Covert fight

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Verdeckter Kampf ( VK , also abbreviation for Verdeckte Kämmer ) was a military term in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s / 70s for a hypothetical communist , subversive strategy with elements of guerrilla and partisan war as well as criminal and terrorist actions. Numerous aspects of the UK show parallels to the concept of so-called asymmetrical warfare . For the defense of the UK were in the armed forces , the Homeland Security Force and the Home Guard Command responsible. According to the Central Service Regulations of the Bundeswehr (ZDv) 3/11 valid in 1977 , the UK was the fighting style of gangs, sabotage troops and terrorists. They were also known informally as X-Forces .

Definition of Ernst Grimmel

The term VK was in Germany apparently first by Ernst Grimmel in his 1964 in Bremen published brochure partisans in the Black Forest? thematized. The author's name was probably a pseudonym . Grimmel described himself as a non-military in the foreword, but did not provide any further information about his person or his activities. Further publications by him are not known.

In Grimmel's opinion, the background to the UK was a changed global military strategic situation after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. This would have created a nuclear stalemate that would make it impossible to wage a conventional war in the foreseeable future. This creates a gray area between war and peace, which the communist side can use through the UK to shift the international balance of power in favor of the communist world through global actions and under the guise of the term “war of liberation”.

Grimmel saw the Federal Republic as particularly endangered; on the one hand by its strategic location, on the other hand by the fact that the communist opponent from the Soviet zone ( GDR ) could bring about an overthrow in West Germany in cooperation with the KPD, which has been illegal since 1956 . The population is now used to a clear separation between war and peace and regards the Cold War as a state of peace. The federal structure of the Federal Republic, a general uneasiness about the deployment of troops inside and the aversion of the West German police to a war-like deployment would favor a potential attack by the UK. Therefore, there is no balance of horror between NATO and the Warsaw Pact , since the latter has a monopoly on the UK in West Germany. Two options of the VK appeared to Grimmel to be particularly explosive:

  1. The use of VK in German uniforms against the three Western stationing powers Great Britain , France and the USA , which could provoke their hatred ,
  2. A Soviet offer for German reunification . In this context, Grimmel also warned against the formation of the National Committee for Free Germany and the start of a UK.

In fact, the UK has been threatened by the West since the beginning of the Cold War. Since 1945 there has been a series of fights that have been unsystematically referred to as war , partisan movement , guerrilla , uprising , etc. These are not wars in conventional political or military parlance. The majority of these UK had come out in favor of the communists, whereby Grimmel did not mention the EOKA guerrilla war by Georgios Grivas in Cyprus , which would have been ideal for his definition of the UK precisely because of its terrorist component.

Grimmel also saw a security risk in the guest workers , as there were numerous communists among them. B. how Greeks and Spaniards would have experience from the Greek and Spanish civil wars . On the other hand, they would not form a classic recruiting potential, since as foreigners they could not fight in hiding.

The targets are technology, traffic, communication links and authorities. Although the partisan had certain soldier traits in terms of tactics and technology , the UK was a political criminal and more gangsters than soldiers. No firearms or explosives are necessary for acts of sabotage in the Federal Republic of Germany . The chemical industry and the military technology of the Bundeswehr are particularly vulnerable. The use of BC (bio-chemical) weapons is also possible; an artificially induced flu epidemic could paralyze the leadership of the country.

The operational area of the UK is the city due to their anonymity. Although the German old towns are not kasbahs , they offer sufficient shelter, as the Warsaw uprisings of 1943 and 1944 ( uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto , Warsaw Uprising ) and the battle for Breslau in 1945 had proven. Objects of the VK would be waterworks , food supply , energy supply , sewage disposal and municipal administration as well as substations and water pumping stations.

In view of the aspects of the UK, Grimmel considered that the Bundeswehr should be deployed internally in peacetime, but was not clear about its specific role. A legal regulation is absolutely necessary so that stationing troops do not have to intervene. All soldiers of the Bundeswehr would have to train in the defense of the UK and draw on the experience of the police:

“The special training would therefore have to be preceded by a military study that also determines which tactical lessons the individual branches of arms have to draw for covert combat. In addition, you should ask the police (traffic, security, order and criminal police) for advice, because they know the particular battlefield and its problems better. "

- Grimmel, partisans in the Black Forest? , P. 35.

Psychological warfare is also necessary , for which preparations must be made immediately.

The undercover fight after Wolff / Günter / Moritz

Wolff / Günter / Moritz defined the VK in 1965 as follows:

“The covert struggle is the 'violent conflict' between irregular forces and the legal state power. The attack is prepared from outside - if possible undetected - and carried out according to a specific operational plan. The aim of the attack is to shake legal state power and, if possible, overthrow it. The covert combat can be carried out as an independent manifestation of the conflict or as a preliminary stage or accompanying phenomenon of open war between states. In most cases, however, it will remain below the threshold of open war when it comes to applying forces and, through its peculiarity, will also force the defender to avoid the outbreak of open war. "

- Wolff / Günter / Moritz, Der Verdeckte Kampf , p. 7.

Methods and Actors

The UK's methods and tactics were seen as espionage , kidnapping , provocations , demonstrations , passive resistance , character assassination , undermining state authority and economic morality, disintegration and breach of the peace .

Sturgeon and sabotage troops, partisans, larger gangs and helpers such as B. considered agitators and demagogues .

Targets of attack

Mainly political and less military objects were seen as targets of attack:

  1. The conquest of power while avoiding open war (preferably in so-called underdeveloped countries in Asia , Africa and Latin America ).
  2. The establishment of a docile government while avoiding open war, also within the framework of a popular front .
  3. The change in the global political heavyweight through indirect pressure by means of UK actions, without these directly leading to success in the rebellious countries.
  4. As a preliminary stage to open war: Destruction of the opposing infrastructure in the event of voltage.
  5. As a side effect of open war: partisan or gang fights in support of the regular troops.

General principles of combat

In peace

The UK fight first on the defensive ; in rural regions (or states) as irregular associations , in industrialized countries possibly even as lone fighters . The aim is to mislead the population through propaganda and spreading of rumors , provocation of the law enforcement agencies, creation of martyrs . The paralysis of the state apparatus takes precedence over destruction, since its intact takeover is the real goal. The destruction should only be carried out in extreme cases, if z. B. no hope of popular support can be expected.

The UK makes use of the so-called oil spill system ( tache d´huile ) developed by the French military strategist Hubert Lyautey (1854–1934): many small imperfections grow together to form larger ones that encompass an area controlled by the attacker. The sabotage does not primarily serve to destroy production facilities:

  1. should the workers not be turned against the insurgents ,
  2. should the production be transferred intact as possible. Sabotage should be directed against:
    • The administration (eg., By miscalculation, destruction of files , misdirection)
    • Supply facilities (e.g. workshops, depots, warehouses, pipelines , airfields )
    • Railway network (overhead lines, substructure, railway stations, rolling stock)
    • Telecommunications network (lines, switchboards)
    • Road network (bridges with supply lines, traffic junctions, signs)
    • Electricity network
    • Gas and water supply (pumping stations, dams, gas works )
    • Sewerage
    • Inland navigation (lifts, locks)
    • Ocean shipping (port facilities, lighthouses, signal systems)
    • Military objects (barracks, depots, equipment, vehicles, warships).
    • Radio and television broadcasters.

The coordination and implementation of these actions, according to Wolf u. a. high demands on discipline and skill in an irregular troop.

In war

The actions listed above were also assumed in the event of war, only that in this case they should be coordinated with regular forces.

Defense. Training for the German armed forces, police and federal border guards

The following aspects seemed necessary for defense: Knowledge of the characteristics of the UK and preparation of the political and military leadership, the population and the Bundeswehr. The following appeared to be important in the training of the Bundeswehr:

  • Only legal combat methods may be used for defense.
  • No acts of retaliation , as these are actually wanted by the attackers in order to provoke and cause parts of the population to overflow.
  • Rapid, agile and adaptable defense against irregular associations.
  • Destruction of the attacker's main lines of communication to their headquarters.
  • Encircling and narrowing the attackers (reverse oil spill system ).
  • Close cooperation between all bodies and associations involved.

On the political-psychological level, the strengthening of one's own strengths, including those of social forces such as democratic parties and trade unions, was called for. Enthusiasts, utopians, fanatics and troublemakers should be withdrawn from their allegiance. The coordination of defense measures in the military and non-military areas also appeared to be essential for defense.

Geographically, the FRG did not seem to be particularly endangered, as there were no real retreats and so-called empty spaces. In contrast, port and industrial cities as well as old towns were considered to be particularly endangered in contrast to the clearly laid out new building areas. The borders to the north, west and south were seen as a gateway for agents; Border and holiday resorts are viewed as particularly good connection points, since non-residents could move around without being noticed for a long time.

The political situation seemed to Wolf et al. Secured in 1965, but the increasingly complex automation and rationalization was seen as prone to failure. The psychological situation, on the other hand, appeared uncertain. On the one hand, the majority of the population saw prosperity as positive, on the other hand, in the event of tension, fears could appear as a reminder of the last war ( World War II ). A scenario in which the attackers intended to avoid the deployment of the NATO allies of the Bundeswehr and to stage the UK as a domestic affair of the Federal Republic was viewed as particularly dangerous.

Another scenario seemed just as dangerous. Although there was no concrete danger for the FRG, in the event of global political tension, communist strategies of the UK in Western Europe could influence the actions of the US President .

A particular problem was seen in the fact that in the GDR staff could be trained for the UK in the Federal Republic without being noticed, since there were no differences in language and lifestyle. A generous asylum and family relationships were the infiltration facilitate of agents, spies and saboteurs. For 1963, the activity of 16,000 Ostagenten in the Federal Republic was assumed. The Frenzel and Felfe cases made their potential clear; moreover, 20% of the West German population were related in the "SBZ". Wolf / Günter / Moritz assumed that the SBZ had already provided sufficient forged documents, but also uniforms from the Bundeswehr, police, BGS , Bundesbahn , technical relief organization and the German Red Cross .

Scenarios for the UK in the Federal Republic

Wolf / Günter / Moritz already saw some elements of the UK in action, e.g. B.

  • Propagandist influences
  • Defamation of leading personalities
  • Defamation of the Federal Republic abroad through false claims such as the pursuit of nuclear weapons or the existence of a strong Nazi movement,
  • Border provocations and obstacles to travel,
  • Kidnapping, extortion and espionage,
  • Smuggling agents into companies and target objects of all kinds,
  • Development of a functional network for sabotage and underground work,
  • Individual cases of hindrance and disruption of production.

In an emergency, it can be expected that the opponent will try to play off the various interest groups in the country against one another and carry out targeted acts of sabotage:

“For example, the communist attacker has no difficulty in faking a large neo-Nazi wave. Such an apparent Nazi movement can begin with the affixing of swastikas in many places in the Federal Republic and continue with violence against individual representatives of democracy or acts of sabotage at cemeteries, synagogues and similar institutions. "

- Wolf / Günter / Moritz, Der verdeckte Kampf , p. 25.

Concepts to defend against the UK in the Federal Republic. The Homeland Security Force

While the riot police of the federal states and the Federal Border Police in the Federal Republic operated from 1950 to approx. 1975 with concepts of the police fight that had already been developed in the 1920s in the conflict with the military apparatus of the KPD ( Central German uprising 1921, Hamburg uprising 1923) , this situation was new for the Bundeswehr. It had neither tactical concepts nor training guidelines nor special units to fight gangs and saboteurs. This changed in 1964/65 with the creation of the so-called homeland security force , which emerged from the territorial army:

"The aim of the training is a soldier of the Homeland Security Force who is trained and ready for action according to modern principles, who can fend off an attacking enemy in the various manifestations of concealed combat."

- Gerhard Schirmer, The Territorial Reserve as a Way to the Home Guard , Troop Practice (1966), p. 153.

The Homeland Security Force had three tasks:

  1. The smashing of airborne or breached weaker enemy forces,
  2. The fight against gangs and terrorist organizations,
  3. The protection of so-called sensitive points (EP) against gangs or other opponents.

To defend against these opponents should serve:

  1. Locally stationed independent security companies and security trains, which usually had to protect a narrowly defined property,
  2. The Grenadier Battalions TV (TV = Territorial Defense) for mobile use, especially as an intervention reserve,
  3. Hunting teams or so-called hunter platoons to track down enemy groups, contain them and destroy them.

The most urgent task of the homeland security force was not the protection of military and civilian objects, but the maintenance of the operational capability of the NATO troops; All other tasks were subordinate to this goal. The training took place in 1966 according to the preliminary guidelines for the training of the homeland security force . It is not yet known whether this has ever been replaced by a more extensive training regulation. The term VK seems to have disappeared from West German military parlance around 1980.

See also

literature

  • Hartmut Schumann: The undercover fight. Its sociological appearance and its treatment in international law. Heidelberg 1969 (Phil. Diss.).
  • Kurt VR Wolf, Reinhard W. Günter, Günther Moritz: The covered battle. Bonn (publisher Offene Zeiten) 1965.
  • Ernst Grimmel: Partisans in the Black Forest? Bremen (Relais-Verlag) 1964.
  • Otto Heilbrunn: Partisan Book. Zurich 1963.
  • Horst Fiegert: Recognition of insurgents as insurgents. Hamburg 1965 (Phil. Diss.).
  • Günther Moritz: International law issues of the hidden fight. Bonn 1964.
  • Oskar Spengler: The Covert Struggle - The form of war of the future. In: Austrian military magazine. Vienna 1964, pp. 415-416.
  • Erich Vorwerck: The homeland security force. Organization, development and training. In: Defense. Journal for all military issues. XV. 1966, pp. 202-207.
  • Erich Vorwerck: The "Covert Struggle" and the Ten Commandments of Mao Tse-tung. No. 1, in: Wehrkunde. Journal for all military issues. XVI. 1967, pp. 35-38.
  • Werner Hahlweg : War experiences in Vietnam and their applicability to Europe. In: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau. European Security Journal. 18th year 1968, pp. 121-139.
  • Wassili Danilowitsch Sokolowski : Military strategy. first German edition. Markus Verlag, Cologne 1965.
    • Russian: Voennaja Strategija. 1st edition Moscow 1962.
  • Ian FW Beckett: Encyclopedia of Guerilla Warfare. New York 2001.
  • Georgios Grivas -Dighenis: Partisan War Today. Lessons from the Cyprus struggle for freedom . With an introduction by Eugen Weyde, Frankfurt a. M. 1964.
  • Major Heinz Post: Fight against X-forces (X = guerrillas, saboteurs, terrorists and gangs). In: Troop Practice. Magazine for tactics, technology and training for officers in the Bundeswehr. 10, 1967, pp. 731-734.
  • Colonel i. G. Gerhard Schirmer: The Territorial Reserve as a way to the homeland security force - new content and new name -. In: Troop Practice. 2, 1966, pp. 151-154.
  • Major Wilhelm Pollert: Combat troops of the territorial defense. In: Troop Practice. 7, 1964, pp. 533-535.
  • The friction . The manual for the soldier . Edition Army, edited by Lieutenant Colonel H.-J. Kämmerer, Herford 1977, p. 249, section C, p. 13.
  • Hartmut Schumann: The political-sociological fact of the Verdeckten Kampfes , in: Wehrkunde , 10, 1968, pp. 508-515.
  • HE Seuberlich: Strategy and tactics of radical left students. Brief analysis and consequences for the Bundeswehr , in: Wehrkunde , 10, 1968, pp. 521-525.
  • Helmut Hammerich: "Only hunters help against elite fighters, not slipper troops". The Bundeswehr and the Little War in the Cold War , in: Uwe Hartmann / Helmut Hammerich / Claus von Rosen (eds.): Yearbook Inner Leadership 2010 , Eschede 2009, pp. 161–173. ISBN 978-3-937885-30-8

Web links

  • Armed forces. Hunt for X. In: Der Spiegel. 21st year, No. 50 v. December 4, 1967, pp. 27f. (on-line)
  • Doreen Hartwich / Bernd-Helge Mascher: History of special combat management (Department IV of the MfS) - tasks, structure, personnel, tradition (2007) [1]