Akrasia

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Under Akrasia ( ancient Greek ἀκρασία akrasia , Latin incontinence , weakness, lack of self control, acting against his better judgment) refers to the case in which a person performs an action, despite being an alternative holding action for better. The analysis of corresponding actions is one of the central problems of the philosophical discipline of action theory , since acratic actions seem to contradict seemingly plausible assumptions about actions of persons. It is examined whether or to what extent corresponding action phenomena are compatible with the following principle: People carry out those actions that they consider good if they are able to do so.

introduction

Word origin

The word akrasia comes from ancient Greek philosophy and was coined as a philosophical term by Aristotle . In Protagoras , where Plato primarily addressed Akrasia, he mainly used corresponding verbal forms; later he used the synonymous nouns akratia and akrateia in some cases . The antonym enkrateia "self-control" can also be found in Plato. Etymologically , akrasia is derived from the noun kratos "strength" or the verb kratein "rule", where the prefix α negates the following part ( alpha privativum ).

In today's philosophy, the terms akrasia and weak will are largely used synonymously. Akrasia is sometimes preferred to weak will for two reasons:

  • in order to avoid the impression that the will as an authority has to play a major role in the explanation of the corresponding actions and / or
  • in order to avoid the problem-obscuring conception that the will is too weak to realize the intention .

The philosophical problem

Akrasia is a specific case of an irrational act. Akrasia occurs when a person performs an action A when he or she thinks the possible alternative action B is better. Akrasia is mostly restricted to actions, but there are also considerations as to whether or to what extent acratic intentions, wishes and opinions are possible. For a long time, acratic acts were restricted to moral acts, but today this mostly no longer happens.

In order for an acratic act to be present, the person acting may not undertake a short-term reassessment, but must share the judgment against which he is acting until the act is completed. For example, eating a cream cake is an acratic act only if the person has the notion 'it is better not to eat the cream cake' both before and during it. On the other hand, if she considers the judgment 'It is better to eat the cream cake' to be correct immediately before consumption, after having previously been of the opposite opinion, there is no case of akrasia.

The explanation of such actions is a problem of action theory. Because the occurrence of acratic actions contradicts the following principle:

Individuals, provided they are able to do so, do whatever they think is best.

This principle follows from the prima facie plausible consideration: If reasons are causes for actions, then the better reason should be the stronger cause for an action. On the one hand, this principle seems to underlie human action; on the other hand, it contradicts introspection, because sometimes we seem to be doing an action deliberately, even though we believe that an alternative would be better and at the same time believe of ourselves that we could have done the better action. On the other hand, cases in which we could not have acted differently, but had to carry out what we thought was worse, are not actual cases of akrasia, but of bondage , dependence or addiction .

Since acratic acts seem to contradict this principle, philosophers have repeatedly denied that akrasia is possible. This does not mean that the corresponding action phenomena cannot occur. These are undisputed and, as a practical problem, are not the subject of action theory. Rather, the theoretical problem of analyzing corresponding action phenomena is controversial.

Whether akrasia is possible or not depends not least on the conditions under which the corresponding action phenomena are understood as akrasia. The decisive elements are:

In the decisive strongest form, all three elements are included in the definition of akrasia.

The question of whether there are acratic acts or not cannot be answered completely with empirical means, such as psychological experiments , because from the outside one cannot judge whether a person, when performing a certain act, was of the opinion beforehand, that an alternative possible action would have been better. Because of this, this question can only be solved through personal experience , thought experiments and conceptual analysis. Nonetheless there is an interest in the problem of akrasia outside of philosophy. Sociologists like Jon Elster , for example, deal with irrationality and the problem of akrasia within the framework of the theory of rational decision-making . The economy , for example in the context of decision theory , deals with the problem. Similar phenomena are discussed in psychology under the heading of cognitive dissonance .

Historical

The philosophical problem of akrasia goes back to ancient Greek philosophy. Here, above all, the aspect of knowledge is problematized. In Christian antiquity the concept of will emerged. There and in the Middle Ages, freedom and sin play a bigger role in the discussion. Akrasia hardly discusses modern times because of the dominance of the conceptions of action that work with acts of will. Since the middle of the 20th century, after a criticism of the traditional concept of will, representatives of the analytical philosophy have addressed akrasia, whereby akrasia is now understood as action against a better judgment .

Greek antiquity

The ancient Greek discussion about akrasia always takes place against the background that the acratic acts against his own eudaimonia , against his own happiness .

poetry

The question of the rationality of actions is present in Greek literature even before Socrates . This already applies to early Greek poetry, but is particularly clear in Euripides - u. a. in its Medea . Acting against better judgment is mentioned in the following verses of Euripides' 428 BC. Chr. Performed tragedy the wreathed Hippolytos thematized. Here Phaidra confesses that she cannot master her passions .

"Phaidra: " I have often thought long nights
about what spoils our human existence,
and I realized: ignorance
is not the root of all evil -
most of them do not lack insight, the reason is quite different:
we see and know what is right we
and we don't do it, either out of nonchalance,
or because the pleasure of the moment
suppresses the work , and there are many temptations (...) " "

- Euripides : Hippolytos 375–383a (quoted from: Euripides, Hippolytos , translated by Ernst Buschor , Stuttgart: Reclam 1961, pp. 20–21)

It is true that a philosophical position is not argued here. However, this passage probably reflects a generally known and also - as also becomes clear in the following in Plato's Protagoras - recognized view.

Socrates and Plato

Socrates

Since Socrates himself did not write any writings, his position has only been handed down indirectly. The most important source is Plato , it is also reported by Aristotle, another source are Xenophon's memories of Socrates . Therefore, in the following, Socrates' and Plato's position (in Protagoras ) are presented together using the dialogue figure Socrates in Protagoras .

“ At least I believe this, that no wise man is of the opinion that any person is absent from free choice or accomplishes something evil (aischra) or bad (kaka) from free choice (hekōn) , but they know well that everyone, which evil and bad do it involuntarily (Akon) do . "

Socrates wants to show that people are wrong when they say "that many who know what is better do not want to do it although they could, but do something else". He argues against this position by assuming - together with these presented opponents who consider akrasia possible and given - that pleasure is a good and greater pleasure the greater good. It shows that it is implausible to assume that a person carries out a certain act A that he knows creates less pleasure or more displeasure than act B. However, it is absurd to assume that the people in these cases "Have been overcome by lust" .

" [T] this becomes a ridiculous speech when you say that often people, although recognizing the bad (to kakon) that it is bad (kakon) , still does it, regardless of him, is free not to do it because he is driven and stupefied by lust; and then you say again that man, knowing what is good, nevertheless does not usually do it, because of the momentary pleasure and overcome by it. "

These cases, according to Socrates in Protagoras , can rather be explained by the fact that the respective persons do not have the correct knowledge about the pleasure value of the two respective actions; presumably they would have miscalculated the exact value - possibly because A was closer in time and B was further away. So Socrates argues in Protagoras that only one of the two is possible: If a person has carried out an adverse act, then he did not have the corresponding knowledge; if it has the appropriate knowledge, then it will not do the detrimental act. Socrates generalizes this knowledge gained in the area of ​​pleasure:

" [W] er in the choice of pleasure and displeasure, that is, the good and the bad (kaka) lacking (exhamartanein) , the lacking for lack of knowledge (epistēmē) ".

Since knowledge for Socrates, and the early Plato, is identical with virtue ( arete ) , it is a necessary and sufficient condition for attaining happiness. According to this position, an acratic acts against his best interests.

Aristotle

Aristotle deals with Akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics VII 1–11. This is where the most historically powerful and perhaps systematically most important discussion of akrasia can be found up into the 20th century. Aristotle describes Akrasia as a disposition of character alongside others that is to be avoided. It ties in with the thesis formulated by Socrates that such action and knowledge cannot occur at the same time.

“ Because, as Socrates thought, it would be strange if, although knowledge (epistēmē) is present, something else dominated and dragged around like a slave. Socrates completely rejected the conception in question, convinced that there was no such thing as unrest. Nobody, he used to say, acts against the best in the belief that they are doing so, but rather because of ignorance (di 'agnoian) . "

According to Aristotle, akrasia occurs mainly in actions associated with physical pleasure (eating, drinking and sexuality); another type occurs with anger . Aristotle distinguishes between two types of akrasia: hastiness (propeteia) and weakness (astheneia) . Accordingly, there are four types of akrasia for Aristotle:

  1. Weakness associated with lust
  2. Hastiness associated with lust
  3. Weakness associated with anger
  4. Hastiness associated with anger

Two types of explanation and the practical syllogism

Aristotle argues against the thesis of Socratic intellectualism that acting against better knowledge is not possible. Because this contradicts the phenomena or the common ideas about action. He tries to show what an acratic's knowledge must be like, that is, to clarify the question, "whether the uncontrolled acts knowingly or not and in what sense of 'knowing' one can be knowingly uncontrolled."

To this end, he uses two different types of explanation in NE VII 5: a dialectical (logikôs) , i.e. conceptual, and a natural-philosophical or scientific (physikôs) . To explain Akrasia, he falls back on the model of the practical syllogism . According to this model, an action takes place exactly when a certain concrete characteristic (here: 'sweet') falls under a major sentence, i.e. a general judgment. According to Aristotle, the conclusion corresponds to an action.

The practical syllogism
Obersatz: Sweet things are to be strived for.
Base: This is cute.
Conclusion: This is to be aimed for.

(Note: A practical syllogism for Aristotle does not always exist in this simple form with two premises , which for the sake of simplicity is taken as a basis in the following.)

The dialectical explanation

In the dialectical explanation, Aristotle distinguishes different types of knowledge. With this he tries to explain how an acratic possesses the knowledge that would have to result in a corresponding conclusion, i.e. action, but does not do so.

The acratic only has knowledge, but does not use it, just as a mathematician has the ability to calculate, even when he is not doing the activity. Aristotle lists ways in which an acratic can have knowledge without using it.

“Because if we have knowledge and still do not apply it, we see that having it becomes something completely different, so that in such cases one has knowledge in a certain way and also does not have it, for example with people who are asleep, insane or drunk. [...] Because knowledge has to grow together with people; but that takes time. So you have to assume that the uncontrolled speak like the actors do. "

The previous distinctions between knowledge in the acratic seem to relate to major propositions, general judgments. In another way, the subset is deficient. A general phrase (for example: 'Everything sweet is harmful to health') is known to the acratic; however, he does not attribute the corresponding property ('sweet') to the concrete object at hand.

The natural-philosophical explanation

In the natural-philosophical explanation, Aristotle offers an explanation for the reason that the acratic conclusion, i.e. the action, comes about although the acratic with the corresponding major proposition has the better knowledge. Aristotle adopts two competing practical syllogisms: a syllogism of reason and a syllogism of desire . Desire (epithymia) prevents or suppresses the corresponding subset of the syllogism of reason.

Syllogism of reason Syllogism of desire
Upper sentence: What is harmful to health is to be avoided. Obersatz: Sweet things are to be strived for.
Minor: This is harmful to health. Base: This is cute.
Conclusion: [/] Conclusion: This is to be aimed for.
"Since the second premise [d. H. the subordinate principle of reason] contains an opinion about an object of perception and this determines the action, the uncontrolled, since he is in affect, either does not have this at all, or he has it in such a way that possessing is not knowledge, but speaking, like that of a drunk who recites verses of Empedocles. "

The knowledge of the acratic also differs according to the type of akrasia. In the case of hastiness or impulsiveness , the acratic jumps directly to the conclusion of desire . In the case of weakness, on the other hand, the acratic knows in some form (not precisely determined) of the conclusion of reason without following it. In this way, the acratic acts against a better knowledge (' which is harmful to health is to be avoided'), which he himself - in some form - possesses. Aristotle does not comment on the exact relationship between the dialectical and the natural-philosophical explanation.

So Aristotle explains Akrasia by saying that the acratic has no real knowledge; to that extent his position is not far from that of Socrates. But it differs from the Socratic one in that the affects - mostly the desire - are the cause of akrasia. These compete with reason, weaken or circumvent it.

Later non-Christian antiquity

The views of the following ancient philosophy on Akrasia have only been preserved to a limited extent and have been passed down mainly through reports from third parties and thus less precisely. According to reports by Plutarch and Galen , for example, most of the Stoics are said to have largely based on Socrates' arguments that akrasia is not possible. In contrast to Socrates, Chrysippus and other representatives of the older Stoa do not explain corresponding phenomena of action through ignorance, but through a change of decision, a short-term reassessment of the situation by the actor.

Christian antiquity and the Middle Ages

The term will in today's sense does not play a role in the ancient Greek discussion of akrasia. The Greeks do not have a concept of will in the sense of a power of decision independent of other psychic faculties (liberum arbitrium) .

In this sense, the term 'will' probably only entered the discussion through the Judeo-Christian tradition and has played a major role for a long time. In terms of cultural history , the will of God seems originally relevant to the problem. In order to do the right thing, the doer has to do the will of God. According to this understanding, akrasia is primarily a violation of God's requirements, i.e. sin .

Paul

Paul makes an important contribution to the later Christian tradition in Romans :

“[I] I don't do what I want (thelein) ; but what I hate, I do. But if I do what I don't want, I admit that the law is good. So it is not I who do it, but the sin that dwells in me ” ( Rom 7 : 15-16  EU ).

Here Paul explains the relationship between man and divine law. He describes the actor as divided because he does not understand himself; the hated act carries out the sin (in the worst case due to obsession ), not he himself, since he does not want to do it. In this “thesis of a split perpetrator ”, the view is implicitly expressed that acting against better knowledge in the true sense is not possible.

Augustine

Augustine's primary focus is on the theological problem of free will and original sin . With him there is first the concept of a will concept, which is a decision-making body independent of thinking and can stand in opposition to it. Assuming such an autonomous will, acting against a better judgment is largely unproblematic. He is preoccupied with a related problem that is expressed in the Pauline passage above: How can the spirit give itself commands that it does not obey? On the basis of sexual desire, Augustine describes his conception that the spirit of man shows an inner turmoil in two wills, an old, carnal (voluntas carnalis) and a new, spiritual one (voluntas spiritualis) .

"So in me two wills, an old and a new one, one fleshly (voluntas carnalis) , the other spiritually (voluntas spiritualis) , quarreled with one another, and their quarrel tore my soul apart."

When these two wills conflict, the mind wills both action A and the opposite action not-A. If the I, which is free in its decision, decides for an action, the corresponding will becomes the action-relevant complete (voluntas tota) .

“But it is not a whole will, therefore not a whole order. Because the spirit commands only insofar as it wills, and insofar as it does not want it, what it commands does not happen either. Because the will commands that the will be, none other than itself. But it does not command fully and therefore what it commands does not happen either. [...] So there are two wills, because one of them is not whole, and what is lacking in one, the other has. "

However, since the other will remains present, the action happens 'against will' (invitus) , willed and yet not willed. The cause of the conflict of wills is sin, ultimately original sin. Being trapped in sin leads to man not clearly recognizing what is truly good; if he could see the truly good clearly, he would not act against it. According to this, it is only through God's grace that man can do what he actually wants.

Insofar as Augustine advocates a concept of will that enables akrasia, it can be said that he clearly considers akrasia to be possible. However, this needs to be slightly restricted in a certain respect. For insofar as Augustine takes the view, 'If man would recognize what is truly good, he would not act against it', he shares a skeptical concern about a very strong concept of akrasia. Thus, according to Augustine, a condition for acratic actions is self-inflicted human ignorance.

middle Ages

The problem of actions against better judgment formulated in ancient Greece has been little discussed for a long time. The attempts to analyze the Augustinian idea of ​​“doing something against one's will” (invitus facere) come closest to the problem, following Augustine's concept of sin and will . This discussion extends from Anselm of Canterbury through Petrus Abelardus and Petrus Lombardus to the 13th century. With the Aristotle Renaissance in the 13th century and above all Robert Grosseteste's Latin translation of the Nicomachean Ethics , the problems formulated in antiquity and in particular the Aristotelian interpretation of akrasia are received, discussed and commented on. Akrasia is explicitly thematized as a philosophical problem under the Latin term incontinentia .

At Albertus Magnus there is one of the first links of Augustine's concept of sin and the Aristotelian view that an action would be difficult against their better judgment. Albertus' solution to the problem consists in the fact that the person in question acts out of an ignorance of the choice (ignorantia electionis) , but he himself deliberately prevents - in the practical syllogism - the desire from suppressing the execution of the syllogism of reason. Albertus also considers the possibility that acratic actions may not pose a problem insofar as there is no actual certainty in the area of ​​practical, action-relevant inferences and thus no actions against better judgment may occur.

Thomas Aquinas discusses Akrasia - in addition to the statements in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics  - in the Summa theologica . He takes the position that akrasia is possible with restrictions. Desire shackles the acratic's reason ( passio igitur ligat rationem ), so that the subordinate principle of the practical syllogism of reason (e.g., 'This is harmful to health') is suppressed and its conclusion does not come about. As a result, the acratic does not carry out the action considered better. The syllogism of desire determines the action. According to Thomas, the acratic does not act out of free choice (ex electione) insofar as reason is tied up by desire. But there is still a choice before the action. For, on the other hand, the acratic chooses to pursue the desire knowing that by doing the act he is committing a sin.

Walter Burleigh adds another alternative within the traditional Aristotelian interpretation. He sets the point in the course of action at which the acratic is prevented from doing better, later: It is not reason that is suppressed, but physical execution. Desire does not suppress any premise in the practical syllogism, so reason is not shackled; the syllogism of reason arrives at the conclusion. Instead, the acratic's desire hinders the physical performance of the act so that the body does not obey reason.

In scholastic medieval philosophy, the Aristotelian position is discussed above all and modified versions of it are represented. On the other hand, especially on the part of the Franciscans ( inter alia in the Correctorium fratris Thomae , in which the teachings of Thomas Aquinas are criticized) a will is postulated in the tradition of Augustine that can oppose reason.

Modern times

From the beginning of the modern era to the second half of the 20th century , akrasia was rarely discussed as a philosophical problem, also because for a long time the ancient texts were not received by philosophers. A more important reason for this is that voluntaristic positions - which postulate a will that is independent of other faculties - were predominant until the middle of the 20th century. As a result, acts against better judgment are rarely discussed as a philosophical problem. René Descartes , for example, in Passions of the Soul does not consider such actions to be a theoretical, but only a practical problem.

Another important reason is that akrasia only represents a theoretical problem if the following thesis is shared, which expresses a special connection between (something) thinking and (to something) being disposed: A person plausibly prefers an action A over B, because she thinks A is better than B. Two reasons can be distinguished why this thesis is not always unreservedly shared in modern times: either causes for actions are understood as external to the person , or, if internal, then not as mental but as purely physiological .

First, Descartes, Spinoza, and other philosophers have tended, since the 17th century, to view man essentially as a being that can be described purely causally and mechanically, like a machine. A frequently used metaphor here is the mechanical clock (e.g. in Descartes' Discours de la méthode V). Since these thinkers accordingly assume that a certain action A is carried out by a person not because he thinks it is better than B, but only because of causal-mechanical external causes, acratic actions cannot be a theoretical problem for them. Second, the striving to do something is seen as a purely physiological process that is completely independent of thinking, analogous to pain.

But modern thinkers also theoretically touch on the broader problem field of actions against better knowledge and do not take it for granted that the worse action is chosen. John Locke, for example, in An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding himself advocates the thesis that the good only determines the will, and the better action is only carried out when desire allows it, according to which akrasia is not a theoretical problem. He admits, however, that the notion that 'the good or the greater good determines the will' seems prima facie plausible, and that he too believed this to be correct for a long time.

"It seems so established and settled a maxim, by the general consent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder that, when I first published my thoughts on this subject I took it for granted " .
(“It seems to be such a self-evident maxim by general agreement around the world that the good, the greater good, determines the will, that I am not at all astonished that I have now taken this at face value than I am first published my thoughts on this subject. ")

Systematically

In 1949, Gilbert Ryle presented a powerful critique of the concept of will with The Concept of Mind . In 1963 GEM Anscombe followed up with an influential alternative to the will-based model of deliberate action. Accordingly, it is not acts of will that explain actions, but reasons . On this basis, philosophers have been increasingly dealing with the problem of akrasia since the middle of the 20th century.

An important contribution comes from RM Hare . "Moral weakness" (moral weakness) provides for his theory of prescriptivism is a challenge because it also conceives the moral judgment as a motivational binding. Prescriptivism claims that to consider a certain moral judgment U to be true means to strive to act accordingly in the corresponding situation U and to do so if possible. According to this, it should not be possible to consider act A to be morally correct, but to carry out act B, which is considered morally wrong. Either the person thinks A is correct, then he is motivated accordingly; or if she is not motivated accordingly, then she does not consider action A to be correct either. Hare's approaches try to explain the corresponding phenomena on the one hand with psychological incapacity and on the other hand with a weakened, only external form of 'should'.

Davidson

Expansion of the subject area

By far the most important, systematically fundamental contribution to the problem that has determined the philosophical debate to this day is Donald Davidson's essay, published in 1970 : How is weak will possible? . According to Davidson, there are acratic acts outside of the areas of physical pleasure that have been classic since Aristotle. Also Davidson does not want Akrasia, as with Hare, restricted to the area of ​​morality and corresponding attempts at explanation.

"When dealing with the problem of uncontrollability, it is recommended to dwell on those cases in which morality does not appear on the scene as one of the applicants for our favor - or in which it does, if it does appear, is on the wrong side. Then we will not succumb to the temptation to want to trace the lack of control back to special cases in which one is overwhelmed by the weaker self, for example, or fails to obey the call of duty, or succumbs to temptation. "

The most important extension concerns the cognitive attitude of the acratic. Akrasia does not only exist when someone acts against their better judgment . Rather, it is sufficient that the agent acts against his own better judgment .

Davidson's problem formulation

Akrasia can be defined as follows:
D .: In doing A, he acts acratically if and only if he does

(i) A intentionally does
(ii) believes an alternative action B is possible , and
(iii) judges that , all things considered, executing B would be better than executing A.

In relation to this definition of akrasia, Davidson sets out three principles. These - according to Davidson self-evident  - principles seem to describe action plausibly.

P1 . If the agent A wants to do to a greater degree (to want to do more) believes as B and, he was free either A or B to do , then , he is unless he deliberately doing either A or B purposely A do .
P2 . If the acting judge , the execution of A would be better than the performance of B , then wants A he do to a greater degree (to want to do more) than B .
P3 . There are acratic acts.

P1 and P2 shown schematically as a chain: (a) consider x better than y → (b) x would rather want than y → (c) x deliberately do

P2 connects (a) and (b) , P1 (b) and (c)

P1-P3 do not seem to be consistent with each other . Because from P1 and P2 follows a principle that seems to contradict the existence of acratic actions:

P * . If the agent judges that doing A is better than doing B and believes he is free to do either A or B , then , provided he is doing either A or B intentionally, he will do A intentionally

P * schematic: (a) x is better than y → (c) x deliberately doing

P * expresses the plausible thought that people, as rational beings, strive for something with their actions that they consider good. A rational person does what he thinks is best of two alternatives. This is contradicted by the phenomenon that, given sufficient self-observation, also apparently applies that people do not always do what they think is better. Davidson tries to show that there is in fact no contradiction and that P1–3 are consistent.

Davidson's approach

Davidson's approach is based on the idea that a judgment 'X is better than Y' has to be interpreted in two different ways at different points in the decision-making process for an action: on the one hand as a conditional and on the other as a non-conditional judgment. The judgment that the acratic reaches after weighing all the reasons is a conditional, a prima facie judgment. The final judgment, however, which corresponds to the acratic act, is a non-conditional judgment.

Conditionally, this is a prima facie judgment relative to a certain amount of information that the agent has. The decisive prima facie judgment against which the acratic acts is one taking into account all (known and relevant) circumstances (E). The final, non-conditional judgment, on the other hand, corresponds to the (acratic) action.

all-in-all judgment: prima facie (A is better than B), E. (Read: 'A is better than B relative to all relevant information known to the actor')
final verdict: B is better than A.

P1-P3 are inconsistent only under the assumption that the acratic who acts according to the conviction 'B is better than A' nevertheless judges: 'A is better than B'. This would contradict P *. According to Davidson's interpretation, however, the acratic does the following: He first makes the prima facie judgment: 'All in all, A is better than B'. But then he makes the final judgment: 'B is better than A' - and acts accordingly.

(i) ' Prima facie - all in all - it is better not to eat the cream cake than to eat it.'
(ii) 'Eating the cream cake is better than not eating it.'

Accordingly, there is no counterexample for P * and the belief expressed in it, 'The action that someone thinks is better he performs (if possible)'. Because the judgment against which the acratic acts is a prima facie all-in-all judgment, (i). But this cannot conflict with a final judgment (ii). In other words: P3, which goes back to Davidson's definition of akrasia (D), contains a conditional judgment; In contrast, P1 and P2, which result in P *, contain non-conditional judgments. So P1-P3 are not inconsistent.

Davidson justifies the fact that all-in-all judgments are only valid prima facie with an analogy to probability inferences . In both cases the conditional major clauses in a syllogism are not all-quantified because they cannot apply without restriction.

(1) prima facie (X is better than Y, X is not eating a cream cake and Y is eating a cream cake).
(2) A is not eating a cream cake and B is eating a cream cake.
(K) prima facie (A is better than B, (1) and (2))

As a result, this also applies to the all-in-all judgment, since it must be thought of as the conclusion of a deliberation process with prima facie premises.

According to Davidson, the acratic does not represent any logically conflicting judgments. Davidson does not want to explain Akrasia "as a simple logical blunder". So in some sense 'A is better than B' also follows from 'A is all in all better than B.' The fact that the acratic does not draw this conclusion is not a logical mistake, but rather violates "the principle of self-control": "Perform the action that is judged to be the best on the basis of all available relevant reasons". There is no reason to act freely and deliberately against what is considered the best act. For Davidson, the special thing about akrasia is that "the agent cannot understand himself: he recognizes something essentially irrational in his own intentional behavior."

Criticism of Davidson

Davidson's solution is primarily criticized for the all-in-all, all things considered . So it is questionable whether the separation of all-in-all judgments and action-effective, final, non-conditional judgments is possible, since perhaps every all-in-all judgment must be understood as non-conditional. (Cf. Grice / Baker) In addition, one could take the view that the definition minus the phrase , all things considered, does not include some cases of akrasia. For these cases, P1–3 would be inconsistent. Finally, it is questionable whether the acratic only acts against prima facie all-in-all judgments, but never against unconditional judgments, never against his intentions.

In a later contribution, Davidson supplements his solution with an answer, approaching some theorems of psychoanalysis, to the question of how it is possible that the reason that triggers the action is not the best reason. The human mind is to be understood as a system of at least two overlapping subsystems. In a subsystem, there are no better reasons for the acratic reason that triggers action. In another there is a complete weighing of all reasons, in which there is a better reason, but one that does not trigger action.

How is Akrasia possible?

Following Davidson, the following philosophically interesting form is discussed in particular: someone freely and deliberately does B, although he believes that action A is possible and better. Whether you consider akrasia possible and if so, what kind of akrasia, can be determined by whether you share P *, and if so in which (possibly modified) form. P * expresses the idea that when a person thinks an action is good, he - by being motivated to take this action - does it, if possible.

In order to solve the akrasia problem on this generally accepted formulation of the problem, the following options are available:

  1. Criticism of P * by denying P1 or P2 or differentiating the terms used there
  2. Skepticism about such defined akrasia (criticism of free and intentional ).
  3. complete rejection of the thought expressed in P *.

Criticism of P *

Criticism of P * most often concerns P2 ( (a) x is better than y → (b) would prefer x to y ). It is doubted that someone who thinks A is better necessarily wants A better too. Counterexamples showed that we thought A was better, but wanted B better, like an adulterer who judges that loyalty is better, but still prefers to do the affair. 'I prefer to want' occurs in two different ways in P *: one evaluative and one motivational . If a person judges 'A is better than B', then they prefer A evaluative. However, it does not follow from this - so the argument goes - that they have a stronger motivation or inclination to do A than B. If a connection between motivation and evaluation is recognized, a modified form of P2 is assumed in which this connection is not is so tight. The fact that the motivation deviates from the evaluation a. explained with a greater (temporal) proximity of B and a lack of attempt to practice self-control. The criticism that P2 understands the connection between evaluation and motivation too closely brings with it the difficulty of explaining the exact nature of a less close connection.

Another possibility is that there are no two judgments. If one regards the acratic's thought process as an argument, the irrational moment could either lie in this or between the conclusion and the action. This solution does not have the problem that a prima facie judgment and a final judgment contradict each other. The action, however, takes place solely out of a physical desire. On the one hand, however, this solution faces the difficulty that the talk of physical desire remains very unclear. Above all, there seem to be a great many acratic acts that do not take place suddenly and immediately, but which are preceded by the conscious formation of an intention.

Skepticism about akrasia

freedom

The acratic could not be free if he - although he had gone through an optimal deliberation process - nevertheless carried out the act B considered worse, since he had done everything possible to resist. The actions defined in this way are consequently not acratic, but unfree and thus compulsive. This argument can be countered by saying that the person has not yet done everything possible, since there are not only deliberative but also non-deliberative means of resisting a certain action. Among other things, one can take away one's attention from the attractive aspects of the acratic act or promise oneself a reward if one follows the better judgment. One possible explanation why the acratic does not use non-deliberative means is that he misjudged the effort required to do so.

Another objection to this skepticism is that people who take action very often believe that they could have done otherwise. This assumption must then be viewed as a cognitive error. According to this, by means of the "ability to deceive [...] we succeed in bridging the discrepancy between our really action-relevant wishes and those wishes that we would like to attribute to ourselves as action-relevant".

intention

Another important argument against the possibility of akrasia can be presented as follows:

(1) If S intentionally performs action B instead of A, then S judges that B is overall better than A.
(2) If S intentionally performs act B acratically , then S judges that A is overall better than B.
(3) It is not possible for S to simultaneously judge 'B is overall better than A' and 'A is overall better than B'.
(4) Hence: Akrasia is not possible.

The key premise here is (1). Since (1) is the reverse of P * ((consider (a) better → (c) intentionally do ) it is accepted by anyone who finds the following thought plausible: If a person intentionally eats a cream cake, they would rather eat it than they would not eat, and if she would rather eat them than not eat them, she also judges that it is better to eat them than not to eat them. (The deliberate execution of an action implies their willingness to love as an alternative, and their willingness to love implies the corresponding better judgment.) Counterexamples have been brought against this necessary connection: Routine actions would therefore be done intentionally without wanting to do them better; Actions out of mere curiosity (“idle curiosity”) are done and wanted, although there is no evaluation.

Complete rejection of P *

Akrasia is a philosophical problem only under the assumption implied in P * that the better reason is the stronger cause of an action. If one does not share this assumption or its assumption that reasons are sufficient causes for actions, then actions against a better judgment are only an everyday phenomenon. In the current debate, this position is represented by John Rogers Searle . Such a theory of action defines volitions as the cause of actions, mere acts of will in the sense of Augustine's conception of will. This action theory thus rejects the self-evident principles P1 and P2 according to Davidson.

See also

literature

Historical positions

Primary texts

Secondary texts

  • Christopher Bobonich (Ed.): Akrasia in Greek philosophy: from Socrates to Plotinus , Leiden 2007. ISBN 978-90-04-15670-8 . (Not used)
  • Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, Matthias Perkams (eds.): The Problem of Weakness of Will in Medieval Philosophy. Peeters Publishers, Leuven, Paris, and Dudley 2006, ISBN 978-9-04291779-8
  • Anton Huegli: weak will. in: Joachim Ritter , Karlfried founder (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy . Vol. 12. Schwabe, Basel [a. a.] 2004, col. 800-809. ISBN 3-7965-0115-X (summarizes the philosophical positions from Aristotle to Davidson)
  • Gareth B. Matthews: Augustin. in: Edward Craig (Ed.): Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge, London 1988. (In particular the introduction, Chapter 6 Philosophy of mind: will and Chapter 12 Ethics: sin, vice and virtue on the subject)
  • Jörn Müller: Weakness of will in antiquity and the Middle Ages: a problem story from Socrates to Johannes Duns Scotus . Leuven University Press, Leuven 2009, ISBN 978-9-05867752-5
  • Risto Saarinen : Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought. From Augustine to Buridan. Brill, Leiden [u. a.] 1994. ISBN 90-04-09994-8 (not used)
  • Ursula Wolf : Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics". WBG, Darmstadt 2002. ISBN 3-534-14142-3 (Provides a detailed interpretation of the Aristotelian position in Chapter VII)
  • Further investigations with historical parts under: Present and general representations

Present and general representations

  • William Charlton: Weakness of Will. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1988. ISBN 0-631-15759-X (Good introduction to the topic, addresses ancient and contemporary positions and analyzes basic concepts)
  • Donald Davidson: How is weak will possible? in: Donald Davidson: Plot and Event. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1990. ISBN 3-518-28495-9 (The most important essay on the subject; towards the end a bit technical and not easy)
  • Donald Davidson: Paradoxes of Irrationality. in: Stefan Gosepath (Ed.): Motives, reasons, purposes. Theories of practical rationality. Fischer Taschenbuch, Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 209–231. ISBN 3-596-13223-1 (To explain irrational actions, takes up elements of Freud, according to which parts of the mind can be independent of one another)
  • Justin Cyril Bertrand Gosling: Weakness of the Will. Routledge, London 1990. ISBN 0-415-03435-3 (systematically discusses Akrasia in one part historically in another)
  • Paul Grice, Judith Baker: Davidson on "Weakness of the Will". In: Bruce Vermazen, Merill B. Hintika (Eds.): Essays on Davidson. Actions and Events. Oxford 1986, 27-49. ISBN 0-19-824963-2 (Basic analysis of Davidson's all things considered judgment; technical and difficult)
  • Richard Mervyn Hare: Freedom and Reason. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt M 1983. ISBN 3-518-28057-0 (Chapter 5 deals with "Moral weakness")
  • Alfred R. Mele: Irrationality. An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control. Cape. 3. OUP, Oxford 1987. ISBN 0-19-508001-7 (A thoroughly systematic and easily readable work)
  • Alfred R. Mele: Philosophy of Action. in: Kirk Ludwig (Ed.): Donald Davidson. CUP, Cambridge 2003. ISBN 0-521-79382-3
  • David Pears: How easy is Akrasia? in: Philosophia. Springer, Dordrecht 11.1982, pp. 33-50. ISSN  0048-3893 ( Analyzes akrasia as a mistake between conclusion and action)
  • Gottfried Seebaß : Akrasia. in: Jürgen Mittelstraß (Hrsg.): Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. Metzler, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 59-63. ISBN 3-476-02108-4
  • Thomas Spitzley: Acting against your better judgment. A discussion of classic positions. de Gruyter, Berlin [a. a.] 1992. ISBN 3-11-013507-8
  • Thomas Spitzley (ed.): Weak will. mentis, Paderborn 2005. ISBN 3897854031 (text collection with introductory introduction and the texts by Aristotle, Plato, Hare, Davidson and others discussed here)
  • Helen Steward: Akrasia. in: Edward Craig (Ed.): Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge, London 1988, 2005. ISBN 0-415-32495-5
  • Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (Eds.): Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality . Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003/2007. ISBN 978-0-19-923595-7
  • Arthur F. Walker: The Problem of Weakness of Will. in: Nous. Cambridge, 23: 653-676 (1989). ISSN  0029-4624 (overview of the solution approaches of the seventies and eighties; very readable)
  • Ursula Wolf: On the problem of weak will. in: Stefan Gosepath (Ed.): Motives, reasons, purposes. Theories of practical rationality. Fischer Taschenbuch, Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 232–245. ISBN 3-596-13223-1 (discusses Aristotle and takes the view that acratic actions are based on self-deception)

Web links

Wiktionary: uncontrollability  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ about GORGIAS 525a 4
  2. ↑ See Arthur F. Walker: The Problem of Weakness of Will, in: Nous 23 (1989), 653
  3. ↑ See William Charlton: Weakness of Will, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1988, 134
  4. ↑ See Gottfried Seebaß: Akrasia , in: Jürgen Mittelstraß (Hrsg.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie , Metzler, Stuttgart 2005, 59
  5. ↑ Cf. Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik VII 3 , see here
  6. ↑ Xenophon, Memories of Socrates III 9.4, IV 5.6.
  7. ↑ Plato: Protagoras 345d9-e4
  8. ↑ Plato: Protagoras 352d5–7
  9. ↑ Plato: Protagoras 352e6
  10. ↑ Plato: Protagoras 355a6-b3
  11. ↑ Plato: Protagoras 357d3-5
  12. ↑ Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VII 3, 1145b22-24
  13. ↑ Cf. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VI 6
  14. ↑ Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics: VII 5, 1157b18-19
  15. ↑ Cf. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VII 5, 1147a10-24
  16. ↑ Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VII 5, 1147a 11–24
  17. ↑ Cf. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VII 5, 1147a1–9
  18. ↑ Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VII 5, 1147b9-13
  19. ↑ Cf. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VII 8
  20. ↑ Cf. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VII 6, 1147b13-15
  21. ↑ See Richard Kraut: Aristotle's Ethics , in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  22. ↑ Cf. Anton Huegli: weak will , in: Joachim Ritter, Karlfried founder (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy . Vol. 12, Schwabe, Basel [u. a.] 2004, 802
  23. ↑ See Jeanne Peijnenburg: Acting Against One's Best Judgment. Dissertation, University of Groningen 1996, 33.
  24. ↑ See Christoph Horn: Wille , in: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Lexikon der Ethik , 6th revised edition, Munich 2002, pp. 292–294
  25. ↑ See William Charlton, Weakness of Will , Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1988, 4 f.
  26. ↑ Gottfried Seebaß: Akrasia , in: Jürgen Mittelstraß (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science , Metzler, Stuttgart 2005, 60
  27. ↑ See Gareth B. Matthews: Augustin. in: Edward Craig (Ed.): Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge, London 1988
  28. ^ Augustine : Confessiones VIII, v.10
  29. ^ Augustine : Confessiones VIII, ix, 21
  30. ↑ Cf. Anton Huegli: weak will , in: Joachim Ritter, Karlfried founder (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy . Vol. 12, Schwabe, Basel [u. a.] 2004, col. 802-803
  31. ↑ Cf. Anton Huegli: weak will , in: Joachim Ritter, Karlfried founder (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy . Vol. 12, Schwabe, Basel [u. a.] 2004, col. 803
  32. ↑ Cf. Anton Huegli: weak will , in: Joachim Ritter, Karlfried founder (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy . Vol. 12, Schwabe, Basel [u. a.] 2004, Col. 803 f.
  33. ↑ Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologica , I-II, 77, 2
  34. ↑ Aquinas: Summa , I-II, 77, 2 cited by Anton Huegli: weakness , in: Joachim Ritter, Karl Fried founder (ed.): Historical Dictionary of philosophy . Vol. 12, Schwabe, Basel [u. a.] 2004, col. 804
  35. ↑ a b cf. Anton Huegli: weak will , in: Joachim Ritter, Karlfried founder (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy . Vol. 12, Schwabe, Basel [u. a.] 2004, col. 804
  36. ↑ Cf. Anton Huegli: weak will , in: Joachim Ritter, Karlfried founder (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy . Vol. 12, Schwabe, Basel [u. a.] 2004, col. 803-804
  37. ↑ See William Charlton: Weakness of Will , Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1988, 9
  38. ↑ See William Charlton: Weakness of Will , Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1988, 7
  39. ↑ See William Charlton: Weakness of Will , Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1988, 7 f.
  40. ↑ John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding II 21, § 35
  41. ↑ Richard Mervyn Hare: Freedom and Reason , Suhrkamp, ​​FfM, 1983, chap. 5
  42. ↑ Davidson, Donald: How is weak will possible? in: ders .: Action and Event , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1990, 56
  43. ↑ Cf. Donald Davidson: How is weak will possible? in: ders .: Action and Event , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1990, 44
  44. ↑ Cf. Donald Davidson: How is weak will possible? in: ders .: Action and Event , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1990, 45 f.
  45. ^ Alfred R. Mele: Irrationality. An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control , OUP, Oxford 1987, 34; or Alfred R. Mele: Philosophy of Action , in: Kirk Ludwig (Ed.): Donald Davidson , CUP, Cambridge 2003, 77
  46. ↑ Donald Davidson: How is weak will possible? in: ders .: Action and Event , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1990, 68.
  47. ↑ Donald Davidson: How is weak will possible? in: ders .: Action and Event , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1990, 71
  48. ↑ Donald Davidson: How is weak will possible? in: ders .: Action and Event , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1990, 72
  49. ↑ See Alfred R. Mele: Irrationality. An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control , OUP, Oxford 1987, 34 or Alfred R. Mele: Philosophy of Action , in: Kirk Ludwig (Ed.): Donald Davidson , CUP, Cambridge 2003, 77
  50. ↑ See Alfred R. Mele: Irrationality. An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control , OUP, Oxford 1987, chap. 3.4
  51. ↑ Cf. Donald Davidson: Paradoxien der Irrationalität , in: Stefan Gosepath (Ed.): Motive, reasons, purposes. Theories of practical rationality , Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 209-231
  52. ↑ See Arthur F. Walker: The Problem of Weakness of Will , in: Nous 23 (1989), 668 f.
  53. ↑ See Alfred R. Mele: Irrationality. An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control , OUP, Oxford 1987, chap. 6.3
  54. ↑ See David Pears: How easy is Akrasia? , in: Philosophia 11 (1982), 33-50
  55. ↑ See Arthur F. Walker: The Problem of Weakness of Will , in: Nous 23 (1989), 654
  56. ↑ See Alfred R. Mele: Irrationality. An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control , OUP, Oxford 1987, chap. 2.2 especially 23 f.
  57. ↑ Ursula Wolf: On the problem of weak will , in: Stefan Gosepath (Ed.): Motive, reasons, purposes. Theories of practical rationality , Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1999, 241
  58. ↑ See Arthur F. Walker: The Problem of Weakness of Will , in: Nous 23 (1989), 658
  59. ↑ See David Pears: How easy is Akrasia? , in: Philosophia 11 (1982), 40 f.
This article was added to the list of excellent articles on May 13, 2006 in this version .