Möhne disaster

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Möhne dam after the attack. Six anti-aircraft blocking balloons are also visible in the picture.

Möhne disaster refers to the consequences of the destruction of Möhnetalsperre by the Operation Chastise the Royal Air Force in the night of 16 on May 17, the 1,943th

A flood rolled through the Möhne and Ruhr valleys . In doing so, it caused great damage and numerous people were killed. The goal of permanently hindering arms production in the Ruhr area was not achieved. The German authorities had underestimated the risk of an attack on the dam and taken inadequate defense and other preventive measures. The destruction was particularly great in the Neheim district . Most of the victims there were imprisoned forced laborers . The Nazi propaganda tried to use the disaster for an anti-Semitic campaign.

Dam and surroundings

The Möhnedamm before the destruction

The Möhnesee was built between 1908 and 1913 by the Ruhrtalsperrenverein to supply the Ruhr area with drinking and industrial water for the population and for industry. The dam has a capacity of 130 million m³. The dam is 650 m long, 40.3 m high and has a bottom width of 34.2 m. It is used to hold up the water in the Möhne and Heve valleys . In addition to the water supply, the lake became a popular excursion destination during the Weimar Republic and the time of National Socialism , and a diverse tourist infrastructure was created.

Below the barrier wall in the valley of the Möhne were some villages and the former Himmelpforten monastery . The first larger city was Neheim. In addition to residential buildings, there were various industrial companies in this section of the Möhne Valley. The town's important metal industry also produced ammunition and other armaments products since the beginning of the war. But the peace industry was also preserved to a considerable extent. The conscription to the military led to a growing labor shortage in the course of the war. In addition to a few prisoners of war, more and more forced laborers were used. Initially, these were housed in various parts of the city, until 1942 the construction of the forced labor camp Möhnewiesen in Möhnetal near the factories. Initially designed for 700 people, in May 1943 it housed between 1200 and 1500, mainly female forced laborers from Eastern Europe. Shortly behind the city, the Möhne flows into the Ruhr.

Protective measures

The bombing war also reached the area around the Möhnesee. The first air raids on Neheim took place as early as 1940. Various parties, in particular the chairman of the Ruhrtalsperrenverein, the Lord Mayor of Essen, Just Dillgardt , repeatedly called for better protection of the dam. The requests went as far as the upper positions of the Wehrmacht , without this leading to any noteworthy reactions. The Ruhrtalsperrenverein drew attention to the strategic importance of the dam without being heard by the responsible Wehrmacht authorities in Münster . The proposal to lower the water level to limit the risk was rejected by those responsible. After the disaster, the Arnsberg District President pointed out that attacks on dams had already been discussed in the pre-war period. He accused the military authorities of failure because they still had not acted adequately. The main reason was that the military experts rated the dam wall as not destructible by bombing. In an attack with conventional bombs, it was assumed that damage was only 7 m wide and 6.7 m deep. This would have caused a considerable flood, but not a catastrophe.

It was only at Dillgardt's instigation in 1940 that the first safety measures were taken at the Möhne reservoir. This did not happen at the Eder and Sorpe dams either. The originally deployed heavy flak on the Möhnedamm was withdrawn before the attack (the picture was not taken at the Möhnetalsperre).

As a result, the preparations to ward off a possible attack were inadequate. At the beginning of the war, anti-aircraft guns with the associated searchlights were stationed there. These units were withdrawn in 1940 in connection with the attack on France . From autumn 1940 to spring 1942, light anti-aircraft guns were used on the dam, but they were withdrawn again during the summer. In autumn the flak was again stationed on the wall. It was a light 2 cm flak. From spring to autumn 1942, barrier balloons were raised for protection . At the beginning of 1943, torpedo protection nets were deployed behind the wall . A fog squad was withdrawn. The temporarily existing heavy flak was replaced by light flak shortly before the attack. Shortly before the attack, the protective measures were further reduced, so that there were only six guns at the time of the attack. They stood at the end of the barrier wall, below the dam and on the towers of the barrier wall. In addition, attempts were made to camouflage the wall by erecting artificial trees. Night fighters were not ready to protect the facility. Overall, the defensive measures were inadequate.

There was no emergency plan and only a poor warning system. A guard should call a control center in the post office in Soest . From there, the affected communities should be warned. However, the telephone lines were also destroyed in the attack, so that no official warning could initially be issued. The guard first had to find another phone to reach the control center. When she finally called Neheim, the local police station was already under water. After the war, the official in charge of the district government in Arnsberg claimed that there had been regular simulation games and alarm exercises with the population, which probably did not correspond to the facts.

attack

As early as 1937, the Royal Air Force had been planning to destroy the dams in Germany in the event of a war with National Socialist Germany. Barnes Wallis developed a special cylindrical type of roll bomb for this purpose since 1938 , because conventional bombs were not suitable for it. This new bomb should first hop over the surface of the water, sink into the depth just before the barrier wall and explode at a depth of around 9 m, where the dams are statically weakest.

Roll bomb under a Lancaster bomber

Wallis struggled to advance with his ideas. It wasn't until 1941 that the engineer was heard by the Air Force. The aviation ministry had already made initial plans to attack the dams. Various options were tried out. Wallis presented a detailed plan in 1942, which was taken into account in the relevant political and military circles. For the commander of the British bomber fleet Arthur Harris , the area bombing was initially in the foreground. Nevertheless, the plan was approved and Operation Chastise was launched. The aim was to interrupt the water supply and thus indirectly the power supply in the Ruhr area and thus affect the armaments industry. Secondary goals were the destruction of infrastructure facilities and the reduction of the water reservoir for shipping. With the paralysis of the Ruhr industry in particular, it was hoped that the war could be substantially shortened. The death of many civilians was not a direct target. But this was tacitly accepted for the overriding goals.

With the aim of attacking the dams, the No. 617 Squadron - called "Dambusters" - set up under the command of Guy Gibson . Intensive training followed, as exact specifications had to be adhered to, for example with regard to flight speed and altitude. The operation was part of what was known as the first Battle of the Ruhr air offensive against cities in the Ruhr area such as Dortmund (May 4/5), Duisburg (May 12/13) or Bochum (May 13/14).

In the spring of 1943 the area around the dam was explored almost daily by reconnaissance planes. However, this did not lead to strengthening the security measures. The prerequisites for success were the dam, which was filled by the spring flood, and a cloudless full moon night. On the evening of May 16, 1943, 19 Avro Lancaster bombers took off in several waves from Scampton . They were protected by escort aircraft. Each machine carried one of the rollerbombs. The aim was to destroy the Möhne, Sorpe and Edertalsperre . Some planes were lost to enemy fire or other reasons. The machines arrived near the lake shortly after midnight and gathered over the Arnsberg Forest .

The destroyed Möhne dam

The squadron's commander, Guy Gibson, flew the first attack without success. Heavy anti-aircraft fire began on the aircraft during the subsequent attacks. The second aircraft was hit by the flak, the triggered bomb jumped over the barrier wall and destroyed the power station located there. The plane itself crashed nearby. During the fifth attack, the flak was no longer able to fire, except for one gun. The bomb exploded in the middle of the wall at 12:49 a.m. and tore open the dam wall to about 30 m. The damage eventually increased to 76 m. At 1:50 a.m. the bombers also destroyed the barrier wall of the Eder reservoir. The attack on the Sorpe Dam later that night resulted in only minor damage.

course

Möhnetal

Aerial view of the flood just behind the barrier

The water pushed out of the breach under extremely high pressure. The tidal wave was about 12 m high. It flowed down to the valley at a speed of 20 to 25 km / h. The water first reached the village of Günne , destroyed houses and uprooted trees. The rubble was carried away. An excursion boat was swept away from the Möhne reservoir itself. After about five kilometers, the flood reached the former Himmelpforten monastery , which at that time was an estate. The local pastor and some residents were killed. The baroque church was able to withstand the pressure for a few minutes before collapsing. In Niederense the parts of the village in the valley, the train station, a power station and a sawmill were destroyed. The water masses were so strong that they tore up the valley floor below the village so far that a new lake was created in the long run (Niederense natural reservoir). The tidal wave was now about 10 m high and carried cattle, trees, rocks and everything in the way with it.

Neheim

In Neheim there had been an air alarm during the night and many people went to the cellars for protection and were sometimes surprised by the flood. Some residents had heard the flak from the direction of the lake. An unofficial warning of the tidal wave was received at the local police station, but these and private calls with the same content were not taken seriously. At the police station, the worried town builder called Kraft, who asked if the rumors that the dam had broken were true. The police lieutenant on duty replied: “... the security service at the Möhne reservoir would have had to report such a case to the local police. But that didn't happen. ”The police headquarters at the district government in Arnsberg had received the news of the destruction from an anti-sabotage troop indirectly through NSDAP offices . Only when the Arnsberg authorities phoned the guard in Neheim at 0:50 a.m. did they try to act. But meanwhile 25 minutes had passed and valuable time had been lost.

Destroyed house and car ( BMW 326 )

As a result, the city was largely unprepared for the tidal wave. The first signs were a noise that sounded like a train. There were shouts of "The water is coming!" In various places in the Möhnewiesen forced labor camp . Some of the otherwise locked barracks were opened, others remained locked. The camp gate remained locked. Some female forced laborers managed to get over the fences. Some of them were able to escape to a higher area, others ran in the wrong direction and perished.

At 1:20 a.m., the flood reached the city. Calls for help rose in the valley and people tried to reach higher parts of the city. Those who did not succeed perished in the floods. The forced labor camp was hit by the water. For many it became a death trap. Even kilometers away in Herdringen the cries of desperation of those trapped could be heard. Some of the barracks floated on the water for a while until they either went under or shattered against the pillars of the Möhne Bridge. Individual bodies of the forced laborers were later found in Schwerte , 40 kilometers away .

Factories and houses were destroyed by the water. The substation exploded at 1:25 a.m. In front of the Möhne bridge, everything that had been carried away by the flood piled up. The reinforced concrete bridge was not able to withstand the pressure and was also destroyed. The great Volkshalle was also hit by the flood. French prisoners of war were housed in part of the building. This building with the prisoners of war disappeared completely. The heavy tombstones of the Jewish cemetery were carried away. Just recently, by chance, Noa Wolff's tombstone was rediscovered and put back in its old location. The Möhnepfortenbrücke was also destroyed by the water pressure.

The water now poured into the Ruhr valley. Most of the water flowed downstream, but there was also a damming several hundred meters upstream. The water rose so much in Neheim that it even penetrated the cellar of the town hall, which is located well above the valley, and destroyed parts of the city archive. The water held its highest level until morning and then slowly sank.

After the flood, the search for the injured and the recovery of the dead began in Neheim. The partially unrecognizable corpses were brought to St. John's Church to be identified there if possible. The forced laborers who were killed were buried in mass graves in the Möhnefriedhof. Various organizations of the Wehrmacht, fire brigade, technical emergency aid , Organization Todt and also from Nazi organizations participated in the first few days with around 3000 people in the first aid measures. There was also the Reich Labor Service outside of the city . Field kitchens catered for the homeless. The electricity and water supplies were provisionally restored relatively quickly.

Eyewitness report

Provisional water supply in the disaster area

Pastor Hellmann reported to Archbishop Lorenz Jaeger in a letter dated May 24, 1943 about the Möhne disaster:

“On the night of May 16-17, 1943, the alarm was given at 11.50 p.m. and lasted until 5 a.m. Around 2:00 am there was a massive impact not too far away, and very shortly afterwards a scream could be heard on the street: "The Möhne dam has been hit" (about 12 km from Neheim). Again after a short time people shouted on the street: "Out of the cellars, the water is coming!" And now everything happened in a rushed hurry. For a very brief moment you heard a terrible rustling, as if a locomotive was letting off its steam, only to an enormous extent. The noise grew stronger and louder, and soon people were coming out of their houses with whatever they could grasp to hurry into the mountains. The fear increased because the enemy planes circled over the fugitive. The water had come over the individual apartments so quickly that most of the people who lived on the Möhne were washed away by the floods. The water rose quickly 10, 12 meters high and even higher. Since the power station was also flooded, no lights were on anymore. The phone lines were torn. The water pipes stopped giving water. The new, large stone bridge that led to Werl was soon torn away and now lies deep down on the Ruhr meadows in front of Vosswinkel ; also another bridge, the iron railing of which is in Ohl, the western part of Neheim. The Möhne itself had become so wide and large that it resembled the Rhine and flooded the entire valley as a huge river. People, animals, trees, furniture and boilers from the factories - the latter on the Möhne - were completely inundated - were swept away by the floods. - In the Möhne Valley, barracks were built for several thousand foreigners, which were swept away by the waves like toy houses. Some of the residents were carried away with the barracks. One of these barracks broke apart and all of the inmates drowned. - More than 30 houses - mostly 2-, 3- and multi-storey massive buildings - were swept away by the floods. It was a gruesome sight the next morning to see the destruction that this terrible water disaster had wrought and it was terrible to see and witness how the man after his wife, the children after their parents, the brother after the sister called. "

Ruhr valley

The Ruhr near Fröndenberg-Bösperde

The Ruhr also caused considerable damage and cost human lives below Neheim in Wickede , Fröndenberg and Hagen . It was not until Hattingen that the force of the tide decreased significantly. In Essen-Steele , the flood claimed lives.

In Wickede the water arrived at around 2 a.m. The city was completely flooded and around twenty houses, as well as the new, massive Ruhr bridge were destroyed. There the official warning from the control center came too late, even though about 1.5 hours had passed since the barrier wall was destroyed. With 188 dead, the place was the most severely affected municipality in terms of population. About 1200 residents were damaged by the flood and 900 were left homeless.

The flood reached Fröndenberg around 3 a.m. The roar of the water could be heard from the direction of Wickede an hour earlier. The warning also arrived on time. There, detectors were sent out by the Hitler Youth to warn people in the danger area. The fire sirens sounded the alarm. But there was no specific signal of a water hazard. The reporters later reported that it was difficult to get people to leave the bomb shelter. When word got around what had happened, they only believed in a flood, but did not expect a 4 m high tidal wave. Without any idea how strong the tide would be, people went to the Ruhr to see the water. You got carried away.

Down the river in Schwerte, about fifty kilometers from the dam, the tide arrived at around 5:15 a.m. People in the endangered parts of the city had been warned around 3 a.m. However, there was only general mention of the risk of flooding without specifying the cause. In some streets the water with the flotsam was still house high in the old town. Some unsuspecting people died there.

In Herdecke , the railway viaduct was badly damaged by the debris and a pillar collapsed. A fully occupied passenger train could stop shortly before. Destruction, albeit less catastrophic in comparison with the places upstream, also occurred near Witten . A helper died in Hattingen trying to save a victim. 289 people still suffered economic damage to their homes on site.

Victims and damage

Destroyed bridge

54 members of the Royal Air Force died on the outbound, attack and return flights. The total number of victims is not entirely certain as many bodies have not been found. The number of female forced laborers killed is particularly uncertain because it is not known exactly how many were in the camp. 25 people were killed at Himmelpforten. 859 people died in Neheim. Among them were 147 Germans and 712 foreigners. 118 died in Wickede, 21 in Fröndenberg and one person in Hattingen. The total number is then 1348. Other figures that were officially published by the Gauleitung Westfalen-Süd and published in the press refer to 1579 victims, including 1020 forced laborers and prisoners of war.

The material destruction was considerable. The existing numbers are also uncertain. It should be noted that both completely destroyed and only more or less damaged houses and facilities were counted. 1000 houses, 120 factories, 30 farms, nine railway bridges, 37 road bridges, power stations, water works and similar infrastructure facilities are named. In addition, numerous grazing animals were killed. 480 houses and 50 factories were damaged or completely destroyed. The mayor of Neheim, Reinhold Löffler, reported that 1,000 people in Neheim had become homeless. The homes of another 5,000 people were more or less damaged.

Production losses did occur in parts of the Ruhr industry as well as in the upper Ruhr and Möhnetal regions, but the industry in the Ruhr area was not substantially damaged. The problems were resolved by the end of July. One reason for the relatively rapid recovery was that the British had overestimated the importance of the Möhne reservoir for the water supply of the Ruhr area. This was not permanently impaired. It also played a role that the Sorpe Dam was not destroyed. Even the production restrictions in the areas directly affected were only temporary. The badly destroyed factories in Neheim such as Kaiser-Leuchten , Brökelmann, Jäger und Busse , FW Brökelmann and others resumed production after a short time. The production of chains in the Ruhr Valley was hit much more sustainably. About 45% of all German production failed for a long time. The consequences of the attack were all the more serious because shortly beforehand several cities in the Ruhr area had been bombed in a series of attacks, which made reconstruction and thus the resumption of production in war-important areas more difficult. In this respect, the attack, together with the bombing of the area, had indirectly hit the arms industry. This was one reason why Albert Speer installed a "Ruhrstab" to coordinate the reconstruction and the planning of better protection for the industrial area.

The Möhnedamm was rebuilt by the Todt organization within a few months. 2000 to 4000 mostly foreign workers repaired the damage in three shifts. The facility was restored on October 3, 1943. But there were definitely indirect negative effects on the German side. Overall, the repair or new construction of all kinds of systems and the removal of the water damage meant the retention of a large number of workers. A lot of material was required for the work, and the costs were correspondingly high. Thousands of forced laborers, prisoners of war and other workers were missing to repair the damage in the bombed cities and in the Ruhr industry. The recruitment of the Todt Organization from the occupied territories meant that workers were withdrawn from the construction of the Atlantic Wall . One consequence of the attack was improved anti-aircraft protection not only for the Möhne, but also for power plants and water systems as a whole. Immediately after the destruction, the Sauerland dams were provided with 8.8 cm flak, tethered balloons, searchlights and smoke systems.

Reactions in the kingdom

After inspecting the damage, the Westphalian governor Karl-Friedrich Kolbow wrote on May 19, 1943 to the ministerial director in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Ludwig Runte : “ The destruction of the Möhne dam exceeds all expectations. The lower Möhnetal and the Ruhr valley between Neheim and Hengsteysee have been completely destroyed. How often has humanity experienced such terrible setbacks from its technical activity! Nobody would have believed in 1911 when the Möhne Reservoir was completed that it would bring more harm than blessing to their homeland. “The events received a lot of attention from Joseph Goebbels , who returned to the topic several times in his diaries. On May 18, he reported on the first disaster reports and concluded: “ The Führer is extremely impatient and angry about the lack of preparation on the part of our air force. “On May 19, he was relieved that the damage was not as great as initially feared. Because the foreign press celebrated the destruction as a great success, Goebbels felt compelled to issue a brief statement on the loss of human life and property damage in order to counteract this. At the same time he was convinced that “treason was at work” in the “Reich territory itself” because he could not imagine how the British could be so precisely oriented. Armaments Minister Albert Speer traveled to the devastated area to get an idea of ​​the situation and to give instructions for reconstruction. On May 20, Goebbels reported on Speer's report on the visit to the disaster area and its first reconstruction measures. “ Take the right measures straight away and don't shy away from dictatorial regulations if they serve the cause. The Führer has given him absolute powers, and he has made full use of them. "

Out of concern for the mood in the population, unauthorized access to the affected area, as well as filming or taking photos, were prohibited. Secrecy and speedy reconstruction should help limit any potential negative impact on morale. The aligned press initially tried to downplay the matter. “ Weak British air forces entered the Reich last night and dropped a small number of high-explosive bombs in some places. Two dams were damaged and the resulting waterfall caused heavy casualties among the civilian population. Eight of the attacking aircraft were shot down, nine other enemy aircraft were destroyed over the occupied enemy western areas, including one by army troops. “The names of the dams concerned were not given. Foreign reporters were not allowed to enter the affected areas. The Gau press offices were instructed not to report on the disaster. According to reports from the SD and SS , rumors of up to 30,000 fatalities were in circulation. Against this background, it seemed necessary to counteract this with press reports. On May 19, the German News Bureau reassuringly reported that the number of deaths was lower than expected, with 370 Germans and 341 prisoners of war. In Neheim, care was taken to ensure that not too many obituaries were published. Only four reports of fatalities per issue were allowed for weeks. In the city, the NSDAP organized rallies and an act of mourning in the Möhnefriedhof. It was not mentioned in the press that the church memorial service took place after the party event. During this, the false rumor arose that the Sorpe Dam had also been destroyed, which caused panic.

The propaganda carried an alleged British press release that an emigrated Jew had alerted the British to the targets. It is not entirely clear whether this was an actual false report or whether the Propaganda Ministry faked the report. In any case, Goebbels used the report to launch an anti-Semitic campaign. In the German press it was reported that the “ true author of the disaster had been exposed. “The headlines in the newspapers were:“ Jews who caused the dam bombing. “As the SD announced, these reports were given little faith in the population.

Reception and commemoration

Monument at the former Himmelpforten monastery
Death stele in Neheim in memory of the victims

Although the Möhne catastrophe cost significantly fewer victims compared to the bombing war in large cities with thousands of deaths, the attack and the consequences remained in the memory of both Great Britain and Germany. There are books in English, and feature films and documentaries have been made. A large part of it deals mainly with the military aspect. There is even a computer game called Dambuster.

In terms of local history, the topic was first dealt with in 1969 by Fritz Schumacher. Helmut Euler, a local researcher from Werl, published his book When Germany's dams broke for the first time in 1975 . Despite methodological and content-related deficiencies - especially with regard to the historiographical classification - the book is still important in terms of facts. The author has followed up the topic in other books. A scientific German-language study on the attack and the Möhne catastrophe is missing.

In the affected areas in particular, the focus is on commemorating the victims. The event is regularly commemorated on the anniversaries in exhibitions and memorial events. This is how the British Ambassador Simon McDonald spoke at the memorial event in Neheim on the 70th anniversary in 2013 . The ruins of the Himmelpforten monastery are a memorial, there are other memorials in the parish church in Niederense, on the Möhnefriedhof and at the Johanneskirche in Neheim, in Wickede, Fröndenberg and Schwerte. In Günne, a wooden stele created by the Winkelmann brothers in the parish church of St. Antonius and a plaque on the memorial commemorate the victims of the Möhne disaster in Günne. On May 17, 2015, a central memorial for all victims of the Möhne disaster was inaugurated at the dam. This was initiated and established by the Heimatverein Möhnesee. The building was supported by the Ruhr Association and numerous donors. In the past, remembrance focused primarily on the German victims, while the slave laborers tend to be neglected. This has only gradually changed in the last few years.

literature

  • Ralf Blank : The “Möhne catastrophe” in May 1943 as part of European war commemoration . In: Der Märker 61 (2012), pp. 97–121.
  • Ralf Blank: Battle of the Ruhr. The Ruhr area in the war year 1943. Klartext-Verlag, Essen 2013, ISBN 978-3-8375-0078-3 .
  • Helmut Euler: When Germany's dams broke. The truth about the bombing of the Möhne-Eder-Sorpe dams in 1943. Stuttgart 1975 (used here 13th edition 1994).
  • Helmut Euler: Water War: May 17, 1943. Roll bombs against the Möhne-Eder-Sorpestaudämme. Stuttgart 2007, new edition, 2013. Partly digitized version (PDF; 1.2 MB).
  • Michael Gosmann (Ed.): 50 Years of the Möhne Catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993.
  • Walter Klisch: The rushing flood of water brings hardship and devastation. The Möhne disaster on May 17, 1943. In: Herdecker Blätter. Volume 3, May 1993, pp. 15-18.
  • Fritz Schumacher: home under bombs. The Arnsberg district in World War II. Arnsberg 1969.
  • John Sweetman: The Dambusters Raid. London 1990 (5th edition 2004).

Movies

Web links

Commons : Möhne disaster  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files
  • Ralf Blank: The night of 16./17. May 1943 - "Operation Chastening": The Destruction of the Möhne Dam Online version
  • Möhnesee travel guide : The Möhnetalsperre and the Möhne disaster with pictures.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Michael Gosmann: 50 years ago Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 pp. 14-16.
  2. ^ To the camp: Siegfried Raschke: The forced labor camp in the Möhnewiesen. In: Forced Labor in Arnsberg 1939–1945. Arnsberg, 2007 pp. 121-127.
  3. ^ Siegfried Raschke: The barrack camp for foreign forced laborers. In: 50 years of the Möhne catastrophe, May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993, pp. 69–86.
  4. ↑ a b Helmuth Euler: When Germany's dams broke. Stuttgart, 1994 p. 19.
  5. ↑ Michael Gosmann: 50 years ago Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 16.
  6. ↑ Alfred Redecker: Because the warning service failed, many people had to die. In: 50 years of the Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 43f.
  7. ↑ cf. Report of the Arnsberg District President In: Helmut Euler: Wasserkrieg; May 17, 1943: Roll-bombs against the Möhne-Eder-Sorpe dams. Stuttgart, 2013, pp. 19-23.
  8. ↑ a b Heike Schmidt: The Möhne catastrophe in May 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 38.
  9. ↑ Peter Michael Kleine: The planned catastrophe. the attack on the dam wall as an example of technical-economic warfare. In: 50 years of the Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 64.
  10. ↑ Heike Schmidt: The Möhne catastrophe in May 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993, p. 35.
  11. ↑ a b Michael Gosmann: 50 Years Ago Möhne Catastrophe May 17, 1943. In: 50 Years Möhne Catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 18.
  12. ↑ a b c d e f g h Ralf Blank : The night of the 16./17. May 1943 - "Operation Chastening": The destruction of the Möhne Dam. lwl.org .
  13. ↑ Helmuth Euler: When Germany's dams broke. Stuttgart, 1994 p. 20.
  14. ↑ Heike Schmidt: The Möhne catastrophe in May 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 36f.
  15. ↑ cf. in detail: Helmuth Euler: When Germany's dams broke. Stuttgart, 1994 pp. 54-93.
  16. ↑ On the British point of view Robert Owen: The attack on the dams from today's point of view Website of the Arnsberger Heimatbund .
  17. ↑ Michael Gosmann: 50 years ago Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 20.
  18. ↑ Heike Schmidt: The Möhne catastrophe in May 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 37.
  19. ↑ Helmuth Euler: When Germany's dams broke. Stuttgart, 1994 p. 113, p. 116-120.
  20. ↑ Alfred Redecker: Because the warning service failed, many people had to die. In: 50 years of the Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 43.
  21. ↑ Alfred Redecker: Because the warning service failed, many people had to die. In: 50 years of the Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 45.
  22. ↑ Heike Schmidt: The Möhne catastrophe in May 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 37f.
  23. ↑ Michael Gosmann: 50 years ago Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 pp. 20-22.
  24. ^ Siegfried Raschke: The barrack camp for foreign forced laborers. In: 50 years of the Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 84.
  25. ↑ Pastor Hellmann reports to Archbishop Jaeger about the Möhne catastrophe of May 24, 1943 , further eyewitness reports: Hartmut Kupitz: “and we heard an eerie noise”. Contemporary witnesses remember the Möhne disaster. In: 50 years of the Möhne catastrophe, May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 pp. 51–62.
  26. ↑ Stefan Klemp: There were no real Nazis here: A city, a company, the forgotten powerful business leader and Auschwitz. Münster, 2000 p. 329f.
  27. ↑ Alfred Redecker: Because the warning service failed, many people had to die. In: 50 years of the Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 44.
  28. ↑ Helmuth Euler: When Germany's dams broke. Stuttgart, 1994 164-181.
  29. ↑ a b c Michael Gosmann: 50 years ago Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 26.
  30. ↑ Peter Michael Kleine: The planned catastrophe. the attack on the dam wall as an example of technical-economic warfare. In: 50 years of the Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 66.
  31. ↑ Report from Mayor Reinhold Löffler on the Möhne disaster on May 17, 1943 to his sister Martha (PDF; 12 kB).
  32. ↑ Destruction of the Möhne dam on neheims-netz.de
  33. ↑ Heike Schmidt: The Möhne catastrophe in May 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 39f.
  34. ↑ Helmuth Euler: When Germany's dams broke. Stuttgart, 1994 p. 25.
  35. ↑ a b Michael Gosmann: 50 years ago Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 24.
  36. ↑ Helmuth Euler: When Germany's dams broke. Stuttgart, 1994 pp. 25-27.
  37. ↑ a b Helmut Euler: Water War; May 17, 1943: Roll-bombs against the Möhne-Eder-Sorpe dams. Stuttgart, 2013 p. 14.
  38. ↑ Martin Schwarz: The names of the dead flow into one another. In: der Westen , May 18, 2013.
  39. ↑ Soester Anzeiger , May 17, 2015
  40. ↑ Michael Gosmann: 50 years ago Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. In: 50 years Möhne catastrophe May 17, 1943. Arnsberg, 1993 p. 28.