Line II of the MfS

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Coat of arms of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR
MfS headquarters: front right house 1, behind house 2, headquarters of HA II

The line I was a working area of the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) of the GDR . Line II, which existed from 1953 to the dissolution of the MfS in 1990, was responsible for internal and external counter-espionage , i.e. the detection and defense of secret service attacks against the GDR in the political, economic and military fields. Since the SED regime assumed that actions directed against the GDR were mostly hostile secret services, the competencies of Line II were correspondingly broad and went well beyond those of a “classic” counter-espionage. Line II comprised the departments II of the 15 district administrations (BV), individual working groups and employees at the level of the district offices as well as the associated main department II (HA II) based in the MfS headquarters in Normannenstrasse in Berlin-Lichtenberg .

tasks

The MfS counter-espionage initially included the classic task of defensive defense against enemy spies. In a resolution dated September 23, 1953 , the SED - Politburo laid down the "implementation of an active counter-espionage in West Germany and West Berlin as well as on the territory of the German Democratic Republic" with the aim of "exposing the plans and intentions of the enemy and the [...] smuggled in agents of the enemy espionage services ”as one of the main tasks of the MfS. In the context of the Cold War , the secret services of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allied states - the latter especially when their activities were directed against institutions of the Soviet Union within the GDR - were the primary opponents of the MfS counter-espionage.

Since actions directed against the GDR (such as oppositional and politically resistant behavior ) were always assumed to be the work of hostile secret services, the fields of activity of Line II were correspondingly broad and also included an offensive, “external counter-espionage”. Specifically, this meant:

  • Detection and defense against secret service attacks against the GDR
  • Enlightenment of organizations that were operating against the GDR from within the Federal Republic or other western states (e.g. the All-German Institute , Eastern Bureau , the combat group against inhumanity or the investigative committee of freedom lawyers )
  • Consolidation of all knowledge gained in counter-espionage and assessment of the "political-operational situation"
  • Guarantee of internal security in the MfS (monitoring of own employees, security check of external employees)
  • Securing the GDR foreign missions and monitoring the foreign missions within the GDR
  • Control of foreigners registered in the GDR, including mainly accredited journalists and correspondents of the western media
  • Securing the cooperation of the SED with parties in the Federal Republic

In these questions she was in charge of all other departments of the MfS. In 1973, on the other hand, it handed over the tasks of counter-espionage to the Head Office for Enlightenment (HV A).

In carrying out their tasks, the MfS's counter-espionage benefited from the GDR's closed society and the resulting opportunities for extensive surveillance, radio, mail and telephone control. While the focus was initially on the deterrent effect of show trials staged by the media, the character of the MfS counter-espionage increasingly changed in the 1970s towards a preventive prevention of enemy espionage.

history

Forerunner and foundation

In the context of the Cold War, the GDR leadership attached great importance to counter-espionage from the start. Initially, it was in the area of ​​responsibility of Department IV of the young MfS in Berlin, which was essentially set up by instructors from the Soviet State Security Service (MGB), and the corresponding departments of the state administrations (and from summer 1952 district administrations). Each of these departments consisted of a section for West German, American, British and French secret service activities, as well as a fifth section for tasks that could not be assigned to any of the above-mentioned secret services. Department IV was headed successively by Lieutenant Colonel Werner Kukelski , Paul Rumpelt and Rolf Markert (actually Helmut Thiemann). At the same time, Department II, which was responsible for espionage activities in the Federal Republic and was headed by Colonel Josef Kiefel , had existed since 1952 . By order of Wilhelm Zaisser , she ran "operational agency work" and recruited agents in West Germany. The Department II was established on November 25, 1953 from the merger of departments II (espionage in Germany) and IV (counterintelligence). Like its predecessor, it initially consisted of four departments, each of which had to cover the activities of a West Allied and West German secret service. The management of HA II was taken over by Josef Kiefel.

"Concentrated Strikes" of the 1950s

Photo of the trial against members of the Combat Group Against Inhumanity (KgU). In a show trial, Gerhard Benkowitz (right) was sentenced to death in June 1955 and executed a little later.

In the 1950s, the HA II succeeded in a number of large-scale actions against Western secret services. This procedure was referred to internally by the MfS as the tactic of “concentrated strikes”. Between October 1953 and August 1954, the “Fireworks” and “Arrow” actions led to the arrest of a total of 665 people suspected of working for the Gehlen organization or the American or French secret service. Another 380 people followed in three major campaigns in 1955. In show trials, the actual and alleged agents were mostly sentenced to long prison terms, in at least ten cases they were even executed. This was made possible by the double agent Horst Hesse , who had previously stolen two safes with the complete agent file of the American military espionage service in Germany from the MID headquarters in Würzburg . In addition, HA II carried out a large number of break-ins, bomb attacks and robberies. In addition, on behalf of the SED, HA II secured the “Traffic” department (ie contacts in the Federal Republic) and the “ Freedom broadcaster 904 ” and supported the Communist Party of Germany , which has been banned in the Federal Republic since 1956 .

From the mid-1950s, HA II made a series of structural changes. In response to democratic reform movements in Hungary (in the run-up to the popular uprising in 1956 ) the MfS intensified its cooperation with the secret services of other socialist countries. A separate department was set up for this purpose. Department 4, which is responsible for the West German secret services, was split up in January 1958 into separate departments for the Federal Intelligence Service and the Protection of the Constitution. From February 1960 Werner Grünert took over the management of HA II .

Changed conditions after the wall was built

Construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961

Further organizational changes resulted from the changed requirement profile as a result of the construction of the wall . The now complete closure of the borders made work for Western secret services in the GDR area more difficult. Therefore, in 1964, the MfS decided to separate “offensive” and “internal defense”. While Departments 1 and 2 (previously American and British secret services) took over the former for foreign or West German secret services, the responsibility for the latter was in future with Departments 3 and 4 (previously French secret service and BND). The tasks of HA II from then on also included tracking down tunnels from West Berlin to East Berlin , of which a total of 287 had been discovered by 1966. Between 1960 and 1966, at least 644 people were arrested on suspicion of espionage.

Line II in the context of international relaxation

Also as a result of the new Ostpolitik of the Brandt II new problems arose for the HA. The increased international recognition of the GDR (at the end of 1973 it had diplomatic relations with 109 countries) created new security areas such as GDR representations in western countries and embassies of the western European countries in East Berlin. At the same time, the HA II gave up other competencies, since with the order 14/73 of the HV A the responsibility for the external counter-espionage was transferred. However, Line II received some of the competencies back in 1976/77. In addition, from 1974/1975 she was also responsible for safeguarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MfAA) and for securing and educating Western correspondents and journalists. To do this, she was supposed to smuggle unofficial employees into the central western publication organs and into the private environment of journalists. They had the task of “ skimming ” colleagues and thus collecting the information that also led to the withdrawal of accreditation for Western correspondents such as Lothar Loewe or the closure of the East Berlin office of the news magazine Der Spiegel . In particular, the contact between Western journalists and the embassies in their respective countries of origin was interpreted as agent activity.

The work of Line II was also subject to qualitative changes, as the SED regime demanded more consideration for the international reputation of the GDR in defensive work against diplomatic missions. The “concentrated blows” of the 1950s and their subsequent propaganda exploitation in show trials were no longer possible in the context of an international policy of détente. Instead, the cooperation with the MfAA was intensified.

Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker sign the 1975 CSCE Final Act

In 1973 the GDR took part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), at which not only economic agreements and the recognition of the sovereign rights of the participating states but also questions of human rights were discussed. By signing the CSCE Final Act in 1975, the GDR declared itself ready to comply with it. In addition, the GDR undertook to relax the applicable travel regulations. Travel from the Federal Republic of Germany tripled between 1969 and 1975, so that in 1975 3.5 million West Berliners traveled to the GDR. At the same time, 40,000 pensioners from the GDR were allowed to travel to the Federal Republic. Line II was enlarged disproportionately to the control of the tourist traffic towards a comprehensive "counterintelligence".

With the increased diplomatic recognition of the GDR and the establishment of western embassies, the number of visitors also increased. In 1982 around 6,000 people turned to the Permanent Mission of the FRG in the GDR for help . Likewise, the number of refugees from GDR citizens to the embassies of western states rose rapidly due to the increasingly insurmountable inner German border. In 1984 alone Line II registered 600 such escapes and arrested 153 “embassy refugees” between January 20 and February 9, 1984 alone. However, this practice was discontinued a little later for fear of the GDR's reputation. Instead, only the personal details of the visitor were recorded when leaving the embassy. The MfS had nothing to counter the increasing shift of the embassy escapes to the German representations in Prague , Budapest and Warsaw at the end of the 1980s.

In February 1976, Günther Kratsch replaced Werner Grünert as the previous head of HA II. Under his leadership, Line II also took over the protection and security of the embassy of the USSR in the GDR from 1978.

In its function as an offensive, external counter-espionage organ, the HA II employed various double agents in West German secret services as well as the West Berlin constitution protection . The highest-ranking example is the case of Joachim Krase , who was also Deputy Chief of the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) and worked for the MfS. However, there were also cases of defectors in their own ranks. For example, Werner Stiller left for the FRG in 1979 as an employee of HV A. This led to increased efforts in the area of ​​"internal security" of the MfS - that is, the monitoring of its own employees.

In order to counteract the increasing shortage of foreign currency in the GDR, the Commercial Coordination Department founded or took over a large number of front companies owned by the SED in western countries. Their protection was transferred to HA II in 1980. The leading employees of these companies were appointed by the head of the "Transport" department of the Central Committee of the SED and consisted mainly of unofficial DKP members. In order to uncover the activities of Western secret services against SED companies, the HA II systematically monitored their employees and their spouses. The close contact with West German communists also made it necessary to secure all communications between the Central Committee of the SED and the West German KPD, later DKP (from 1968). This was also taken over by Line II. To protect SEW , it also worked on the protection of the constitution in West Berlin.

From 1980 onwards there were more and more strikes in the People's Republic of Poland , which ultimately led to the establishment of the free trade union Solidarność and the proclamation of martial law . In order to fight the opposition in Poland more effectively and to prevent the movement from spreading to the GDR, HA II intensified its cooperation with the Polish counter-espionage. In addition, in 1984 the HA II decided to work more closely with the intelligence headquarters. Since the MfS was dissatisfied with the actions of the Polish security forces against opposition members, which were classified as too moderate, Poland became the only Eastern European country to de facto become the “operational area” for the MfS. Department II proved to be in charge of gathering information on the situation in Poland. For example, she used GDR citizens resident in Poland as IMs; contact persons also existed in the Polish Ministry of the Interior and the Polish United Workers' Party (PVAP).

From 1970 to 1989, Line II arrested a total of 170 people on suspicion of espionage, of which the MfS assigned 104 to the Federal Intelligence Service, 28 to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, two to the Military Counter-Intelligence Service, 33 to the American secret services and three to other NATO secret services.

resolution

In 1989 the main department still processed a total of 258 suspected espionage cases. This was also due to the increased activity of the secret services of the Federal Republic and the USA, which collected political, economic and military information in the GDR. Nevertheless, with the political change in the GDR, the entire legitimation of the MfS was up for grabs. Line II also showed the first signs of disintegration at the end of 1989, with individual employees going over to the BND or KGB. The last report on the work of counterintelligence was prepared on December 15, 1989. Internally, the destruction of files and the sale of Line II property to employees had already begun. Plans for a reorganization of the counterintelligence finally failed on January 15, 1990, when the Modrow government renounced the establishment of a new office for the protection of the constitution. On the same day, citizens occupied the MfS headquarters in Berlin. Günther Kratsch, like most of the main department heads, was released from his position on December 6, 1989 and dismissed on January 31, 1990. From December 6, 1989 until the final dissolution of the MfS, renamed the Office for National Security , the previous 1st Deputy, Major General Wolfgang Lohse, headed the HA II.

structure

Organization chart of HA II (1989)

The central management of the line II took over the main department II with seat in the MfS headquarters in Berlin-Lichtenberg. At the district level , the district administrations of the MfS maintained their own departments II (Dept. II / BV), which were responsible for the local implementation of the decided measures. In addition, working groups or individual employees of the MfS district offices (KD) were responsible for counter-espionage tasks at the district level. However, they passed on their information and results to the superior BV.

From 1953 to 1955 the service unit was subordinate to the then 1st Deputy Minister for State Security Erich Mielke . From 1955 to 1982 she was subordinate to the Deputy Minister, Bruno Beater . After his death, Mielke - now a minister - took over the management of the service unit again. The head of HA II and his four deputies each headed several of the 20 departments. There was also a staff and four working groups, three of which were so-called functional management bodies. In addition, the HA II had its own SED party organization with a full-time party apparatus and a secretariat for the leadership.

The following illustration of the departments and working groups represent the status of 1989. In the course of its existence, however, HA II carried out numerous structural changes, some of which are explained in more detail in the history section.

Tasks of the HA departments and working groups
Structural unit abbreviation tasks management Workforce
(as of end of 1988)
Staff of the HA - Planning and coordination, control center for immediate measures in the event of mobilization Major Axel Uhlig 030th
Working group of the leader AG L Secretarial tasks, mobilization work Colonel Rudolf Sonntag 008th
Evaluation and control group AKG Development of policy documents, storage of operational information, press evaluation of western media Lieutenant Colonel Siegfried Neubert 073
Coordination working group AG K Coordination of all counter-espionage activities of the MfS, central coordination of the work of " unofficial employees " (IM) with connections to western secret services, identification of western agents and their targets Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Mauersberger 021st
Working group foreigners AG A Control and processing of foreigners residing in the GDR Lieutenant Colonel Reiner Wiegand 036
Department 01 HA II / 1 Defense against intelligence attacks against (former) employees of the MfS, IM, as well as against members of the KGB in the special area Berlin-Karlshorst and against the criminalistics section at the Humboldt University in Berlin as well as processing suspected cases of double agent activity among unofficial employees Lieutenant Colonel Bernd Porstein 061
Department 02 HA II / 2 Implementation of offensive measures against the Federal Republic of Germany, especially against the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Federal Office and the State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV, LfV), the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD), the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), against police and armed forces , data processing centers , Mass media, political parties and human rights organizations Colonel Erhard Schierhorn 057
Department 03 HA II / 3 Processing of US citizens, diplomats and CIA members in the area of ​​the GDR and West Berlin Lieutenant Colonel Bernd Häseler 054
Department 04 HA II / 4 Defense against military espionage, safeguarding the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed in the GDR Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Holletz 051
Department 05 HA II / 5 Search for postal connection systems of western secret services together with the main department VI (monitoring of cross-border traffic) and department M (postal control) Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Stuchly 023
Department 06 HA II / 6 Surveillance of former high-ranking secret carriers and public figures who were under surveillance by Western secret services or who could damage the reputation of the GDR Major Frank Neuberger 042
Department 07 HA II / 7 Processing of other, non-socialist countries, incorporated into HV A in 1956. A conversion of the foreigners working group to Department 7 planned in 1988 was no longer carried out due to the dissolution of the MfS. - 0-
Department 08 HA II / 8 Logistics, care of the conspiratorial objects of HA II Lieutenant Colonel Lothar Lätsch 136
Department 09 HA II / 9 Processing of Western European secret services (except the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria and Switzerland), mainly British and French secret services Colonel Fritz Scholz 035
Department 10 HA II / 10 Cooperation with the counterintelligence departments of other Eastern Bloc intelligence agencies with operational groups in Moscow , Warsaw , Prague , Budapest and Sofia Colonel Willi Brückner 084
Department 11 HA II / 11 Security and control of the diplomatic institutions in Berlin Colonel Wolfgang Jacob 021st
Department 12 HA II / 12 Supervision and processing of the permanent representation of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the embassies of Austria and Switzerland Lieutenant Colonel Reiner Oertel 039
Department 13 HA II / 13 Surveillance of foreign journalists and correspondents, penetration into the editorial offices of Western publications Colonel Dieter Schaffer 065
Department 14 HA II / 14 Defense work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR (MfAA) Colonel Heinz Primus 105
Department 15 HA II / 15 Monitoring of the embassies of non-socialist non-European countries (except the USA and Canada) Major Roland Ernst 032
Department 16 HA II / 16 technical department for the development, modification and use of intelligence technology Major Hans-Jörg Fröhlich 046
Department 17 HA II / 17 Implementation of conspiratorial observation measures Colonel Heinz Hesselbarth 066
Department 18 HA II / 18 Defense against terrorist acts Colonel Gerhard Hempel 039
Department 19 HA II / 19 Securing the SED connections to communist parties and organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany, supporting illegal communist parties and securing the Ralf Forster group Colonel Ralf Bauer 043
Department 20 HA II / 20 Protection of the embassy of the USSR Colonel Gerhard Kaulfuss 184
Department 21 HA II / 21 External security of the MfS service objects in Berlin, surveillance and protection of residential areas in which MfS employees are concentrated Lieutenant Colonel Harald Neubert 046

Employee

Head of the main department

Werner Kukelski (first head of Department IV)

Personnel development

The main department II was able to gradually expand its workforce over the course of its 36 years of existence. In 1954 it had a staff of 156 employees, this had grown to 1,432 by the end of 1989. The last establishment plan of the HA II from December 31, 1988 shows 1424 employees, including 123 officers in special operations (OibE) and 114 full-time unofficial employees (HIM). There were also 934 full-time employees in the district administrations and individual employees at the level of the district offices. In addition, HA II had around 3,500, and Departments II of the district administrations had around 4,000 IM. In addition, there were further IMs from the district offices and 109 IMs in the west (as of 1976).

A sharp increase in the number of employees can be observed for the 1970s, when the workforce more than quadrupled. This was mainly due to the increased number of Western diplomats and journalists as a result of the diplomatic recognition of the GDR. Therefore, the increase in staff was concentrated on Berlin as the capital of the GDR. The increase in employees in the district administrations was comparatively moderate. While in 1972 two thirds of the counterintelligence employees were still employed in the BV, this ratio turned around by 1982. The BV with the largest number of staff in 1989 was Berlin with 90 employees, the workforce of the other BV varied between 42 (Gera, Suhl) and 77 (Cottbus). In the 1980s, the NATO double decision and the presumed intensification of espionage activities against the military of the Warsaw Pact states led to a further increase in personnel on Line II.

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. a b Extraordinary resolution of the Politburo of September 23, 1953 , SAPMO -BA, DY 30, J IV 2/202/62, quoted in n. Labrenz-Weiß: Main Department II , p. 3.
  2. ^ Wagner, Uhl: BND contra Sowjetarmee , pp. 74–76.
  3. ^ Georg Herbstritt : Counter- espionage . In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR . Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd updated edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , p. 313.
  4. Ministry for State Security: Service instruction 1/87 of February 13, 1987 to ensure the complex procedure in the defense against secret service attacks against political, economic and military areas - counter-espionage , BStU , ZA, DSt 103354.
  5. ^ Georg Herbstritt : Counter- espionage . In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR . Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd updated edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , p. 314 f.
  6. command 67/51 of 11 December 1951 BStU, ZA, DSt 100,016th
  7. Karl Wilhelm Fricke, Roger Engelmann: "Concentrated Beats" - State Security Actions and Political Processes in the GDR 1953-1965 . Berlin 1996, pp. 42-51.
  8. Hanna Labrenz-Weiß: The Main Department II: Counter- espionage . In: BStU: Anatomie der Staatssicherheit , MfS-Handbuch III / 7, Berlin 2001, p. 37.
  9. ^ Georg Herbstritt : Counter- espionage . In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR . Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd updated edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , p. 314 f.
  10. Labrenz-Weiß: Main Department II , p. 42 f.
  11. ^ Labrenz-Weiß: Hauptabteilung II , pp. 42–46.
  12. Command 14/73 of April 23, 1973, BStU, ZA, DSt 100750.
  13. ^ A b Hermann Weber: Brief history of the GDR . Cologne 1988, p. 156.
  14. Bernd Eisenfeld : The departure movement - a manifestation of resistant behavior . In: Ulrike Poppe , Rainer Eckert, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk (eds.): Between self-assertion and adaptation, forms of resistance and opposition in the GDR . Berlin 1995, p. 206.
  15. Labrenz-Weiß: Main Department II , p. 69.
  16. Klaus Marxen , Gerhard Werle (ed.): Criminal Justice and GDR Injustice - A Documentation , Volume 4/2: Espionage . Berlin 2004, pp. 682-685.
  17. Labrenz-Weiß: Main Department II , p. 56 f.
  18. Labrenz-Weiß: Main Department II , p. 73.
  19. Jürgen Borchert: The Cooperation between the Ministry for State Security (MfS) and the Soviet KGB in the 1970s and 1980s - A Chapter from the History of SED Rule , Berlin 2006, p. 225.
  20. Walter Suess: State Security at the End: Why the Powerful Didn't Succeed in Preventing a Revolution in 1989 . Berlin 1999, p. 553 u. 578
  21. Labrenz-Weiß: Main Department II , p. 27.
  22. a b Jens Gieseke : The full-time employees of the Ministry for State Security , statistical appendix. In: BStU: Anatomie der Staatssicherheit , MfS-Handbuch IV / 1, Berlin 1995.
  23. Labrenz-Weiß: Main Department II , p. 28.
  24. a b c Labrenz-Weiß: Main Department II , p. 30 f.
  25. a b Georg Herbstritt : Main Department II (counter-espionage / HA II) . In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Suess (eds.): The MfS Lexicon - terms, people and structures of the state security of the GDR . Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd updated edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , p. 132.
  26. ^ Gieseke: employees , p. 318.