Battle of Carpi
Colored contemporary engraving
| date | July 9, 1701 |
|---|---|
| place | Carpi d'Adige in Italy |
| output | Victory of the imperial troops |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
Maréchal de Tessé |
|
| Troop strength | |
| approx. 11,400 men (1,500–2,000 deployed) |
approx. 17,000 men (approx. 11,300 deployed) |
| losses | |
|
approx. 350 dead and wounded (50 officers) |
approx. 42 dead (2 officers) |
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Carpi - Chiari - Cremona - Kaiserswerth - Luzzara - Cádiz - Friedlingen - Vigo - Schmidmühlen - Ekeren - Höchstädt (1703) - Gibraltar - Speyerbach - Schellenberg - Bonn - Höchstädt (1704) - Vélez-Málaga - Cassano - Barcelona (1705) - Sendlinger Murder Christmas - Calcinato - Ramillies - Turin - Castiglione - Almansa - Toulon - Lille - Oudenaarde - Malplaquet - Almenara - Saragossa - Brihuega - Villaviciosa - Denain - Rio de Janeiro - Barcelona
The Battle of Carpi ( Carpi on the Adige , Province of Verona ) on July 9, 1701 was the first major battle between the French and the troops of the Roman-German emperor in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714). In it, an imperial army of 11,300 men under Prince Eugene of Savoy attacked a 1,500 to 2,000-strong French division on the Adige, which was under the command of the Maréchal de Tessé . The battle ended with a strategically important victory for the Imperialists, which enabled them to make an operational breakthrough to the Mincio . The fight caused a sensation in Europe because France and the Habsburg Empire were not officially at war. The imperial success heralded the actual beginning of the war.
prehistory
After Charles II of Spain died on November 1, 1700 and in his last will he declared Philip of Anjou , the grandson of King Louis XIV of France , to be his sole heir, he moved on February 23, 1701 as the new Spanish King Philip V. in Madrid . Both the Habsburgs and the Bourbons then made preparations for war, as it became clear that Emperor Leopold I of the Austrian House of Habsburg would not accept the Bourbon increase in power.
In strategic terms, France intended to remain defensive in the event of another war. Nevertheless, it was important to find the most favorable starting positions possible. This primarily concerned northern Italy. There the duchies of Milan and Mantua , which belonged to Spain, were able to fulfill a bridgehead function. From there one could threaten the Habsburg-Austrian heartlands of the emperor on the flank, pull the Republic of Venice to the Franco-Spanish side and cover both the Kingdom of Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples against Habsburg attack. However, although they had recognized Philip V's sovereignty, these countries were more inclined to the House of Habsburg. In order to keep them on the Franco-Spanish side, it was decided in Paris to occupy the duchies. Since Viktor Amadeus II of Savoy had also sided with France, French troops were able to invade the Italian principalities unhindered. Viktor Amadeus received substantial subsidies, the supreme command of the allied troops in northern Italy and the promise of his second daughter's marriage to Philip V. From January to April 1701, a Franco-Spanish army under Maréchal Nicolas de Catinat occupied the fortresses in Milan and Mantua.
As early as November 1700, plans existed in the Vienna Imperial Hofburg to forestall a French occupation of northern Italy in winter. But it was not possible to mobilize the army quickly enough , which had been emaciated by the Turkish war that had just ended . It gathered slowly around Rovereto and was not operational until May 1701. Prince Eugene of Savoy was appointed as their commander-in-chief with the task of occupying the Italian duchies of Mantua and Milan and, if possible, advancing further on Turin . Prince Eugene's campaign began without a declaration of war. France and the Holy Roman Empire were not formally at war with each other until the fall of that year. It was not until September 7, 1701 that the Great Hague Alliance was formed , as a result of which war was declared.
The operations up to the battle
The Franco-Spanish army in Italy numbered 39,000 men (including 9,000 cavalrymen ). By May 1701, Catinat had occupied all the mountain passes and concentrated its main power at Rivoli between the Adige and Lake Garda . Across the river was the neutral Republic of Venice , whose territory was not to be entered. In accordance with the overall defensive strategy of Louis XIV, he now waited for his opponent to react. For the imperial army, which comprised only about 32,000 men, a frontal attack on the mountain passes or in the Adige Valley offered little prospect of success. Therefore the Prince of Savoy feigned an advance against Catinat's position on Lake Garda with only a few troops and led the bulk of the imperial army from Rivoli across the Alps into the Alps from May 27 to June 4 in a logistical achievement admired throughout Europe Republic of Venice, whose neutrality he deliberately disregarded.
During the following weeks, while the Imperialists organized their supplies and looked for a way to cross the Adige, Marshal Catinat evenly distributed his troops along the river. The imperial family finally managed to cross at Castelbaldo . Here they occupy the artificial “island” Villabuona, which is formed by the Canal Bianco, the Canal Malopera and the Tartaro . Then Prince Eugene let some troops march south, which even crossed the Po . Catinat, who was already concentrating his troops near Villabuona, now believed that the Imperialists wanted to turn south. He therefore directed his bandages on Ostiglia to cross the Po there as well.
Across from the imperial camp on the Villabuona, only a small French contingent remained at Carpi under Field Marshal Saint-Frémont to cover the Canal Bianco and the Adige. It consisted of 300 infantrymen (including 150 grenadiers ) and 16 squadrons of cavalry with about 1,200 men. A few kilometers west of Carpi was at San Pietro di Legnago (near Legnago ) a stronger French forces under Maréchal de Tessé . This comprised eight battalions (4,000 men) and 20 squadrons (2,400 men). Another seven Piedmontese battalions were in Cerea . On the day of the battle, the French would have been able to concentrate 15 battalions and 36 squadrons (together around 7,800 men and 3,600 horsemen) at Carpi. Contrary to Catinat's assumptions, Prince Eugene was not planning a march south. His southward shifts of troops had only been a diversionary maneuver, while the actual blow against the French troops was to take place at Carpi, i.e. in a westerly direction. For this purpose, the prince provided 21 battalions (approx. 10,500 men), 66 squadrons (approx. 6600 riders) and 58 guns between Castelbaldo and Castelgugliemo (on the Tartaro).
Course of the battle
To the south of Carpi the marshland of the Valli Veronesi was only about 1200 meters from the Adige. This bottleneck was the only access to the Mincio, and this gave Carpi its strategic importance. The place itself was fortified by Saint-Frémont. A little further to the south was another fortified position, which in turn was preceded by another near the village of Castagnaro. From the fortified cemetery there, a field hill extended to the banks of the Canal Bianco.
The advance of the imperial troops
On the evening of July 8th, the imperial troops were placed in readiness for march, with only the highest officers being informed of the march goal. During the night Prince Eugene led a column (8 bags and 18 Esk. = 4,000 men and 1,800 riders) across the Canal Bianco, while the Prince of Commercy led a second division (8 bags. 15 Esk. = 4,000 men and 1,500 riders) ) took another route over the Tartaro. After the bridge had gone unnoticed, the troops crossed the water hazards around 3:00 a.m. Both columns then turned north on Carpi. The left column of Prince Commercy made no progress in the difficult terrain and finally had to march behind the right column of the Prince of Savoy on the canal embankment. In order to support the attack, Prince Eugene instructed Colonel Wirich Philipp Graf Daun to take up position with 20 guns and two regiments of infantry on the Canal Bianco at the level of the Castagnaro field hill. Feldzeugmeister Börner took up another position with 12 guns on the other side of the Adige opposite Carpi himself.
After a two-hour march the imperial attack column reached the French position of Castagnaro at the beginning of the day, which was quickly taken. Saint-Frémont, however, carried out a counterattack with the three companies of French grenadiers and dragoons who had rushed up from Carpi , which threw the imperial soldiers out of the redoubt. The second imperial attack, supported by artillery fire from across the canal, eventually forced Saint-Frémont to evacuate Castagnaro and retreat to Carpi. The French gained some time by the fact that some grenadier troops continued to defend the church and the steeple of the village. It was only when the imperial men threatened to set the church on fire that they were made to give up. Saint-Frémont's troops were nevertheless pursued by imperial cavalry regiments, so that it was not possible for them to organize new resistance in the second hill at Catarane. This only succeeded at Carpi, especially since Prince Eugene had stopped the pursuit as his troops had also got into disarray due to the rapid advance. Since he also assumed that the French might have strengthened themselves in Carpi, he wanted to prepare well for the attack on this place. The French remained thus time to consult reinforcements, set up to defend Carpi and the magazine to evacuate the city as a precaution.
The French counterattack
At the beginning of the battle, Saint-Frémont had sent a messenger to Maréchal de Tessé with a request for reinforcements. He had heard the noise of the battle as far as San Pietro di Legnago and had set out for Carpi with the readiness of his corps. On the way he learned from the messenger that Castagnaro had fallen. He therefore sent the message to San Pietro di Legnago to send all available troops to Carpi as quickly as possible. When he learned shortly after that Saint-Frémont had retaken Castagnaro, he doubted whether it was a serious imperial advance and revoked his order to concentrate the troops. When the imperial had formed and marched on Carpi, Maréchall de Tessé arrived. To defend the place were only two Cuirassier regiments and three regiments of dragoons, and the remains of the weak infantry companies are available. Since the terrain was very cut through and unsuitable for cavalry, two dragoon regiments fought defensively on foot. The regiment d'Albert and the cuirassier regiment Ruffey attacked the imperial line-up. While the Ruffey cuirassiers attacked in the front, de Tessé personally led the d'Albert Dragoons against the left imperial wing. There they threw back the imperial cuirassier regiment Neuburg in three successive attacks. To cope with this crisis, Prince Eugene had to throw the Cuirassier Regiment Voudémont and some divisions of infantry to his left wing.
However, after the French attack was repulsed, the numerical superiority of the Imperial made itself felt and they began to encompass the French units. Once again a detachment of French dragoons attacked the imperial in order to make room for a retreat. The French withdrew to the west under the hesitant resistance of the dismounted dragoons. Halfway to San Pietro di Legnago, Marshal de Tessé met six battalions and the entire cavalry that had followed him from the camp at Villa Bartolomea. Although this had given him significant reinforcement, de Tessé decided not to renew the battle for Carpi and marched back to the camp at Legnago. The imperialists stopped north of Carpi because they were no longer able to pursue after the night march and the battle.
Result
The episode with the most losses in this battle was the attack by the French cavalry on the Neuburg regiment. The lieutenant colonel of the Neuburg regiment had fallen. Prinz Eugen suffered a slight gunshot wound to his knee. Two horses were shot under him and his aide wounded. On the French side, Colonel d'Albert and the Lieutenant Colonel of the Ruffey regiment fell. The imperial family captured part of the French baggage and 200 horses in the place, but otherwise Saint-Frémont had the place's depot completely cleared. In addition, the fact that some of the horsemen had succeeded in capturing the standard of the French cuirassier regiment Mauroy meant a moral victory.
The battle of Carpi claimed around 450 victims. This was a small number compared to the great battles of the War of the Spanish Succession, but the event had some significance. With the victory at Carpi, Eugene of Savoy had secured a base on the other side of the Adige and the canals, from which he could act against Milan as well as against Modena. This was all the more important as the Imperialists were able to simplify and secure their supply lines. At the same time, the initiative was wrested from the French, which only gave the emperor and empire the opportunity to conduct an offensive war in northern Italy. Marshal Catinat tried in the following days to rally his troops and took up a new position on the Mincio. He confessed in a letter to Versailles on July 11th :
- We are now compelled, sire, to await the steps the enemies want to take.
But Louis XIV was indignant about Catinat:
- I had sent her to Italy to fight an enterprising young prince; he behaved against all the rules of the art of war. But now you follow him and let him do what he wants.
In fact, Catinat Prinz Eugen could not postpone the further advance. He therefore withdrew further in the direction of Milan and was finally removed from his post as Commander-in-Chief.
literature
- Alfred Arneth: Prince Eugene of Savoy . 3 volumes, Vienna 1858.
- Marco Picone Chiodo: The War of the Spanish Succession in Italy . 2003.
- Leander Heinrich Wetzler: Campaigns of Prince Eugene of Savoy . Vol. III, Vienna 1876 (edited by the War History Department of the Imperial and Royal War Archives).
Individual evidence
- ↑ For an overview of the strategic considerations at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, see Hermann Stegemann, Der Krieg. His essence and his change , Vol. II, Stuttgart / Berlin 1940, pp. 87 ff.
- ^ Alfred von Arneth: Prinz Eugen von Savoyen , p. 139
- ↑ Leander Heinrich Wetzler, campaigns of Prince Eugene of Savoy , vol. III, p. 191 f.
- ↑ A detailed list of the various regiments in Leander Heinrich Wetzler, Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen , Vol. III, p. 191 f.
- ^ Alfred von Arneth: Prinz Eugen von Savoyen , p. 141
- ^ Alfred von Arneth: Prinz Eugen von Savoyen , p. 142
- ↑ Quoted by Alfred Arneth, Prince Eugene of Savoy , Vol. I, Vienna 1858, p 478.
Web links
- Illustration: Treffen by Carpi. the 10 Jul 1701 . Amstelodami, 1712 ( digitized edition of the University and State Library Düsseldorf )