Saint George's ribbon

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George's loop

The Ribbon of Saint George ( russian георгиевская ленточка transcribed georgijewskaja lentotschka ), also George ribbon or George ribbon called, is in Russia since 2005, the most important sign of the memory of the victory in the Soviet German War . It goes back to a military award that was given in the Russian Empire and later reintroduced under a different name in the Soviet Union . It consists of a pattern of three black and two orange stripes.

Since the anti-government mass protests in Russia in 2011 and 2012 and the war in Ukraine since 2014 , the Georgian bracelet has served as a sign of support for the political course of the Putin government. Since then, other post-Soviet states have restricted the public use of the Georgian ribbon or replaced it with their own national symbols .

The Saint George ribbon is ubiquitous in Russia. It is also used in commercial advertising and decoration.

History of the military award

  • Order of St. George 1st class

  • Georgskreuz 3rd class

The history of the Saint George ribbon goes back to the 18th century of the Russian Empire. The ribbon takes its name from the Order of St. George . In 1769 Catherine II founded the “Order of the Holy and Victorious Great Martyr George” as the highest military award for service and bravery. Originally the ribbon on which the medal hung was yellow-black or occasionally gold-black. In the statutes it was officially described as yellow-black, but was later often executed in the colors orange and black. While the medal was only awarded as an individual award, the ribbon was sometimes awarded to entire regiments or units for special bravery in combat missions. It thus became part of their military banner .

The George Cross was derived from the order, which was donated by Emperor Alexander I in four classes and awarded to lower ranks. The George Cross was worn on a yellow-black or orange-black ribbon. From 1806, merited members of the Russian Guard and the Imperial Body Guard were decorated with appropriate ribbons. The ribbon was led at a pike , the tip of which was occupied by the George Cross.

After the October Revolution , the Bolsheviks banned all symbols of the tsarist-imperial past and the Order of St. George was abolished in 1917.

  • Postage stamp with the guard ribbon in honor of the Soviet Guard

  • Order of Glory 3rd class

In 1942 the orange-black ribbon was reintroduced, this time under the name Gardeband (гвардейская лента). On May 21, 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet introduced the Order of the Soviet Guard , which hung on the guard ribbon. The colors orange and black are supposed to symbolize fire and smoke.

The Order of Glory , introduced on November 8, 1943, was also worn on the orange-black Georgian ribbon or guard ribbon. The medal was given to officers and men of the armed forces as well as NCOs of the air force for special bravery in the face of the enemy. With the medal “Victory over Germany” , another badge of honor of the Red Army was attached to the orange-black ribbon. The medal was awarded to selected soldiers and officers who were directly involved in the fighting against the German Reich .

Members of the Collaborationist Union of Russian Youth use Saint George's ribbon at a demonstration in Babruysk (1943)

During the last years of the German-Soviet War, the Order of Saint George was used by General Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army , who fought on the side of the Axis powers . Other collaborating Russian units such as the 29th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS "RONA" (Russian No. 1) wore the George Cross as an arm badge.

In 1992 the Order of Saint George was reintroduced as a military award in the Russian Federation and was first awarded in 2008 for services in the Caucasus War in 2008 .

Introduction as a memorial symbol

George ribbon at the military parade for the 60th Victory Day on May 9, 2005
Defense Minister Shoigu , President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev on May 9, 2014

From 2005 the Georgian ribbon, which used to be part of military awards, became a symbol of war commemoration. On April 14, 2005, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Victory , the state news agency RIA Novosti announced that it would carry out a ceremony called георгиевская ленточка (Georgian ribbon) with the support of a youth organization and the Moscow city government . The news agency distributed 800,000 black and orange striped ribbons of fabric. Official posters of the campaign called for the Saint George ribbon to be a symbol of remembrance and to attach it to bags, car antennas or lapels . Since then, the St. George's ribbon has been used as a common symbol of remembrance and a national symbol in Russia . The central slogans of the band initiative were "Thank you for the win, Grandpa" and "I won't forget, I'm proud". The band's campaign has become an important social and political event, with millions of Russians participating in the weeks leading up to Victory Day on May 9th. President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev wore the George Bow for the first time on the 70th anniversary of Victory and since then every year on May 9th.

The organizers of the ribbon initiative stated that the idea of ​​the ribbon was inspired by the Remembrance Poppy in Britain and similar memorial symbols. The Georgian ribbon differs in many ways from the signs of war commemoration in other countries. On the one hand, the time frame is different. In Russia, Soviet combat operations are rarely considered part of World War II (1939–1945). Rather, the memory goes to the " Great Patriotic War ", which according to Russian historiography began with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The tape represents an image of history that does not take into account the first two years of World War II, the German-Soviet non-aggression pact and the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland . On the other hand, the memory is primarily dedicated to the victors and heroes of the "Patriotic War", whereas the Western European culture of remembrance places the victims of the war in the foreground. Another difference is that Georgian ribbons are made with government support and distributed free of charge. In Western European countries, however, memorial symbols are sold and the proceeds go to war veterans.

Commentators in Russia and abroad see the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 as the real reason for the introduction of the Georgian bracelet the following year. The orange ribbon bow was the central symbol of the Ukrainian protests for democracy and against electoral fraud. In Russian circles close to the government, the Ukrainian protest movement was referred to as the "orange plague". Fearing that pro-democracy demonstrations would spread to the entire former Soviet Union, Moscow wanted to shake up memories of the 1945 victory and made the Georgian ribbon a symbol. According to Julija Latynina , the Georgian ribbon was created as a counter-revolutionary symbol to prevent possible color revolutions in Russia. The youth organization Naschi was one of the first groups to distribute the Georgian ribbon and integrate it into their campaigns. Naschi was founded in 2005 with the aim of supporting President Putin and the ruling United Russia party and preventing protests critical of the government. Naschi contrasted the orange-black Georgian ribbon with the orange fabric bow of the Ukrainian protest movement.

Political symbol

The ribbon initiative was supported by the Russian government from the start. President Vladimir Putin had already placed the question of state symbols in the foreground during his first term in office. The victory in the “Great Patriotic War” is of paramount importance for the national identity , unity and national pride of Russia. The sociologist and pollster Lev Gudkow described him as the "only positive support for national self-confidence". The Russian government is using the victory to legitimize its policies and has welcomed the Georgian ribbon as a symbol. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the preservation of historical memories is an element of Russian foreign policy and that the ribbon campaign is supported for this reason. Georgian ribbons are distributed abroad with the active participation of Russian embassies and diplomatic staff.

During the mass protests against election fraud in the 2011 parliamentary elections and 2012 presidential elections , the Georgian ribbon was worn beyond the May 9 celebrations. The demonstrators chose a white fabric bow as their symbol, while counter-demonstrators loyal to the Kremlin wore the orange and black Georgian ribbon. Since then it no longer stands primarily for victory in the German-Soviet war, but has developed into a political symbol of loyalty to the Putin government. The Georgian ribbon, which used to be a symbol of unity in commemoration of the war, contributed to the division of Russian society into supporters of Putin and opponents of the government. Groups loyal to the Kremlin recognize each other through the Georgian ribbon. Members of pro-government groups who attack opposition activists, human rights activists, independent journalists and critical artists wear the Georgian ribbon as a distinguishing feature. The editors of Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote in April 2015 that the black and orange ribbon had become an integral part of rallies against Russian liberals and against the so-called “ fifth column ”. People would be urged to accept a very specific political program and a negative attitude towards the West, the United States and Kiev in addition to the memory of the war .

Since the Euromaidan protest movement and the war in Ukraine, the Georgian ribbon has been a symbol of support for the Kremlin's foreign policy course and especially for Russian military intervention on the Crimean peninsula and in eastern Ukraine. Even during the protests against President Viktor Yanukovych , who was loyal to the Kremlin , counter-demonstrators made the Georgian ribbon their identification mark. The ribbon became a central symbol of the anti-Maidan movement. Berkut units and hired thugs who violently cracked down on Euromaidan protesters appeared with the orange and black ribbons. After special units of the Russian armed forces appeared in Crimea and occupied Ukrainian administrative buildings, Georgian ribbons were distributed on the peninsula and displayed on posters and billboards. The night wolves , who also adorned themselves with the St. George's ribbon, helped when they came to power in the Crimea . As the fighting shifted to southeastern Ukraine, the Georgian ribbon found widespread use among fighters and militia leaders such as Igor Girkin and Arsen Pavlov . It has also been incorporated into association badges and flags. For example, the “ Vostok Battalion ” and “Southeast Battalion” (also known by their own name “People's Militia LNR”) wear the ribbon in their badges and flags. The Russian organizations National Liberation Movement and Russian National Unity , which take part in the war, also use the Georgian band as a distinguishing feature. From the beginning of the conflict, the Russian government used the war rhetoric of the “Great Patriotic War” for mobilization purposes and to legitimize its foreign policy. The Georgian ribbon was intended to create the symbolic link between the two wars. In order to justify the Russian conquest in Ukraine and to create grounds for intervention, state media and politicians created a threatening backdrop based on the German-Soviet war. Ukraine was equated with Hitler's Germany and declared an existential threat to Russia. The European Union and the United States have been defamed as aggressors and fascists . In contrast, the Georgian ribbon is rarely associated with fascism in Russia, although it was worn by Russian collaborators during World War II.

In 2015, state officials in the Russian provinces were threatened with dismissal if they failed to wear the ribbon. Pupils who came to school without a Georgian ribbon were reported to the police. An art exhibition in Moscow that was critical of the George ribbon was interrupted by security services and destroyed. Among other things, a meat grinder was presented at the exhibition , the green men - in allusion to the Russian troops in Crimea - processed into Georgian ribbon. In the course of the government's appropriation of the symbol, the Georgian ribbon appeared on tanks and military vehicles, symbolizing the military might of today's Russia rather than the commemoration of the "Great Patriotic War".

Use outside of Russia

Since the military intervention in Ukraine, the Georgian ribbon has been understood in the former Soviet republics as an expression of support for President Putin. For this reason, attempts are being made throughout the post-Soviet space to restrict public use of the tape. In addition, Russia is increasingly interpreting the Soviet victory as a purely Russian achievement, whereas earlier it was seen as the result of the efforts of all Soviet republics. Therefore, other post-Soviet countries introduced their own national symbols to highlight their contribution to victory.

Belarusian President Lukashenka visits Vladimir Putin on May 8, 2015

Belarus developed an alternative to the Georgian ribbon in 2015. The new national commemorative symbol is the flower of victory: an apple blossom on a red and green ribbon. President Lukashenka said the new Belarusian flower design brought a sense of "national identity" but stressed that wearing the Georgian ribbon was still allowed. During a state visit to Russia in May 2015, Lukashenka wore a combination of both symbols.

In the Ukraine, the poppy was introduced in 2014 based on the British Remembrance Poppy and the slogan "Never again" (Ніколи знову) in memory of the war victims. The day of remembrance has also been moved from May 9 to May 8. In June 2017, the public use of Saint George's ribbon was banned as it was viewed in Ukraine as a symbol of Russian neo- imperialism .

Kyrgyzstan , Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan celebrate the victory under their national colors - in Kyrgyzstan in red and yellow, in Kazakhstan in light blue and in Uzbekistan in green. In Tajikistan , young people and intellectuals are protesting against increasing Russian influence and calling for the Georgian ribbon to be banned.

Victory Day is not celebrated in the Baltic states of Estonia , Latvia and Lithuania . The public wearing of the Georgian ribbon is not forbidden, but frowned upon because the ribbon is associated with separatist aspirations of the Russian-speaking minorities.

There have been political initiatives in the Republic of Moldova to criminalize the public use of Georgian ribbon. In the Moldovan region of Transnistria , which is under Russian influence, new banknotes were issued in May 2015 that show a Soviet medal on a St. George ribbon.

In other countries there have also been isolated attempts to prevent the wearing of the Georgian ribbon. For example, a woman worker in Norway was warned that the display of political views in the workplace was not welcome.

In the commercial

After the annexation of Crimea there was an inflationary use of the Georgian ribbon. In the past, the ribbon was only awarded to a few people for special military merits, but since 2005 the ribbon has been ubiquitous and is worn on almost every occasion. It was used en masse for the marketing of consumer goods and for decoration. The ribbon adorns women's handbags, toilet cubicles and vodka bottles , among other things, or serves as a shoe laces and dog collar. In May 2015, Vladimir Zhirinovsky called for the improper use of the Georgian ribbon to be banned. The occasion was the marketing of biscuits with the help of the Georgsband. Shirinovsky's proposal met with support from the Moscow authorities, but received criticism from private entrepreneurs.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Vera Demmel: Das Georgsband: Order of fame, commemorative symbol, pro-Kremlin symbol . In: Osteuropa 3/2016, pp. 19–31.
  2. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w Pål Kolstø: Symbol of the War - But Which One? The St George Ribbon in the Russian Nation Building . In: The Slavonic and East European Review . 94, No. 4, October 2016, pp. 660–701. doi: 10.5699 / slaveasteurorev2.94.4.0660 .
  3. ↑ a b SA Oushakine: Remembering in Public: On the Affective management of History . In: Ab Imperio: Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space 1/2013, pp. 269–302. doi: 10.1353 / imp.2013.0000 .
  4. ↑ a b Who is afraid of the Georgs tape? In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung , May 22, 2014.
  5. ↑ David Littlejohn: Kaminski and RONA In Foreign Legions of the Third Reich: Poland, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Free India, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Russia (4th volume). 2nd Edition. R. James Bender Publishing, San Jose, Calif. 1994, ISBN 0-912138-36-X , pp. 309-312.
  6. ^ A b c d Nataliya Danilova: The Politics of War Commemoration in the UK and Russia . Palgrave Macmillan, London 2015, ISBN 978-1-349-67939-3 , pp. 199-204 .
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  9. ^ Victory Day cult in Russia . In: New Eastern Europe 6/2016.
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  12. ↑ Julie Fedor et al. (Ed.): War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus . Palgrave Macmillan, London 2017, ISBN 978-3-319-66522-1 , p. 14 f.
  13. ↑ Lev Gudkov: The Shackles of Victory: Russia's Identity from Memory of the War . In: Eastern Europe 4–6 / 2005, pp. 56–72.
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  15. ^ The Black and Orange Ribbon of Putin's Army . In: The Moscow Times , April 16, 2014.
  16. ↑ Как сохранить подлинный день победы ( Eng . How can an authentic victory day be obtained ). In: Echo Moskwy , May 2, 2018.
  17. ↑ От символа единства - к символу разъединения ( Eng . From a symbol of unity - to a symbol of separation ). In: Echo Moskwy , May 5, 2015.
  18. ↑ Ленточный конвейер: Как заработать на патриотических чувствах (German ribbon assembly line : how money can be made with patriotic feelings ). In: Kommersant , May 11, 2018.
  19. ↑ День Победы как информационная дуэль Москвы и Киева (German Victory Day as an informational duel between Moscow and Kiev ). In: Echo Moskwy , May 21, 2015.
  20. ↑ Георгиевские ленты в каждый дом? (German Georgian ribbons in every house? ) In: Echo Moskwy , May 6, 2015.
  21. ↑ Великая Победа: действительно одна и действительно на всех ( Eng . Great victory: really only one and really for all ). In: Nezavisimaya Gazeta , April 30, 2015.
  22. ↑ a b Elisaveta Gaufman: Memory, Media, and Securitization: Russian Media Framing of the Ukrainian crisis . In: Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society . 1, No. 1, 2005, pp. 141-190.
  23. ↑ Oksana Danylenko: Symbols, Meanings, and Conflicts: How the interpretation of History Influences Contemporary events in Ukraine . In David Carment, Milana Nikolko (ed.): Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Development . Global Dialogues 11, Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Center for Global Cooperation Research ( University of Duisburg-Essen ), Duisburg 2016, doi: 10.14282 / 2198-0403-GD-11 , p. 31.
  24. ^ Thousands take part in 'Anti-Maidan' protest in Moscow against uprising in Ukraine . In: The Telegraph , February 21, 2015.
  25. ↑ Wilfried Jilge : History politics on the Majdan: Political emancipation and national self-assurance. In: Eastern Europe 5–6 / 2014, pp. 239–258, here pp. 245 f.
  26. ↑ Yuliya Zabyelina: Russia's Night Wolves Motorcycle Club: from 1% ers to political activists . In: Trends in Organized Crime ( Springer Science + Business Media ). June 2017, pp. 1–15. doi: 10.1007 / s12117-017-9314-7 .
  27. ↑ Ukraine: Night Wolves and unidentified military men seize key Crimea sites . In: The Guardian , February 28, 2014.
  28. ↑ Poppies Vs. Ribbons: The War Of Symbols Between Ukraine And Russia . In: Forbes , May 14, 2014.
  29. ↑ The Kremlin's Faux 'Freedom Fighters' . In: Foreign Policy , April 25, 2014.
  30. ↑ Andrew Wilson: Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West . Yale University Press , New Haven 2014, ISBN 978-0-300-21159-7 , p. 126 .
  31. ↑ Mikhail A. Alexseev, Henry E. Hale: Rallying 'round the leader more than the flag: Changes in Russian nationalist opinion public . In Pål Kolstø, Helge Blakkisrud (Ed.): The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015 . Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2016, ISBN 978-1-4744-1043-4 , p. 210 .
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  33. ^ Thomas Ambrosio: The rhetoric of irredentism: The Russian Federation's perception management campaign and the annexation of Crimea . In: Small Wars & Insurgencies . 27, No. 3, 2016, pp. 467-490. doi: 10.1080 / 09592318.2016.1151653 .
  34. ↑ Elizaveta Gaufman: World War II 2.0: Digital Memory of Fascism in Russia in the Aftermath of Euromaidan in Ukraine . In: Journal of Regional Security . 10, No. 1, 2015, pp. 17–36. doi: 10.11643 / issn.2217-995X151SPG48 .
  35. ↑ В георгиевской мясорубке ( Eng . In George's meat wolf ). In: Radio Free Europe , May 9, 2015.
  36. ↑ a b Introduction: War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus . In Fedor et al. (Ed.): War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus . Palgrave Macmillan, London 2017, ISBN 978-3-319-66522-1 , pp. 1-40.
  37. ^ A b c d For Victory Day, Post-Soviets Show Their Colors - Just Not Orange And Black . In: Radio Free Europe , May 7, 2015.
  38. ↑ Analysis: The politics of history in Ukraine since the change of power in spring 2014 . In: Federal Agency for Civic Education , April 20, 2015.
  39. ↑ Ukraine forbids wearing the georgian ribbon . In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung , June 13, 2017.
    Ukraine Bans Russian St. George Ribbon . In: Radio Free Europe , June 12, 2017.
  40. ↑ Why a banknote causes fear in Ukraine . The world. May 22, 2015. Accessed May 24, 2015.
  41. ↑ "Патриотизм законодательно запретить нельзя" (German: "Patriotism cannot be legally prohibited" ). In: Kommersant , May 8, 2015.