Luise Leonhardt
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The Luise Leonhardt was a freight steamer that ran aground in the evening hours of November 23, 1930 during a heavy storm on the shallows of the Großer Vogelsand (sand bank in the mouth of the Elbe in front of Cuxhaven ). All 30 crew members were killed. To this day, this accident is one of the worst shipping disasters in the Elbe estuary.
prehistory
The Danish sailing ship captain Marcus Nissen, with the help of his wealthy family, founded the steamship company “Atalanta” based in Copenhagen in the years before the First World War . The first ship of the shipping company was named Senegal . The ships MT Mondal and TT Nygaard, built in Holland, followed in 1913 and 1916 . Both new buildings were lost in the war in 1917.
Due to the good profit situation in 1920 and the growing need for transport capacities due to the resurgent sea trade , Marcus Nissen placed two new shipbuilding orders with the Scottish shipyard Burntisland Shipbuilding Company . At the beginning of 1922, the shipyard delivered the steamer Sierra Morena to the Atalanta shipping company. The steel built Sierra Morena , later Luise Leonhardt , was equipped with a ship's boiler that was fired with oil.
Little is known about the voyages of the ship under the Danish flag. Apart from a few trips to North America, East Asia and Australia, the Sierra Morena was mainly used in the regular service between West Africa and French ports. With the start of the Great Depression in 1929, the decline of the Atalanta shipping company began. In the same year she sold the Sierra Morena to the Hamburg-based shipping company “ Leonhardt & Blumberg ” for £ 35,000 .
With the new owner of the ship, its name also changed. Adolf Leonhardt , who founded the shipping company "Leonhardt & Heeckt" (from 1903 "Leonhardt & Blumberg") in 1899, gave his ships the names of family members. The Sierra Morena was given the name of his wife and was entered in the Lloyds register under the name Luise Leonhardt .
From January 1930 the shipping company started using the ship in tramp shipping . It is no longer known which ports Luise Leonhardt called and which cargo she was carrying. In July / August of the same year a repair was carried out in a shipyard because of a grounding . At the beginning of November 1930, the shipping company had the boiler firing switched from oil to coal . With this system, which has not yet been run in, the maximum speed was reduced to 5 to 6 knots . The ship began its last voyage on November 23, 1930.
The downfall
On November 23, 1930, the steamer was supposed to start the journey from Hamburg to Searsport / Portland . The cargo consisted of 5380 tons of kainite . Initially, 900 tons of bunker coal were ordered and taken over in two bunkers. At the request of the first engineer, a further 50 tons of coal were subsequently taken over. The stores amounted to 40–50 tons, the supply of fresh water about 30 tons, of oil about 0.5 tons.
On the day before departure, November 22nd, the following sea weather reports were issued by the German Seewarte.
- 8:00 am: Deep 732 between Scotland and southern Norway is fairly firm and requires a continued strong supply of mild south-west air. Outlook German Bight stiff, south-westerly winds, changeable, moderate visibility.
- 7:00 p.m .: Deep 732 North Sea with strong southern foothills. Outlook German Bight, strong to stormy southwest winds, cloudy to overcast, moderate to good visibility.
In addition, a wind warning (signal ball) was issued by the Seewarte for the western Baltic Sea and for the entire North Sea coast. On the evening of November 22nd at 20:40, this signal was changed to clockwise south-west storm and was broadcast by Norddeich Radio following the sea weather report at 10:30 p.m. and on November 23 at 6:15 a.m.
On November 23, 1930, the steamer Luise Leonhardt was manned by port pilot Schulze at around 5 a.m. At this time the tide was running and the south-westerly wind reached a strength of 7. The steamer was turned with the help of the tug Emil of the tug shipping company "Petersen und Alpers" and steered out of the Köhlbrand . At the exit to the Elbe the steamer sheared out to port and ran aground on the western edge of the fairway. With the help of the tug, the steamer was made afloat again. Since the grounding had not caused any damage, the exit was continued. At around 10:30 a.m., Patent Pilot Stehr took over the pilot.
During the course of the morning the wind increased steadily. According to reports from the Deutsche Seewarte reported at 8:00 a.m.:
- Borkum reef WNW wind force 8
- Outer jade NNW wind force 8
- Cuxhaven WNW wind force 8
- Elbe 1 WNW wind force 9
At 09:30 a.m. the storm warning signal for the western Baltic Sea and the entire North Sea coast was changed to northwest storm . At 11:00 a.m. reported:
- Borkumriff NW wind force 9
- Elbe 1 WNW wind force 9
- Borkum NW wind force 9 gusty over 12
At around 11:50 am, Luise Leonhardt passed Brunsbüttelkoog. Several ships were anchored here, waiting for better weather. In the afternoon, the storm turned into a hurricane in hard hail gusts . Since the steamer had been fired with coal instead of oil firing and the machine was manned by new people, it only drove at 9 to 10 atmospheres (operating pressure 13 atmospheres) and thus only reached a speed of 5 to 6 knots. Cuxhaven was passed around 4:30 p.m. The pilot's concerns about continuing the voyage were ignored by the master. He gave the chief officer the order to lower the anchors and close the jacks. At 17:45 Stehr pilot was slightly above the lightship Elbe 3 struck out from the pilot steamer. Despite another warning from the pilot, the Luise Leonhardt continued her journey.
At 7:50 p.m., the Cuxhaven shipping office received the following distress report:
- "SOS, SOS, SOS. Luise Leonhardt to Leona Hamburg. Broken rudder chain, greatest danger to life, Elbe 1. Hoffmann. "
The immediately established contact with the towing, shipping and rescue company revealed that the company's salvage tug Hermes had also intercepted the distress report, left Cuxhaven at 19:54 and had reported this to the damaged ship. In the course of the next few hours there was lively radio communication between the Luise Leonhardt , the salvage tug Hermes and the coastal radio stations . This radio traffic was overheard by the lightships Elbe 1 and Elbe 2 and has therefore been handed down. At 8:05 p.m. Luise Leonhardt reported :
- “To Leona Hamburg. Broken anchor chain, ship touched ground. Hoffmann. "
At around 8:20 p.m., the radio operator of the distressed man asked the rescue tug:
- "How far still?"
The Hermes reported: Do same 4 happened. The tug was rolled over by heavy breakers just below the Kugelbake , but continued its journey at the highest possible speed. The radio operator Luise Leonhardt asked again and again to the greatest possible haste that happened Hermes at about 21:00 the lightship Elbe 3 . The wrecked ship was asked to give its position. This answered at 9:01 pm:
- "Elbe one position. When can you be here? "
At 21:20 the following radio message was recorded by the disturbed:
- “To Piper Otterbecksallee 3 - Hamburg. Broken rudder chain near Elbe 1. Port anchor chain broken. Ship drifts on sandy bottom. Greatest danger, both lifeboats smashed. Starboard anchor still holds, permanent ground sea. Rowing gear completely useless. Hermes tractor on the move. Hoffmann. "
At 9:36 p.m. the Hermes passed the lightship Elbe 2 and asked twice for the exact position of the Luise Leonhardt . This answered at 9:48 pm:
- "Position Westspitze Vogelsand after bearing."
and for the last time at 9:50 p.m .:
- "We're burning down blue fire."
At around 10:00 p.m. the emergency signals were seen north of blinking buoy No. 2. When the Hermes had worked its way up to the flashing buoy and tried to force the surf on the Great Bird Sand, it was so covered by ground lakes that further advancement was impossible. The tug captain therefore broke off the rescue operation and sought deeper water so as not to endanger the ship and crew. Over the radio he called the Cuxhaven lifeboat Ferdinand Laeisz of the German Society for the Rescue of Shipwrecked People ( DGzRS ) for help. This left Cuxhaven at around 11:30 p.m. in the tow of the navigation steamer Neuwerk .
The lightships Elbe 1 and Elbe 2 had eavesdropped on all radio traffic. On Elbe 1 the guards were manned twice and already at 8:00 p.m. sighted the masthead lights of a steamer in the direction of r / w 68 °, which, judging by the position of the lights, was on a south-westerly course. According to later statements by the guards, the impression appeared as if the ship was at anchor and was working with the engine to relieve the anchor chain. At around 8:34 p.m. the masthead lights went out of sight. At 9:30 p.m., distress signals, two rockets and several blue fires were observed in the direction of r / w 79 °. When the recovery tug came into view, blue fires were shown again, then red fires. Despite intensive efforts, the radio operator on the ships or land stations, came after 21:50 no radio contact with the Luise Leonhardt more about.
At 10:30 p.m. the guards on Elbe 1 observed that the masthead lights of the steamer came into view for a short time and that two more red fires were burned shortly afterwards.
On the lightship Elbe 2 , the first emergency signals were seen in the direction of 8:30 p.m. The captain of the lightship had to refrain from attempting to launch the lifeboat from Elbe 2 . The hurricane-like wind ruined the launch and the surf standing on the Great Bird Sand would have made it impossible to get to the damaged vessel. At about 10:50 p.m., several more blue fire and rocket signals were seen in the direction of the accident site. After that nothing was observed anymore.
The lifeboat Ferdinand Laeisz passed Elbe 4 at around 1:20 a.m. on November 24 and Elbe 3 at daybreak . However, since the wind and swell were so heavy, the lifeboat driver decided to turn around at Elbe 2 and seek protection in the roadstead of Elbe 3 . The small lifeboat was eleven meters long and was designed as a sailing boat with a weak auxiliary drive (28 HP petrol engine) for coastal use. This small boat was unable to do anything during the hurricane and heavy seas on the night of November 23rd to 24th, 1930.
On the morning of November 24th around 7:00 am, the Ferdinand Laeisz and the tug Hermes tried to get to the scene of the accident again. The Hermes had crossed above in front of the accident site until after midnight and had then also sought protection at Elbe 3 . As the wind subsided somewhat in the early morning hours and the swell became more bearable, the Ferdinand Laeisz managed to work its way up to the wreck . From this only the machine house with the two fans and part of the forecastle protruded from the water. All superstructures such as chimneys , masts and deck superstructures were washed away by the sea. The stern seemed to have broken off behind the central structure. The condition of the wreck left no doubt that human life could no longer exist on the wreck. The salvage tug Hermes and the lifeboat Ferdinand Laeisz had to turn back to Cuxhaven without being able to provide any help.
The wreck of the steamer was about 8 m water depth at the position 54 ° 1 '31 " N , 8 ° 19' 55" O . None of the 30-strong crew of Luise Leonhardt was rescued. The corpse of Captain Carl Hoffmann was found drifting and recovered by fishermen on November 24, 1930 at 11:00 a.m. in the North Sea, in the Süderpiep not far from Friedrichskoog . The bodies of the stoker Johannes Kaiser and the mess boy Waldemar Kahl were found and landed days later by Büsum fishermen. There is still no trace of the rest of the crew.
Today the meter-thick layers of sand of the Great Bird Sand cover the wreck. Since it is unlikely that wreck clearance work will ever be necessary in this area, the Luise Leonhardt will probably remain there undisturbed until her final decay.
After the downfall
The maritime administration hearing
The main hearing began on December 5, 1930 in the Hamburg Maritime Office. The captain of the salvage tug Hermes as well as the captain of the lightship Elbe 2 and the helmsman of the lightship Elbe 1 were interrogated as witnesses . Attempts were made to precisely reconstruct the hours up to the stranding of the accident steamer. After several hours of negotiations, the five-person committee of the Maritime Administration announced its verdict:
- According to the results of the evidence, the sinking of the steamer Luise Leonhardt can be traced back to the fact that the oar chain and then also the anchor chains in the prevailing heavy Northwest Orcan were broken, so that the steamer was driven helplessly onto the shallows of the Großer Vogelsand. On November 23, 1930, there was the worst storm of autumn, a hurricane with wind force 12 and higher. The swell was unusually heavy and became even steeper and more dangerous from 3:00 p.m. onwards, as the current capsized off Cuxhaven and the current ebb against the heavy north-west storm was up. Due to the conversion from oil to coal firing, the Luise Leonhardt could not drive with full steam pressure and only reached 5 to 6 nautical miles. Therefore, the further it advanced into the mouth of the Elbe, the less and less opportunity it had to maintain its course in the prevailing hurricane and swell. Therefore, the ship was soon driven out of the fairway near the Großer Vogelsand, where the lakes became steeper and steeper and the danger of ground lakes steadily increased. It remains open whether the rudder chain break is due to grounding. When the oar chain broke, the ship was deprived of its maneuverability and so it was only dependent on its anchors.
- The port anchor chain broke immediately after the oar chain. That the starboard anchor could not hold in the long term was an inevitable consequence. It can be determined afterwards that the Luise Leonhardt did not even get to the actual shoal of the Großer Vogelsand, but rather sank in 8 m water depth. The ship had constantly had heaps of ground, which shows what kind of immense ground lakes are stranded on the Great Bird Sand. The Maritime Administration does not accept other causes, such as the poor condition of the ship or incorrect loading. The Maritime Administration also found that the steamer was not overloaded. After checking all the documents, the total load was 6,400 tons. It is therefore certain that the maximum load capacity of 6,440 tons according to the loading scale was not exceeded.
- According to the freeboard certificate from the See-Berufsgenossenschaft , the freeboard had to be 1.14 m on the steamer. With a height of the ship's side (including the keel) of around 8.37 m, a draft of around 7.23 m remained after deducting the freeboard. The pilot's slip signed by the master confirmed the calculations, so that 5 inches were missing up to the highest draft. It was also established that the steamer was properly manned, so that no complaints were to be made with regard to seaworthiness, equipment and cargo. Everyone involved in the rescue has done their best. The captain of the salvage tug Hermes deserves special recognition, as he worked his way to the scene of the accident with considerable danger for the ship and crew and was only prevented from continuing the rescue operation by the mighty surf standing on the Great Vogelsand. The Maritime Administration supports the abortion of the rescue operation of the Ferdinand Laeisz , as the lifeboat and its crew would have been lost due to the huge ground lakes. For this reason, the Maritime Administration also approved that the captain of the lightship Elbe 2 did not attempt to reach the scene of the accident with the help of the existing motor lifeboat. The captain of the unlucky steamer Carl Hoffmann was charged with having sailed at all in this weather situation. He had the opportunity to watch the storm build up from the bridge of his ship. He was also informed about the weather report from the German Naval Observatory of November 22, 1930. Furthermore, on the journey from Hamburg to Cuxhaven, he saw that all signal points on the Altonaer Landungsbrücke, at the Seemannshöft-Yachthafen , in Brunshausen and Glückstadt had set the signal south-west storm clockwise and that from 12:00 this signal on the now passed Brunsbüttelkoog, Belumer Schanze, Cuxhaven, Neuwerk and on Elbe 3 in Nordweststurm was changed. Finally, he was warned several times by the pilot. If he nevertheless attempted to continue the journey, he evidently did so in consideration of the weather report from the German Seewarte of November 23, 1930 at 11:15 a.m. via Norddeich. It is deeply regrettable that he made a mistake here. However, the weather report for the North Sea speaks of stormy, rapidly waning northwesterly to westerly winds. In the meantime, Captain Hoffmann had to know that this report was valid for the next 24 hours. When the code for sea weather reports was changed, which was introduced on November 15, 1930, there is an express announcement of the content and significance of the sea weather reports in the Nachrichten für Seefahrer in issue 43 of October 25, 1930 on p. 1420. Captain Hoffmann, who had the duty to inform himself about the content of the messages for seafarers, should have considered this announcement. A short wait would have been enough to prevent the accident. The actual weather forecast from the Seewarte was correct, because the wind died down on November 24th to such an extent that in the morning only wind force 3 prevailed in the German Bight. It is all the more regrettable that the master had a wrong idea about the scope of the weather forecast and had undertaken the exit despite the raging hurricane and the emphatic warning from the signaling stations and the pilot. The Maritime Authority therefore also urges all skippers to urgently advise that they pay the greatest possible attention to the storm warning service. It is of the opinion that making the greatest possible use of the free information provided by the meteorologist at the Seewarte, or inquiries at the coastal radio stations, is quite suitable to prevent large-scale accidents such as the stranding of the steamer Luise Leonhardt .
Public criticism
Many questions remained unanswered in the maritime administration negotiations, as all those directly involved were no longer alive. An important point that immediately sparked public criticism was the inadequate rescue system in the Elbe estuary. One critic was Captain Stoll from Emden , who wrote in the January 1931 issue of Hansa magazine:
- “Then, in my opinion, more could have been done to save the team. I noticed that the absolutely seaworthy Elbe pilot steamer did not go into action. Where was the pilot steamer when the first SOS calls from Luise Leonhardt sounded? I assume that he was drifting or anchored at Elbe 3 , he could have been at the distressed ship within an hour and tried to get in contact with the ship for towing. In my opinion, the pilot steamers off the Elbe, Weser and Ems must be equipped with throw line guns in order to be able to get in contact with a drifting ship even in the worst weather. Furthermore, heavy towing gear would have to be available on board every pilot steamer, be it at the expense of the united underwriters, the maritime professional association, or the Reich. It is incomprehensible why the lifeboat from Cuxhaven did not go into action earlier. The Cuxhaven radio station had picked up all the emergency calls from the wrecked liner. Wasn't there anyone there who could get the lifeboat out to sea as quickly as possible? In my opinion, the world's first-class rescue station should exist at the mouth of the Elbe. An unsinkable lifeboat that is seaworthy in any weather may not lie in Cuxhaven in bad weather, but must move into its station at "Elbe 3". The Elbe estuary has such huge shipping traffic that the shipping population can expect that there is a first-class rescue station there. "
In the statement of the Cuxhaven Waterways and Shipping Office responsible for the rescue operation, the director rejected the criticism:
- “Under the circumstances, the rescue tug, which set out with recognized speed, could under no circumstances be hindered by the provision of a lifeboat, either from leaving the port or from moving at speed. After the first SOS call, there was still a certain possibility of rescuing the steamer, which was in distress, if the salvage tug "Hermes" managed to reach it before it was driven up onto the Großer Vogelsand. However, this hope was dashed when Luise Leonhardt already reported basic shocks. In view of the fact that the most powerful rescue tug was on its way to the scene of the accident, I had no reason to let the lifeboat go. It was clearly held to leak. However, I would not have ordered this outflow until the ebb flow had built up and the tide had set in. With the noticeably strong ebb and the prevailing hurricane-like north-west storm, it must be described as nonsensical to send such a small lifeboat out to sea in tow of a larger steamer. The wind blowing against the ebb current in this weather situation caused such a swell that an open boat could not cope with. I therefore again support the reversal of the navigation steamer Neuwerk with the lifeboat “Ferdinand Laeisz” in tow. The slow-moving tug was so flooded by lakes off Elbe 2 that it seemed impossible to advance. The captain of the Hermes , who could best overlook the situation, was convinced that it was impossible to get to the wreck. Out of a certain desperation to leave no stone unturned, he requested the lifeboat. He described the attempt to get to the scene of the accident as one of the most difficult experiences of his many years of work in the rescue sector. The rescue tug was so covered by the lakes and it is a miracle that it came out of the surf there. I would like to draw your attention to the following. The determined depth at the wreck is 8.3 m at low tide. On November 23, 1930 at 8:40 p.m. the water in the Elbe estuary was low. The report about the first basic thrusts of the damaged vessel ran at 8:05 p.m., i.e. when the water was almost low. During the prevailing hurricane and the wind congestion it caused, the water level was at least 2 m above normal water. The greatest draft of the "Luise Leonhardt" was 7.23 m. This shows that the ship has penetrated more than 3 m in the surf. That proves enough, which surf stranded on the Great Bird Sand. A comparison of the water depth at the wreck with the draft of the “Hermes”, which is only 3.70 m, also shows that the salvage tug would have found enough water to reach the scene of the accident without having penetrated like Luise Leonhardt . This fact was known to the captain of the salvage tug, who was only forced to turn around by the enormous surf. I would also like to make it clear that another distress report could come in at any moment and it would not have been understood to completely deprive the Cuxhaven rescue station of all life-saving equipment. Only under the urgent demands of Hermes did I advocate leaving the lifeboat. I do not consider the proposal to call in the pilot steamer to provide assistance in such cases. On the night in question, both pilot steamers were lying between Elbe 3 and Elbe 4 due to the bad weather and were only able to manned incoming ships and piloted outgoing ships with difficulty, as Elbe 3 could no longer take off in this weather. The proposal to set up a pilot steamer as a tug must be rejected. I have to report about the existing rescue facilities that in June of last year I submitted a proposal to the German Society for Rescue of Shipwrecked People to equip the Cuxhaven rescue station with a more powerful lifeboat. Guided by the idea of carrying out rescue operations on the outlying sands of Vogelsand and Scharhörn, I submitted this proposal to the company. This failed because of the financial situation, as such a boat costs around 150,000 Reichsmarks and also requires considerable means of maintenance. After the sinking of the "Luise Leonhardt", negotiations about the procurement of a more powerful lifeboat were resumed, but so far have also failed due to the company's financial situation. I strongly reject the fact that the rescue facilities in the Elbe estuary failed. The critic does not seem to be aware that 38 people from a total of 5 crashed ships have been rescued in the last twelve years. "
The one fact remained, however, that the sea sign steamer always had to be used to tow the lifeboat during rescue operations on the outer sands. It was not until 1933, obviously against the background of the Luise Leonhardt tragedy, that the Krogmann twin screw boat (2 × 125 PS diesel drive) was used in the Elbe estuary, a modern and powerful rescue vehicle for the time. The lifeboat Ferdinand Laeisz was equipped with a 50 HP crude oil engine from 1936. The retrofitting was evidently based on the fact that on October 18 of the same year the lightship Elbe 1 and its entire crew sank in a severe storm. In 1944 the boat was lost during the war in the mouth of the Danube.
Further criticisms were made of radio communications. The allegation raised by the tug Hermes that the distress call was severely disrupted by radio performances could be refuted. In general, the distress radio traffic was secured against interference from radio transmissions. The 600 m wave was reserved for marine emergency communications, like all marine communications. Broadcasting on waves 580–620 is also prohibited. This measure made interference impossible with selective on-board radios. However, if the radios, as on the Hermes , are not sufficiently selective, it could happen that the reception of distress radio traffic was disturbed by presentations on neighboring wavelengths. Here, however, the radio operator had the opportunity to report the interference to the coast radio station. This had to determine the interfering transmitter and ask him to stop transmitting. The radio operator of the "Hermes" did not use this possibility. The request to stop all radio presentations during the distress radio traffic was therefore rejected. The reports from the shipping authority leave no doubt that all radio stations correctly heard the radio traffic. The Maritime Administration also referred to the fact that the records from the radio diary of "Elbe 1" showed that the radio traffic was only disrupted by the Danish steamer Swanhild .
Conclusion
Many questions remained unanswered about the crux of the tragedy , the decision to sail by Captain Carl Hoffmann. Was it really just a misinterpretation of the weather report? He was aware that he could only drive with reduced machine performance. On the way to the mouth of the Elbe, he saw the signals for storm and heard the pilot's warnings. At the latest when he passed Brunsbüttel he saw the hurricane. Today one can only speculate about his decision to continue.
One mistake was made when the boat ran out and paved the way for the second, the break in the oar chain. Why the captain did not immediately make an emergency call is also unknown to this day. After the first SOS call, Luise Leonhardt reported grounding a few minutes later. So the ship was already in the surf area of the Great Bird Sand. Since it is unlikely that it will be driven out of the Elbe fairway so quickly , a period of 15 to 20 minutes must have passed unused for an emergency message. Delaying the emergency call cost the entire crew their lives.
To this day, the question of how far the salvage tug Hermes could work its way towards the wreck remained unanswered. According to statements made by sailor Otto May from the rescue tug, the distance was only 60 m when it was necessary to turn back.
Direct consequences for shipping
In addition to the numerous shoals and danger points in the Elbe estuary, the Luise Leonhardt wreck was a new addition. Although it was far from the actual shipping routes, on the western foothills of the Großer Vogelsand, the wreck seriously disrupted two branches of shipping. On the one hand the Elbe fishermen, who had good fishing grounds here, and on the other hand the small craft, which deviated from the concreted routes here, using a shortcut to the north. The first incident occurred just a few weeks after the accident. The Finkerwärder Ewer HF 285 ran onto the wreck in the dark. This caused considerable damage to the ship's bottom. The Lower Elbe Insurance Fund in Finkenwärder billed the Cuxhaven Shipping Office for the damage amount of 1,028.60 Reichsmarks. This request was unsuccessful, as the office took the position that leaving the buoyed waterways was at your own risk. The incidents increased. Despite the growing flood of petitions and claims for damages, the shipping authority remained tough. With the indication that she would only be responsible for safety on the marked routes, all claims by ship owners and insurance companies were rejected. The Elbe fishermen continued to insist that the wreck be disposed of, or at least that the wreck be marked with a light buoy. The demands dragged on until 1933, when the Reich Ministry of Transport , which had meanwhile been confronted with the dispute, finally refused to buoy the wreck. During a storm in the winter of 1934/35, the last outstanding remains of Luise Leonhardt sank in the grinding sands of the Großer Vogelsand and the wreck was no longer an obstacle.
Public concern
The sympathy for the sinking of Luise Leonhardt was very high on the part of the population throughout Germany. In the weeks after the total loss, hundreds of expressions of condolences reached the shipping company "Leonhardt & Blumberg" and the relatives of the crew members. A Mr. Tratlehner even wrote from distant Austria:
- Commendable ship's office!
- Endes Manufactured hereby honors itself, as well as all relatives and survivors of the crew of the steamer Luise Leonhardt, on the sinking of this ship in the Elbe on the occasion of the great storm, to give his warmest and deepest condolences, hoping and wishing that it is the great art May the honorable German engineers succeed in lifting the sunken ship and making it seaworthy and afloat again, I conclude and remain with my warmest greetings and respect
- Your most devoted Josef Tratlehner
- Vienna, December 3, 1930
As early as the morning of November 24, 1930, the Hamburg newspapers reported in large special reports about the accident in the Elbe estuary. Many other newspapers across Germany devoted a lot of space to the loss of ship and crew in the style customary at the time. Two fates of crew members are intended to illustrate how close luck and bad luck are to one another.
The machine assistant Franz Walkiewicz got engaged to his bride Anni Mextorf on November 22, 1930. The engagement party took place in the presence of the captain and some crew members on board the Luise Leonhardt . A day later, Franz Walkiewicz was dead.
The seaman Joachim Wiese already had his license for Luise Leonhardt in his pocket when he failed the examination for fitness to serve on board. The reason for this was a fresh scar after an appendix operation that broke open again when the examining doctor kneaded it.
On December 5, 1930, a memorial service for the perished crews of the motor ship Stralsund and the steamer Luise Leonhardt took place in the main church in Altona , with great sympathy from the population .
The motor ship Stralsund was on its way from England to Sweden and probably sank in a storm on the night of November 10th to 11th with a crew of 13.
After the sermon , the names of the crew members were read out.
List of crew members
When the "Luise Leonhardt" sank, they died while exercising their seamanship:
- Carl Hoffmann (captain)
- Johann Schütt (First Officer)
- Friedrich Schmincke (Second Officer)
- Hans Schurich (third officer)
- Johannes Koop (first engineer)
- Fritz Hahn (Second Engineer)
- Erich Jonsson (third engineer)
- Franz Walkiewicz (machine assistant)
- Ludwig Danhofer (cook)
- Johann Lackmann (cabin steward)
- Waldemar Kahl (mess boy)
- Paul Daum (cook boy)
- Friedrich Glanzer (carpenter)
- Rudolf Schaumberg (sailor)
- Friedrich Schulze (sailor)
- Harry Stoll (sailor)
- Heinrich Dickenhorst (sailor)
- Karl Hager (sailor)
- Heinz Wiese (sailor)
- Claus Trost (ordinary seaman)
- Heinz Schröder (boy)
- Josef van Dyck (stoker)
- Ernst Hentschel (stoker)
- Hans König (stoker)
- Johannes Kaiser (stoker)
- Wilhelm Strutz (stoker)
- Gerhard Henker (stoker)
- Walter Schröder (trimmer)
- Gerard Welzel (trimmer)
- Gerhard Klotz (trimmer)
Literary adaptations
The writer Wolfgang Frank took the sinking of Luise Leonhardt as a model for his novel “Novembersturm” (1938), but embedded the events in the fictional story of the Hamburg ship's boy “Claus”.
Source
- Peter Baltes: Stranded ... / Sunk ... The end of "Luise Leonhardt". Cuxdruck E. Vorrath, Cuxhaven 1983, ISBN 3-920709-04-7 .
- Wreck Museum Cuxhaven
- Cuxhaven Waterways and Shipping Office
- Leonhardt & Blumberg shipping company