Ilısu Dam

Ilısu Dam
	Location of the planned dam in southeastern Turkey
Location:	Southeast Anatolia , Turkey
Drain:	Tigris
	Turkey
Coordinates	37 ° 34 ′ 0 ″ N , 41 ° 54 ′ 0 ″ E Coordinates: 37 ° 34 ′ 0 ″ N , 41 ° 54 ′ 0 ″ E
	Data on the structure
Construction time:	2007–2015 [obsolete] (planned)
Height above foundation level :	135 m
Crown length:	1820 m
Power plant output:	1200 MW
	Data on the reservoir
Water surface	313 km²
Storage space	10.4 billion m³

The Ilisu dam is part of the Southeastern Anatolia Project ( Turkish Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi ( GAP )) of the Turkish government. With it, the Tigris is to be dammed shortly before the border with Syria and Iraq in the southeast of the country for the operation of a hydropower plant and for water level regulation.

The project is highly controversial regionally, nationally and internationally. One of the main points of criticism is that the town of Hasankeyf and other archaeological sites will be flooded when it goes into operation. The Mesopotamian swamps in Iraq, which are considered the biblical "Garden of Eden", have been part of the UNESCO World Heritage since 2016 and could also be affected by river regulation.

After a first attempt failed due to fierce international protest in 2002, the project was relaunched in 2005 and signed in 2007. In July 2009, Germany, Austria and Switzerland stopped their export risk insurances because they saw requirements for environmental and cultural property protection as not being met.

The regional-political dimension of the project extends to the water scarcity in the region and the associated power position of the water suppliers. The majority of the Kurds live in the region, some of whom are striving for autonomy. The planned Ilisu dam is about 65 kilometers from the Turkish-Syrian border . Stopping the water would affect Syria and Iraq; the rivers Euphrates and Tigris are dependent on Turkish water.

The first electricity production took place on May 19, 2020 with the commissioning of a first turbine.

The project

Key data

The Tigris is to be dammed with an 1820 m wide and 135 m high embankment. This creates a 313 km² reservoir over a length of 135 km with a storage volume of 10,400 million cubic meters. The water is to be used primarily to generate electricity. The planned output of the hydropower plant is 1200 MW, the annual electricity production is to be 3,833 GWh. The Ilısu Dam would thus contribute 16 percent to the GAP's electricity production and 3.2 percent to Turkey's total energy production. The construction costs are estimated at around 1.2 billion euros. The site of the planned dam is in southeastern Anatolia about 65 km upstream from the Syrian border in an area inhabited by Kurds. In 2010, Turkey expected it to go into operation at the end of 2014 ^[obsolete] . The project has been delayed further. In October 2019 it became known that Hasankeyf was to be flooded in a few months and that some of the residents had moved to Neu-Hasankeyf.

History and first consortium

The construction of the Ilısu Dam was discussed as early as the 1950s. However, the implementation of the plans was not started until 1997 due to disagreements about the final project design and questions regarding funding. A consortium was commissioned with the construction, which consisted of the following companies: The Swiss companies Sulzer Hydro (now Andritz Hydro ) and ABB (later Alstom ) (both responsible for the delivery of the electromechanical equipment for the project), the British construction company Balfour Beatty , the Italian Impregilo , Skanska from Sweden and the Turkish construction companies Nurol , Kiska and Tekfen . A German subsidiary of Sulzer Hydro was to supply turbines and generators. The UBS took over the financing.

The World Bank has rejected the project because of its environmental and social impact. The consortium therefore turned to export credit agencies (ECAs) to hedge the financial risk . Due to massive public criticism of the project planning, based on the environmental impact assessment and expert opinion on the resettlement problem, four conditions of the ECAs were announced in December 1999 as a prerequisite for a positive guarantee:

Creation of a relocation plan according to international standards
Provision of sewage treatment plants to ensure water quality
Insurance for adequate water drainage
Planning to preserve Hasankeyf's archaeological heritage

After the preparation of a second environmental impact assessment and further studies by a broad coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in April 2001, it became apparent that the project violated a large number of World Bank and OECD regulations and that the requirements of the ECAs would not be met. In the course of this, Balfour Beatty, Impregilo, Skanska and UBS announced their withdrawal from the project. In February 2002, the first attempt to build the Ilısu Dam failed.

Second consortium

In autumn 2003, the Turkish government started negotiations again with VA Tech Hydro (formerly Sulzer Hydro), the old consortium leader . At this point in time a new consortium had already been formed, which in 2007 consisted of the following companies: Andritz Hydro (Austria), Alstom, Stucky, Colenco and Maggia (Switzerland), Ed. Züblin AG (Germany) and Nurol, Cengiz , Çelikler un Temelsu (Turkey).

The fact that the Turkish government and the consortium are not interested in a dialogue with the public is evident from the largely hidden preparations for the construction. Few details about the project and its planning were made generally available; According to some NGOs, information about the environmental impact assessment, which was revised in November 2005, and the relocation plan again revealed glaring deficiencies.

Despite the shortcomings that the project has made public by various non-governmental organizations, the three ECAs of Germany ( Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs AG ), Switzerland ( SERV ) and Austria ( OeKB ) decided at the end of March 2007 to grant export credits of over 450 million euros for take over the Ilısu Dam project. This funding was tied to the fulfillment of 153 World Bank criteria with regard to the issues of cultural property and environmental protection as well as human rights, which Turkey was to fulfill within 180 days.

An expert report commissioned by the governments of Germany, Austria and Switzerland came to a damning verdict in 2008. Turkey ignores almost all of the 153 requirements that it should have met by contract by the end of 2007 and is deliberately violating agreements with mass expropriations. Information and consultation of the population “did not take place as requested”. The search for new land for the farmers has not started. The planned channels for complaints had not been created. Not even the total number of people being resettled - the experts estimated them to be at least 55,000 - could not have given them the name of the Turks. The report immediately called for a "massive training program for the Turkish authorities" and the recruitment of 200 resettlement experts. There is still no map material for the excavation sites and there is still no study as to whether the fragile structures can be moved at all.

As a result, the delivery consortium was instructed in December 2008 by the export credit insurers in Germany, Austria and Switzerland to suspend the contracts for the project for 180 days - until July 6, 2009. This stopped the construction work that had already started.

On July 7th, 2009 the export risk agencies of Germany, Austria and Switzerland announced that they were withdrawing from the project because the requirements for environmental and cultural property protection had not been met.

Further development

In February 2010, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan announced that his government had found new creditors and that the dam could be built.

In January 2013, the country's highest administrative court suspended construction due to a lack of environmental regulations.

Turkey's goals

Due to the development spurts, the energy demand in Turkey is also increasing. The estimates assume an increase of between 6.4 and 7.9 percent per year. According to the consortium, investments in hydropower, the energy yield of which is around 25 percent across the country, result in the following economic benefits:

Sustainable economic growth and strengthening exports
More independence from foreign oil suppliers
The relocation, improvement and rebuilding of settlements, roads, bridges, railroad infrastructure, power lines and public buildings will pump over $ 200 million into the region
The economically and socially backward region of Southeast Anatolia is to be brought closer to the richer west of Turkey through projects such as the Ilısu Dam (poverty reduction, sustainable improvement of the living conditions of the population).
The CAP creates an estimated 3.8 million jobs; Ilısu, as the largest power plant in this project, generates up to 20% of the total volume of investment and employs up to 11% of all construction workers (4,000) living in the region for five to seven years, which counteracts the high unemployment rate in this part of Turkey. (In 2006 the unemployment rate was 90%, in 2007 70% in Hasankeyf)
Creation of 500 jobs in fisheries
Compensation for seasonal fluctuations in the Tigris water level and thus prevention of floods and droughts
Creation of new tourist attractions in the south of the country (new museum near Ilısu, archaeological park: the city of Hasankeyf will be relocated to a nearby "archaeological park", as the Turkish government must ensure the preservation of the archaeological heritage of the city of Hasankeyf in order to meet the requirements .)

criticism

As with the first attempt, the new project planning is being discussed intensively both by many and by the state. The main points of criticism are not only the allegedly still unfulfilled World Bank standards for dam projects, but also doubts about the actual economic benefit of Ilısu, as z. B. the project will not create long-term jobs. (The explanations of the following points of criticism are mainly based on the publication of the NGO World Economy, Ecology & Development (WEED).)

Relocation

The city of Hasankeyf on the Tigris

Over an area of over 300 km², the district town of Hasankeyf , four smaller towns, 95 villages and 99 hamlets (199 settlements in total) are to be completely or partially flooded. The criticism of the relocation preparations in 2000 and the newer version from 2005 falls according to reports from various NGOs and the former World Bank expert and sociologist Dr. Ayse Kudat is equally spicy:

Instead of the 12,000 to 15,000 affected people cited by the project operators, up to 78,000 affected people had to be expected. The resettlement plan assumes around 48,000 people in the affected area.
A full socio-economic survey was not carried out. There is a lack of crucial data on land rights, the income structure of the population and the reception situation in the host cities. Accordingly, it cannot be assumed that all people will be adequately compensated for their losses.
The question that remains unanswered is how to make a living in the future when many of the people lose their sources of income. A constant standard of living cannot be guaranteed. In doing so, Turkey is violating the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
The Turkish government is apparently unwilling to provide a sufficient budget for the resettlement and the subsequent return programs. The surrounding cities do not have the capacity to take in tens of thousands more resettlement victims. This resettlement plan cannot prevent the impoverishment of the majority of them. Uprooting and a lack of prospects lead to massive psychosocial problems, which manifest themselves in high suicide rates - especially among women and girls.
Women's issues were not examined separately.
There have been no open consultations on the impact of the project, nor on the rights and obligations of the affected population. Information brochures were only written in Turkish, but not, as necessary, in Kurdish. However, although over 90% of the residents speak Kurdish languages (89% speak Turkish), only under 30% can read Kurdish languages. Therefore, publication in different Kurdish languages does not make sense.

According to the NGOs, it is obvious that the announcement of broad, public rejection should be avoided. Residents of a village near Hasankeyf expressed concern: "We were recently called to a local police station and were told that we had to leave our village within seven years, and that was all," said one of the villagers near Hasankeyf during a delegation trip by WEED and FERN in July 2005.

According to the Bern declaration (now Public Eye), the affected population was offered real replacement, but only poor land.

In summary, it must be assumed that the implementation of the Ilısu project and the associated resettlement would lead to a massive exacerbation of social problems in the region.

Cultural assets

Pillar of the bridge over the Tigris in Hasankeyf, built in 1116

The Ilısu Reservoir will bury the traces of 9,000 years of human history, including a multitude of historically significant sites that housed the Assyrians , Persians , Greeks , Romans , Abbasids , Byzantines and Seljuks , Ayyubids, Artukids, Omayads, Ottomans and Marwanids. The unique cultural landscape of the Tigristal will be irretrievably lost. Although the ancient and medieval city of Hasankeyf , which was founded around 350 AD, was granted full archaeological protection by the Turkish Ministry of Culture as early as 1978 , as it was an important supraregional economic center and has a high symbolic value in Turkey to this day, it is be flooded according to the construction plans. Plans by the European Union to declare Hasankeyf a World Heritage Site in 2004 were rejected by the Turkish government. In view of the protest, which first ignited in the city itself, then in western Turkey and finally also in other parts of the world, the Turkish government announced improvements with regard to the handling of the cultural goods in Hasankeyf. In 1998, the METU Center of Research and Assessment of Historic Environment (TACDAM) took on the task of scientific management for excavations and thus the saving of the cultural heritage. The aim is to restore some particularly significant monuments, such as mosques and churches, and to rebuild them elsewhere, to excavate and document archaeological sites inside and outside Hasankeyf, and to build an archaeological park near the citadel on the steep bank. Almost 108 million euros have been estimated for all rescue work in the affected region.

Old rock dwellings in Hasankeyf

On the one hand, however, criticism was sparked by the short period of time allotted for this work. The archaeologists and their teams only have seven years to sift through and recover the most important artifacts, with realistic assessments being able to work effectively after only seven months a year due to the weather conditions. It cannot be said that even a single site could be completely excavated and examined in the given time.

On the other hand, the effects of the armed Kurdish conflict in the region were completely ignored in the planning. Several sites are located in the Garzan Valley in the districts of Besiri and Batman. There were exchanges of fire there in 2005, so that archaeologists were denied entry by the military. Because of this and because of hidden landmines, it is generally not possible to move safely, especially off the road.

Historic Sites in Hasankeyf

The largely missing exploration of the almost 6000 Hasankeyf caves (600 of which are below the maximum waterline) and the fact that a further 300 surrounding archaeological sites ( tumuli - hills under which archaeological relics are suspected) have only been mapped to a rudest extent so far can only start excavations at 14), makes realistic rescue planning difficult. There is also medieval architecture in Hasankeyf, which cannot easily be rebuilt in another location. The construction of many monuments makes it impossible to transport and rebuild them without causing major damage. However, these monuments have already fallen into disrepair. The interlinking of culture and nature cannot be reconstructed elsewhere. Experts cannot even begin to guess which cultural treasures in the former Mesopotamia will be lost with the flooding.

“The laws forbid - under threat of punishment in the event of an offense - to destroy such cultural assets. That means: If Ilısu is built, it is simply dishonest. [...] Hasankeyf is the only Anatolian city from the Middle Ages that has been preserved as a whole. There are ruins of various cultures, mausoleums, minarets, churches. We don't know what exactly is below. But we should know what we're losing. "

- Professor Olus Arik, excavation manager in Hasankeyf, 1998

There can be no question of a “rescue plan”, because Hasankeyf enjoys cultural uniqueness in its entirety.

Resistance:

As early as 2001, the National Committee of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) called on the German government to work towards ensuring that German companies do not contribute to the destruction of Hasankeyf.
In Turkey, lawsuits have been filed both in Turkish courts and in the European Court of Justice .
The "Initiative to Rescue Hasankeyf" actively sent out a signal and began building a cultural park in the city on March 23, 2007.

Environmental impact

The environmental impact assessment of 2001 and the revised version of 2005 lead individual NGOs to the conclusion that international standards are not being complied with. Contrary to the investigations of the experts who carried out the environmental review in 2005, NGOs claim that massive ecological consequential damage is to be expected, which will also have a negative impact on the economy, which is listed as the main reason for the construction:

Flooding of mainly fertile arable land with no equivalent replacement for the people affected.

Deterioration in water quality and associated health risks: Wastewater from irrigated agriculture and from households in the large cities of Diyarbakir, Bismil, Batman and Siirt will lead to a high concentration of nutrients in the reservoir. Planned sewage treatment plants can only partially weaken this effect. The oxygen deficiency caused by rotting processes dissolves heavy metals in the sediment and can therefore lead to the death of all organisms and fish stocks living in the deeper layers.

Salinisation of agriculturally used soils: The increased salt content in the water occurs due to the larger evaporation area and the groundwater with the minerals in the soil that is led to the surface. When the reservoir water is used for agriculture, the soils become too salty. Since only a few, salt-tolerant plants (maize, barley) can be grown, monocultures will be used, which are very susceptible to disease. The economic consequences for agriculture are immense. In this way, the Ilısu region cannot become the most fertile area in Turkey, as the Turkish government is striving for.

Sedimentation of the reservoir: Particles brought with them from the Tigris will almost completely be deposited at the mouths of the reservoir tributaries and in the reservoir itself, which affects the fauna through broad delta formation. These deposits in turn lead to erosion , which causes a decrease in the organisms living in the river. As a result, the groundwater level also sinks downstream and leads to water shortages.

Destruction of sensitive ecosystems, e.g. through the formation of mold on cultivated plants due to increased humidity and impairment of the habitat of (threatened) animal species.

Climatic impact - The release of small amounts of greenhouse gases due to the rotting of biomass in the reservoir with simultaneous lack of oxygen.

Change in the previous interplay of high and low water: Small and medium-sized floods can be absorbed by the reservoir, but large ones can have even more serious effects due to dramatic fluctuations in the water level of up to seven meters in some cases. Without a dam, however, the water level fluctuates by up to more than 20 meters, so that a significant improvement in the flood situation can be expected from the dam.

Depending on the time of year, up to 190 km² of the bank edge will be exposed, thus promoting the spread of malaria .

“ The prospect that the newly emerging lake could ecologically enrich the region and make a positive contribution to development as a recreation area or source of income for fishermen appears to be completely out of thin air in view of the massive ecological damage associated with the creation of the mega reservoir . "

- Setton / Drillisch.

Water conflicts with neighboring countries

The intensification of future conflicts between Turkey and Syria and Iraq due to the Ilısu Dam can be explained using the following points:

Another dam (Cizre) is planned on the 65 km stretch between the Ilısu Dam and the border with Syria and Iraq. If the building were to be built, the Turkish government would have the option of reducing the water flow for several months or even cutting them off. This would hold her in hand with a great potential for blackmail, with which she could assert her interests in the region.
The law calls for the notification, consultation and the conclusion of negotiations with the neighboring states downstream. Turkey has so far only fulfilled this obligation to a limited extent. So far there have been protests on the Iraqi side by the Iraqi water minister and the Austrian-Iraqi friendship association IRAQUNA.
The reduction of the water runoff to Iraq is planned to 60 m ³ / s. Turkey takes the position that the water from rivers that have their sources in their own country belongs to it. This constitutes a violation of the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigable Use of Transboundary Waterways.
In addition, a deterioration in access to clean water must be expected, which in turn would violate the right to water. This could have catastrophic consequences for farmers in Iraq and Syria. Iraq can only meet 40 percent of its needs from its own water resources. This project therefore harbors incalculable potential for conflict.

Energy policy alternatives

No balanced and systematic analysis of cheaper, more environmentally friendly and more socially acceptable alternatives for energy production has taken place. In its current form, the Ilısu Dam is the most unproductive of all GAP dams in terms of energy profitability. Conceivable technical possibilities for avoiding the construction are the following:

Use of the already built GAP dams under full load: According to investigations by the WEED , they ran far below their capacity.
Improving energy efficiency by investing in the ailing distribution network : The loss of currently (?) 21 percent of the electricity produced could probably be reduced to 11 percent. This would correspond to a value of 3600 MW - in fact three Ilısu dams.
Increased use of renewable energies such as wind energy , solar energy , geothermal sources, biomass, hydrogen, hydropower plants up to 10 MW: Turkey has gigantic potential for the use of renewable energies beyond large dams, but only uses this to 0.09 percent.
Construction of nuclear power plants - however, Turkey is an earthquake-prone country .

Protests

Turkey

Due to the repressive political climate and the resulting problematic human rights situation in Turkey, the protest there was very difficult in the first few years after the contract was awarded. In March 2007, for example, officials from the state water authority were quoted as saying: The reservoir floods thousands of caves which can be used as hiding places and cuts off “the paths of the PKK” . Despite this situation, there are a large number of organizations and individuals who deal with dam construction and are politically active.

Local opponents of the dam project are insulted as friends of the PKK : “They want to defame us,” said hydraulic engineer Ercan Ayboga and spokesman for the “Initiative to Rescue Hasankeyf”: “Because they know that almost everyone on the ground supports us and they don't Have arguments against us. The dam is a disaster. Ecologically. Cultural. Social. “In the run-up to the fifth World Water Forum, which took place in Istanbul in mid-March 2009, the Turkey office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation organized a 'water court' together with the Tribunal Latinoamericano del Aqua . Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and Chancellor Angela Merkel were symbolically accused. In the case of the Ilısu Dam, the independent jury called on the Turkish government to bring its national laws in line with the acquis communautaire as part of the EU accession process - especially with regard to respect for human rights and the preservation of cultural property, Hasankeyf to be included in the UNESCO World Heritage List, to review potential alternative energy sources and to advance archaeological excavations.

Prominent supporters of the protest include Turkish Nobel Prize laureate Orhan Pamuk and pop singer Tarkan .

Germany

The initiative WEED and the World Wide Fund of Nature (WWF), as part of an international NGO coalition, criticize the German government, which throws the principles of common European values overboard for good business. "The Federal Government must demand compliance with the WCD recommendations (World Dam Commission) from the international institutions it supports, Hermes Kreditversicherung and the Landesbanken," said WWF freshwater expert Martin Geiger. Otherwise their alleged support will remain just an empty phrase. With the decision of Germany, Austria and Switzerland to grant export credits for the Ilısu Dam, these countries are committing "a monstrous act of destroying an irreplaceable world cultural heritage, since unique documents of Turkish history are being destroyed forever," according to the initiative.

According to ARD, Ulrich Eichelmann should have succeeded in getting German companies to participate in the dam.

The German company Züblin has also come under sharp criticism from the public since its involvement in the project was announced. On the occasion of its shareholders' meeting on July 5, 2007, a vigil was held in front of Züblin's headquarters in Stuttgart, which was supported by a number of organizations (see web links).

Participation in highly controversial projects is not an isolated case at Züblin AG. Their involvement in the construction of the Xiaolangdi Dam in China, the Ghazi Barotha Dam in Pakistan and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) in southern Africa has been hotly debated by human rights and environmental organizations.

Jens Loewe from the Stuttgart Water Forum criticized the fact that Züblin was on the one hand a member of the Stuttgart One World Network for Justice, initiated by Mayor Schuster. Participation in the Ilısu project, which is supposed to rob tens of thousands of people of their livelihoods and enforce against their will, turns "the noble intentions" of the one-world network into a farce.

Prominent supporters of the protest include Fatih Akın and Claudia Roth .

Switzerland

Under pressure from various NGOs and private customers, Zürcher Kantonalbank, as one of the financing institutions, withdrew from the project on June 15, 2007. "It was extremely scandalous that an otherwise trustworthy state bank, which is committed to observing environmental protection and human rights, secretly financed a major project with far-reaching negative consequences and only corrected this blatant wrong decision under massive pressure from the public," criticized Christine Eberlein from the declaration from Bern (today Public Eye ).

Austria

At the beginning of July 2007, at the shareholders' meeting of HypoVereinsbank , NGOs asked its sister company Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG (BA-CA) and the joint group boss Profumo to get out of the Ilısu project. In Austria there are weekly protests in front of branches of BA-CA, which intends to support the project in the hundreds of millions. Numerous customers have already announced that they will close their accounts if they do not withdraw from the project. “Ilısu is one of the most scandalous projects in the world. Anyone who wants to make a profit from this shouldn't be surprised when customers close their accounts, ” says Ulrich Eichelmann . "We call on BA-CA to adhere to its own principles of sustainability and to reject Ilısu," said Mary Kreutzer from the International NGO Campaign on Export Credit Agencies (ECA-Watch). The organization announced that the protests will continue until it does.

In December 2008, activists from ECA-Watch occupied the building of the Austrian Control Bank (OekB) in downtown Vienna for several hours. The organization protested against Austria's participation in the controversial dam project and called on the head of the control bank , Rudolf Scholten , to prompt the exit from the project.

literature

Daniela Setton and Heike Drillisch: Doomed to fail. The Ilisu Dam in southeastern Turkey , ed. by World Economy, Ecology & Development , 05/2006, 90 pages, ISBN 978-3-937383-40-8 ( table of contents ).

Joerg Dietziker: Water as a weapon. Turkish dams and Swiss helpers. The importance of the Southeast Anatolia GAP project and the planned destruction of Hasankeyf by Sulzer Hydro and ABB Switzerland. Bern: Declaration of Bern , 1998, 62 pp., Ill. ISBN 3-905550-20-2 ( table of contents ).
Ludwig W. Fliesser Governance of the Ilisu Dam Project, Marburg 2010: Tectum Verlag , 186 pages, ISBN 978-3-8288-2396-9 ( table of contents ).

Individual evidence

↑ A new Turkish dam forces up to 70,000 people to relocate. Retrieved July 20, 2017 .
^ ^A ^b swissinfo.ch: No Swiss money for Ilisu dam
↑ Frankfurter Rundschau: Ilisu Dam in Turkey: Germany drops mega-project . In: Frankfurter Rundschau . ( fr.de [accessed on July 21, 2017]).
^ Sine Maier-Bode / Tobias Aufmkolk: The dam project "GAP" . June 10, 2015 ( planet-wissen.de [accessed July 20, 2017]).
↑ [1]
↑ Turkey: High culture Hasankeyf goes under | Video | ARD media library. Retrieved October 12, 2019 .
^ Ilisu hydropower plant - the project, website of the consortium of the Ilisu hydropower plant. Retrieved May 16, 2010.
↑ D. Setton, H. Drillisch: Doomed to failure. The Ilısu Dam in southeastern Turkey. 05/2006. Pp. 18-19.
↑ Ngo-online: Hermes guarantee granted for the construction of the Ilısu Dam in Turkey, March 28, 2007.
^ Daniel Gerny: Conditional approval of Ilısu Dam, NZZ , December 16, 2006.
^ Ilisu donors by the nose, Tages-Anzeiger of March 15, 2008.
↑ ORF: Turkey ignored edition, n ( Memento of the original from May 31, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. May 28, 2009. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.orf.at

↑ Project Ilisu / Turkey: Export guarantees end - despite improvements, conditions could not be met on time.

↑ Turkey Says to Continue Ilisu Dam Project in World Bulletin February 12, 2010, accessed January 17, 2013.

↑ Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR 3) Kulturnachrichten from January 16, 2013, ( Memento of the original from January 18, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved January 17, 2013.

↑ Consortium of the Ilısu hydropower plant

↑ ^a ^b Water as ^aconflict material - the Southeast Anatolia Project . Retrieved May 16, 2010.

^ Ilisu hydropower plant - the project . Website of the Ilisu Hydro Power Plant Consortium. Retrieved May 16, 2010.

^ Ilisu hydropower plant - economic benefits . Website of the Ilisu Hydro Power Plant Consortium. Retrieved May 16, 2010.

^ Ilisu hydropower plant - the project . Website of the Ilisu Hydro Power Plant Consortium. Retrieved May 16, 2010.

^ Ilisu hydropower plant - economic benefits . Website of the Ilisu Hydro Power Plant Consortium. Retrieved May 16, 2010.

^ Parliamentary materials . Website of the Austrian Parliament. Retrieved June 10, 2010.

^ Ilisu Hydroelectric Power Plant - Tourism and Fishing . Website of the Ilisu Hydro Power Plant Consortium. Retrieved May 16, 2010.

↑ The Ilisu Dam: Not a Successful Project ( Memento of the original from December 13, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 872 kB). Website of the organization Greenpeace in Central and Eastern Europe. Retrieved May 16, 2010.

↑ “ Doomed to Fail . The Ilısu Dam in Southeast Turkey ”by D. Setton and H. Drillisch pp. 26–74 (see literature)

↑ ^a ^b D. Setton, H. Drillisch: Condemned to fail. The Ilısu Dam in southeastern Turkey. 05/2006, p. 30.

↑ 1500 asylum seekers announced because of Ilisu Dam, NZZ Online, March 4, 2008.

^ Joerg Dietziker: Water as a weapon. P. 52.

↑ Tages-Anzeiger, September 22, 2006, p. 5.

^ ^A ^b Kai Strittmatter: Kulturkampf am Tigris. Despite protests, Berlin is promoting dam project in Turkey. in: Süddeutsche Zeitung . from March 28, 2007, Volume 63, p. 1.

↑ Press release of the Hasankeyf initiative: Destruction of culture and expulsion with German and Austrian help! Weed, March 27, 2007.

↑ Heinrich-Böll-Webpage: Istanbul Water Tribunal - CASE: The Ilısu Dam Project in Hasankeyf in the Dicle (Tigris) river , Tütün Deposu, Istanbul, March 14, 2009 (PDF)

^ Günter Seufert: World Water Forum: Water only from plastic bottles. In: Zeit Online. March 24, 2009, accessed December 9, 2015 .