Maji Maji Riot

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Maji Maji Riot
Map of German East Africa at the beginning of the Maji Maji War, 1905
Map of German East Africa at the beginning of the Maji Maji War, 1905
date July 1905 to July 1907
place Southern German East Africa
output Victory of the protection force
consequences Restoration of colonial rule
Parties to the conflict

No flag.svg Maji Maji movement (approx. 20 East African tribes)

Reichskolonialflagge.svg German East Africa

Commander
Kinjikitile Ngwale
(executed at the beginning of the war)
Gustav Adolf von Götzen
(Governor)
Troop strength
min. 10,000
approx. 2,760 (September 1905)
losses
75,000-300,000
(Estimates, including civilian starvation deaths)
about 400
(including auxiliary troops)

The Maji Maji Uprising (also called Maji Maji War ) from 1905 to 1907 was an uprising of the African population in the south of German East Africa against German colonial rule . At the same time, it is considered to be one of the largest colonial wars in the history of the African continent.

In contrast to the resistance that formed almost everywhere in Africa against the conquest by European powers, the Maji Maji War was characterized by a broad alliance between members of different ethnic groups and its spread over an area the size of Germany.

The reasons for the uprising were the repressive conditions in the colonial system and the elimination of the local economy. The religious cult of Maji-Maji played an important role in the mobilization of the African population. It encouraged the rebels to ally themselves across ethnic boundaries and to turn against the militarily superior colonial power.

The Maji Maji War ended in a devastating defeat for the African people.

German East Africa before the survey

Social and economic structures

Large parts of southern Tanzania, the region between Lake Malawi , the Rufiji in the north, the Ruvuma in the south and the Indian Ocean, were presumably hardly populated until the 17th century. In the 18th century, developments in southern Africa increased the immigration of Bantu-speaking peoples. In contrast to the Ngoni , the other ethnic groups in the region were not centralized, but rather organized in small communities that were usually grouped around a strong chief. These communities also entered into alliances with one another, for example for defense or trade.

In the 19th century the Ngoni finally immigrated, who were able to build up a large area of ​​influence through superior military armament and combat technology by integrating already resident peoples or making them subject to tribute . The disputes over land, people and influence in the region increased. In order to survive against the Ngoni, many groups took over their military tactics and centralized themselves in order to be able to build up standing armies for defense.

One factor that also led to major armed conflicts was the ivory trade boom that began in the 19th century , which could generate large profits. The trade routes stretched from the coast across the south to Portuguese Mozambique and Lake Nyassa, as communication channels they ensured an exchange between people from many regions, language groups and ethnicities. With the help of firearms, small, militarily organized societies were formed that fed slaves and ivory into the trade and thereby became increasingly powerful. Trade also fostered contacts between the coastal regions of East Africa, from where the ivory was sold and shipped. The contacts were not limited to the exchange of goods, but also to ideas, especially religious ideas. Slaves from the south came to the coast and influenced Islam there , Islam came into the inland as the religion of the coastal inhabitants and gave new impulses to the local religions.

German colonial policy

Despite its formal existence for almost two decades, German rule in East Africa had only established itself selectively on the eve of the uprising. The first phase of the colonial takeover after the Berlin Africa Conference was determined by the activities of the German-East African Society (DOAG). This was primarily limited to expeditions and the conclusion of protection agreements with local leaders. In terms of personnel and finances, the DOAG was hardly in a position to control the huge area under "protection" or even to establish an administration.

Military conquest

With the uprising of the East African coastal population in 1888 it finally became clear that the DOAG, whose interests lay primarily in the field of trade, had taken over. She turned to the Empire for assistance. Bismarck , who had long been hostile to the colonial undertakings, feared a loss of prestige and asked the Reichstag for finance for the military equipment to suppress the so-called "Arab uprising". With the approved two million marks, the so-called "Wissmann Troop" was created, an action force made up of several dozen German officers and non-commissioned officers , 600 Sudanese mercenaries and 400 Mozambicans under the command of Hermann Wissmann .

Gustav Adolf von Götzen, governor of German East Africa from 1901 to 1905

The Wissmann troops put down the uprising on the coast over the course of the next fifteen months, and Wissmann established himself as the military arm of the colonial project in the subsequent fighting on Kilimanjaro and in central Tanzania by bringing important parts of the caravan routes under his control. After the area was transferred from the DOAG to the Reich in January 1891, the Wissmann troop became the Imperial Protection Force for German East Africa . Over the course of the decade, the Schutztruppe, now headed by Emil von Zelewski , was primarily concerned with smashing the resistance that had formed in the south of the region under the Hehe with its head Chief Mkwawa .

administration

The administration of the area only gradually changed to a civilian form. The heads of the 24 districts into which the country was divided were largely military personnel and were only gradually taken over by civilians. A district official had the judicial authority, he was assigned the military and police who were supposed to enforce his power. This favored an often completely arbitrary form of rule, since central control was impossible due to the size of the country and the long communication channels. Subordinate to the district officials were the Akiden , who presided over the Akidaten , into which a district was divided. The Akids were usually local people who worked with the colonial administration. They often benefited from this cooperation with the new rulers.

The German officials and members of the military ruled with repressive measures, physical violence was the order of the day. The Askaris , as the African soldiers of the Schutztruppe were called, exercised their power with brutal violence against the rest of the East African population. In 1898 the so-called hut tax was introduced, which could be paid in monetary form, and a year later also as work. The tax became the symbol used to manifest colonial power. In the event of refusal, the askari enforced the collection of the tax, which was often associated with armed violence, flogging, imprisonment, forced labor, robbery, confiscation of cattle and rape.

economy and trade

A white planter in front of his house in German East Africa.

An arbitrary regime also prevailed on the few agricultural holdings that Europeans owned. Like the administrative posts, the farms and plantations were also independent spheres of power in which the landowner could rule like an absolutist ruler. Their labor needs were supported by the colonial administration through tax liability - African workers had to earn money to pay their taxes. Under labor law corporal punishment was part of the catalog of punishments, beatings, deprivation of food and long working hours were the order of the day. Many settlers also had a private army that was supposed to ensure their safety.

With the appointment of Count von Götzens as governor, the situation worsened. A number of laws and ordinances were intended to ensure that, on the one hand, the European settlers had enough labor available, and on the other hand, the colony generated a profit or at least covered its own costs. According to an ordinance of 1902, villages had to create a joint plantation, the so-called Kommunalshamba ( Shamba = swahili for field), on which forced laborers were used. Half of the profits were to be transferred and half to flow into the coffers of the municipalities. In fact, they often arrived very late or not at all in the African villages. This system was particularly widespread in the south of the colony. Most of the time, the villagers had to grow cotton on the communal hammocks. Every man who did not work for a European had to work in this field 24 days a year, which meant that his own fields were neglected due to the lack of labor.

In addition, Götzen issued a hunting and game protection ordinance in 1903, which placed numerous hunting activities that were part of the local economic system under severe fines and imprisonment. A beer tax made home-brewed beer, an important part of the ritual of everyday life, subject to a fee. In addition, from 1904 the local population was disarmed in large parts of the colony.

The most drastic change followed in 1905: in March a new tax ordinance declared a poll tax of three rupees for an adult man to be permissible. Compared to the previous hut tax, this was a drastic increase, and from now on the tax could only be paid in cash. At the same time, an ordinance came into force, according to which Africans could be consulted free of charge for public works in road construction and the like. In addition, there was ongoing land appropriation for extensive European plantations, on which export products such as sisal , cotton , rubber and coffee were supposed to be grown and were already grown.

The war against the colonial power

The religious background of the war

The societies in East Africa, despite their heterogeneity, shared fundamental religious ideas. This included the central role of the ancestors , who, according to the East African view of the world, influenced the living as deceased from another world. Gods and spirits, on the other hand, represented themselves in natural material appearances - in trees, mountains, rivers or animals. Healers who were able to treat with herbs, herbs and their connection to spirits were just as common as prophets who communicated with gods and passed their messages on to the living. This mystical view, however, had proven to be of little help during the colonial conquest, and with the social and economic structures also the religious ideas got into a crisis.

Kinjikitile and the Origin of Maji-Maji

Historians therefore explain the emergence of a new religious movement, which originated in the Rufiji area in 1904 , with the need for spiritual and moral renewal that corresponded to the changed social, cultural and economic conditions. The movement probably went back to Kinjikitile , a successful healer who had lived in the Matumbi Mountains as a respected man for several years. Tradition has it that he began to work as a prophet after an awakening experience - a night in a pond from which he emerged safe and dry the following morning . Kinjikitele's prophecies were understood as messages from another world in which he had been underwater during his absence. He predicted nothing less than a reversal of the existing conditions: the return of the ancestors and their support in the expulsion of the German colonial power, the transformation of big cats into harmless sheep and finally the disappearance of ethnic boundaries - all clans and societies would belong to only one the clan of the Zanzibari Sultan Said.

The power of maji

An important part of the message was the function of the maji . Maji, the Swahili term for “water”, indicated the fundamental importance of water for the agrarian societies in the southeast of the colony. Bokero commanded the maji and this promised a healthy future in prosperity, with rich harvests, peaceful predators and freed from oppressive colonial rule. According to Kinjikitele, holy water will play a central role in driving out the colonial power. Boiled with millet , lend it - drunk, scattered over the body or carried around - magical powers, make invulnerable and let the bullets from the guns of the colonial oppressors roll off the body like raindrops. Associated with this prophecy were moral rules and norms that had to be observed by the warriors in order for the maji to be effective . These included sexual abstinence , prohibitions on witchcraft and pillage, or taboos on a range of foods. The Maji Maji cult should lead to a renewal and strengthening of the societies of East Africa and promote their liberation from the Germans.

Propagation and recruitment of followers

The spirit Hongo , possessed by Kinjikitile and subordinate to the god Bokero in the Rufiji River, commanded the spread of the prophecy. It happened in different ways. The message of his prophecy was so popular that soon after Kinjikitile's awakening experience, his homestead in Ngarambe became a place of pilgrimage for entire clans from a radius of up to 100 kilometers. The pilgrims hoped for the healing of diseases, contact with their ancestors, rich harvests and encouragement in the fight against the Germans. In Ngarambe they sacrificed to their ancestors at a shrine with millet, salt or money, and were then able to meet Kinjikitile personally. He presented the clan leaders with an amulet and a container with the magical water. At a nightly initiation ceremony , the initiates were told commandments and taboos on the effectiveness of the maji , followed by parades, so-called likinda , which underlined the military character of the cult. Kinjikitile's home became the central place of pilgrimage where local leaders met; thus a network of allies was created here.

However, Kinjikitile's message was also actively shared. Messenger authorized by Kinjikitile traveled to all parts of the colony, up to Lake Victoria and even to the neighboring Protectorate of British East Africa to find new followers and to initiate them into the secrets of the maji . The caravan routes and trade networks established in the 19th century offered fast communication channels. It is possible that the existing networks of Islamic traders and teachers also offered an infrastructure for communication over long distances and made it possible to unite groups from different regions with different linguistic origins in a religious message. The messengers were also named Hongo after the spirit who had given the message to Kinjikitile . In the different regions and linguistic areas in which the Hongo moved, they varied their message and tied in with local customs in initiation rites. In addition, the Hongo, like Kinjikitile themselves, also introduced new Hongo into the messenger service , which in turn carried the message on, but also gave it different local characteristics. This meant that the Maji Maji movement spread over large regions, but was not a homogeneous movement, but was adapted to local rites, customs and needs depending on the local character.

The recruiting of followers was not successful everywhere and was also enforced with force and violence. In regions whose residents had already experienced clashes with the colonial troops as a result of previous resistance (such as the Hehe near Iringa ), the Maji advertisers met with little interest. Some of these regions even joined the party of colonial power after the outbreak of war.

Myth and Reality of the maji

The Maji Maji fighters had to understand quickly and painfully after the outbreak of war that the maji's power was extremely limited. Because despite the initial successes of the insurgents, the first deaths occurred early on. For a certain period of time, the lack of effectiveness of medicine could be explained by the disregard of Kinjikitele's commandments, for example with the violation of the commandment on sexual abstinence or the prohibition of looting. The Hongos also claimed the fallen were not dead but would return. At the same time, rumors were circulating from fighters that the maji had shown the predicted effect. Confidence in medicine was lost at the latest in view of the many dead who had been slaughtered by the German machine gun fire.

But there were also fighters who had doubted the effect of the maji from the start and still went into the fight. This shows that medicine was a strong motivational tool to oppose the overwhelming power of the Germans. After the devastating defeat, Kinjikitele was remembered as a dishonest medicine man whose betrayal led people to disaster.

Course of the war and theaters of war

Map of the uprisings
Machine gun division of the Schutztruppe in German East Africa

The beginning of the war and the first successes of the insurgents

Preparations for a war against the colonial power were not completely hidden from the Germans in the southern coastal area. On July 16, 1905, they arrested a number of healers in Mohoro , including Kinjikitele; the men were suspected of stirring up riot and dissatisfaction at gatherings. Since the fighters feared after Kinjikitele's arrest that the secrecy of their war plan was no longer guaranteed, they decided to attack quickly. Four days later the war drums were beaten in the Matumbi area, in the village of Nandete. The first target of the insurgents was the hated communal hamben, which was created by forced labor. A small group began tearing up the cotton plants on the Nandete communal plantation. When the local Akida tried to bring the situation under control with police forces, they were received by an overwhelming force of Maji Maji fighters, pursued and finally fought in the first open battle of the war. In the days that followed, the fighters launched attacks on other places along the trade route to the coast and looted the homes of Akiden, Indian traders and European settlers, the beneficiaries of the new colonial order. A stream of refugees from settlers, Akids and Indians set in on the coast and alerted the colonial officials there.

The war spread rapidly in all directions, east to the places Samanga and Mohoro near the coast, south to Umwera, west to Mahenge, north to Uzaramo and south-west to Liwale . On August 13, 1905, insurgents attacked the German boma in Liwale. After three days of siege , they succeeded in conquering them, in which a German sergeant, a settler who had fled here, and some Askari were killed. For the insurgents, Liwale became a logistical hub between the breakout area and other important theaters of war. Warriors exchanged news here and maji medicine was also given out here.

Spread, skirmishes and guerrilla tactics

Battle of Mahenge , painting by Friedrich Wilhelm Kuhnert

After the success of Liwale, more attacks quickly followed. On August 17, 1905, the Ifakara trading post was attacked; south of Kilwa, a German patrol sent to Lindi to restore the telegraph connection was attacked, and its members were all killed. In Umwera, as in other regions, traders passing through were the target of the insurgents, and warriors also attacked the Benedictine mission stations in Lukuledi and Nyangao , plundered them and razed them to the ground. Finally, on August 30, 1905, a storm of up to 10,000 fighters took place on the military station Mahenge, the strongest outpost of the colonial power in the central southeast of the colony. In Mahenge 4 Europeans, 60 Askari and several hundred "auxiliary warriors" of the German protection force had holed up. The German defenders were under the command of Theodor von Hassel (father of the later Federal German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel ). Due to a prepared field of fire with wire entanglements and distance markings, at which two machine guns were pointed in raised stands, the attack became a disaster for the insurgents. The number of attackers killed in this battle is estimated to be at least 600. No more than 20 “auxiliary warriors” fell on the German side. Von Hassel reported "rows, yes mountains, of the dead" left behind by machine gun fire. Nevertheless, the Germans needed time to get more troops and material into the rebellion region.

Thus, in the first month of its course, the war had already spread over two-thirds of its later total geographic extent and included ethnically very different groups. The residents of the individual regions did not act with a commonly agreed tactic. Although they communicated with each other over long distances, the local approach of the fighters was based on the respective possibilities and circumstances.

While the war continued to spread towards Lake Nyassa in September 1905, the fighting strategy changed. Where the warriors had seen their comrades fall despite their military successes, a guerrilla strategy was adopted, with rapid attacks and rapid retreat. In those regions that were newly entering the war, however, the belief in the effect of the Maji was still largely unbroken, so that the fighters ran into the machine gun fire of the Germans with breakneck death courage.

Fronts and alliances

At the height of its expansion there were around 20 different peoples and ethnic groups, the entire southwest of German East Africa and thus around a third of the colony's territory at war with the German colonial power. The insurgent ethnic groups included the Luguru , Kichi , Matumbi , Ngoni , Sagara , Vidunda , Wagoni , Wangindo , Wapogoro and Zamaro . Despite the originally common cult, which through its mobilizing power was able to spread the idea of ​​resistance so far, there was no common organization and planning of the fighters. The procedure and the war tactics differed considerably, depending on how the social organization of the respective societies on which the war encroached was formed. The groups in the south, such as the Ngoni, who had developed into highly centralized communities with organized military forces in the past few decades, also fought against the Germans in order to reestablish their position weakened by colonial rule.

In addition, there were groups who deliberately refused to join the resistance. These included the Hehe, who had already come to know and fear the strength and brutality of the colonial troops and their weapons technology in an earlier uprising under the leadership of their head Mkwawa . The Wayao were also loyal to the Germans.

The colonial war strategy

While the Maji Maji movement continued to expand and reached its greatest extent in mid-September 1905, the colonial war machine was formed, albeit slowly at the beginning. As in many parts of the vast colony - apart from the coast - colonial rule in the southeast was based on a very thin staffing base. In the area between the administrative centers on the coast and a military station - the garrison town of Songea near Lake Nyassa - 588 Askari, about 500 auxiliary police officers and the grass-covered fort of Liwale made up the entire military presence in the southeast.

After the colonial officials initially viewed the fighting as small unrest that could be brought under control quickly, concern grew at its rapid spread. The unrest in Uzaramo, the war zone closest to Dar es Salaam , panicked residents of the colony's capital. Von Götzen, meanwhile alarmed, wired an urgent request for military reinforcements to Berlin, but only managed to get two cruisers from China and their naval crew to move towards Dar es Salaam. One after the other, the small cruisers Thetis and Seeadler arrived at the colony, where the small cruiser Bussard, stationed in East Africa, was already in use.

Götzen then mobilized the troops available in the region. In addition to the Askari, they consisted of auxiliary troops. These were African mercenaries, so-called rugaruga , who saw military service with the colonial power - similar to the previous military support for caravan traders - primarily as an opportunity to enrich themselves through looting, a practice that was not stopped by the Germans .

In fact, it was this practice that soon became the main strategy of the colonial forces. The war in its confusion, with its small-scale fronts, its incalculable and unpredictable spread for the Germans made it impossible to determine a center of its organization and to plan counter-attacks there; This was completely ruled out in view of the guerrilla tactics to which the African combat units were switching. Therefore, especially after the arrival of reinforcements in November 1905, the colonial army directed great efforts to destroy the economic base of the combatants. A large unit led by Major Kurt Johannes began their trek on the coast in Kilwa in November, moved to Liwale and on to Ungoni, and reached Songea at the end of the month. From Songea as a location, the army moved from one theater of war to the next, leaving behind the proverbial scorched earth . The colonial troops robbed villages and harvest stores, and if the booty could not be transported, the supplies were destroyed and the fields burned.

Some leaders continued the guerrilla war until they too were captured and executed in July 1908 .

Results and consequences

Famine and depopulation

However, the majority of the victims of the uprising did not die from rifle bullets, but from starvation, because the German protection force had started in 1907 to burn down villages, fields and bushes ( scorched earth ). In the end, entire areas were fallow and extinct. The number of deaths is estimated at between 75,000 and 300,000, including 15 Europeans, 73 black Askaris and 316 members of the auxiliary troops on the German side. The crackdown and famine did not alone kill about a third of the population. Research conducted in the late 1930s concluded that the disaster also reduced the average fertility of surviving women in the area to around 25 percent.

Maji-Maji as a historical event

The Maji Maji War is classified by Africa historians as one of the great colonial wars in the phase of the conquest of Africa - long called "pacification". Almost everywhere on the continent resistance formed against the conquest and the establishment of colonial structures of rule and exploitation; the British historian Terence Ranger described it as the "primary" resistance. However, unlike the Maji Maji War in its trans-ethnic dimension, almost all of these movements were limited to local groups and manageable regions. It was not until after the Second World War that major liberation movements formed again.

Reception, research history and place of memory

Maji-Maji as a colonial place of remembrance

Compared to the almost simultaneous genocide in German South West Africa , the Maji Maji War left even fewer traces in Germany's collective memory. Since the commemoration of the centenary of the uprisings, this fact has become more present in the public consciousness. This was followed by other changes. In many schools, war is now part of the curriculum and the content of critical journalism.

Research history

Maji-Maji as part of the colonial extermination campaigns that anticipated the extremes of the 20th century on the colonial battlefields. In the course of research history, the term “war” has become more and more popular in German as well. This designation is based on the fact that Maji-Maji is also spoken of as a war in Tanzania, Vita vya Ukombozi = war of liberation. The fundamentally not wrong designation uprising is often rejected because its history in the context of Maji-Maji was determined by colonial terminology and the colonial assessment of the illegitimacy of the uprising.

In Tanzania , the Maji Maji Uprising is seen as an important event in national history. Julius Nyerere , the first president of united Tanzania, called him a pioneer of the national unification, which in 1964 led to the founding of the state of Tanzania.

In 1906 the museum director Felix von Luschan received the weapons captured by the German protection force, essentially around 12,000 spears. Since von Luschan attached hardly any scientific value to the weapons, it was considered that they should be distributed to German schools as objects for demonstration. This plan failed because part of the spearheads was poisoned. Thereupon von Luschan had most of the objects burned. Only a few objects have survived. The investigation of their whereabouts is part of a German-Tanzanian agreement and two research projects.

See also

literature

  • Karl-Martin Seeberg: The Maji-Maji War against German colonial rule . Dietrich Reimer Verlag, Berlin 1989, ISBN 3-496-00481-9 .
  • Hubert Gundolf: Maji-Maji - blood for Africa. On the trail of the mission bishop Cassian Spiss OSB, who was murdered in East Africa in 1905 . EOS Verlag Archabbey St. Ottilien, ISBN 3-88096-166-2 .
  • Felicitas Becker and Jigal Beez (eds.): The Maji-Maji-War in German East Africa 1905–1907 . Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-86153-358-8 , foreword, pdf .
  • Walter Nuhn : Flames over German East Africa . The Maji Maji uprising in 1905/06. Bernard & Graefe, Bonn 1998, ISBN 3-7637-5969-7 .
  • Thomas Morlang: “I'm fed up with the matter here, heartily fed up.” Letters from Colonial Officer Rudolf von Hirsch from German East Africa 1905–1907. In: Military History Journal 61 (2002), pp. 489-521.
  • Gisela Graichen, Horst Founder: German colonies. Ullstein, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-550-07637-1 .
  • Lili Reyels, Paola Ivanov, Kristin Weber-Sinn (eds.): Humboldt Lab Tanzania. Objects from the colonial wars in the Ethnological Museum, Berlin - A Tanzanian-German dialogue . (Trilingual publication: English, German, Kiswahili) Reimer, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-496-01591-8 .

Web links

Commons : Maji Maji Rebellion  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Wilfried Westphal: History of the German colonies . Bindlach: Gondrom, 1991, p. 156, ISBN 3-8112-0905-1 .
  2. ↑ Guido Knopp : The world empire of the Germans . Munich: Piper, 2011, p. 274, ISBN 978-3-492-26489-1 .
  3. ↑ Guido Knopp: The world empire of the Germans . Munich: Piper, 2011, p. 283.
  4. ^ A b Winfried Speitkamp: German Colonial History . Stuttgart: Reclam, 2005, p. 135, ISBN 3-15-017047-8 .
  5. ↑ Jigal Beez, Caravans and Short Spears. The pre-colonial period in what is now southern Tanzania, in: Becker & Beez, Maji-Maji-Krieg, pp. 17-27, pp. 18-21.
  6. ↑ Jigal Beez, Caravans and Short Spears. The pre-colonial period in today's southern Tanzania, in: Becker & Beez, Maji-Maji-Krieg, pp. 17–27, pp. 24–27.
  7. ^ John Iliffe: A Modern History of Tanganyika. Cambridge 1979, p. 95.
  8. ↑ Reinhard Klein-Arendt, A country is forcibly taken possession. The German East Africa Colony, in: Becker & Beez, pp. 28–48, pp. 33–35.
  9. ↑ Reinhard Klein-Arendt: A country is forcibly taken possession. The colony of German East Africa, . S. 35-36 .
  10. ↑ Patrick Krajekski, Dampfer and Dhaus, p. 55.
  11. ↑ Reinhard Klein-Arendt: A country is forcibly taken possession. The colony of German East Africa, . S. 38-39, 43 .
  12. ^ Detlef Bald, German East Africa, 1900-1914. A study on administration, interest groups and economic development, Munich 1970, pp. 63, 127–128. Patrick Krajewski, steamer and dhows. Coastal trade and agriculture before the war (1890–1905), in Becker & Beez, pp. 49–58, p. 49.
  13. ^ Iliffe, Modern History, p. 68.
  14. ↑ a b c Winfried Speitkamp, Small History of Africa , Stuttgart 2007, p. 220.
  15. ↑ Reinhard Klein-Arendt: A country is forcibly taken possession. The colony of German East Africa, . S. 46-48 .
  16. ↑ Jigal Beez, With water against rifles. The Maji-Maji-Message of the Prophet Kinjikitele, in: Becker & Beez, Maji-Maji-Krieg, pp. 61–73, pp. 66–67.
  17. ↑ Jigal Beez: Projectiles to water drops. Socio-religious aspects of the Maji-Maji War in German East Africa (1905–1907) . In: Pre-Colonial and Early Colonial History in Africa . tape 1 . Cologne 2003, ISBN 3-89645-450-1 .
  18. ↑ Gilbert CK Gwassa & John Iliffe (ed.), Record of the Maji Maji Rising. Part One, Nairobi 1968, p. 9. Since Ali ibn Hammud had been Zanzibari sultan since 1902 , the appeal to "Sultan Said" is probably to be understood as an appeal to the Zanzibari sultans from the Said dynasty as recognized sovereigns.
  19. ↑ Jigal Beez, With water against rifles. The Maji-Maji-Message of the Prophet Kinjikitele, in: Becker & Beez, Maji-Maji-Krieg, pp. 61–73, pp. 63–66.
  20. ↑ Gilbert CK Gwassa, African Methods of Warfare during the Maji Maji was 1905-1907, in: Bethwell A. Ogot (Ed.) War and Society, London, 1972, p 123-148, p.130.
  21. ↑ Jigal Beez, With water against rifles. The Maji-Maji message of the Prophet Kinjikitile, in: Becker & Beez, Maji-Maji-Krieg, pp. 61–73, p. 68.
  22. ↑ Jigal Beez, With water against rifles. The Maji-Maji-Message of the Prophet Kinjikitile, in: Becker & Beez, Maji-Maji-Krieg, pp. 61–73, pp. 68–69.
  23. ↑ Jigal Beez, With water against rifles. The Maji-Maji-Message of the Prophet Kinjikitile, in: Becker & Beez, Maji-Maji-Krieg, pp. 61–73, pp. 68–69.
  24. ↑ Jigal Beez, With water against rifles. The Maji-Maji-Message of the Prophet Kinjikitele, in: Becker & Beez, Maji-Maji-Krieg, pp. 61–73, pp. 72–73.
  25. ↑ Felicitas Becker, From the field battle to the guerrilla war. The course of the war and its arenas, in: Becker & Beez, pp. 74–86, p. 75. Beez, Mit Wasser, p. 70.
  26. ↑ Becker, From the field battle to the guerrilla war, in: Becker & Beez, pp. 77-78.
  27. ↑ Guido Knopp: The world empire of the Germans . Munich: Piper, 2011, pp. 271ff., ISBN 978-3-492-26489-1 .
  28. ↑ a b Bernd G. Längin: The German Colonies - Schauplätze und Schicksale 1884-1918 . Hamburg / Berlin / Bonn: Mittler, 2005, ISBN 3-8132-0854-0 , p. 202.
  29. ^ Winfried Speitkamp: German Colonial History . Stuttgart: Reclam, 2005, p. 131, ISBN 3-15-017047-8 .
  30. ^ John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905–1912, Cambridge 1969, p. 18. John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 171–172.
  31. ↑ John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge 1979, pp. 175-176.
  32. ↑ Becker, From the field battle to the guerrilla war, in: Becker & Beez, pp. 80–81.
  33. ^ AT & GM Culwick, A study of population in Ulanga, Tanganyika Territorium, in: Sociological Review, 30 (1938), p. 375.
  34. ^ Terence O. Ranger: Connexions between “primary resistance” movements and modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa. In: Journal of African History 9 (1968), pp. 437-453, 631-641, 494.
  35. ^ Leonhard Harding: History of Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries. Munich 1999, pp. 27, 65.
  36. ↑ Germany's Wars in Africa, in: Le Monde diplomatique (ed.): Atlas der Globalisierung - Das 20. Jahrhundert , Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-937683-32-4 , p. 8f.
  37. ↑ a b Becker, foreword, in: Becker, Beez (ed.), Maji-Maji-Krieg, p. 12.
  38. ↑ Karl-Heinz Kohl : This is art for its own sake. Die Zeit, September 6, 2017, accessed on December 2, 2017 .
  39. ^ "Humboldt Lab Tanzania" and "Tanzania-Germany: Shared Object Stories"