18th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)

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18th Panzer Division

Division badge of the 18th Panzer Division

Division emblem of the 18th Panzer Division
active October 26, 1940 to 1943 reorganized as an artillery division
Country German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire
Armed forces Wehrmacht
Armed forces army
Branch of service Armored force
Type Panzer Division
structure structure
Installation site Chemnitz
Second World War German-Soviet War
Kettle Battle near Białystok and Minsk
Battle of Moscow
Company Citadel
Company Gypsy Baron
Commanders
list of Commanders

The 18th Panzer Division was a large unit of the army of the German Wehrmacht , which was used on the Eastern Front during World War II . In 1943, due to the lack of tanks, it was re-established as the 18th artillery division and was planned for the Walküre by the military resistance against Hitler to occupy the Fuehrer's headquarters in Wolfsschanze . The 18th Panzer Division was involved in a number of war crimes from the start of the attack on the Soviet Union.

Division history

Lineup

The 18th Panzer Division was set up on October 26, 1940 in Chemnitz in Wehrkreis IV from parts of the 4th (IR 52) and 14th Infantry Division (IR 101). In December 1940, the newly formed tank regiments 18 and 28, each with two departments, were placed under her command. The latter was dissolved again in March 1941 and a III. Division formed for the 18th Panzer Regiment.

German-Soviet War (1941–1943)

As part of the XXXXVII. Panzer Corps of Panzer Group 2 , the 18th Panzer Division crossed the border to the Soviet Union with 200 tanks in the central section of the Eastern Front. The area south of Smolensk was reached by the beginning of August. After battles, especially with the superior Soviet T-34 tanks, after two weeks it had only 83 tanks; on July 24, just four weeks after the start of Operation Barbarossa , 12 tanks were left. A supply column was destroyed by a Soviet counterattack. In the first three weeks of the war of 17,174 soldiers and 401 officers, 2,300 soldiers and 123 officers died. These losses led to war fatigue. Even during the Blitzkrieg phase in mid-July 1941 was Motorcycle Battalion for ten days in a trench war forced the to the trench warfare of the First World War recalls. It was under constant fire from Soviet artillery and was subject to constant attacks by enemy infantry. The battalion doctor wrote a haunting report:

“The total state of exhaustion can be seen in all the people in the battalion. It is [...] above all due to the excessive mental and nervous strain. The troops [...] lay under strong heavy artillery fire. The enemy attacked [...], broke into their own positions and was thrown back in close combat and counter-attack. During those days, people couldn't sleep day or night. It was only possible to eat during the few hours of darkness. A large number of people who are still with the force have been buried in artillery fire. The fact that people […] had been promised a few days of rest had a particularly serious effect, but instead they got into situations that were more difficult than the previous ones. The people are completely unresponsive and apathetic, sometimes had crying fits and cannot be cheered up by any words. Food is only consumed in relatively small amounts. "

- Battalion doctor in a report on July 27, 1941

At the end of August, the 18th Panzer Division attacked with Panzer Group 2 to the south, thus closing the Kiev pocket . Then, at the beginning of October, the actual attack on Moscow began with the Battle of Briansk . At this point in time, 9,323 soldiers and 239 officers, including replacements, were still alive. Despite replacement deliveries, the 18th Panzer Division had no more than 50 operational tanks in mid-August 1941. The logistics had to be switched from motorized transport of supplies to horse-drawn panje wagons . This removed the strategic advantages of a tank unit: speed and mobility. The tank shrinkage continued. On November 9th, 14 working tanks were still available, which failed due to lack of fuel by November 19th. The number of other vehicles had shrunk to a quarter of the original stock. Threatening supply shortages in food and clothing as well as miserable living conditions, frostbite, illnesses ( flu , skin infections, intestinal inflammation, typhus and typhus ) and exhaustion further reduced the operational capability: "The physical and mental condition of the troops and individual leaders" noted the operations management of the division on March 22nd December 1941 "forces you to issue very detailed orders and painstakingly checking all orders in order to avoid breakdowns." At the time of the Soviet counter-offensive, 1963 soldiers and 43 officers were still able to fight.

After the 18th Panzer Division had reached the upper Don southeast of Tula by December 12, 1941 , it withdrew to the winter position. From December 26, 1941, the Soviet counter-offensive began in their area, which they opposed until April 1942. The 18th Panzer Division burned down all the villages it could no longer hold, killed or consumed all livestock, arrested the male population and drove women and children into the snow.

In February 1942 the commander noted: “Because of the frequent occurrence of typhus, a company had to be withdrawn from the front and segregated […] Given the condition of the troops, the reduction in the portion rates is not acceptable for a long time. Complete relaxation for refreshment, health and mood is desirable. ”In the first three months of 1942, one third of the division reported sick, around 5000 soldiers. The commander urged his officers "to work hard to counteract the undoubtedly existing tiredness and indifference of our people." In the first three months of 1942 the 18th Panzer Division lost 6,667 soldiers and 120 officers, often due to illness and frostbite.

In the spring and summer of 1942, the 18th Panzer Division constantly complained of inadequate replacement in terms of quantity and quality, and a lack of officers and subordinates with experience at the front. During this time she was in the area of ​​the 2nd Panzer Army in XXXXVII. Armored Corps used. In early July 1942, these remains were almost destroyed in a Soviet attack, in the first three days of which alone 1,364 soldiers and 43 officers were reported as dead. A second devastating defeat followed in the winter of 1942/43 at Orel , in March the division's total strength was only 2,834 men. The assessment of the situation says: “In the last few weeks, 8 of 16 commanders (including all Panzer Grenadier Battalion commanders) have changed, and the position of division commander and the Ia has been newly filled […] None of the commanders has in his current position combat and leadership experience in attack, only in defense [...] The existing officer corps for attack and defense insufficient in numbers [...] 28% deficit. "

In the spring of 1943, the 18th Panzer Division, strengthened by 89 officers, 130 NCOs and soldiers, went into the battle of Kursk (Operation Citadel). At that time it was one of the strongest German divisions on the Eastern Front. This strength was achieved, however, through the deployment of older soldiers from the entourage, about whom it was later said that they were completely unsuitable for deployment at the front. On July 11, 1943, a few days after the start of the Citadel operation, the division had 5,266 soldiers and 157 officers, 12 days later there were only 890 soldiers and 30 officers.

From the remnants of the division, the 18th Artillery Division was formed in October 1943 , which was largely in the hands of the conspirators around Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg . She was scheduled for the Valkyrie company for the coup , but was not used.

Killing of our own soldiers for discipline

The warfare of the 18th Panzer Division was accompanied by a fight against "indiscipline". At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, rumors about approaching Soviet tank units led to panic and reversal of individual units. The commander, who was Walther Nehring in the beginning , tried to prevent this by issuing sharp instructions to his officers. In mid-August, three soldiers were tried in a German court martial , one sentenced to death and two to long prison terms . In the opinion of the commander, prison sentences for soldiers who fell asleep while on guard duty did not have a sufficient deterrent effect in November 1941 to maintain discipline. He therefore announced the imposition of the death penalty in a daily order. In another order of the day, the commander issued a death sentence on December 21, 1941 against a soldier who had followed his troops late, unarmed and heavily drunk. He used the judgment to point out that "every case of cowardice [...] will be ruthlessly atone for death". In March 1942, one soldier was sentenced to death for refusing to give orders and another for leaving his gun group in battle. In the summer of 1943, the commander ordered his officers to shoot their own soldiers if they violated discipline in battle and showed panic.

Treatment and murder of Soviet citizens

The readiness of the commanders to kill their own soldiers for reasons of discipline contrasted with the practice of ignoring German attacks against the civilian population and prisoners of war protected by international war law or of bending and breaking international law. This claimed numerous lives. The military historian Omer Bartov notes that over-harsh discipline on the one hand and tolerance of crimes against the civilian population as an outlet on the other was a crucial condition of the crimes of the war of extermination.

"Fighting partisans" and dealing with prisoners of war

Following instruction No. 21 , the 18th Panzer Division issued its own guidelines, which ordered every enemy soldier who was not clearly identified as a soldier, as well as every civilian suspected of supporting partisans, to be shot. Fleeing Soviet citizens or captured soldiers were also systematically handed over to the Secret Field Police , which also murdered them or shot them directly as "spies". The 18th Panzer Division forbade the transport of prisoners of war in trucks for alleged fear of lice. The malnourished prisoners therefore had to walk long distances. The rations of prisoners of war used for forced labor were officially half the rations for German soldiers; according to an order, they could be reached “by the most primitive means”.

The well-known poor treatment of prisoners of war also had negative military effects. In February 1942, the 18th Panzer Division lamented the reluctance of Soviet soldiers to overflow or be captured, since the fear of captivity "is greater than the fear of falling in combat." warned that “in the interests of waging war, Russian women are always ready to use their physical assets and the trust of our soldiers for espionage purposes wholeheartedly.” There is a risk of being not only spied on by such partisans but also mutilated. Soviet women who were found accompanied by German soldiers were to be handed over to the police for security reasons, and their partners were to be accused of collaborating with an enemy intelligence service. In 1942, the 18th Panzer Division shot all the suspects it found in the "desert zone" behind its front line.

"Company Gypsy Baron"

In May 1943, the 18th Panzer Division took part in the "clean-up" Operation Gypsy Baron , in which they arrested all male civilians between the ages of 15 and 65 in the forests around Bryansk , expelled the remaining population, burned the villages and confiscated property. Captured officers and " commissioners " should be handed over to the SD . Ordinary soldiers, members of the CPSU and Jews were supposed to be murdered by being used to clear land mines . Together with other units, “partisans” were killed in 1584, 1568 made “prisoners” and 15812 villagers displaced. There were no losses of my own. Taking hostages and threatening to shoot them had already been tried out the previous year.

Private and collective looting, hunger of the civilian population

Already at the beginning of the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, the units of the 18th Panzer Division were given the order to “take full advantage of the land” to provide for themselves. For this purpose, special “booty capture squads” were set up. Only flour from the empire should be used for supply. At the end of July 1941, the loss of the harvest with the result of a famine among the Soviet civilian population became apparent, as the division's reports show. The 18th Panzer Division appointed an "agricultural officer" to oversee the rebuilding of the kolkhozes , but they continued to care for them ruthlessly from their holdings. In August and September 25 tons of meat were confiscated, in November 40 tons of meat.

In 1941, the permanent requisitioning of cattle - although there was no need to do so - led to considerable bitterness among the Soviet population. The leadership of the 18th Panzer Division noticed that the senseless slaughter of cattle was rampant, and soldiers often took away the last remaining food and cattle from the civilian population. No one was prosecuted for this form of unauthorized looting, although the division commander warned that this behavior would drive the population back to the " Bolsheviks ". Soldiers of the 18th Panzer Division began openly armed robbery in the winter of 1941/42, during which they broke resistance with armed force. They were not responsible for this, they maintained this behavior in the following winter.

Nuremberg Trials

At the Nuremberg Trials on February 13, 1946, the treatment of captured or injured Soviet soldiers by the 18th Panzer Division was discussed on the subject of criminal orders . One witness testified:

“I know the order from Lieutenant General Model of the 3rd Panzer Division, which said that no prisoners should be taken. Major General Nehring of the 18th Panzer Division gave the same order. In the briefing session on June 20, two days before the attack on the Soviet Union, we were told that the wounded Red Army soldiers should not be bandaged in the future campaign, as the German army had no time to bother with prisoners of war. "

- Hans Drews, formerly a soldier of 4th Company, 6th Panzer Regiment

This was confirmed by another testimony:

“On June 21, the day before the war against Russia broke out, we received the following order from our officers: The commissars of the Red Army are to be shot on the spot, because there is not much to do with them. You don't have to bother with the wounded Russian prisoners of war either, you should put an end to them on the spot. "

- Harry Marek, formerly the headquarters company of the 18th Panzer Division

reception

A book and a booklet are available in German about the 18th Panzer Division with it in the title. One is Der Landser (Issue 2104): Marching Beresina: 1941 - The 18th Panzer Division in the initial phase of the Russian campaign , the second the book by Wolfgang Paul , which has been self-published in several editions since 1975 : History of the 18. Panzer- Division: 1940-1943. With history of the 18th Artillery Division 1943 - 44th Appendix Heeresartillerie-Brigade 88 1944–1945. Paul was platoon and company commander of tank grenadiers in the 18th Panzer Division under Nehring. In 1986 he published another book about Panzer-General Walther K. Nehring , which was published by Motorbuchverlag.

Commanders

after Mitcham

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Samuel W. Mitcham: German Order of Battle, Volume 3: Panzer, Panzer Grenadier, and Waffen SS Divisions in WWII. Stackpole 2007, p. 49 f.
  2. ↑ a b c d Rolf Stoves, p. 122 f .; Source cannot be identified
  3. ↑ a b c Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, pp. 39–41.
  4. ↑ a b c d Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, pp. 66-69.
  5. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 40.
  6. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, pp. 41, 44.
  7. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 126.
  8. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 44.
  9. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 44 f.
  10. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, pp. 74-76.
  11. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 75 f.
  12. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, pp. 84-86.
  13. ^ Peter Hoffmann (2007): Colonel i. G. Henning von Tresckow and the coup plans in 1943. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte pp. 331–364 ( PDF ).
  14. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 157 f.
  15. ↑ a b c Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, pp. 149–151.
  16. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 150.
  17. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 155.
  18. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 139.
  19. ↑ a b c Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 142.
  20. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 137.
  21. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 135.
  22. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 145 f.
  23. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 140.
  24. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 118 f.
  25. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 120.
  26. ↑ Omer Bartov: Hitler's Wehrmacht. Soldiers, fanaticism and the brutalization of war. Reinbek near Hamburg, p. 122.
  27. ↑ a b Protocol on www.zeno.org
  28. ↑ Most recently published by the Prussian Military Publishing House in Reutlingen. Information from the DNB
  29. ↑ Nehring, Walther K. on http://kulturportal-west-ost.eu/ accessed on February 13, 2013.
  30. ↑ Samuel W. Mitcham: German Order of Battle, Volume 3: Panzer, Panzer Grenadier, and Waffen SS Divisions in WWII. Stackpole 2007, p. 52.