Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation

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The Proskurov-Chernivtsi Operation ( Russian Проскуровско-Черновицкая операция ) was an offensive operation by the Red Army during World War II that was carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Front as part of the Dnepr-Carpathian operation . It lasted from March 4 to April 17, 1944.

prehistory

As a result of the Rovno-Lutsk operation (January 27 to February 11, 1944), the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front had taken new positions, which were advantageous for a further offensive into the rear of the German 1st Panzer Army and for cutting off and encircling the middle front of Army Group South should be used. After Marshal Watutin was fatally wounded in the fighting at the end of February, Marshal Zhukov took command of the 1st Ukrainian Front on instructions from the Stawka, which had 56 rifle divisions, 6 cavalry divisions, 7 armored and 3 mechanized corps and approximately 800,000 men, 11,900 guns, 1,400 tanks and 477 aircraft existed.

course

First phase of attack

On March 4, the main forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front began an offensive against the German Army Group South (renamed Army Group Northern Ukraine from April 1 ) under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (from March 31 under Walter Model ). The northern wing of Zhukov pushed the German 4th Panzer Army (General Raus ) gradually back to Galicia , the Soviet 13th Army (General Puchow ) took Dubno on March 17th , south of it the 60th Army (General Tschernjachowski ) reached the entrances Brody , where it was stopped by German counter-attacks.

The strong armored forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front ( 1st Panzer and 3rd Guards Armored Army and 1st Guard Army ) in the center led the main thrust southward from the Shepetovka area . The 1st Panzer Army (General Katukow ) advanced on the eastern bank of the Sereth in the direction of Czortkow , to the left of this the 4th Panzer Army (General Badanow, later General Leljuschenko ) was later introduced and strove to break through to Hussjatyn on both sides of the Zbrucz . Katukov's 1st Panzer Army carried out the breakthrough over the Dniester and the cut off of the German 1st Panzer Army ( General of the Panzer Troop Hube ) as the western encircling wing . While the 1st Guard Army in the Proskurow area attracted the main German power (LIX.AK), the 4th Panzer Army and the 3rd Guard Armored Army (General Rybalko ) narrowed the western kessel front opposite the German combat group Mauss (part of the 7th Panzer Division ) and the III. Panzer Corps with the 1st , 6th , 11th and 19th Panzer Divisions .

From March 7th to 10th, the main power of the 1st Ukrainian Front extended their advance to a depth of 70-80 km, reached the Tarnopol - Proskurow line and interrupted the Lemberg - Odessa railway line , which was the main supply line for the southern German eastern front. The German Wehrmacht carried out several counter-attacks until March 11th, but these could not prevent nine tank and six infantry divisions of the 1st Panzer Army from being pushed further and further south to the Dniester and the connection to the Germans, who were also hard pressed on the upper Sereth 4th Panzer Army was completely lost. On the right wing of this army, the XXXXVIII. Panzer Corps stabilized the front with three newly introduced infantry divisions. Tarnopol had been surrounded in a semicircle since March 8, and the Soviets had also already formed several bridgeheads on the western bank of the Sereth.

On March 11, the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front began with the Soviet 38th (General Moskalenko ) and 40th Army against the forming eastern basin front of the German 1st Panzer Army. On March 12, the STAWKA stopped its troops and specified the task of the 1st Ukrainian Front anew. The infantry armies (60th and 1st Guards Army) were supposed to fend off the German counterattacks in a defensive position at Tarnopol and Proskurow, while the 1st Panzer and 3rd Guards armies should achieve the operational breakthrough to Chernivtsi . The Stawka had not clearly formulated the intention to encircle the opposing 1st Panzer Army . According to the order, the Soviet 4th Panzer Army, which was introduced later, was to take Kamenez-Podolski in order to prevent the 1st Panzer Army from retreating to the west, but the front Soviet troops had no direct instructions to carry out this measure.

Several armies (4th and 7th Guards and 40th Army ) of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (Army General Konjew) penetrated the Bug via Uman and Gaissin during the Uman-Botoșan operation , and reached the Dniester near Jampol on March 18 . Troops of the 6th Panzer Army (General Kravchenko ) reached Mogilev-Podolski on March 19 , crossed the river and advanced on Chotin to prevent the retreat of the German 1st Panzer Army to the south.

At the same time, the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front on both sides of Vinnitsa with troops from the Soviet 18th and 38th Armies had crossed the Southern Bug by March 21, conquered the towns of Shmerinka and Chmielnik , thus creating the conditions for the southern encirclement of the Germans 1st Panzer Army north of Kamenets-Podolski. By March 21, the Soviet 1st Guard Army (General Gretschko ) took Proskurov, which the Germans had declared a fortress, and pushed the German LIX , which was holding on the northern boiler front . Army Corps (General Schulz ) returned south towards Kamenez-Podolski.

Second attack phase

The Kamenets-Podolski kettle

See also " Kamenez-Podolski Kessel" (Hube Kessel) .

From March 21, the offensive was continued in the main direction to the Dniester, with three Soviet armored armies being used side by side for the first time (as well as in the Uman-Botoșaner operation, which was carried out at the same time) during the war. On March 23rd, Czortkow was captured by the Soviet 1st Panzer Army, on March 24th, the Soviet troops crossed the Dniester at Zaleszczyki and thus crossed the Romanian border. The 8th Mechanical Guard Corps under Major General JF Dremow and the 20th Mechanical Guard Brigade (Colonel XA Babajanjan) were the first to reach the Dniester near Zaleszyski, the 19th Mechanical Guard Brigade (Colonel VM Gorelow) and the 21st Mechanical Guard Brigade (Colonel Ivan Jakowlew) went at Ustechko across the river. A first bridgehead was built on the southern bank by the 11th Guards Panzer Corps with the 64th Guards Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Boiko). Following the armored forces, the 11th Rifle Corps under Major General Samerzew was the first large infantry unit to follow suit . On March 29th, Chernivtsi was occupied by the 11th Guards Panzer Corps under Lieutenant General Getman .

The German XXIV Panzer Corps fought its way in the east against the Soviet 18th Army with the 16th Panzer Division , the 20th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 208th and 371st Infantry Divisions, holding back between the bow and the bar. To the south there was already an additional gap in the front compared to the XXXXVI. Panzer Corps ( 1st , 254th and 82nd Infantry Divisions ), which could no longer be closed.

The distance between the trapped troops and the newly formed German front reached more than 100 kilometers. The Soviet troops had the option of completely encircling a German army again. The enclosure of the 1st Panzer Army gave the Red Army the opportunity to open a direct route to Central Europe through Romania and Hungary . Field Marshal Manstein informed Hitler from his headquarters in Lemberg on March 24th that he had to order the necessary withdrawal of the army. Hitler's answer contained the agreement that the 1st Panzer Army should maintain its communication routes to the west while maintaining the current front position. Manstein was summoned by Hitler to Berchtesgaden for a meeting . On the evening of March 24th, the 1st Panzer Army received instructions from Manstein to prepare for a retreat. On March 25, under threat of resignation, Manstein wrestled Hitler's approval of the withdrawal in lengthy briefings and ordered the risky breakout of the army to the west.

On March 26th the Soviet 4th Panzer Army took Kamenez-Podolski, on March 30th Chotyn fell . To the north-east of this city, the German 1st Panzer Army was completely enclosed with around 20 divisions and around 200,000-220,000 soldiers.

• Mauss group with 7th Panzer Division, parts of 1st SS. Pz.-Div. "Adolf Hitler" and 68th Infantry Division
• Corps group Chevallerie with LIX. Army Corps (Schulz, from March 22, Röhricht ) - 11th and 19th Panzer Divisions, 96th and 291st Infantry Divisions and XXIV Panzer Corps ( Nehring ) with 20th Panzer Grenadier, 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions, 101st Jäger and 208th, 168th and 371st Infantry Divisions
• Group Breith with III. Panzer Corps - 1st and 6th Panzer Divisions and XXXXVI. Panzer Corps (from March 22nd Schulz ) with 1st, 82nd and 254th Infantry Divisions
• Group Gollnick (south of the Dniester) with 75th Infantry Division and 18th Artillery Division

Eruption to the west, sketch of the location at the end of March 1944

Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front crossed the Prut on March 29th , so that the southern German 8th Army finally lost touch with the Hubes Panzer Army. The Soviet 40th Army followed on the north wing and enclosed the Chotin held by the Gollnick group .

On March 29, the Chevallerie Corps Group was able to form two western bridgeheads on the Zbrucz sector at Skala and Zbrycz. The bulk of the Russian 1st Panzer Army (Katukow) had already crossed the southern Dnestrufer and had expected the German breakout there in vain. The Breith group had pushed away the Soviet 4th Panzer Army at Kamenez-Podolski and behind the group reached the breakthrough to the west to the Zbrucz. The Gollnick group was also able to pull away from Chotin to the northwest in time. On March 30, General von Manstein was dismissed by Hitler due to differing views on the further conduct of the war and transferred to the Führer Reserve .

The High Command of the 1st Ukrainian Front estimated the trapped group to be around 14 divisions and on April 2 issued an ultimatum to surrender, which Hube had rejected. The approximately 20 km wide section between the right wing of the 1st Guard Army and the left flank of the 4th Panzer Army was only protected by individual groups without artillery; this corridor was used by the Germans. In order to prevent the further breakthrough to the west, Marshal Zhukov pulled the bulk of the 4th Panzer Army (now under General Lelyuschenko) and grouped the 74th Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General FE Schewerdin) of the 38th Army, and the 52nd Rifle Corps (Major General Perkhorovich ) of the 18th Army in the Czortkow area . The 15th and 94th Rifle Corps and the 4th Guards Panzer Corps in the formation of the 60th Army against the northern, eastern and southern outskirts were set up to encircle the group of German troops still holding at Tarnopol. Contrary to all expectations of the Stawka, the 1st Panzer Army was able to hold on to all fronts as a "wandering cauldron" and fight back west to the Strypa . Troops of the Soviet 18th and 38th Armies and the 4th Panzer Army pushed in immediately, but the division and destruction of the German troops did not succeed. A snowstorm that began for several days on April 2nd deprived the Soviet Air Force of the opportunity to provide more detailed information to the German troops.

The OKW relocated new troops to Galicia and the Hungarian 1st Army in the Carpathian Mountains to stabilize the front . As part of the II. SS Panzer Corps ( Hausser ), the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions and the 349th Infantry Division from France , the 100th Jäger and the 367th Infantry Division from Yugoslavia , the 361st Infantry -Division from Denmark and the 214th Infantry Division from the Reich used to counterattack. On April 6, the German 6th Panzer Division reached the area southeast of Lemberg and penetrated Buczacsz . From the northwest, the counter-attack by the 10th SS Panzer Division was approaching. The connection to the forced German front, which had been lost on February 23, was achieved. The pocket was completely broken open on April 7th by counter-attacks by the 10th SS Panzer Division, 367th Infantry and 100th Jäger Divisions and the "wandering" army was reintegrated into the German defensive front.

During the outbreak of the German 1st Panzer Army, 399 Soviet tanks and assault guns and 280 guns were destroyed. The losses of the German troops amounted to 2311 dead, 3567 missing and 8364 wounded.

The end in Tarnopol

An attack by the Soviet 60th Army with 11 rifle divisions and the IV. Guard Panzer Corps threw the XXXXVIII. Panzer Corps back behind the Wosuszka section and completely enclosed the city of Tarnopol, which Hitler had declared a "fortress". On March 25, a first attempt at relief by the 8th Panzer Division under Colonel Friebe , who at the same time served the XIII now deployed at Brody and under pressure , failed . Army Corps should relieve. On April 5th, the besiegers launched a huge bombardment on Tarnopol. The second relief attempt by the 9th SS Panzer Division "Hohenstaufen", which began on April 12, was scheduled too late and did not come through. Between April 14 and 17, troops of the Soviet 60th Army destroyed the German garrison, which numbered about 4,600 soldiers when it was enclosed. General von Neindorf fell on April 15th, and the remnants of the garrison were huddled and fought down on the left bank of the Sereth near Zagrobela. This concluded the operation on April 17th, after the German counter-attacks had come to a halt by the Soviet troops.

consequences

During this operation, the Red Army advanced 80–350 km to the west and south , liberated 42,000 km² and 57 cities, reached the Carpathian Mountains and split the southern German eastern front in two. The previous Army Group South was divided into two Army Groups on April 5 - Army Group Northern Ukraine (German 1st and 4th Panzer Army, Hungarian 1st Army) and Army Group Southern Ukraine (German 6th and 8th Army, Romanian 3rd Army).

literature

• Carl Waegener : Army Group South , Podzun Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1972, pp. 264–306
• Илья Борисович Мощанский : " Освобождение Правобережной Украины" Вече, Moscow . 2010 ( coollib.com ).
• Владимир Оттович Дайнес: Советские танковые армии в бою (WO Daines: Soviet tank armies in battle). Moscow 2010, ISBN 978-5-699-41329-4 .

Web links

• Operations of Encircled Forces, Washington 1952, American treatise
• KS Moskalenko, smashing of the 1st Panzer Army
• Plan of the Proskurov-Chernovitz operation
• Proskurov after the reconquest. March 1944

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Anatoli Nikolajewitsch Grylew (AH Грылев): Днепр-Карпаты-Крым , Nauka-Verlag, Moscow 1970, see also tables in the appendix
2. ↑ KS Moskalenko, smashing of the 1st Panzer Army
3. ^ Wagener: Army Group South, p. 265
4. ↑ ML Dudarenko, Ju. G. Perechnjew: "Liberation of the cities during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" (directory), Moscow 1985
5. ^ Wagener: Army Group South, p. 284
6. ^ Wagener: Army Group South, p. 288
7. ^ Wagener: Army Group South, p. 293
8. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser : The German Reich and the Second World War Volume 8 - Stuttgart 2007, p. 432 f
9. ↑ Proskurov-Cherno Witzer operation