Umkhonto we Sizwe

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Spear of a Zulu warrior - symbol of MK

Umkhonto we Sizwe (abbreviation MK ; IsiZulu and isiXhosa for "The Spear of the Nation") was the military arm of the African National Congress (ANC), which campaigned against apartheid in South Africa . The symbol of the spear was chosen because black Africans used this simple weapon to wage wars for centuries. The MK was founded in 1961 and laid down its arms in 1990.

founding

Umkhonto we Sizwe came into being in 1961, after several decades of unsuccessful actions by the unarmed resistance of the ANC and its allies. In the 1940s and 50s there were mass rallies and strikes against the racial laws of the apartheid government, in the early 1960s there were public burning of identity documents (“pass-burning”), which restricted the freedom of movement of non-white South Africans (see also: Passport laws ).

The Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the associated ban on the ANC and other major black resistance movements was followed by a lively debate within the ANC regarding the future of nonviolent resistance. Since opinions remained divided, the newly founded MK was initially not put in touch with the ANC.

First actions

The MK first carried out attacks in Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth on December 16, 1961, the Day of the Vow, a holiday at the time that commemorated the Battle of the Blood River .

The first phase of the armed struggle was primarily aimed at the "selective sabotage " of military, industrial and civilian targets. According to Nelson Mandela , this form of struggle was chosen because the loss of life creates "bitterness" and could stand in the way of a future democracy for all population groups. For more than a year, pass offices, power poles and police stations were attacked using simple means such as homemade explosives. The state was initially taken by surprise, but took measures at various levels to counter the threat. Anti-terror laws ( Sabotage Act and Unlawful Organizations Act ) were passed, the secret services expanded and their members sent to the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and the USA for training. MK had foreseen this development and for his part entrusted Oliver Tambo with establishing a representation abroad in order to advertise international support on the one hand and to ensure military training opportunities outside of South Africa on the other.

Rivonia

Less than 18 months after it was founded, almost the entire leadership of the MK was arrested on a farm outside Johannesburg and sentenced to long prison terms in an elaborate court case (“ Rivonia trial ”). In the aftermath of the trial, the ANC focused on expanding its external infrastructure and securing the military training of the young guerrilla army. Initially, the training took place in Algeria (where Mandela was also trained), Tanzania and the Soviet Union . In the following years it was expanded to almost all socialist and a number of African countries.

In 1964 the MK had trained several hundred soldiers in exile, but their smuggling in caused problems due to the lack of allied states bordering on South Africa. Rhodesia , Bechuanaland , Basutoland , Swaziland and Mozambique were either controlled by white settler regimes themselves or were economically highly dependent on South Africa. The early breaking up and internment of the MK leadership cadre made this project even more difficult.

In 1965 the ANC entered into an alliance with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in Rhodesia and its military wing ZIPRA . Both organizations had close contact with the Soviet Union, from which they received military support. This connection was strengthened by ethnic similarities and the fact that both groups recruited their followers primarily from urban regions.

Wankie and Sipolilo

In the following two years MK and ZIPRA undertook extensive reconnaissance missions in Rhodesia in preparation for a large-scale infiltration. On July 30, 1967, a joint unit of MK and ZIPRA crossed the Zambezi River . The MK contingent (known as the " Luthuli Detachment") was to pass through Rhodesia on the western flank and reach South Africa in the northern Transvaal . However, the common unit was tracked down by the Rhodesian security forces at an early stage and involved in a series of fighting in the Wankie and Sipolilo regions. The determination with which the rebel army fought despite heavy losses forced Rhodesia's President Ian Smith to request support from South Africa. President Vorster sent units of the South African Police and authorized unofficial operations by the South African military in Rhodesia.

Military actions by the MK in South Africa were kept to a minimum until the early 1970s. The focus was placed on the rebuilding of the command structure and the further training of their cadres abroad. At Soviet military academies , they could now also receive more specialized training in communication and engineering. This approach led to a mixture of Soviet-influenced military tactics and training with the characteristics of a classic guerrilla army with flat hierarchies and self-sufficient units.

Student soldiers

In the mid-1970s, circumstances turned in favor of the MK: The uprising in Soweto in 1976 resulted in many thousands of schoolchildren and students leaving South Africa to join the MK. This unit ("June 16th Detachment") should usher in a new phase in armed struggle. The training took place in the newly independent countries Angola and Mozambique and included both political and military training. Hundreds of recruits were also sent abroad for specialized training. Hundreds of fighters could already be smuggled back to South Africa in 1977.

Despite the now strengthened infrastructure in the country, MK actions were limited to "armed propaganda" in which the various mass rallies of the ANC were to be supported by targeted attacks on symbols of apartheid (e.g. police stations, train stations or government buildings). In the years 1977–1980 police stations were attacked in Booysens, Soweto and Sooekemaar, at Derdepoort and Rustenburg MK fighters were involved in open skirmishes with the police. The arrests of MK members increased. The South African Air Force (SAAF) began at this time in addition to attacks on SWAPO -Rebellen in Namibia , regularly attacking bases of MK in southern Angola, so that they are moved to the north of the country had to (see also: South African Border War ).

SASOL: special forces

With the beginning of the 1980s, the increasing development towards complex acts of sabotage by the MK became clear. In June 1980 a unit of MK special forces ("Solomon Mahlangu Detachment") attacked an oil refinery belonging to the state-owned Sasol group. This resulted in property damage of around 66 million rand. In 1981, in line with the ANC's political actions, strategic targets such as an ESCOM power plant in the Transvaal, military and police facilities and government buildings were attacked. On August 9, 1981, there was a dramatic attack on the Voortrekkerhoogte military base near Pretoria . MK special forces fired five 122-mm rockets from positions within the area and hit several targets. A fuel depot was only just missed.

In 1982 several explosive devices exploded within twelve hours within the safety zone of the Koeberg nuclear power plant near Cape Town . In May 1983 the SAAF and military intelligence headquarters in Pretoria was badly damaged by a car bomb . 21 military personnel and civilians were killed and 217 injured. This attack signaled a departure from symbolic military actions. In line with this tactical change, the ANC stated that the integrity of civilians caught in the crossfire cannot be guaranteed. However, as in the past, it was stressed that white civilians were not targeted.

Against the background of the complex political and military situation in southern Africa, the strategy of the MK was reviewed at the Kabwe conference in Zambia in 1985. Three problem areas were identified:

  • Because the focus of the military operation was on urban regions, rural areas were neglected. There the state had consolidated its control by influencing tribal leaders and establishing homelands .
  • MK actions were limited too much to "armed propaganda". The transition to a people's army was called for.
  • The definition of a “legitimate military target” had to be reformulated. In addition, the direct confrontation of SADF / SAP and the carrying of the conflict into white areas were demanded. For example, white farmers who supported the South African armed forces should be targeted. The white civilian population should continue to be spared.

State of emergency (1985–1989)

The declaration of the state of emergency in 1985 was followed by the arrest of tens of thousands of activists in the years up to 1987. Despite this, an increase in MK activities was recorded in both urban and rural regions. In 1987, four police officers were killed when a car bomb was detonated outside the Johannesburg District Court . Further attacks were made on military targets in predominantly “white” areas. In 1989, MK's most dramatic operation occurred in a rural area. A larger unit of special forces with grenade launchers launched a coordinated attack on a secret SAAF radar system in Klippan in the western Transvaal. The planning and coordination of this attack showed the ability of the MK intelligence service MKIZA.

Foreign assignment

Despite the difficulties of organizing the armed struggle within South Africa, MK has been involved in combat operations in other countries throughout its history. In addition to the experience in Rhodesia in 1967/68, MK fought alongside FRELIMO in Mozambique in the early 1970s and alongside ZIRPA troops until Zimbabwe gained independence. 1987–89 MK troops support the Angolan MPLA in the fight against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels.

resolution

On August 1, 1990, the MK laid down its arms after 29 years and was integrated into the newly founded South African National Defense Force (SANDF) in 1994 . At the end of 1998, SANDF consisted of 16 percent former MK soldiers.

Prominent members of the MK

  • Tatamkhulu Africa , South African writer and poet
  • Denis Goldberg , former ANC representative at the United Nations
  • Chris Hani , Deputy Commander in Chief of the MK in 1982, Chief of Staff of the MK from 1987 to 1992, and later Secretary General of the SACP
  • Ronnie Kasrils , founding member of the MK, after 1976 regional MK representative in Angola, from 2004 to 2008 Minister of Intelligence and Intelligence
  • Moses Mabhida , commander of the MK
  • Nelson Mandela , first commander in chief of the MK from 1961 to 1962, former ANC President, first freely elected President of South Africa
  • Zola Maseko , South African filmmaker
  • Govan Mbeki , founding member of the MK and father of the later President Thabo Mbeki
  • Raymond Mhlaba , Chief Commanding Officer of the MK from 1962 to 1963
  • Wilton Mkwayi , MK 1963-1964 Commander in Chief
  • Johannes Modise , 1965 Commander in Chief of the MK, Minister of Defense in the Mandela Cabinet (1994–1999)
  • Siphiwe Nyanda , Chief of Staff of the MK since 1992
  • Tokyo Sexwale , officer of the MK, later governor of Gauteng Province and prominent businessman
  • Walter Sisulu , former ANC vice president
  • Joe Slovo , MK's Chief of Staff from the 1960s to 1987, Minister for Housing in the Mandela Cabinet in 1994
  • Jacob Zuma , MK member since 1962, head of the ANC intelligence service in the 1980s, later Vice President and President of South Africa

Individual proof

  1. ↑ Foreign Policy Study Foundation (Ed.): South Africa: Time Running Out . The Report of the Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa. University of California Press , 1981, ISBN 0-520-04547-5 , pp. 175 ( limited preview in Google Book search).

literature

  • Nelson Mandela: The Long Road to Freedom. Autobiography . S. Fischer 1994, ISBN 3-10-047404-X .
  • Tsepe Motumi: Umkhonto we Sizwe - Structure, Training and Force Levels (1984 to 1994) . In: African Defense Review . Issue No 18, 1994 ( online )
  • Rocky Williams: The other armies: A brief historical overview of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), 1961-1994 . In: Military History Journal. Vol. 11, No. June 5, 2000. The South African Military History Society. ( online )

Web links