Battle of Sarıkamış
Turkish machine gun emplacement on the Eastern Front, 1915.
| date | December 22, 1914 to January 15, 1915 |
|---|---|
| place | Caucasus |
| output | All-out victory of the Russian Empire |
| consequences | Russian occupation of Eastern Anatolia |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
|
Caucasus Army 100,000 |
3rd Army 120,000 |
| losses | |
|
30,000 |
60,000 |
.svg){kind=small}
Bergmann Offensive - Sarıkamış - Ardahan - Van - Malazgirt - Karakilise - Erzurum - Trabzon - Bitlis - Muş - German Caucasus Expedition - Sardarapat - Abaran - Karakilisa - Baku
The Battle of Sarıkamış or Sarikamisch ( Turkish Sarıkamış Savaşı, Sarıkamış Harekâtı , Armenian Սարիղամիշի ճակատամարտ Sarighamishi chakatamart ; Russian Сражение при Сарыкамыше Sraschenie pri Sarykamysche ) was a battle of the Caucasus Front of the First World War . It ended with a decisive victory for the Russian Empire over the Ottoman Empire . The battle of Sarıkamış was preceded by the battle of Köprüköy .
background
Ottoman war targets
The Ottoman war goals were divided into three stages: First, there was the recapture of the areas of Batumi , Ardahan and Kars , which had been lost to Russia during the 10th Russian Turkish War . The German Supreme Army Command wanted to persuade the Ottomans to attack Odessa or to deploy in Galicia . But Enver Pascha did not accept the German plans because he was aware of the potential danger in the east of the country. Sooner or later the Russians would use their positions in the Caucasus and Persia to attack Eastern Anatolia.
In second place was the recapture of the Caucasian territories that had been lost in previous wars, especially the areas with a Muslim population. The third war goal was shaped by Turanism and envisaged an advance into the Central Asian areas around the Caspian Sea and the unification of the "Turanian" peoples resident there. Enver Pasha based his plans on the hope that the regional Muslim population would join his troops and fight the Russians.
Russian war targets
The war goals of Russia can also be broken down into three sub-goals: First, the invasion of Eastern Anatolia, associated with an advance to İskenderun and thus gaining access to the Mediterranean . Then the conquest of Trabzone and then along the coast of the Black Sea the conquest of Istanbul . The final goal was to reach the Persian Gulf along the Tigris and Euphrates . In particular, the war target of Istanbul, or Constantinople as the old metropolis of the Orthodox Byzantine Empire , enjoyed a nationalistic, Pan-Slavic and religious transfiguration.
Ottoman forces
The 3rd Army consisted of three corps (IX., X. and XI.) And two cavalry divisions with a total of 120,000 men, 60,000 riding and draft animals, 168 artillery pieces and 44 machine guns.
The numerical superiority of the Ottoman armed forces was deceptive given the condition of the force. Although they had 120,000 men, they were poorly equipped. The supply of clothing and food was inadequate due to the lack of transport.
Russian armed forces
The Russian Caucasus Army comprised two army corps with a total of 100 battalions of infantry, 117 squadrons of cavalry and 250 guns. Their strength was around 100,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalrymen. Before the war began, it was reinforced by four Armenian and two Georgian battalions.
Preparatory battles
Miners offensive
On November 1, 1914, Russian troops began attacking the border posts of the Ottoman Empire. The next day, under the leadership of General Bergmann, the Russians managed to cross the border and take Zivin , Doğubeyazıt and Diyadin . Hasan İzzet Pasha, the commander of the 3rd Army, thought that the Russians had started a major attack with numerous troops. So he ordered his troops to rally at Erzurum and stay on the defensive with the help of the fortress there. On November 4th, Russian troops slowed their movements in the field. Hasan İzzet Pascha no longer believed in a major attack by the Russians, his preparations were ineffective.
Battle of Köprüköy
On November 6, 1914, the first battle between the Ottomans and the Russians took place in the village of Köprüköy. The 22 Russian battalions faced 26 Turkish ones. Due to the lack of communication between the Ottoman forces, poor training and lack of discipline, many Turks left their positions and left their equipment behind. The fighting lasted until November 8th, when neither party could achieve a decisive victory. Since the Russians could not organize enough supplies, they withdrew to their positions. Hasan İzzet Pasha's troops meanwhile expanded their positions and reorganized themselves.
Enver Pascha tried meanwhile to improve the battered mood in the headquarters by giving İzzet Pascha the order to attack the Russian troops immediately. The aim was to surprise the enemy who was in retreat. Hasan İzzet Pasha's army was not ready for such an offensive, nevertheless he obeyed the order and attacked the Russian forces at Köprüköy with two divisions on November 10th. These began to withdraw after they had lost around 40 percent of their soldiers. On November 17th, a second offensive by the Ottoman forces began to take the retreat positions of the Russian troops. However, this did not succeed, and İzzet Pasha ordered the fighting to be stopped.
The invasion plan (Caucasus)
The Third Army was unable to completely defeat its Russian opponent. This fact led to increasing dissatisfaction among many Ottoman generals, politicians and also in the public. The headquarters of the Young Turks, the governors of Erzurum, Vans and Trabzons and the Ottoman secret service ( Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa ) felt a disapproval of Enver Pascha.
The prevailing view within this group was that victory against the Russians could be achieved with courageous and dynamic officers. The German Emperor Wilhelm II and his Chief of Staff Falkenhayn were also dissatisfied with the course of the war in the Caucasus. Enver Pascha feared for his reputation, which had so far been shaped by his vigor.
The lack of success of the Ottoman army was the reason for the revival of the Caucasian invasion plan. The idea had been discussed earlier. However, the generals had come to the decision that they had to gain the upper hand in the Black Sea first and wait until spring. On November 17th, however, all concerns were dropped and the following points of the plan were established:
- The Russian troops are to be attacked in a pincer movement on the one hand from the Black Sea and on the other from Persia.
- Part of the Ottoman army and the Ottoman secret service (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) are supposed to get the local Turkish population to rebel against the Russians.
Changes in the Ottoman army command
There were some changes in the Ottoman command structure during the planning of this large-scale invasion. Enver Pascha ordered his uncle Halil Bey to command a division that was yet to be established. This division was supposed to advance through Tabriz to Dagestan and move the Muslim population there to rebellion against the Russians. Kâzım Karabekir Pasha was also appointed to head a division that was to conquer Tehran. After that, if possible, he should move on to Turkestan and Afghanistan . The secret service was supposed to incite the population against the British and Russians there.
Enver retired on December 6, 1914, Ziya Pascha, commander of the Xth Corps of the Third Army, and appointed Colonel Hafız Hakkı as corps commander in his place. The commander of the IX. Corps was removed from active service for opposition to Enver's invasion plans. Hasan İzzet Pasha, as army commander, feared that, in view of these hasty changes, Enver's attack would be premature and unprepared. On December 18, he resigned from his command. The next day, Enver Pasha himself took over the leadership of the Third Ottoman Army.
requirements
The Third Army was the main battle group of the Ottomans in the theater of war. It consisted of three corps and a cavalry division. The Ottomans had a total of 120,000 men. The Ottoman army command also assumed a possible invasion of Batumi. These 120,000 men faced 100,000 soldiers on the Russian side.
The soldiers had not received adequate training for this large-scale maneuver. The troops were not adequately provided with food and clothing suitable for winter. Medical care at the front was catastrophic. There was only one road in the combat area and it was covered with snow in places 1.5 m high. At the time of the fighting, temperatures were between −20 ° C and −25 ° C. In addition there was Enver Pasha's incompetence; he lacked experience in leading such a large unit.
The Ottoman attack
Under these circumstances Enver Pasha ordered his troops to attack. The Russian armed forces were to be forced into action in a pincer motion. The XI. Corps and the cavalry division were supposed to divert the Russian troops, consisting of a corps and a cavalry battalion, with smaller skirmishes. Meanwhile the IX. and X. Corps circumvent the right flank of the Russian troops via Bardız and Oltu and force them into the Araş Valley. The attack began on December 22nd.
The IX. Corps moved in the direction of Bardız, the X Corps in the direction of Oltu. After a counter-attack by Russian troops, the Turks gained the upper hand and moved into both Oltu and Bardız. After Enver Pascha had relocated the occupation belt 15 kilometers to the east, communication between the individual units deteriorated. At the same time the fighting strength of the Ottomans began to decline due to the poor supply situation.
Nevertheless, Enver Pascha succeeded on December 25th with a division of the IX. Corps Sarıkamış to approach at six kilometers. Russian troops prevented further advance. Meanwhile, the Russian leadership thought of evacuating the city, as they had learned that the X. Corps was approaching over the Allahüekber Mountain and the XI. Corps went on the attack.
After two unsuccessful attacks by the Ottomans on December 26th, Enver Pasha was waiting for the X Corps. Due to the more than 1 meter high layer of snow on the Allahuekber mountain, this progressed only with difficulty. The soldiers could only travel one kilometer an hour. Of the 13,000 soldiers of the X Corps, only 3,000 reached Sarıkamış on December 27, the remaining 10,000 died of cold, hunger and overexertion. On December 30, this remnant attacked the Russian armed forces, which had 22 battalions, 12 cavalry companies and 22 artillery pieces. The attack brought no progress. In the meantime, the division, which was the rear lines of the IX. Corps reinforced.
The Ottoman retreat
On January 4, a 7,000-strong Ottoman force held a 20-kilometer front north of Sarıkamış. This front was attacked by 30,000 Russian soldiers. The Russians planned to attack the Ottoman forces from the east and west and to penetrate the left flank of the Ottoman forces with a cavalry division.
Enver Pascha had to withdraw the remaining parts of the Third Army. He handed over command of the troops in Sarıkamış to Hafız Hakkı Pascha on January 5, for which Enver promoted him to general ( orgeneral ). Hafız Hakkı Pasha gave the IX. Corps and X Corps the order to withdraw. But the order came too late, Bronsard Pasha was injured in the arm, the IX. Corps and its commander Ali İhsan Pasha were captured. The X Corps began its retreat. 12 field cannons were rolled into an abyss. On January 8th, Enver Pasha handed over the command of the Third Army to Hafız Hakkı Pasha. Enver then went to Istanbul via Erzurum. The Ottoman troops suffered great losses during the retreat. On January 18, they arrived at their pre-invasion positions.
consequences
The battle lasted three weeks and ended with great losses on the Ottoman side. The third Ottoman army lost half of its soldiers. The IX. Corps (7,000 men), its commander and 200 officers were captured by the Russians. The Russians also captured 20 machine guns and 30 artillery pieces. The Russian casualties amounted to 30,000 men.
Like many soldiers who took part in the Battle of Sarıkamış, Hafız Hakkı Pasha fell ill with typhus in February 1915 . He was treated in the hospital in Erzurum, but died on February 15, 1915 of the consequences of the illness.
The civilian losses were no less severe, and many villages were burned to the ground. The Turkish population feared attacks by the Russians and Armenians and fled towards Erzurum.
Enver Pascha commented on the great defeat with the laconic words: "We went, saw, attacked and came back." For him the defeat was a great blow. During the retreat he wrote his will, apologizing to the Ottoman people. He toyed with suicidal thoughts , but his political comrade in arms, Talat Pasha , was able to dissuade him. As a result, he declared his defeat with the participation of the six Armenian legions, which had largely consisted of deserted Ottoman soldiers, and Armenian militants who had also fought on the side of the Russians. This declaration contributed to the suspicion that the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were a " fifth column " of Russians, which was one of the reasons for the genocide of the Armenians in 1915/1916.
Commemoration
Today the Allahuekber Dağı Şehitliği memorial is located on European route 691 near Sarıkamış.It commemorates the victims of the battle and especially the soldiers who died while crossing the Allahuekber Mountain (now a well-known ski area in Turkey).
literature
- William E. Allen, Paul Muratoff: Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828–1921 . Print of the edition 1953. Battery Press, Nashville TN 1999, ISBN 0-89839-296-9 , ( Classic history of the war ).
- Richard E. Dupuy: The Encyclopedia of Military History , (numerous editions).
- David Fromkin: A Peace to End All Peace. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the modern Middle East. Avon Books, New York NY 1989, ISBN 0-380-71300-4 , pp. 120f.
- Spencer C. Tucker : The Great War: 1914-18. Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington IN et al. a. 1998, ISBN 0-253-21171-9 .
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces: TSK, March 2008 ( Memento of the original from August 8, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.
- ↑ Guenter Lewy : The Armenian Case. The politicization of history. What happened, how it happened, and why it happened. Edition divan. Klagenfurt / Celovec 2009, p. 126 f.
