and put the Mediterranean fleet on alert. Libya responds by threatening an oil embargo , while France threatened to react militarily if any of Libya's neighbors were attacked. The agreement was also rejected by all of the GUNT ministers in Tripoli, with the exception of Acyl.

Most observers assume that the reasons behind Goukouni's approval were based on a mixture of threats, pressure and promises of financial aid from Gaddafi. In addition, prior to his trip to Tripoli, Goukouni had sent two of his commanders there for deliberations. On his arrival Goukouni learned from Gaddafi that they had been murdered by Libyan dissidents and that if he did not want to lose Libya's favor and power, he should agree to the unification plan.

The fierce opposition they encountered resulted in Gaddafi and Goukouni downplaying the importance of their communiqué and speaking only of a union of the people and not of the states, which was only a first step on the way to closer cooperation . But the damage had already been done and the joint communiqué had significantly weakened Goukouni's prestige as a Chadian nationalist and statesman.

Goukouni responded to the increasing international pressure against the Libyan presence in Chad by saying that the Libyans were in Chad at the request of the government and that the international mediators had to accept the decisions of the legitimate Chadian government. At a conference in May, Goukouni was a little more indulgent and said that while the Libyan withdrawal was not a priority, he accepted the OAU's decisions. At this point in time, Goukouni could not do without the support of Libya to keep Habré's FAN in check, which was supported by Sudan and Egypt and also financially via Egypt by the US secret service CIA .

In the meantime, however, the alliance between Gaddafi and Goukouni also began to become fragile. Libyan troops were stationed at several points in northern and central Chad and reached a total strength of approximately 14,000 men from January to February 1981. The Libyan troops led to increasing opposition from the other factions in the GUNT, as they also helped Acyl's faction in all local disputes with other militias, even in a clash with Goukouni's FAP in late April. In addition, there were attempts to Libyanize the local population, which made many fear that a union with Libya would mean an Arabization and implementation of Libyan culture, especially the Green Book.

Against the background of fighting between Gaddafi's Islamic legionaries and Goukouni's troops in October 1981, as well as rumors that Acyl was planning a coup to usurp the leadership of the GUNT, Goukouni demanded the complete withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chadian territory on October 29 which, starting with the capital, should be completed on December 31st. The Libyans should be replaced by an Inter-African Force (IAF) of the OAU. Gaddafi gave in, and by November 16 all Libyan troops had withdrawn into the Aouzou Strip.

The rapid withdrawal of Libya surprised many observers. Reasons are presumed to be that Gaddafi wanted to organize the annual OAU conference in Libya in 1982 and also wanted to hold the presidency of the OAU for that year. Another reason is suspected in the difficult situation of the Libyans in Chad, where without international and local support they could not risk a war with Sudan and Egypt with US help. That didn't mean that Gaddafi had changed his plans for Chad, but he now needed a new partner south of the border as Goukouni had proven unreliable to Gaddafi.

Habré conquers N'Djamena

The first IAF unit to arrive in Chad was Zairian paratroopers , followed shortly thereafter by Nigerian and Senegalese units, so that the IAF had 3,275 troops. Before the peacekeeping force was fully established, however, Habré had already used the Libyan retreat and conquered many areas in eastern Chad, including the important city of Abéché , which fell on November 19. In early January he took Oum Hadjer , only 160 kilometers from Ati , the last relevant city before the capital. The GUNT was temporarily bailed out by the IAF, the only credible military power that prevented Habré's FAN from taking Ati. In view of Habré's offensive, however, the OAU asked the GUNT to start negotiations with Habré, a request that Goukouni angrily rejected; he later said:

“The OAU has betrayed us. Our security was completely guaranteed by Libyan troops. The OAU has put pressure on us to kick the Libyans out. Now that they are gone, the OAU is leaving us in the lurch as it tries to force us into a negotiated agreement with Hissein Habré. "

In May the FAN began its final offensive and passed the peacekeeping forces in Ati and Mongo unhindered . Goukouni, increasingly angry at the IAF's refusal to fight Habré, made an attempt to reestablish ties with Libya and arrived in Tripoli on May 23, but Gaddafi declared his country's neutrality due to the ungrateful treatment of Libyans the previous year this conflict.

The GUNT tried to organize a last resistance 80 kilometers north of the capital at Massaguet on the N'Djamena – Abéché road, but was finally defeated on June 5th after a hard fight. Two days later, Habré arrived in N'Djamena without resistance, de facto transferring the government of the country to him, while Goukouni fled the country and found refuge in Cameroon .

Immediately after taking the capital, Habré secured his power by occupying the rest of the country. In just under six weeks he conquered southern Chad and destroyed the FAT, Kamougué's militia, whose hope for help from the Libyans had not been fulfilled. The rest of the country was also subjugated, with the exception of the Tibesti region .

GUNT offensive

Since Gaddafi had behaved passively in the months before the fall of the capital, Habré initially hoped to be able to reach an understanding with the Libyans by means of an agreement with Gaddafi's deputy in Chad, the leader of the CDR, Ahmat Acyl. This seemed open to dialogue. But Acyl died on July 19 and was replaced by Acheikh ibn Oumar. Additionally, the CDR was upset because Habré's ambition to unite the country drove him to overrun some CDR bases as well.

With Libyan help, Goukouni was able to collect the GUNT again and set up a national peace government in the city of Bardaï in the Tibesti region and claim the title of legitimate government of the country on the basis of the Lagos Agreement. For the upcoming fight, Goukouni was able to rely on 3,000 - 4,000 men from various militias, which were merged into the “Armée Nationale de Liberation” (ANL) under the leadership of the southern Chadian Negue Djogo .

Before the Libyans could stand up to Goukouni with full force, Habré tried to create a fait accompli and attacked the GUNT in Tibesti, but was repulsed in December 1982 and January 1983. Fighting intensified in the months that followed, while talks failed, despite mutual visits to N'Djamena and Tripoli even in March. That is why Habré brought the Libyan-Chadian dispute to the UN on March 17 and asked the Security Council to deal with the Libyan aggression and occupation of Chadian territory.

But Gaddafi was now ready to take the offensive. This began in June when a 3,000-man GUNT force stormed Faya-Largerau, the most important city of the government in the north, and then quickly took Koro Toro, Oum Chalouba and Abéché along the road to the capital. Libya helped recruit, train and equip the GUNT z. B. with heavy artillery, but provided only a few thousand soldiers for the offensive. These were mainly artillery and supply units. This was probably due to Gaddafi's efforts to make the conflict appear as a purely intra-Tjadic affair.

The international community reacted negatively to the Libyan-backed offensive, especially France and the USA. On the day of the fall of Faya-Largeau, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson warned Libya that France would not stand idly by a new Libyan interference in Chad, and on July 11 the French government again accused Libya of providing direct military support to the rebels. As a result, French arms deliveries were resumed on June 27, and on July 3 a first contingent of 250 Zairians landed to strengthen Habré; the US announced in July its support in the form of weapons and food for US $ 10 million. Gaddafi also suffered a diplomatic setback as the OAU officially recognized Habré's government at their meeting in June and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Chad.

Supported by the USA, France and Zaire, Habré was able to quickly reorganize his armed forces, which were now called FANT (French Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes). He marched north to oppose the GUNT and the Libyans, so that a battle broke out south of Abéché. Habré again demonstrated his ability to overcome Goukouni's powers and began a quick counter-offensive that enabled him to take Abéché, Biltine, Fada and, on July 30th, Faya-Largeau in quick succession. He also threatened to take Tibesti and the Aouzou Strip.

French intervention

Since he saw a complete annihilation of the GUNT as an unacceptable blow to his reputation and feared that Habré could also support Libyan opposition groups, Gaddafi significantly expanded the Libyan armed force. Moreover, without Libyan arms and air support, its Chadian allies were clearly unable to achieve a decisive victory.

Since the day of the fall of Faya-Largeau, the city has been repeatedly hit by air strikes carried out by Su-22 and Mirage F1 from Aouzou Air Force Base and Tu-22 bombers from Sabha . Within ten days, a large force was assembled east and west of Faya-Largeau, in which soldiers, weapons and artillery pieces were airlifted from Sabha to Al-Kufrah and then to Aouzou before being brought into the combat zone by short-haul aircraft. The fresh Libyan forces numbered 11,000 men, supported by 80 fighter planes; however, Libya initially continued to restrict itself to its traditional role of support, mainly through firepower and occasional armored advances, while the GUNT could only fall back on 3,000-4,000 men for the offensive.

The army formed from GUNT and Libyans captured Faya-Largeau on August 10, where Habré had holed up with 5,000 men. Under heavy fire from rocket launchers , artillery and tanks, as well as air strikes, the line of defense of the FANT broke up, with 700 fatalities. Habré escaped with the remains of his army to N'Djamena without being pursued by the Libyans.

The GUNT victory turned out to be a strategic mistake, however, as renewed Libyan interference alarmed France. On August 6, Habré sent another request for military aid to France. On the same day, under African and American pressure, France announced the return of French soldiers to Chad as part of Opération Manta , whose task it was to stop the advance by GUNT and Libya and to weaken Gaddafi's interference in Chad's internal affairs. Three days later, the first few hundred French soldiers who had been transferred from the Central African Republic landed in N'Djamena . A short time later the strength of the French troops increased to 2,700, supported by a few squadrons with fighter bombers of the type Jaguar . This meant the creation of the largest French expeditionary force ever deployed in Africa outside of the Algerian war .

The French government then defined a red line along the 15th parallel that ran from Mao to Abéché and warned that they would not tolerate any crossing of this line by GUNT or Libyan forces. Both the Libyans and the French stayed on their side of the line and it became apparent that France was unwilling to help Habré recapture the north, while Libya avoided starting a conflict with France. This led to a de facto division of the country into a Libyan-controlled north and a Chadian-French controlled south.

The resulting standstill lasted a few months. During this time, OAU mediation attempts failed, as did one by the Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam at the beginning of 1984. Mengistu's failure was finally followed on January 24 by an attack by the GUNT, supported by heavy Libyan weapons against the FANT outpost in Ziguey, an attack that was actually more likely had the purpose of persuading the African states and France to open new negotiations. France reacted to this first violation of the Red Line with a first heavy air strike, bringing fresh troops into Chad, and the unilaterally proclaimed relocation of the Red Line to the north to the 16th parallel.

French print

To end the deadlock, on April 30th, Gaddafi finally proposed a joint withdrawal of French and Libyan soldiers. The French President François Mitterrand was open to the proposal, and so the two leaders finally declared on September 17 that the withdrawal of the armed forces of both countries would begin on September 25 and be completed on November 10. The deal was first hailed by the media as proof of Mitterrand's diplomatic skill and as a significant step towards resolving the Chad crisis.

While France stuck to the time frame, the Libyans did not withdraw all troops, but eventually left 3,000 men stationed in northern Chad. When this became known, France felt embarrassed and mutual blame ensued between France and the Chadian government. On November 16, 1984, Mitterrand met with Gaddafi in Crete under the patronage of the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou . Despite Gaddafi's assurances that he had withdrawn all Libyan troops, Mitterrand had to confirm the following day that this was not true. However, he did not order the French soldiers back to Chad.

According to South African political analyst Sam Nolutshungu, the 1984 Franco-Libyan accord would have provided Gaddafi with an excellent opportunity to withdraw from the chaos in Chad while maintaining his reputation. He would have been given a position that would have enabled him to force Habré to accept a peace agreement including the interests of the Libyan representatives. Instead, Gaddafi misinterpreted the French withdrawal as a willingness to accept the presence of the Libyans in Chad and the de facto annexation of the BET region as a Libyan prefecture, a measure that brought opposition from all Chadian factions, the OAU and the UN. This misjudgment ultimately led to Gaddafi's defeat, as he now had all the rebels as opponents and in 1986 another French military intervention took place.

Another French intervention

No major fighting took place between 1984 and 1986, and Habré was able to decisively strengthen his position thanks to continued US support and Libya's failure to respect the Franco-Libyan accord. Another decisive factor was the weakening of the GUNT through internal disputes, which were mainly caused by the struggle for supremacy within the organization between Goukouni and Acheikh ibn Oumar.

During this period, Gaddafi expanded his control over northern Chad by building roads and building a large new air base in Ouadi Doum to provide better air support for ground operations beyond the Aouzou Strip. In addition, he had the armed forces in Chad increased to 7,000 men, 300 tanks and 60 combat aircraft. In the meantime, however, significant parts of the GUNT overflowed to the Habré government, as the latter pursued a policy of reconciliation.

These defectors in turn alerted Gaddafi, since the GUNT ultimately provided the legitimation for the Libyan presence in Chad. To counter this development and to regroup the GUNT, a major offensive was carried out against the Red Line, with the aim of taking N'Djamena. The attack began on February 10, 1986 with 5,000 Libyan and 5,000 GUNT soldiers and was concentrated on the FANT outposts in Kouba Olanga, Kalait and Oum Chalouba. The campaign ended in disaster for Gaddafi when, on February 13, a FANT counter-offensive, armed with new French weapons, forced attackers to retreat and reorganize.

Even more important was the French response to the offensive. Gaddafi may have assumed that, faced with the 1986 elections, Mitterrand would hesitate to take a risky and costly move to save Habré. This assumption turned out to be wrong because, on the contrary, the French president could not afford to show weakness in the face of Libyan aggression. Therefore, on February 14, the Epervier operation was started, with which 1200 soldiers and several squadrons of jaguar fighter bombers were relocated to Chad. Two days later, to show Gaddafi's determination, French planes bombed the Libyan base in Ouadi Doum. In retaliation, a Libyan Tupolev Tu-22 bombed N'Djamena airport on February 17 . The attack did little damage.

Tibesti war

The defeats the GUNT suffered in February and March accelerated its decline. When a new OAU round of talks met in the People's Republic of the Congo in March 1986 , Goukouni did not appear there. Many suspected Libya to be behind, which led to the defection of GUNT Vice President Kamougué, the First Army and the FROLINAT Originel . In August the CDR, which controlled the city of Fada, also defected. When Goukouni's FAP attempted to retake Fada in October, his troops were attacked by the Libyan garrison they were actually allied with, resulting in a confused battle that effectively ended the GUNT's existence. In the same month Goukouni was arrested by the Libyans because his troops revolted against Gaddafi, who had thrown Libyans out of all positions and defected to Habré on October 24th.

To restore their supply lines and retake the Bardaï , Zouar and Wour oases , the Libyans dispatched 2,000 soldiers with T-62 tanks and strong air support. The attack was successful and also robbed the GUNT of their last positions of power through the use of napalm and allegedly chemical weapons . This attack ultimately turned out to be a failure, as Habré sent 2,000 men from his FANT as support, who united with the remaining fighters of the GUNT. Mitterrand had fuel, food, ammunition, bazookas and military advisors flown in for support and parachuted down. During this action, the French also declared that from now on they no longer felt bound by the Red Line and would intervene wherever they found it necessary.

While Habré was only partially successful militarily in trying to throw the Libyans out of the Tibesti region, the campaign was still a strategic breakthrough for the FANT, as the civil war had turned into a national war against a foreign invader and in Chad a feeling of the national unity emerged that had never existed before.

Toyota war

In the last year of the war, in early 1987, the Libyan expeditionary force still consisted of 8,000 soldiers and 300 tanks, but had lost the support of the Chadian allies who had provided the reconnaissance and the assault infantry. Without this support, the Libyan garrisons were isolated and vulnerable islands in the Chadian desert. On the other side, the FANT had been significantly strengthened and now had 10,000 highly motivated fighters, equipped with fast-moving, sand-adapted Toyota pickups and MILAN anti- tank guided weapons, which gave the last phase of the Chadian-Libyan conflict the nickname Toyota War . The 400 Toyota Hilux vehicles had been delivered from France along with the Milan rocket launchers .

Habré began recapturing the northern part of the country on January 2, 1987 with a successful attack on the Libyan communications base in Fada. The Chadian commander Hassan Djamous carried out a quick pincer operation against the Libyan army, encompassing the Libyan positions and defeating them with attacks from all sides. These operations also led to success in March at the Battle of B'ir Kora and Ouadi Doum , where heavy casualties were inflicted on the Libyans and Gaddafi was forced to evacuate northern Chad.

This success also jeopardized Libyan control over the Aouzou Strip. Aouzou was killed in a FANT attack in August. However, it was recaptured in a large-scale Libyan counter-offensive, also because the French refused to provide air support to the Chadians. Habré responded to this setback with the first foray into Libyan territory when, on September 5, he carried out a highly successful raid on Maaten al-Sarra and the local Libyan air base, which held a key position for Libyan supplies. This attack was intended to minimize the risk of Libyan air strikes before a new attack on Aouzou should take place.

The planned attack on Aouzou could never be carried out, however, because the resounding success at Maaten al-Sarra made the French fear that this could only be the first operation of a general advance into Libya, which the French did not want to tolerate. Under internal and external pressure, Gaddafi was ready to negotiate, and with the mediation of the OAU, a ceasefire was agreed on September 11th.

consequences

There were only a few minor truce violations. Both governments immediately began to use diplomatic maneuvers to attract the world's public to their side, and it was widely believed that the conflict would continue; however, both sides were constantly trying to keep the door open for a peaceful settlement. The peaceful solution was also supported by France and most of the African states, but the US administration under Reagan saw the continuation of the conflict as the best way to overthrow Gaddafi.

Peace and reconciliation

Nevertheless, relations between the two countries continued to improve, especially Gaddafi wanted to normalize relations with the neighboring state, even to the point of admitting that the war had been a mistake. In May 1988, Gaddafi announced that he recognized Habré as President of Chad, which he presented as a gift to Africa . This led to the resumption of full diplomatic relations between the two countries on October 3rd. The following year, on August 31, 1989, Libyans and Chadians met in Algiers to negotiate a framework agreement for a peaceful solution to the territorial dispute. Here Gaddafi finally agreed to negotiate with Habré about the Aouzou strip and to bring the matter to the International Court of Justice if bilateral talks fail. This finally happened on both sides after another year of unsuccessful talks in September 1990.

The Chadian-Libyan relationship continued to improve when, on December 2, 1990, Idriss Déby overthrew the previous president, Habré. Gaddafi was the first head of state to recognize the new regime, and he also signed several friendship and cooperation agreements. Nevertheless, Déby followed the line of his predecessor with regard to the Aouzou strip and said that if necessary he would also fight to avoid leaving the Aouzou strip to the Libyans.

The Aouzou dispute was finally resolved on February 3, 1994, when the International Court of Justice ruled with a 16 to one vote that the Aouzou strip belongs to Chad. The court's decision was implemented without hesitation, and both sides signed an agreement on April 4th to implement the court's ruling. Monitored by international observers, the Libyans withdrew between April 15 and May 10. The Aouzou strip was formally handed over on May 30, when both sides signed a joint declaration proclaiming the Libyan withdrawal complete.

Libyan retaliation against allies of Chad

The French support for Chad through air strikes on Libyan positions in 1986 led Gaddafi to identify France as the “aggressor” as well as the USA and to grudge both of them for years. Gaddafi is considered to be the mastermind behind the attack on the La Belle discotheque in Berlin in 1986, which left three dead, as well as the Lockerbie attack in 1988 and the attack on UTA flight 772 in 1989, in which 170 and 270 people were killed, respectively.

swell

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b K. Pollack, Arabs at War , p. 375.
  2. ↑ a b c K. Pollack, p. 376.
  3. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy , p 230th
  4. ↑ M. Azevedo, Roots of Violence , p. 151.
  5. ^ A. Clayton, Frontiersmen , p. 98.
  6. ↑ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis , p. 84.
  7. ^ R. Brian Ferguson, The State, Identity and Violence , p. 267.
  8. ↑ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 85.
  9. ^ G. Simons, Libya and the West , p. 56.
  10. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p. 327.
  11. ^ J. Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara , p. 130.
  12. ↑ M. Azevedo, p. 145.
  13. ↑ International Court of Justice: - ( Memento of July 27, 2001 in the Internet Archive ) Public session of June 14, 1993 in the case of the territorial dispute between the Libyan People's Republic and Chad
  14. ↑ R. Buijtenhuijs, “Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir”, p. 19.
  15. ↑ R. Buijtenhuijs, p. 16f.
  16. ↑ International Court of Justice: - ( Memento of July 27, 2001 in the Internet Archive ) Public session of July 2, 1993 in the case of the territorial dispute between the Libyan People's Republic and Chad
  17. ^ A. Clayton, p. 99.
  18. ↑ J. Wright, pp. 130f.
  19. ^ S. Macedo, Universal Jurisdiction , pp. 132f.
  20. ↑ R. Buijtenhuijs, Guerre de guérilla et révolution en Afrique noire , S. 27th
  21. ^ A. Gérard, Nimeiry face aux crises tchadiennes , p. 119.
  22. ↑ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 86.
  23. ↑ R. Buijtenhuijs, Guerre de guérilla et révolution en Afrique noire , S. 26th
  24. ↑ R. Buijtenhuijs, “Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir”, p. 18.
  25. ↑ Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle , p. 32.
  26. ↑ R. Buijtenhuijs, "Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir", p. 21
  27. ↑ a b c M. Azevedo, p. 146.
  28. ↑ J. de Léspinôis, "L'emploi de la force aérienne au Tchad", p 70f.
  29. ^ H. Simpson, The Paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion , p. 55.
  30. ↑ M. Brandily, “Le Tchad face nord”, p. 59.
  31. ^ N. Mouric, “La politique tchadienne de la France”, p. 99.
  32. ↑ M. Brandily, pp. 58-61.
  33. ↑ M. Azevedo, pp. 104/105, 119, 135
  34. ↑ Ibid., P. 106.
  35. ↑ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 88.
  36. ↑ N. Mouric, p. 100.
  37. ↑ K. Pollack, p. 377.
  38. ^ T. Mays, Africa's First Peacekeeping operation , p. 43.
  39. ↑ T. Mays, p. 39.
  40. ↑ T. Mays, pp. 45/46
  41. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, S. 133rd
  42. ↑ M. Azevedo, p. 147.
  43. ^ J. Wright, p. 131.
  44. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p. 135.
  45. ↑ a b M. Azevedo, p. 108.
  46. ↑ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 89.
  47. ^ H. Metz, Libya , p. 261.
  48. ↑ a b J. Wright, p. 132.
  49. ↑ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, pp. 89/90
  50. ↑ M. Azevedo, pp. 147/148
  51. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, S. 156th
  52. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p. 153.
  53. ↑ M. Azevedo, p. 148.
  54. ↑ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 90.
  55. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 154f.
  56. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p. 164.
  57. ↑ T. Mays, pp. 134f.
  58. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p. 165.
  59. ↑ T. Mays, p. 139.
  60. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p. 168.
  61. ↑ a b K. Pollack, p. 382.
  62. ↑ T. Mays, p. 99.
  63. ↑ S.Nolutshungu, p. 186.
  64. ^ Ibid. P. 185.
  65. ↑ a b c d S. Nolutshungu, p. 188.
  66. ↑ M. Azevedo, pp. 110, 139.
  67. ↑ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 91.
  68. ↑ M. Azevedo, p. 159.
  69. ↑ K. Pollack, pp. 382f.
  70. ↑ K. Pollack, p. 383.
  71. ^ J. Jessup, An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict , p. 116.
  72. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p. 189.
  73. ↑ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 91f.
  74. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, S. 191st
  75. ↑ M. Azevedo, p. 110.
  76. ↑ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 92.
  77. ↑ M. Azevedo, pp. 139f.
  78. ↑ M. Azevedo, p. 140.
  79. ↑ GL Simons, p. 293.
  80. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 202f.
  81. ↑ Ibid., Pp. 191f, 210.
  82. ↑ a b S. Nolutshungu, p. 212.
  83. ↑ K. Pollack, p. 389.
  84. ↑ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 93.
  85. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p. 212f.
  86. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 213f.
  87. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p 214/216
  88. ↑ K. Pollack, p. 390.
  89. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 215f, 245.
  90. ↑ M. Azevedo, pp. 149f.
  91. ↑ K. Pollack, pp. 391, 398.
  92. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, S. 218f.
  93. ↑ The Terrorists ' Most Underrated Weapon , Die Welt Online, August 26, 2014.
  94. ↑ K. Pollack, pp. 391/394
  95. ↑ K. Pollack, pp. 395/396
  96. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p 222/223
  97. ↑ K. Pollack, p. 397.
  98. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p 223/224
  99. ↑ G. Simons, pp. 58, 60.
  100. ↑ S. Nolutshungu, p. 227.
  101. ↑ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 95.
  102. ↑ M. Azevedo, p. 150.
  103. ↑ IGH: Case Concerning The Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya / Chad) - Judgment ( Memento of March 4, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 3.8 MB)
  104. ↑ G. Simons, p. 78.
  105. ↑ UN: Agreement signed on April 4, 1994 between the Governments of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya concerning the practical modalities for the implementation of the Judgment delivered by the International Court of Justice on February 3, 1994 (PDF; 56 kB)