Iron law of the oligarchy

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As an iron law of the oligarchy ( brazen : elevated German for "from ore " in the sense of "hard, forever while"; oligarchy : Greek for "rule of a few") one describes the between 1907 and 1911 by the German-Italian sociologist Robert (o) Michel 's theses on the development of democracy : parties, but also other large groups, always form a bureaucratic organization for reasons of efficiency , the tops of which develop into a corrupt oligarchic power elite .

background

Title page of Political Parties by Robert Michels.jpg

In 1911 Robert Michels published his major work On the Sociology of Party System in Modern Democracy. Studies on the oligarchic tendencies of group life . In this case study of the German labor movement of the fin de siècle , in particular the SPD , he examined the development of decision-making structures. In doing so, he looked at both formal bureaucracy and informal power structures. His central theses state that leadership groups in organizations are increasingly interested in their own interests and personal benefit - especially ensured by maintaining the organization. The former goals of the group they are at the head of now fade into the background. Leading groups try to steer the social base, the “ masses ”, even when the ruling ideology of these groups strives for the opposite.

Michel's fragment of theory has inspired research that has now spanned more than a century. After their last renaissance in the late 1990s in the course of neo-institutionalism , Michel's theses are at the center of social science research and are discussed in fields as diverse as the radicalization of churches , the institutionalization of the New Social Movements or the organization of Wikipedia .

Darcy K. Leach sums up the current state of research metaphorically in such a way that it may not be an “iron law”, but at least a “tendency made of aluminum”.

Classification of the history of ideas

Michels published the first papers on the Iron Law in 1907 when he had turned his back on the Socialist International from the social democratic parties in Germany and Italy (later he turned to the fascismo Mussolini ). Michels had been active within the Marburg local branch of the SPD, but had never held a leadership position, even though he was regarded as an intellectual in the party. Michels always pursued an academic rather than a political career and was ideologically located closer to the French syndicalism movement, which he supported with his friend Hubert Lagardelle . The theory appeared in 1911 in Michel's now classic work on party research , On the Sociology of Party System in Modern Democracy. Studies on the oligarchical tendencies of group life , in which the organizational structure in the SPD is analyzed. The work can be understood as a polemic against the anti- syndicalism of the SPD. The study is dedicated to Max Weber , who exerted a significant influence on Michel's thinking. In addition, he built on the work of Gaetano Mosca on the political class , to whom he largely owed his disillusionment with syndicalism and whose ideas of leadership and leadership he largely adopted. Michel's understanding of democracy is based on the direct democratic model in Rousseau's social contract ; his long-term goal is a classless society .

Michel's central thesis on the politics of his time reflects Max Weber's “steel-hard casing” of capitalism in the economy; both phenomena, dubbed “brazen”, were later subjected to sharp criticism and fought against in the 1968 movements .

Three minor hypotheses

Michels applied the Iron Law to parties , states and trade unions , and later research extended the scope to other organizations.

The law can be broken down into three hypotheses :

  1. Larger groups of people always form a bureaucratic organization for reasons of efficiency.
  2. Bureaucracies tend to develop a power elite .
  3. The resulting oligarchization leads to the corruption of this power elite.

These theses can be explained in detail as follows.

Formation of formal organizations

A prerequisite for democracy in states or political parties is that the decision-making lies with the people or the members. In the case of larger groups, however, an organization will probably have to be formed to take on the task of coordination. Michels justifies this primarily with the technical communication conditions that would make it impossible to enable democratic decision-making in larger groups; Michels assumes the maximum size of directly democratically organized groups between 1,000 and 10,000 people; However, studies by Bruce H. Mayhew and Roger L. Levinger put the number much lower , even taking into account the more modern communication technologies already available in 1976 . A mass party like the SPD, which had 90,000 members in the Berlin area as early as 1905, could no longer be led directly democratically.

In order to act efficiently, larger groups need a level of representation and an organization of group interests by experts, i.e. a bureaucracy, and associated with it extensive specialization, which requires the training of the office holders, the pillars that are difficult to replace and therefore permanent due to their acquired specialist and organizational knowledge of the organization. In modern times, communication moves away from face-to-face meetings to the mass media, which was dominated by newspapers in Michel's day .

The emergence of oligarchy

Michels postulated that any organization, no matter how democratic or autocratic its ideology was at the outset , must lead to the formation of an oligarchy . His much-cited core thesis is:

"The organization is the mother of the rule of the elected over the voters, the commissioner over the client, the delegate over the delegate."

- Robert Michels : On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy

The delegation of tasks is necessary in every organization. This delegation leads to the formation of an educational lead in organizational and specialist knowledge of a management class, which in this way gains a lead in power . The basis of oligarchic power is therefore not only the coercive forces inherent in the hierarchy, but above all also knowledge monopolies .

Michel's concept of oligarchy remains ambiguous. For him, characteristics of the oligarchy are social status , power, knowledge and financial resources.

Corruption of the power elite

According to Michels, the establishment of a party organization inevitably leads to a loss of internal organizational democracy and a loss of the group's dynamism as a result of the inertia of bureaucratic apparatus. In addition, conservatism would be promoted, which would also become independent. "This is how the organization turns from a means to an end into an end in itself". This leads to an internal division of the organization and an alienation of the organizational elite from the members.

Theoretical reception

Michel's theses have now inspired a century of theoretical and empirical research. Regardless of all criticism, his innovative approach to conducting organizational sociology on site and investigating informal structures is considered a classic of organizational theory .

Nicolai Bukharin , one of Michels' early critics

The law was initially criticized from circles of orthodox Marxism , for example from Bukharin , who denied that bureaucratic organizations lead to a concentration of power, since no property is associated with organizational positions and roles . On the other hand, Rosa Mayreder largely confirmed Michel's theses in an early reception and applied them to social movements , which, in the course of their development, if successful, she said a tendency from content-related work to pure power maintenance: “The older a power organization becomes, [...] the stronger the interest of self-preservation as the most important thing becomes the focus of their orientation. ”However, in their opinion, this obstacle to social progress can be circumvented by the formation of new competing organizations that do not yet participate in power.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the sociological criticism primarily criticized a generality and lacked a differentiation between the forms of oligarchy and the associated differentiation of the psychological effects on organizational leadership. During this period, research was focused on replacing substantial organizational goals with organizational reproduction as the primary goal of the organizational leader.

Seymour M. Lipset and Philip Selznick developed into two leading exegetes of the Iron Law in the period after the Second World War . Lipset used two examples, to which he was personally connected, to criticize that this would not apply under certain conditions, namely when the leadership of an organization reflected its class base . In addition, student and other youth groups are also less susceptible to oligarchic tendencies because they pursue an ethics of conviction rather than responsibility and are therefore not concerned with organizational power.

In later years new theoretical points of criticism were raised and the empirical appropriateness of the theses examined. More recent survey studies have come to the conclusion that, although there are no “iron laws” in the strict sense of the word, a tendency towards oligarchization is unmistakable. Most studies try to identify conditions under which oligarchization and / or its negative consequences are weakened; only rarely, however, are Michel's theses fundamentally questioned.

American political scientists Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson refer to Michel's Law in their work Why Nations Fail (2012). As examples of the topicality of Michel's thesis, they refer to the October Revolution and the subsequent rule of the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union as well as the decolonization of Sierra Leone , Zaire and Zimbabwe , after which the new rulers Siaka Stevens , Mobutu Sese Seko and Robert Mugabe die The colonial rulers' “extractive” (that is, those based on exploitation ) institutions would not have abolished, but only adapted them to their own interests.

Empiricism

Empirical analyzes relating to the iron law of the oligarchy deal with a variety of organizational problems. Until the early 1970s, mostly bureaucratic mass organizations were examined for oligarchization, only afterwards also smaller organizations and social movements moved into the focus of research. In addition to movements and political parties , economic organizations , churches and other religious organizations were analyzed with the aid of the Iron Law. As before, the question of whether the more fluid forms of organization of movements can soften, delay or even prevent the emergence of oligarchies has not yet been researched .

The greatest weakness of empirical research is Michels' failure to clearly define the term oligarchy and the often inadequate operationalization that goes with it . In most cases, oligarchization is measured either through continuity in the occupation of leadership roles or through the change in ideology away from substantive goals towards organizational reproduction.

application areas

Political parties

Michel's original object of study, political parties with democratic ideology, is by no means dominant in the empirical study of the Iron Law, but there are a number of studies on such parties.

An experimental study of party oligarchization found that parties that have information media that are independent of the party leadership would be organized in a more egalitarian manner.

The green

In the institutionalization of the New Social Movements in the German party Die Grünen , oligarchization should be consciously avoided. There were no permanent roles or permanent agents. Every smallest, routine decision could be put up for discussion and vote. When the membership was small, these anti-oligarchic measures had some success. However, as the party grew and became more successful, the drive to compete in elections with other parties, raise funds for it, organize large events and demonstrations, and cooperate with elected parties led the Green Party to adopt more conventional structures and modes of operation. The so-called rotation principle , the separation of office and mandate as well as the dual leadership of the party and faction leadership originate from the early days of the party . With the increasing professionalization of the party structures and especially since joining the red-green federal government in 1998 , there have been repeated attempts to soften the principle of separating office and mandate.

Companies

The Iron Law is also applied and mostly confirmed to commercial enterprises. Thus says the economist Oliver E. Williamson from downside drift : the tendency that the corporate governance increasingly their own interests rather than the interests of business owners, in particular the shareholders pursues.

Churches

Religious organizations, especially those of Christianity, are another field of study of the Iron Law . For example, a study on the radicalism of Protestant churches in the USA found that churches with greater apathy on the part of the laity, other things being equal, take less pluralistic political positions.

Another study on the church's umbrella organization, the National Council of Churches, comes to the conclusion, contrary to Michel's assumption, that the organizational goals cannot necessarily become more conservative but also more radical through oligarchization . As expected, the organizational employees would have become more professional, but the incentive structure within the organization would have benefited those employees who would have advocated particularly “noble” goals and changes.

Social movements

In movement research, the Iron Law is understood primarily as the institutionalization of movement: Movement organizations first emerge, are then professionalized and finally fit into institutionalized politics as pressure groups , non-governmental organizations or political parties . At the same time, the goals of the movement organizations are becoming more conservative in order to be able to build a stable relationship with politics and the rest of society.

Abstinence movement

One of the first studies to review the Iron Law on the basis of a movement looked at the abstinence movement from the 1880s to the mid-1950s. Joseph R. Gusfield's study shows that the law was in many ways inapplicable to the movement: ideology at that time shifted from the idea of ​​modern social reform to moral withdrawal; the strongest movement organization, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union , lost its staff and tied down less qualified staff from the lower classes .

Peasant movement

Seymour M. Lipset was researching peasant movement organizations in Saskatchewan and Manitoba around the same time as Gusfield . He came to the conclusion that due to the significantly poorer transport infrastructure in the former Canadian province, the leadership of the movement there was recruited more from the average peasantry. As a result, she continues to represent the interests of farmers strongly, while this is not the case in Manitoba.

New social movements

The 1968 movements , the New Social Movements (NSB) that emerged from them and the New Left made a conscious attempt at the end of the 20th century to overcome the Iron Law in a practical and voluntarist way. Even in the early stages of the movements, the Port Huron Declaration explicitly attached importance to the equal participation of all movement members.

new media

Regarding the importance of communication technologies postulated by Michels, there have been some recent studies that examine the influence of the new media on the Iron Law. Two prominent objects of investigation of this strand are the news portal Indymedia and the online encyclopedia project Wikipedia .

Indymedia

A study of indymedia comes to the conclusion that the new media put a stop to the iron law, but in return the target corridor of the movement industry associated with indymedia (initially only critical of globalization ) becomes significantly wider and therefore more difficult to enforce.

Wikipedia

A predominantly informally organized community, the dynamics of which have recently been used to review the Iron Law, is Wikipedia. Piotr Konieczny, Wikipedia author, administrator and sociology doctoral candidate, whose database is primarily the discussions around the English-language metadiscussion site about the verifiability of information, denied in his 2009 essay Governance, Organization, and Democracy on the Internet: The Iron Law and the Evolution of Wikipedia does not have the tendency that authors who collaborate in the long term have a slight lead in the creation of the articles. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the Iron Law, through the wiki principle, has at best a restrictive effect. The reason for this is the greatly improved communication options in wikis , which allow broader participation and greater transparency , as well as the modesty of the Wikipedia management, which is caused by the voluntary work of all Wikipedia employees: Nobody therefore contributes to Wikipedia in order to rise in its hierarchy, since there would be no monetary or other reward incentives.

In contrast, the sociologist Christian Stegbauer, also in 2009 in his study Wikipedia: The Riddle of Cooperation, sees the criteria for the Iron Law within Wikipedia as largely fulfilled. The leadership of the (German-language) Wikipedia, which he operationalizes by belonging to the user group of administrators , is therefore overwhelmingly co-opted , in that management positions are predominantly elected on the proposal of and with the overwhelming majority of the elite members. Even the formal process of assigning administrator rights without mandatory re-elections ensures the stability of the management staff that Michels assumed. The management staff also develop an ideology of indispensability in order to legitimize their claim to leadership. Ultimately, the management staff also form an informal network, which manifests itself, for example, at physical meetings of the so-called “regulars' tables”.

The legal theorists Adrian Vermeule comes with reference to an article in Slate in autumn 2010 to a similar result as bridge builders and suggested that this result to all epistemic communities apply.

literature

expenditure

  • Robert Michels: On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy. Studies on the oligarchic tendencies of group life. Klinkhardt, Leipzig 1911 ( archive.org ).
    • 2nd, increased edition. Philosophical-Sociological Library 21, Alfred Kröner, Leipzig 1925.
    • 4th edition. published and provided with an introduction by Frank R. Pfetsch , Kröners Taschenausgabe, Volume 250, Kröner, Stuttgart 1989, ISBN 3-520-25004-7 .
    • Michels, Robert: On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy. Investigations into the oligarchic tendencies of group life, Leipzig 1911. In: Hans Maier among other things: Classic of political thinking. Volume 1: From Plato to Hobbes. 5th edition. Beck, Munich 1979, ISBN 3-406-02517-X .

Secondary literature

  • Christiane Bender, Elmar Wiesendahl: The Iron Law of the Oligarchy: Is Democracy Possible? In: From Politics and Contemporary History. 61. Vol. 44–45 / 2011, pp. 19–24.
  • Maurizio Bach: Robert Michels, “On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy. Studies on the oligarchic tendencies of group life ”. In HP Müller, M. Schmid (Ed.): Major works of inequality research. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 2003, ISBN 3-531-13320-9 , pp. 180-181.
  • W. Grunwald: The “Iron Law of the Oligarchy”: A basic problem of democratic leadership in organizations. In: W. Grunwald, H.-G. Lilge (Ed.): Participatory leadership: business management and social psychological aspects. Huber, Bern 1980, pp. 245-285.
  • Joachim Hetscher: Robert Michels: The development of modern political sociology in the context of the challenge and deficit of the labor movement. Diss. Münster. Pahl-Rugenstein, Bonn 1993, ISBN 3-89144-141-X .
  • Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer: Intra-party democracy: “The iron law of the oligarchy?”. In: Peter Haungs, Eckhard Jesse (Ed.): Parties in the Crisis? Domestic and foreign perspectives. Verl. Wiss. und Politik, Cologne 1987, ISBN 3-8046-8694-X , pp. 243-247.
  • Till Westermayer: Internal party use of new media and the power of the elites: Is the iron law of the oligarchy beginning to break or is a return to the cadre party threatened? In: Arne Rogg (Ed.): How the Internet changes politics. Applications and effects. Leske + Budrich, Opladen 2003, ISBN 3-8100-3851-2 , pp. 105-115.

supporting documents

  1. ^ Robert Michels: On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy: Studies on the oligarchical tendencies of group life (=  philosophical-sociological library ). Klinkhardt, Leipzig 1910 ( ssoar.info [accessed on May 5, 2020]).
  2. ↑ a b c d e Darcy K. Leach: The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy across Organizational Forms . In: Sociological Theory . 23, No. 3, 2005, ISSN  0735-2751 , pp. 312-337, p. 313.
  3. ^ Phillip J. Cook: Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective . In: The Journal of Politics . 33, No. 3, 1971, pp. 773-796, p. 789.
  4. ^ Phillip J. Cook: Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective . In: The Journal of Politics . 33, No. 3, 1971, pp. 773-796, p. 778.
  5. ^ A b Phillip J. Cook: Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective . In: The Journal of Politics . 33, No. 3, 1971, pp. 773-796, pp. 782 f.
  6. ^ Phillip J. Cook: Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective . In: The Journal of Politics . 33, No. 3, 1971, pp. 773-796, pp. 775 f.
  7. ^ Phillip J. Cook: Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective . In: The Journal of Politics . 33, No. 3, 1971, pp. 773-796, pp. 779 f.
  8. ^ Phillip J. Cook: Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective . In: The Journal of Politics . 33, No. 3, 1971, pp. 773-796, pp. 783 f.
  9. ^ Phillip J. Cook: Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective . In: The Journal of Politics . 33, No. 3, 1971, pp. 773-796, p. 786.
  10. ^ Phillip J. Cook: Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective . In: The Journal of Politics . 33, No. 3, 1971, pp. 773-796, p. 788.
  11. ↑ Wini Breines: Community and Organization: The New Left and Michels' "Iron Law" . In: Social Problems . 27, No. 4, 1980, ISSN  0037-7791 , pp. 419-429, p. 427.
  12. ^ A b C. Fred Alford: The "Iron Law of Oligarchy" in the Athenian Polis ... and Today . In: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique . 18, No. 2, 1985, ISSN  0008-4239 , pp. 295-312, p. 297.
  13. ↑ Robert Michels: On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy. Studies on the oligarchic tendencies of group life . Werner Klinkhardt, Leipzig 1911, p. 27 .
  14. ↑ Bruce H. Mayhew, Roger L. Levinger (1976): On the Emergence of Oligarchy in Human Interaction. In: American Journal of Sociology 81 (5): 1017-1049.
    Michael Katovich, Marion W. Weiland, Carl J. Couch: Access to Information and Internal Structures of Partisan Groups: Some Notes on the Iron Law of Oligarchy . In: The Sociological Quarterly . 22, No. 3, 1981, ISSN  0038-0253 , pp. 431-445, p. 431.
  15. ↑ Robert Michels: On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy. Studies on the oligarchic tendencies of group life . Werner Klinkhardt, Leipzig 1911, p. 26 .
  16. ^ A b Phillip J. Cook: Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective . In: The Journal of Politics . 33, No. 3, 1971, pp. 773-796, p. 790.
  17. ↑ Robert Michels: On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy. Studies on the oligarchic tendencies of group life . Werner Klinkhardt, Leipzig 1911, p. 384 .
  18. ↑ Michael Katovich, Marion W. Weiland, Carl J. Couch: Access to Information and Internal Structures of Partisan Groups: Some Notes on the Iron Law of Oligarchy . In: The Sociological Quarterly . 22, No. 3, 1981, ISSN  0038-0253 , pp. 431-445, p. 432.
  19. ↑ Frank R. Pfetsch: Introduction . In: On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy. Studies on the oligarchic tendencies of group life . 4th edition. Kröner, Stuttgart 1989, ISBN 3-520-25004-7 , pp. XVII-XLI, pp. XXVI .
  20. ↑ Robert Michels: On the sociology of the party system in modern democracy. Studies on the oligarchic tendencies of group life . Werner Klinkhardt, Leipzig 1911, p. 359 . For example, quoted in: Wini Breines: Community and Organization: The New Left and Michels' "Iron Law" . In: Social Problems . 27, No. 4, 1980, ISSN 0037-7791 , pp. 419-429, p. 424.
     
  21. ↑ a b Rosa Mayreder: The typical course of social movements . In: The rise: New magazines and pamphlets . tape 3 . Anzengruber, Vienna 1917, p. 20 ( ngiyaw-ebooks.org [PDF; 2.1 MB ]). The typical course of social movements ( memento of the original from September 11, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.ngiyaw-ebooks.org
  22. ^ A b Dieter Rucht: Linking Organization and Mobilization: Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy Reconsidered . In: Mobilization . 4, No. 2, 1999, ISSN  1086-671X , pp. 151-169, p. 154.
  23. ^ Philip G. Altbach , Seymour M. Lipset (Ed.): Students in Revolt . Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA 1969, The possible effects of student activism on international politics, p. 495-521, p. 499 .
  24. ^ Darcy K. Leach: The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy across Organizational Forms . In: Sociological Theory . 23, No. 3, 2005, ISSN  0735-2751 , pp. 312-337, p. 313.
  25. ↑ Kim Voss, Rachel Sherman: Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the American Labor Movement . In: The American Journal of Sociology . 106, No. 2, 2000, ISSN  0002-9602 , pp. 303-349, p. 306.
  26. ↑ Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail . The origins of power, wealth and poverty . S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2013, pp. 149, 428 f., 434 and others.
  27. ^ Darcy K. Leach: The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy across Organizational Forms . In: Sociological Theory . 23, No. 3, 2005, ISSN  0735-2751 , pp. 312-337, p. 314.
  28. ^ Darcy K. Leach: The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy across Organizational Forms . In: Sociological Theory . 23, No. 3, 2005, ISSN  0735-2751 , pp. 312-337, p 315.
  29. ↑ Alwin J. Schmidt: Oligarchy in fraternal organizations. A Study in Organizational Leadership . Gale Research Co., Detroit, MI 1973, ISBN 0-8103-0345-0 , pp. 10 .
  30. ^ Darcy K. Leach: The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy across Organizational Forms . In: Sociological Theory . 23, No. 3, 2005, ISSN  0735-2751 , pp. 312-337, pp. 317 f.
  31. ^ Darcy K. Leach: The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy across Organizational Forms . In: Sociological Theory . 23, No. 3, 2005, ISSN  0735-2751 , pp. 312-337, pp. 318 f.
  32. ↑ Michael Katovich, Marion W. Weiland, Carl J. Couch: Access to Information and Internal Structures of Partisan Groups: Some Notes on the Iron Law of Oligarchy . In: The Sociological Quarterly . 22, No. 3, 1981, ISSN  0038-0253 , pp. 431-445, p. 444.
  33. ↑ Fraune, Cornelia: Borders of civil society: empirical findings and analytical perspectives . Waxmann, 2012, ISBN 978-3-8309-2370-1 , pp. 81 ff .
  34. ↑ The Greens: Kretschmann speaks out against dual leadership . In: The time . April 19, 2016, ISSN  0044-2070 ( zeit.de [accessed June 30, 2017]).
  35. ↑ Reitzig, Daniel: Separation of office and mandate before the end . In: krisentheorie.de . Berlin December 30, 2017 ( krisentheorie.de [accessed December 30, 2017]). Separation of office and mandate before the end ( memento of the original dated December 31, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / krisentheorie.de
  36. ↑ Oliver E. Williamson: Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice . In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization . 24, No. 2, 2008, pp. 247-272, pp. 258 f.
  37. ^ Marc Berk: Pluralist Theory and Church Policy Positions on Racial and Sexual Equality . In: Sociological Analysis . 39, No. 4, 1978, pp. 338-350, p. 349.
  38. ^ J. Craig Jenkins: Radical Transformation of Organizational Goals . In: Administrative Science Quarterly . 22, No. 4, 1977, ISSN  0001-8392 , pp. 568-586, p. 568.
  39. ^ J. Craig Jenkins: Radical Transformation of Organizational Goals . In: Administrative Science Quarterly . 22, No. 4, 1977, ISSN  0001-8392 , pp. 568-586, p. 582.
  40. ^ J. Craig Jenkins: Radical Transformation of Organizational Goals . In: Administrative Science Quarterly . 22, No. 4, 1977, ISSN  0001-8392 , pp. 568-586, p. 584.
  41. ^ Joseph R. Gusfield: Social Structure and Moral Reform: A Study of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union . In: The American Journal of Sociology . 61, No. 3, 1955, ISSN  0002-9602 , pp. 221-232, p. 221.
  42. ^ Mayer N. Zald, Roberta Ash: Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change . In: Social Forces . 44, No. 3, 1966, ISSN  0037-7732 , pp. 327-341, p. 332.
  43. ^ Joseph R. Gusfield: Social Structure and Moral Reform: A Study of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union . In: The American Journal of Sociology . 61, No. 3, 1955, ISSN  0002-9602 , pp. 221-232, p. 232.
  44. ^ A b Seymour M. Lipset: Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan . 2nd revised edition. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA 1968, ISBN 0-520-02056-1 , pp. xviii (first edition: 1949).
  45. ↑ Wini Breines: Community and Organization: The New Left and Michels' "Iron Law" . In: Social Problems . 27, No. 4, 1980, ISSN  0037-7791 , pp. 419-429, pp. 423 f.
  46. ↑ Wini Breines: Community and Organization: The New Left and Michels' "Iron Law" . In: Social Problems . 27, No. 4, 1980, ISSN  0037-7791 , pp. 419-429, p. 421.
  47. ↑ Jenny Pickerill: Radical Politics on the Net . In: Parliamentary Affairs . 59, No. 2, 2006, pp. 266-282, pp. 272 ​​f.
  48. ^ Piotr Konieczny: Governance, Organization, and Democracy on the Internet: The Iron Law and the Evolution of Wikipedia . In: Sociological Forum . 24, No. 1, 2009, ISSN  1573-7861 , pp. 162-192, p. 179.
  49. ^ Piotr Konieczny: Governance, Organization, and Democracy on the Internet: The Iron Law and the Evolution of Wikipedia . In: Sociological Forum . 24, No. 1, 2009, ISSN  1573-7861 , pp. 162-192, p. 162.
  50. ^ Piotr Konieczny: Governance, Organization, and Democracy on the Internet: The Iron Law and the Evolution of Wikipedia . In: Sociological Forum . 24, No. 1, 2009, ISSN  1573-7861 , pp. 162-192, pp. 180 f.
  51. ^ Piotr Konieczny: Governance, Organization, and Democracy on the Internet: The Iron Law and the Evolution of Wikipedia . In: Sociological Forum . 24, No. 1, 2009, ISSN  1573-7861 , pp. 162-192, pp. 182 f.
  52. ^ Christian Stegbauer: Wikipedia: The riddle of cooperation . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2009, ISBN 978-3-531-16589-9 , p. 179 ff .
  53. ^ Christian Stegbauer: Wikipedia: The riddle of cooperation . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2009, ISBN 978-3-531-16589-9 , p. 184 ff .
  54. ^ Christian Stegbauer: Wikipedia: The riddle of cooperation . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2009, ISBN 978-3-531-16589-9 , p. 186 ff .
  55. ^ Christian Stegbauer: Wikipedia: The riddle of cooperation . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2009, ISBN 978-3-531-16589-9 , p. 190 ff .
  56. ↑ Chris Wilson: The Wisdom of the Chaperons: Digg, Wikipedia, and the myth of Web 2.0 democracy . February 22, 2008. Retrieved October 15, 2012.
  57. ^ Adrian Vermeule: Law and the limits of reason . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, pp. 53 .

Web links