Ernst Laas

Laas in his time in Strasbourg.

Ernst Laas (born June 16, 1837 Fürstenwalde / Spree ; † July 25, 1885 Strasbourg ) was a pedagogue , high school teacher , philosopher of positivism and professor of philosophy and pedagogy at the University of Strasbourg . The suggestions of the history of philosophy and sensualism were fundamental for his scientific work .

biography

Laas grew up as the son of master tailor Joh. Peter Laas (1807–57) and his wife Berta Ida Flora (1818–52), née. Beil, in Fürstenwalde in economically limited circumstances. The support of a General von Massow enabled him to attend the Joachimsthal Gymnasium . From 1854 to 1856 he worked as a private tutor. He then enrolled at the University of Berlin . He studied theology and philosophy with Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg . Trendelenburg was known for his knowledge of the history of philosophy. In his lectures he taught that a philosopher can learn a lot from the history of philosophy for himself and about the philosophizing of others. Laas received his doctorate in philosophy in 1859 with a thesis on The Moral Principle of Aristotle .

Former building of the Joachimthalschen Gymnasium, Berlin-Wilmerdorf, Bundesallee

In 1860 he became a teacher of German, Greek, Latin and Hebrew at the Friedrichs-Gymnasium Berlin and in 1868 at the Berlin Wilhelmsgymnasium . In 1861 he married his wife Martha (1839–1919), b. Vogeler. Both became parents of five sons. In 1872 he was given a chair in philosophy at the Kaiser Wilhelm University in Strasbourg , which was re-established after the war in 1871/72 , which he held until his death.

University of Strasbourg at the end of the 19th century.

In his lectures, he initially dealt with literary and cultural history (including Luther , Lessing , Herder and Goethe ) and educational topics. He read about pedagogy at the time of humanism and the Reformation , about pedagogical theories in ancient and modern times, as well as about upbringing and teaching. His lectures always contained philosophical elements. From 1878 he only read about philosophy and continued his education in mathematics and natural sciences.

One of his students, the philosopher Benno Kerry (1858–1889) from Vienna, published the literary estate after his death. Laas, wrote Kerry, published knowledgeable and detailed studies of the theoretical philosophy of his time, especially Kant. He also wrote his three-part main work "Idealism and Positivism", in which he spoke out in favor of positivism. For him, the facts of his positivism were the ideas that people develop through “perceiving” (Laas' spelling, which he kept throughout) or “feeling” about the world. He held this sensualistic or positivistic approach to the idealistic approach of the majority of his contemporaries as the philosophically superior and productive one. According to Laas, every fact that he claims can be checked by anyone - who wants to -, comment on them and develop their own.

Laas' positivist philosophy is said to have met with much approval in Strasbourg during his lifetime. But it also gave rise to controversial discussions about epistemology and moral philosophy . Laas z. B. asserted - similar to Hume and Mill - in contrast to representatives of the Kantian philosophy that human reason is incapable of producing ideas and concepts that guarantee the objectivity of our knowledge and moral action. People are always dependent on what they “perceive” and “feel”.

In 1882 the Neo-Kantian Windelband was appointed to Strasbourg. From his point of view, the positivist philosophy of Laas was a radical relativism , or anti-philosophical sophistry , the philosophical values, z. B. questioned objective knowledge and morals. Windelband therefore saw it - as Klaus Köhnke interpreted - as his 'missionary task' to restore the traditional German, ie above all Kantian and idealistic philosophy against Laas in Strasbourg. Politically - according to Köhnke - this was expressly supported by the ministry.

Positivist philosophizing

Historic occasions

Laas was independently philosophizing in exchange of ideas with philosophers of the 19th century. Since about 1830, positivism, in connection with the rise of other sciences and the collapse of German idealism, played an increasingly important role in philosophy. The neo-Kantians were busy bringing their philosophical role model up to date with current scientific developments and developing it further. They contradicted positivist philosophers from their point of view e.g. B. with this, without a priori assumptions, no judgments about facts are possible. This resulted in positivist thematizations of Kantian ideas among the neo-Kantians. It was discussed whether the a priori elements - e.g. B. Kant's terms and categories - should not also count as facts.

Laas held positivism for the "scientifically only legitimate" philosophy. This is namely free from the "arbitrary absolutes of speculative philosophy", especially Hegel's - according to Fr. Jacob Kohn in his dissertation on Laas' positivism - and uses the method of science currently practiced. With his three-volume publication Idealism and Positivism, Laas therefore attempted to establish a unified philosophy that also met the 'moral' requirements "on the solid basis of experience", or more precisely on the basis of sensual "perception". He also used terms such as facts, feelings, experiences and memories for this basis.

In the first volume of his trilogy, Laas presented interpretations of texts by Plato , Kant , non- Kantian philosophers and philosophers close to positivism, e.g. B. Condillacs , of the early modern period presented the general foundations of his positivism. He used a "historical-critical" method that he had learned from his teacher Trendelenburg . By distinguishing between the 'fundamental' of a philosophy and what is 'derived' from it, he concluded that in the history of philosophy there are really only two kinds of philosophies:

Namely a positivistic one, which starts from sensual "perceptions" or facts and rejects statements about the non-sensual, as well as an idealistic one, which - like z. B. Kant - from ontological instances, such as “reason” and ethical abstractions, such as the “ought”, which are present 'before every experience' ( a priori ) in human reason or understanding. Compared to the a priori, idealists only consider sensual "perceptions", "sensations" and "facts" to play a subordinate role. The first philosophy, which Laas also characterized as "sensualistic", can be traced back to Protagoras from Abdera and the second to Plato .

At first glance, according to Laas, it looks as if the “transcendental-philosophical twist ... seems to be far removed from the Platonic view”. At second glance, however, there is an “interesting relationship”. Do not the "laws of the understanding ... have something of the paradigmatic character of the Platonic ideas in themselves?" And does the central role of the a priori forms not result in parallel to the Platonic ideas "on the unconditional Unum et bonum (the one and the good)?"

At present, according to Laas, idealistic philosophy is not in a position to develop proposals that respond in a philosophically appropriate manner to the current state of scientific development. Instead of starting from "facts" or sensual "perceptions" like the other sciences, idealistic philosophers still built on systems of supernatural knowledge of the world - such as B. Representatives of the transcendental philosophy and the Hegelian philosophy - which are supposed to establish the certainty of scientific and everyday action. Kant's epistemology - as the discussions among philosophers of the 19th century showed - had only promised this certainty , but has not yet been able to deliver on what it promised. Laa's writings on Kant's Analogies of Experience (1876) and Kant's position in the history of the conflict between belief and knowledge (Berlin 1882) provide detailed information on this.

Laas saw himself following the philosophy of David Hume and especially that of John Stuart Mills and recommended positivism or sensualism as a desirable common direction for the philosophy of his time. Although he recognized the founder of positivism Auguste Comtes as a positivist, he missed explosive philosophical topics such as B. Statements about subject and object . He rejected Comte's other ideas - including his scientific theory. He also distanced himself from the religious ideas of the late Comte, which he considered "mythical and romantic".

Laa's positivist ideas were not discussed further after his death. Successors like Avenarius , Mach , Ostwald and Ratzenhofer completely ignored him. Laas was mentioned in Eisler's Philosophenlexikon and in Meyer's Grosse Konversations-Lexikon. In the common philosophical stories of the 20th century, there are no differentiated representations of his ideas.

About the philosophical and political explosiveness of his analysis, Laas wrote in the end of the 3rd volume of his trilogy:

• When I fundamentally opposed my philosophical convictions to Kant and Plato,
• "Seemed to be declaring war on idealism celebrated by innumerable voices",
• put my views in historical context with the largely contemptuous sophist Protagoras,
• 'betrayed a certain preference for the skeptic David Hume',
• called my philosophy positivism,

... I had to be prepared for “all kinds of misunderstandings and dialectical fencing tricks”.

But he does not regret having emphasized the contrast between idealism and positivism. On the contrary, he considers some life and world views, which are represented today in the name of idealistic philosophy, not only inaccurate, but even as "dangerous", even "culturally dangerous". The longer he pays attention to the use of the word “idealism”, especially in Germany, the more he notices that it is used as a “convenient use” by those who lack their own thoughts and knowledge or whose cause has “a rotten spot” . The word "idealism" always evokes "a blind feeling ... of benevolence". Nonetheless, he hoped that his presentation would contribute to an adequate understanding of the cause of positivist philosophy, even if he was assumed to be hostile to "the idol of national bias".

Sensualistic positivism

Laas saw the possibilities of philosophy fundamentally differently than the idealists Plato and Kant . The latter claimed that every human being had a spiritual faculty called reason. With this authority - according to Laas - from a historical perspective, Kant replaced the previous scholastic metaphysics with a different term. Sensualists or positivists deny instances such as God and reason and claim that all thinking, judging, and all ideas are based on “sensual sensations” or “perceptions” or “facts”. Idealists asserted against every experience that the authority “reason” determines thought and action and can judge everything, including that which a person has not yet experienced.

Positivists think sensualistically and proceed exclusively from what can be sensually experienced, from facts. The latter are - in contrast to the "nonsensual" of transcendental categories and platonic ideas - accessible to everyone and stimulate their own thoughts and actions. That which can be experienced through the senses or the world of matter and the natural sciences can be explained to a sufficient extent by mutually dependent factors. As Hume has already made clear, it is questionable to construct causal relationships and habitually hold them to be “true”.

From an idealistic point of view, however, the objection is that what can be sensually experienced is not suitable as a basis for research because it is constantly changing. This also applies to the psychological events or our “perception”, thinking, judging, feeling. Everything is in flux, as Heraclitus is said to have said. This statement was the reason for Plato to invent eternal, constant ideas. Kant's skepticism caused Hume to assert a priori, experience-free terms in order to generate certainty. With this, Laas concludes, both philosophers have left people to believe in their idealistic claims instead of guessing based on factual evidence.

For a positivist, “change” or “change” is an empirical fact that philosophy must accept and research if it wants to give scientific orientation to thought and action. The current scientific development shows that despite all changes and all changes, even despite all errors, there are useful research results. Idealistic claims to absoluteness ignored this. From our "perceptions", so Laas, memories and ideas arise, i. H. “Psychological 'realities'” with which we can work scientifically.

Among the changes in the world, Laas also included changes or variations in "perceptions". People don't just perceive facts as individually different. Even what is supposedly the same is "perceived" differently at different times. This is one of the strongest and generally understandable objections to idealism, which is based on the assumption that there are ideas or reason in humans that enables constant knowledge. Criticized the like, inter alia, Johann Ulrich from Jena one of the first and Kant known performers and contemporary Kant. Protagoras expressed this everyday experience or fact with his sentence Man is the measure of all things . Plato added the thought to this sentence - interpreting Protagoras - in Theaetetos 160c : Things are for me as they are for me and for you as they are for you.

If the - thus asserted - completely individual view of every person is a true fact, then any idealistic attempt would be superfluous - be it through some kind of doctrine of ideas or even more sophisticated transcendental philosophical constructions - to want to transform "perceptions" into the objective. He will show on the other “pages” that positivism can achieve something similar, but in a completely different way than usual.

According to Laas at the end of the first volume of his historical-critical analysis, his positivism is an idealism “entirely of this world”. The ideas he uses are, however, self-made and have their roots in sensual perceptions. They did not come from pure reason or the Platonic realm of ideas , but rather from very useful desires and human needs for an improvement in society.

Positivist ethics

The improvement of society was also the guiding principle of the ethics developed by Laas. It is about a religion-free 'morality drawn down into the earthly'. He considers it impossible that the different religions can contribute to peaceful coexistence. In addition, questions of faith cannot be answered scientifically.

In his view, it is unnecessary for citizens to belong to a religion. On the other hand, it is essential to instruct everyone to act morally. A morality that is valid for everyone can only be developed collectively, since individuals would be overwhelmed by it. Its ethics follow the "eudaimonistic principle". He characterizes this principle with the idea of ​​being able to lead the most fulfilling life possible both individually and with others. The concretization of this idea for his time, including prospects for conceivable further developments, are the subject of his "ethics".

Exclusion of existing moral concepts

Laas claims about current and past moral concepts that above all they lack a philosophically and logically tenable foundation and that they get stuck in the moral standards of their respective time. This applies to all views that assume that innate nature enables man to make morally correct decisions and to act accordingly, as was the case for Aristotle and the philosophers who followed him.

Similar errors would result in Christian philosophers assuming a “pure ideal person” who could act morally correctly if he only wanted to and therefore also able to make morally correct decisions for social policy. This applies e.g. B. for Herder , Fichte and Schiller . Because of its fundamental ambiguities, this assertion is not socially acceptable, says Laas, and it is a fuel for incalculable social conflicts.

Laas also admits that the “instinctive moral concepts” of English thinkers, such as those of the Platonist Shaftesbury and the Enlightener Hutcheson, are unclear . It is merely stated that moral judgments 'occur with instinctive immediacy'. What conditions these moral judgments obey will forever remain hidden. In this way, the individual is neither able to control his actions nor to think about it.

Kant's moral approach fails because of the unproven assertion that reason, autonomous and free from immorality, together with the will, enables ethical action. Kant does not make it clear how people can be induced to take moral actions, other than to demand that they be made compulsory, including Christian beliefs. He used terms such as "transcendental freedom" and the formal Golden Rule , which express Platonic-Aristotelian views. However, it is a fact of history and human behavior, according to Laas, that the moral law is based “in what is culturally acquired, in solidarity and justice” and not in unprovable pure reason.

Ethics as wisdom

Laas characterizes his ethics as "practical wisdom". This wisdom “sets the pleasure and utility of the subject with the pleasure and utility of all others in that equilibrium which produces the highest bliss of the whole”. This is how Laas describes both the process and the current situation of individual and social ethics. Moral action develops human skills and follows maxims that result from human experience and with "probability" guarantee common happiness. The corrections are made which, according to human judgment, presumably perfect pleasure and benefit. The possible consequences of the respective decisions are considered together in order to continuously develop the moral behavior of all people.

Forerunner of his ethics

Laas names the moral theories of the Epicureans and Jeremy Bentham as models for his ethics.

According to Laas, the Epicureans did the preparatory work for his positivist ethics with their ethics. For the Epicureans, ethics are committed to the love of life. Socially, it functions as a “creation of needs” and “utility agreements” in order to protect people from harm. Morally correct is therefore that which protects the individual from harm and benefits society. If moral laws are deficient here, they must be improved.

The most successful further development of Epicurean ethics to date has been made by Jeremy Bentham. He expands the sympathetic and friendly impulses of the Epicureans to a "universal philanthropy". The individual ethic that Bentham calls 'private ethics' is realized in the context of the development of social policy and legislation. Bentham's idea that morally good is combined with what has been calculated wisely is believed by Laas to be a mistake. He assumes that current morality can be linked to the valuations and formulations of history. In general and in essence, they had the right thing in mind and in the majority of cases also hit them. As a result, in contrast to Bentham, he sticks to the mandatory term “You should!”.

Ideals of his ethics

Laas defines morality or ethics as the "science of ideals" of his practical wisdom. These ideals are the highest good, the highest duty and the highest virtue.

• The highest good is the greatest possible painlessness and the greatest excess of pleasure for all sentient beings.
• The highest human duty is to act in such a way that this good can develop as expediently as possible.
• The highest human virtue is a character form or, more contemporary, an individual behavior that can produce these ideals as perfectly as possible.

It is the task of private and public education to develop this behavior without coercion. What is morally valuable in each case, moral duties and virtues are content-related tasks that people have to solve together.

Morality is a social function. According to Laas, it is shaped by the demands of others and the needs of each individual. So the starting point for the implementation of his ideals is the currently valid morality or the practiced moral and self-evident behavior. They must be checked to see how far they are in the individual and common interest. Moral education must not only get along without violence and coercion, but also, if everyone should respect moral rights and duties, everyone must also be able to make decisions about them.

Objectivity of morality

The distinction "objectively valuable" is only given to those values ​​that are 'in the well-understood overall interest of a larger number of sentient beings'. This 'very simple idea' justifies 'the indissoluble unity of duties and rights' and is derived exclusively from human 'needs and interests'. A truly objective moral value is e.g. B. the desire of all people to limit the arbitrariness of individuals and groups.

Laas' definition of "objective" follows his view that subject and object are inextricably linked. He called this correlativism . In this sense, objectivity is a functioning, coherent subject-object relation. Laas also calls this type of objectivity “subject objectivism”. In doing so, he also clarifies the connection that exists between his idea of ​​objectivity and that of Protagoras . Something similar can be found with Arthur Schopenhauer , for whom “will” and “imagination” are a mutually enabling basis in order to grasp and shape the world.

Morality needs cooperation

The moral development of the individual and of society depends on everyone working together. Small, manageable partnerships provide the first important suggestions. The more people join together in well-organized cooperations and feel solidarity, the higher the average chance of increasing happiness for the individual. The highest form of cooperation is all of humanity, including the animals that they have “trained and bred” and are supposed to serve it. Social organizations continuously work out the progressive development of a fulfilling life (eudaimonia) for everyone. In this, they are to be supported by the development of socio-political techniques: "It is up to sociopolitical technology to bring the legal and duty delimitations that are necessary to increase the commune bonum ever more securely to light and implement."

Morality has history

The respective goal of the applicable morality is subject to social development, which pursues the highest level of satisfaction "without knowing what makes this satisfaction possible". The level of moral culture that is currently achievable therefore consists “of attempts to delimit freedoms and necessary tasks from one another, so that overall an increase in happiness seems to be achievable for many”. It is only in the course of historical development that people will improve their sense of what is generally benevolent and their insight into the best means, so that the sufferings become less and the joys greater.

Epistemology

In modern times, scientists had created epistemology as the fundamental discipline of science. In Locke's time, according to Richard Rorty , it was an empirical project and had the task of justifying the sciences that had arisen since the Renaissance 'from below' through the senses. The scholastic schools had previously founded the sciences 'from above', from God and from reason. Epistemology, as Locke thought, should be a 'natural philosophy': Scientific research should clarify what the human mind can know, judge and know.

About 100 years after Locke, at the time of Laas, the epistemological project in Germany was again guided by idealistic, Kantian or post-Kantian ideas. For these idealists, or for all “anti-sensualist directions” as Laas also calls them, all ideas, ideas and actions arise from the mental faculty that they call reason. Reason guarantees the objective validity of philosophical statements if they are formulated according to correct logical laws in cooperation with the a priori concepts. Reason put not only philosophers but all people in a position to be able to make correct judgments about every possible experience as well as about that which cannot be experienced.

Sensualists like Protagoras and positivists like him, Laas notes, consider these idealistic claims to be unfounded. From his point of view, they are, among other things, the result of the Platonic construct 'absolute certainty', the 'innate ideas'. In view of the scientific standards of the 19th century, this should be considered obsolete. With regard to the actions and thoughts of people, Laas even describes this idea as a 'harmful error': it ultimately ignores what people perceive. No requirement of reason could change the fact that the facts ("perceptions") are as they are, says Laas. Positivists - like Berkeley, Locke and Hume - start from "perceptions" and accept that what people "perceive" is relative and changeable. Unlike idealists, however, positivists hold on to the fact that this reality can be scientifically worked on.

Facts of human knowledge

It is part of every person's wealth of experience to have repeatedly experienced that the continuity of our "perceptions" or our thinking is constantly interrupted. We notice that the impressions of different senses get mixed up and combine. We experience that memories, fantasies, scraps of thought slip between every thought process. Nevertheless, people have always been able to do science. Because people, according to Laas, have no problem with their “perceptions”, judgments and feelings constantly changing.

In everyday life, people deal with their "perceptions" or changes in facts in the following tried and tested way:

1. They are mainly based on their "perceptions". Errors are easily resolved by further "perceptions". Other people give us clues about it. So everyone can easily learn to differentiate between real and assumed ideas or “perceptions”.
2. Overall, the world shows sufficient constancy so that people can act to adapt to changes. Scientifically fruitful are all distinctions that improve our ability to “find our way in the world of the manifold”, to understand its laws and to make prognoses.
3. Changes do not confuse, they are accepted as facts.
4. "Perceptions" of every kind are related to each other and thus result in a coherent world. Laas explains this fact using correlativity. An objectivity that creates coherence through the interaction of all facts of all people.

Scientific knowledge

Science now takes up all more or less superficial and coincidental or only the individual “perceptions” and checks them. By systematically observing, either directly or through the media, they try to “establish basic scientific facts”.

Scientists live with probabilities. They assume there is no certainty. "They are used to starting with provisional matters and gradually looking for the definitive." To do this, they conclude from changing relationships that their research objects have changed according to law. Under the current scientific conditions, they combine the different individual views in a consistent idea of ​​the subject. “The formal truth” remains unaffected by this. It compares something under abstract conditions - e.g. B. with mathematical means - which in concrete terms is incomparable. In addition, science can hypothetically or fictitiously resolve what is “perceptible” (e.g. atomic theory).

Private and scientific evaluations of facts are the result of “cumbersome train of thought”. They are based on arbitrary taste judgments or on suspected effects. Positivists evaluate research results according to the highest mutual benefit. But even they cannot say what this actually consists of. What is useful for everyone must therefore be continuously researched together -

According to Laas, all distinctions that improve our ability to “find our way in the world of the manifold”, to understand its laws and to make prognoses should also be scientifically fruitful. Every conceptual differentiation and categorization serve the development of the sciences. The idea of ​​researching human abilities, because they are fundamental conditions of all sciences, was also suggested to all modern philosophers by David Hume in his "Treatise on Human Nature". The similarity with Hume's phenomenology of the human mind, in particular that of the human "taking warnings" through "impressions", shows itself in the epistemology of Laas. The terms and facts used by Laas are not only linguistically related to Hume's sensualistic thinking, they are presumably also comparable in substance.

Foundations of his epistemology

In his epistemology, Laas is based exclusively on "sensations". From these, both from his and from the point of view of other sensualists such as Locke , Comte , Hume and Condillac, ideas and facts develop that people orientate themselves on. Reason plays a subordinate role for Laas. He considers her - as Hume put it - to be 'the slave of sensations'. Above all, it serves logical thinking. An epistemology serving action, however, is not made possible by reason. From a positivist point of view, 'sensations' are fundamental to this. From a neurophysiological point of view, they have the character of 'physical side effects' of cognition.

Laas uses the terms “sensations”, “perceptions” and “facts” synonymously. These do not designate “knowledge”, but that which precedes and conditions all knowledge for a lifetime. The modern idealistic epistemology, whose main exponent - according to Laas - is Kant with his transcendental-philosophical variant of rational idealism, assumes something subordinate, something genetically later, namely 'reason' and declares this to be the spiritual "court of justice" that judges all knowledge.

"Pure reason" provides Kant with all the means of knowledge in order to know the world, with the participation of sensual events. He ignores the fact that the world is always present to us through “temperature, touch and pressure sensations”. Rather, Kant pretended “as if the mind were always present as 'substance' in consciousness; and as if the I were more present ... than ... the ever-present sensations of touch and pressure on our skin. ”Correspondingly, in the first preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, he had that of Locke in his essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690 ) devalued the “Physiology of the Human Mind” because Locke derived it “from the mob of common experience”.

In 1877, a reviewer for the Jenaer Literaturzeitung recommended that the Kantian apriorists of his time face this "powerful attack on the transcendental hypothesis". According to the reviewer, it could be that in the criticism by Laas “a turning point in the development of the currently so much worked on theory of knowledge” was given. The prevailing epistemology seems to have 'noticed' this possible “turning point” as a “blind spot” of one's own knowledge: In contrast to Laas, it insists in an inexpedient way that subject and object are not only separated from one another, but that the object must be an "independent item" in all respects.

Correlativism

The term correlativism has disappeared from the philosophical discussion for more than 100 years. The associated basic meaning, as used by Laas, can be found under the correlation of measured variables and functions in mathematics and statistics.

Event instead of substance

Laas's positivist philosophy is anti-metaphysical and anti-rationalist. That means, Laas starts with people, their needs and ideals. Laas sees this philosophical approach expressed for the first time in Protagoras . In a publication from 1884 it was said that it was rightly asserted that the "positivist-style line of thought of Protagoras" was reminiscent of modern positivist currents.

"Similar to Hume", Laas sees "in the 'world' nothing more than the epitome of sensory or perception realities and possibilities". For him, behind these realities there is “no object 'in itself' and no transcendent 'matter'.” For idealists such as metaphysicians and rationalists, on the other hand, the world consists of two substances, namely of 'matter' and 'spirit'. Laas only looks at 'subjective states (feelings) and sensations'. Similar to what the anti-metaphysicists Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach do after him .

In contrast to the Kantian theory, people do not need any 'transcendental forms of intuition' for the idea of ​​an extended world. According to Laas, the idea of ​​expansion is acquired through the senses from birth. Everyone can therefore inevitably think of space for himself “with regard to the position of his body and his living conditions. These ideas never leave him in his life ”.

Experience wholeness

For his theory of knowledge, Laas always starts from physical events, while Kant bases it on rational definitions. This causes the pronounced difference between the two theories. The subject-object relation is for Laas "correlative" ( today 'correlative' ). That is, subject and object are not - as Kant thought - absolute "existences" that stand for themselves, but rather 'both are correlative phenomena: they are "moments" of an "experiential wholeness". The ego also has no 'transcendent existence': It lives “through the actual and conceivable connections of the momentarily present, the experienced and the palpable.” ... Hence “the present moment is the most certain; and in the same there is always the correlation ... between the self and the world: none of these moments is without the other. "

Subject and object jointly create “the object of perception on the one hand, and perception on the other hand” as a psychological state. The generating processes are in uninterrupted flow and have 'an existence that varies from moment to moment'. They are "... inseparable twins, stand and fall with each other". According to Laas, however, his theory of knowledge is no longer “ subjectivism , but ... subject objectivism; strictly speaking it is not relativism , but correlativism. "

With the latter, Laas also replies to an allegation of the idealistic philosophy of his time that positivism was nothing but “a new edition of egoism or solipsism ”. Using the means of idealistic epistemology, she criticizes the fact that positivistic facts are merely mental representations of consciousness without reference to the transcendent or transcendental object. Laas contradicts this assumption with references to the completely different framework of his philosophizing - among other things, the separation of mind and body cannot be demonstrated phenomenally for him. He is concerned with the individual and society, "with the present and its current interests". For this, spiritual facts, ideas and "perceptions" that people use are axiomatically indispensable.

One of his interpreters, Dragischa Gjurits, states: "We can turn things around as we want, the fact remains that we can never get epistemologically out of correlativism". Correlativism - he also notes - is a central axis of all of Laas' philosophical views around which they revolve.

Reform of language teaching

Teaching and cultural advancement

Laas campaigned for thorough reforms of all existing higher education institutions, especially the grammar schools. According to Laas, the centuries-old, scholastic form of education still prevails there, believing it to get by without connection to life and instead practicing the exclusive imparting of theoretical book knowledge. He published the ideas he had tried out in 1872 in Der deutsche Studium auf higher Lehranstalten . He emphasized that his reform proposals were long overdue consequences of the changed socio-political conditions. This resulted in a book that he had sorely missed as a young teacher.

Modernization of language didactics

From his point of view, the obsolete teaching content resulted from the fact that the curricula that were still valid in his time had already been created in the 16th century. At that time, the reformer Melanchthon determined the content and methods of teaching according to the time requirements. As in the Middle Ages, Latin remained a subject and language of instruction. At the time, this corresponded to the importance of Latin as the language of science and as a pan-European lingua franca. These conditions no longer exist today. The national languages ​​would have replaced Latin in science, social intercourse and literature.

The changing role of teaching Latin

The old curricula have not yet been changed. This is now leading to criticism and resentment of the methods and content used on the part of many who are involved in the teaching of the school. Above all, the outdated curricula prevented the higher education institutions from developing into general educational institutions that were supposed to serve the learning needs and interests of the people of their time. The pupils who wanted to practice the teaching profession benefited most. But Latin is no longer the language of the scientific and educated world. It is therefore no longer up-to-date, so Laas described with reference to the conditions in schools when pupils in the Abitur examination failed due to a certain number of errors in grammatical Latin exams.

Interpret instead of imitation

He proposed far-reaching changes that were controversial in the discussion of the time: above all, a reduction in grammar and formal style exercises in the ancient language subjects. The last suggestion referred specifically to the teaching practice of having students give their own texts, formulated and memorized from templates, as “lectures” in front of the class. Laas gave these "lectures" because of their poor quality and minimal learning incentives for wasted time. Instead of such formal content, the interpretation of the content of ancient writers, including the texts of contemporary German-speaking authors, should determine the teaching. In this way, the students could also learn to write really independent texts. Laas had the personal development of the students in mind, which was not adequately promoted within the framework of the previous curricula. Laas had already explained this idea in detail in 1868 in The German Essay in the First High School Class (Prima.) And supplemented it with materials.

Fonts

• Eudaimonia Aristotelis in ethicis principium quid velit et valeat . Berlin 1859.
• Aristotelian text studies . Berlin 1863. Digital reader
• The German essay in the first high school class (Prima) a manual for teachers and students containing theory and materials . Berlin 1868. Digital reader
• Goethe and Alsace . Leipzig 1871.
• German teaching at higher educational establishments . Berlin 1872. Digital reader
• The pedagogy of Johannes Sturm . Berlin 1872.
• Gymnasium and Realschule: old questions, historically and critically re-examined in consideration of the upcoming Prussian education law . Berlin 1875.
• Kant's Analogies of Experience: A Critical Study of the Foundations of Theoretical Philosophy , 1876.
• Idealism and positivism . 3 parts. Berlin 1879–84.
  • First part: principles of idealism and positivism . Berlin 1879. Digitized
  • Second part: idealistic and positivistic ethics . Berlin 1882. Digitized
  • Third part: idealistic and positivistic epistemology . Berlin 1884. Digitized

• The causality of the ego . Quarterly journal for scientific philosophy, Vol. 4. Leipzig 1880. Digitized
• Kant's position in the history of the conflict between belief and knowledge: a study . Berlin 1882.
• On the question of women . Berlin 1883.
• Literary estate , ed. by Benno Kerry. Vienna 1887

literature

• Rudolf Lehmann : The German teaching: a method for higher educational institutions . Berlin 1897. Reprint of the 3rd neub. Ed. 1909, (TP Verone) Cyprus 2016.
• Dragischa Gjurits (* 1871): The epistemology of Ernst Laas . A representation of correlativism. Inaugural dissertation to obtain a doctorate in philosophy. Leipzig 1902 ( online in the Internet Archive).
• Rudolf Hanisch: The Positivism of Ernst Laas. Hall 1902.
• Pinchas Jacob Kohn: The Positivism of Ernst Laas . Inaugural dissertation from the high philosophical faculty of the University of Bern. Scheitlin, Spring & Cie., Bern 1907 ( online in the Internet Archive).
• Katharina Awakowa-Sakijewa: The epistemology of Ernst Laas. Zurich 1916.
• Friedbart Holz:  Laas, Ernst. In: New German Biography (NDB). Volume 13, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1982, ISBN 3-428-00194-X , p. 359 f. ( Digitized version ).
• Laas, Ernst . In: Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon . 6th edition. Volume 12, Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig / Vienna 1908, pp.  2–3 .
• Lucia Grunicke: The Concept of Fact in the Positivist Philosophy of the 19th Century. Tubingen 1930.
• Ludwig Salamonowicz: The ethics of positivism after Ernst Laas. Diss. Berlin 1935.
• Nikolaus Koch: The relationship between Ernst Laas and Kant's epistemology: a contribution to the history of positivism in Germany. Dissertation Cologne 1939.

Web links

• Literature by and about Ernst Laas in the catalog of the German National Library
• Works by and about Ernst Laas  in the German Digital Library
• Works by and about Ernst Laas in the University Library Vienna (EoD)
• Rudolf Eisler : Philosophers Lexicon . Berlin 1912. zeno.org

Individual evidence

1. ↑ See Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg: Historical contributions to philosophy . Berlin 1846, p. VII. Digisat
2. ↑ Cf. Benno Kerry Introduction to: Ernst Laas: Literarischer Nachlass . Vienna 1887, reprint of the 1902 edition by Nabu public Domain Reprints 2012, pp. 5–6.
3. ↑ Friedbart Holz:  Laas, Ernst. In: New German Biography (NDB). Volume 13, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1982, ISBN 3-428-00194-X , p. 359 f. ( Digitized version ).
4. ↑ Cf. Benno Kerry Introduction to: Ernst Laas: Literarischer Nachlass . Vienna 1887, reprint of the 1902 edition by Nabu public Domain Reprints 2012, pp. 7–8.
5. ^ Klaus Christian Köhnke: Neo-Kantianism between positivism and idealism? In: Hübinger / Bruch / Graf (eds.): Culture and cultural sciences around 1900: Idealism and posivisimus . Stuttgart 1997, pp. 41-52.
6. ↑ See Johannes Hirschberger : Small history of philosophy . 6th edition Freiburg 1966, p. 167.
7. ↑ Cf. Gerhard Lehmann : History of Philosophy . Berlin 1953, Vol. IX, pp. 85f. - See also Moritz Schlick : Positivism and Realism . In: Knowledge 3, 1932, pp. 1–31.
8. ↑ Pinchas Jacob Kohn: The positivism of Ernst Laas . Inaugural dissertation from the high philosophical faculty of the University of Bern. Scheitlin, Spring & Cie., Bern 1907 ( online in the Internet Archive).
9. ^ Cf. Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, p. 273. - 'War perception' is the spelling used throughout by Laas.
10. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, p. 4. - Also A. Trendelenburg: About the final difference between the philosophical systems . Historical contributions to philosophy. Vol. II, Berlin 1855, p. 1.
11. ↑ Cf. on the fundamental contrast in philosophy, Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, pp. 4-6.
12. ↑ Spelling Laas.
13. ↑ Cf. on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, pp. 69-73.
14. ↑ Protagoras expressly rejected religion and metaphysics as not belonging to philosophy. Cf. Alexander Riistow: Location of the present: a universal historical cultural criticism . Münster 2003, p. 114.
15. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, p. 72.
16. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, I, p. 15.
17. ↑ ^{a b} Ernst Laas: Kant's Analogies of Experience . A critical study of the foundations of theoretical philosophy. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin 1876 ( online in the Internet Archive).
18. ↑ Pinchas Jacob Kohn: The positivism of Ernst Laas . Inaugural dissertation from the high philosophical faculty of the University of Bern. Scheitlin, Spring & Cie., Bern 1907 ( online in the Internet Archive).
19. ^ Cf. Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, p. 184.
20. ↑ See Ludwig Stein : The social optimism (1905). Reprint Kessinger 2010, p. 178.
21. ^ Rudolf Eisler (philosopher) : Philosopher Lexicon . Berlin 1912, pp. 371-373 ( zeno.org ).
22. ↑ Laas, Ernst . In: Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon . 6th edition. Volume 12, Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig / Vienna 1908, pp.  2–3 .
23. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume III, pp. 665f.
24. ↑ Spelling of Laas.
25. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume III, pp. 2-5.
26. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume III, 5.
27. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, p. 230.
28. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume III, p. 8.
29. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, p. 232.
30. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume III, p. 12.
31. ↑ Laas occasionally referred to the pages of his publication as described by him as “leaves”.
32. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume I, pp. 272-75.
33. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume II, p. 229.
34. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume II, p. 98.
35. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume II, p. 293.
36. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume II, p. 224.
37. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume II, pp. 109-113.
38. ↑ ^{a b} Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume II, p. 117.
39. ↑ Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume II, p. 142f, as well as p. 52, note 5 and p. 102, note 3.
40. ↑ See the whole section, Laas: Idealism and Positivism . Volume II, pp. 159-169.
41. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism . Volume II, p. 291.
42. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism. Volume II, 181 f.
43. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism. Volume II, 182.
44. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism. Volume II, 207 f.
45. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism. Volume II, 293.
46. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism. Volume II, 209.
47. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism. Volume II, 211-215.
48. ↑ Laas, loc. Cit
49. ↑ Dragischa Gjurits (* 1871): The epistemology of Ernst Laas . A representation of correlativism. Inaugural dissertation to obtain a doctorate in philosophy. Oswald Schmidt, Leipzig 1902, p. 10-20; 46 ( online in the Internet Archive).
50. ↑ See also Johannes Volkelt: Arthur Schopenhauer . 1923 n.d., p. 89 ff.
51. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism. Volume II, 221.
52. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism. Volume II, 219 f.
53. ↑ Laas, Idealism and Positivism. Volume II, 223.
54. ↑ See Locke: Laas, I, 63f. - Richard Rorty: The mirror of nature . Frankfurt a. M. 2008, pp. 149-166, ibs. S. 156. - Wolfgang Röd: The way of philosophy. Munich 1996, pp. 63-66. Locke's successors z. B. Berkeley and Hume each followed this path in their own way.
55. ↑ See, inter alia, Laas I, p. 58 f; 68 ff; 126 ff; ders. III, p. 5; 314-318;
56. ↑ See Laas III, p. 438 f.
57. ↑ Laas III, p. 459.
58. ↑ Laas III, pp. 2-6.
59. ↑ Laas III, pp. 10-14.
60. ↑ See Laas III, p. 30
61. ↑ See Laas III, p. 15 f.
62. ↑ See Laas III, pp. 19-22.
63. ↑ See Laas III, p. 24.
64. ↑ See Laas III, p. 25 f.
65. ↑ See David Hume: A Treatise on Human Nature I, Introduction, 4.
66. ↑ See Laas III, p. 30.
67. ↑ Dragischa Gjurits (* 1871): The epistemology of Ernst Laas . A representation of correlativism. Inaugural dissertation to obtain a doctorate in philosophy. Oswald Schmidt, Leipzig 1902, p. 14 ( online in the Internet Archive).
68. ↑ See Wilhelm Windelband : Textbook of the History of Philosophy . Tübingen 1912, 6th edition, p. 547.
69. ↑ Cf. Laas Vol. III, p. 151 and Alexander Bain : Geist und Körper . Leipzig 1881, p. 52. Epistemology also raised questions about the relationship between physiological and mental processes. See also pp. 1-5.
70. ↑ See Laas III, 151.
71. ↑ See Laas III, 53 f.
72. ↑ See Laas III, 48.
73. ↑ Laas III, 36.
74. ↑ See Kant: Kr.drV A IX u. Laas III, 63. In this context is the 1876 publication of Laas: Kant's Analogies of Experience . revealing. Here Laas discusses the deficits of the Kantian philosophy and the very different foundations of his positivist philosophy. Full text at archive.org
75. ^ The 3rd successor to the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung , published between 1874–1879. Jena literary newspaper
76. ↑ C. Schaarschmidt: Review of Ernst Laas: Kant's Analogies of Experience . Jenaer Literaturzeitung 1877, No. 5, p. 75.
77. ↑ See e.g. B. Heinrich Rickert: The object of knowledge. Tübingen and Leipzig 1904, p. 125.
78. ↑ Adolf Harpf: The ethics of Protagoras and their twofold moral justification . Heidelberg 1884, p. 3.
79. ↑ Cf. Laas, III, p. 43 and 46.
80. ↑ Dragischa Gjurits (* 1871): The epistemology of Ernst Laas . A representation of correlativism. Inaugural dissertation to obtain a doctorate in philosophy. Oswald Schmidt, Leipzig 1902, p. 57 f . ( online in the Internet Archive).
81. ↑ See Laas, III, 45 f.
82. ↑ Laas, III, p. 47.
83. ↑ Cf. Laas, III, p. 48. - The term “experience-based wholeness” can be found in Felix Krueger: On the philosophy and psychology of wholeness . Berlin / Göttingen / Heidelberg 1953, p. 262. Krueger thus describes the "interaction of all experiences, including the aftermath of past ones, and (it) is rooted in the entire organism"
84. ↑ Laas, ibid.
85. ↑ See Laas, I, p. 178f.
86. ↑ Laas, I, p. 181 f.
87. ↑ See Laas, III, 35.
88. ↑ Laas, I, p. 17.
89. ↑ See Laas, I, p. 51.
90. ↑ Dragischa Gjurits (* 1871): The epistemology of Ernst Laas . A representation of correlativism. Inaugural dissertation to obtain a doctorate in philosophy. Oswald Schmidt, Leipzig 1902, p. 60 ( online in the Internet Archive).
91. ↑ Dragischa Gjurits (* 1871): The epistemology of Ernst Laas . A representation of correlativism. Inaugural dissertation to obtain a doctorate in philosophy. Oswald Schmidt, Leipzig 1902, p. 60 ( online in the Internet Archive): “the consideration of Lass' epistemology, correlativism resp. of the subject-objectivism, around which, as around a central axis, all other philosophical views of Laas revolve. "
92. ↑ Ernst Laas: German teaching at higher educational establishments . A critical organizational attempt. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin 1872, p. VI ( online in the Internet Archive): "How often did I look for it myself in the early days of my educational work and sorely miss it!"
93. ↑ Ernst Laas: German teaching at higher educational establishments . A critical organizational attempt. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin 1872, p. 4th f . ( P. 4/5 online in the Internet Archive).
94. ↑ Ernst Laas: German teaching at higher educational establishments . A critical organizational attempt. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin 1872, p. 25 ( p. 24/25 online in the Internet Archive): “Latin has long since lost its dominant position over all modern languages. [...] Latin has finally lost its place among scholars too. "
95. ↑ Cf. Rudolf Lehmann : The German teaching: a method for higher educational institutions . Berlin 1897. Reprint of the 3rd neub. Edition 1909, TP Verone Cyprus 2016, p. 107.
96. ↑ See Laas: German teaching at higher educational establishments . Berlin 1872, pp. IV-VI. Citation p. VI., Pp. 3-40.
97. ↑ Ernst Laas: German teaching at higher educational establishments . A critical organizational attempt. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin 1872 ( online in the Internet Archive).