Venetian diplomacy

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Envoys reception in the Sala del Collegio of the Doge's Palace, Francesco Guardi , 1770–1775

The Swiss historian Johannes von Müller is considered to be the discoverer of the relazioni of the Venetian ambassadors. However, they only became famous through the work of Leopold von Rankes , who was allowed to work in the State Archives for five months in 1830 .

The roots of Venice's diplomacy can, however, be traced back considerably if statements can only be made about the more important embassies and the heads of the merchant colonies who are also involved in negotiations. The gradation from the simple messenger of a letter to the permanently established ambassador was still permeable, although one can only speak of ambassadors or even one's own messages in the 15th century. The task was carried out exclusively by nobles.

In accordance with the development of the Venetian constitution, small, orally negotiating bodies around the Doge decided on embassies for a long time, but the Grand Council, and later the Senate, took on this responsibility. This also added a written component to the reporting system, from which the Relazioni later emerged. The same applies to the Comissio , which recorded the envoy's negotiating powers in writing.

Since envoys negotiated with potentates , they had to display an appropriate, ostentatious generosity, which led Venice to set upper limits, to regulate thrift when traveling, to control and demand the delivery of all gifts in return. Part of the financing was obtained through loans, and part of the cost was passed on to the officials.

The relationship with the emperor of Byzantium , who theoretically and symbolically still claimed world domination, was particularly complicated , which the Venetians undermined by refusing to perform parts of the rituals , depending on the good or bad relationships .

Permanent representatives and legations in the 13th and 14th centuries

Rhetoric and eloquence

As in most political fields, there was no mandatory training in Venice for an envoy or negotiator. The usual criteria such as many years of experience, personal relationships at the place of work, loyalty and eloquence are likely to have been decisive.

Every nobleman acquired this eloquence in practice, but the correspondence was subject to strict rules that were mediated and influenced by letter writers (artes dictaminis or dictandi).

In addition, the negotiators had to take into account the rules of rhetoric customary at the place of negotiation, in particular the strongly ceremonial rhetoric when speaking in front of the Byzantine emperor. The excessive rhetoric of the speech and the entire behavior at the imperial court often met with rejection.

The right mixture of (not too) submissive request and clear demand, mostly legal argumentation, also against the respective ruler, while at the same time recognizing the honor of the ruler and the empire, required numerous skills and knowledge.

In historiography, eloquence and trained letter rhetoric often appear as characteristics of the nobility. Conversely, the Ars dictaminis is stylized as a means of social advancement on the mainland. Thereby one increasingly identified, especially from the first half of the 13th century, the resulting skills as a sign of the ruling group.

Designation and powers

The later important distinction between nuncii , procuratores , legati and ambaxatores , which covered the entire spectrum between negotiators with a specific negotiating mandate and a permanently resident embassy, ​​was not very pronounced in the 13th century. A resolution of the Grand Council of 1283 called the trip of a "nuncius" to Tunis an "ambaxata", in 1284 a "tractator" was sent to Padua , in 1285 a "nuncius" to Almissa , and in 1286 an "ambaxator" was sent to Ortona without that one could see where the difference lay in each case. In all three cases, the posted workers were supposed to regulate damage caused to the local Venetians. Marino Tiepolo, who was sent to Durazzo on a similar mission in 1224 , was referred to as "legatus".

Already at this time the idea had developed that a nuncius or a legatus had to hand over a letter and, if necessary, explain it orally, whereas a procurator had full right to conclude each type of contract. He was given instructions and powers to define his negotiating scope. The first group of procurators who were equipped with plena potestas or full freedom of choice is known from the year 1201. It was the commission which negotiated with the cruisers gathered in Venice the place, time, extent and cost of the passage from Venice to the Holy Land . Their agreements claimed full validity, even without consulting the highest bodies.

That is why in Venice, in most cases of diplomatic contacts, we are dealing with ambaxatores who were normally not allowed to conclude contracts. This right could be transferred to them, but Venice reserved the right to ratify or recognize the agreements they had negotiated.

Trigger for posting

Amaxatores or sometimes Tractatores were apparently only sent out when special problems or tasks arose, not to maintain diplomatic contacts permanently. In general, these trips were then with "because of the Paduan affair" (pro facto Padue) or more specifically with "because a satisfaction (satisfactio) is necessary for the damage to our faithful". The latter happened frequently. Numerous cases of damage to Venetian merchants have survived. It could be piracy , robbery (e.g. of silk), customs offenses, but also pogrom-like incidents like in Trani , where the local Venetians were asked to leave the place for security reasons. Significantly, the consul of Trani received the right to carry arms as early as 1272 in order to be able to defend himself and his family. Another reason for a posting was the conclusion of a treaty, such as with Bologna on March 24, 1286. The Roman Curia played a special role, occasionally requiring a solution from the interdict , which led to complicated negotiations, but the details of these are extremely rare and only partially tangible.

Local structures

In less significant negotiations, the Vicedomini appeared as agents in all of Northern Italy and on Istria . In addition, numerous consuls all around the Mediterranean handled diplomatic communications, especially with Alexandria and Tunis, but also, if the circumstances required, with the Mongol rulers.

If an embassy should be sent, which always caused a high material and personnel expense in the thin Venetian ruling class, the two positions of ambassador were gladly combined with that of the local consul for a year. So on April 27, 1281, the Great Council sent an experienced man to Tunis, who was to be consul there for a year, and he was to be nuncius to the King of Tunisia. For this he should receive a presbyter, four assistants and two horses. On May 16, his consulate was extended to two years.

This was obviously intended to be a permanent representation at the royal court. This becomes clearer with the consul of Apulia . He was the general agent for all Venetian traders in the empire of Charles of Anjou and his successors. He apparently stayed at the royal court for a long time, but the enormous costs forced him to limit this stay. His freedom of negotiation was apparently so great that at least between 1282 and 1299 not a single embassy was required, which is surprising in view of the turbulent political conditions after the Sicilian Vespers (1282).

The rights of the Bailò in Constantinople went even further . Not only did he head the Venetian colony, but he was instrumental in all political decisions between 1204 and 1261. That is why we rarely hear of embassies, such as the one led by Marco Bembo in 1237. In contrast, after 1265, when Constantinople was retaken from the Greeks (1261), embassies had to be furnished again. The Bailò , who headed the now re-established, scaled-down trading colony in Constantinople, only had comparatively little diplomatic competence.

The selection of envoys, authority to issue instructions (commissio)

Only a small group of noblemen came into question for the strict ritual and politically complicated negotiations of an embassy trip. The same names appeared again and again, especially at embassies to royal courts: Tiepolo, Dolfin , Ziani, Gradenigo, Zeno, Bembo, etc. In addition to experience and belonging to the nobility - if only to be able to appoint men from kings of equal birth - a rhetorical qualification was part of the office , as well as strong expertise. Marco Bembo, for example, who knew his way around Byzantium, was often sent there.

Another criterion was the equipment of the legation, because this was only partly done at state expense. So it was said in 1292 that it was difficult to find someone for the embassy to the despots of Epirus - because of the poor wages (“propter paucitatem salarii”). Participation in a legation was certainly a great honor and a means of political advancement, but it was also a costly and often dangerous task.

Within the Venetian colonial empire and the areas dependent on Venice, envoys were added who were only sent to deliver an instruction or order to the local officials. Formulations such as "that someone is sent to the Duca di Candia and the Councils of Crete to give orders ..." appear frequently.

In the research was long assumed that only the Great Council for the appointment of the ambassador was responsible, but is found in the Liber Plegiorum a decision from 1224, which shows that at the request of the Doge and the majority of his councilors an envoy to Thessaloniki are sent should. The Great Council is not mentioned here. However, this fits in well with the constitutional development of Venice , in which the Grand Council took on more and more powers and responsibilities after 1200.

Apparently, the election was not always received with enthusiasm, because fines were threatened for the first time as early as 1200 if someone refused such an office or even escaped by fleeing. At least one agreed on legitimate reasons that could justify a rejection. So Iacopo Tiepolo , who was chosen as envoy to Cremona in 1293 , did not have to make this trip because he was ill.

Despite confidentiality difficulties, the ambassadors' scope for negotiation was determined in the Grand Council, a body that is far too large for these often explosive subjects. This also applied to the reading out of letters that were supposed to be sent to the Pope, for example. But as early as the 13th century, the Grand Council gave this competence to the Senate , especially when it came to determining the exact scope that was drawn up in a written commissio . The senators, at that time still called Rogati , instructed the envoy to be Pope, who had been elected in the Grand Council in 1285, in detail. In 1292 it is only succinctly said that he should be elected in the Grand Council, but he received the commissio in the Consilium Rogatorum , the later Senate, and the Council of Forty , the Supreme Court. The question of financing developed in a similar way and was increasingly ceded to smaller bodies. In 1289 an envoy to Sicily was no longer appointed in the Grand Council. In 1291, Rogati and the Council of Forty were supposed to decide on everything like the Grand Council itself, as far as the comissio was concerned, but also the remuneration, the costs incurred, yes, they should even be able to revoke opposing decisions of other bodies. In times of crisis it became a matter of course that the Grand Council no longer determined the delegations. The Council of Thirty , which received numerous powers during the war against Genoa from 1293 to 1299, also determined the legations. Apparently, envoys were only given over to the “electoral machinery” of the Grand Council when fundamental issues were touched, such as assuming two offices at the same time.

Equipment and size

Pope Pius VI receives the Doge, Francesco Guardi, 4th quarter of the 18th century

An important criterion for determining how many ambassadors you needed was the question of cost. But the honor of the negotiating partner was also of great importance. The Grand Council justified the increase in the number of envoys to the Pope with his honor (“pro ipsius honore”). When Venice sent only two envoys to Rome during the war against the Genoese in 1298, this was certainly an emergency measure. An embassy included a clergyman, several servants, and horses. Attempts were made to reduce travel costs by stipulating the route, which was occasionally done for safety reasons. In 1297 the ambassador to Sicily was prescribed to sail to Trani first. Only from there could he continue his way freely.

Overall, the Senate complained that the legations were eating up a large part of the municipal income. In order to have control over the handling of the goods and the money given, they should keep accounts of salaries, as well as lists of goods and horses provided by the municipality. They should also give back everything that was left. As soon as he left San Nicolò on the Lido , the ambassador was expressly traveling at his own risk.

When he set out, every ambassador had to swear to do everything for the benefit and honor of Venice. All gifts and gifts that he received on his journey were to be returned at home. The only exception was food. From 1275 every envoy was obliged to note the expenses for each day, presumably already separated according to items that were covered by the salary and those that were taken over by the municipality. For costs of more than 18 grossi per day, the Grand Council reserved approval from 1280, but complained in 1293 that envoys had not submitted their lists and set a deadline of three months. In 1296, envoys with costs of more than 18 grossi per day were given a scribe (who received three grossi). At the same time, the auditors (de super racionibus) should request the account and check it carefully. The splendid embassy that traveled to the King of Hungary in 1291 was given 24 horses and the usual servants, a cook, a notary and, above all, an expensator who had to record and control all costs.

In order to secure the financing of the high expenses, wood and wine concessions should be leased if necessary. Embassies to royal courts in particular caused high costs. When an envoy was to be sent to Tunis in 1283, his salary was set at 400 Libra , as well as the usual gifts for a king. There was also a chaplain , six servants, including a cook, who each received a salary and a piece of clothing. The envoy received 40 solidi grossorum per month by sea and 50 by land, plus wagons and horses. Anything beyond that he paid out of his own pocket. What was left had to be handed in. The trip was supposed to be financed from the wine tariffs and credits, but it was hoped that the king would give ample gifts. However, this was apparently not enough, so that a loan had to be taken out. In addition, the wages were apparently too low for the servants, because in 1283 the envoy Nicolao Faletro did not find enough tubatores , and also no priest who wanted to accompany him. The consul of Apulia also felt the cost pressure, who was not allowed to stay at court during the king's campaigns, when he was absent. In order to reduce the cost of ship passage, the ambassadors were forbidden to take more than the horse provided by the community.

In 1287 the idea came up of sharing the costs with the dealers, for whose claims an embassy was to be put together. Thus the commune only bore half the cost of the envoy to the king of Raszien.

At the end of the 13th century, the wheat chamber ( camera frumenti ), which was actually responsible for stockpiling grain and also handled large sums of money, was increasingly burdened with other costs. The same applied to the ambassadors. Loans were repeatedly taken out for them from the Chamber, but in the 1340s the Senate required the approval of all members of the Dominant , three quarters of the Senators and the Council of Forty for such loans .

Reception ceremony

The reception of a Venetian embassy from the Middle Ages is nowhere described. Jacobus de Voragine reports on the first Genoese-Venetian war, but, like most chroniclers of his time, keeps his description of diplomatic contacts extremely brief. Caffaro reports at receptions in 1242 and 1293. In 1242 the Venetian ambassadors Pietro Gradenigo and Iacopo de Duro met in neutral Lucca to extend the alliance with the Genoese Guido Spinola and Ugo de Flisco . Choosing a neutral location seems to have been the norm between the arch-rivals, because they also met in 1257, this time in Bologna . A second meeting should already take place in Genoese territory, more precisely in Porto Venere . At the border, an armed escort was sent to meet the ambassadors , which had been equipped at the expense of the municipality of Genoa. The meeting, called conventio , took place in a place called locus comunis , like in 1293 when negotiating in Cremona . On this occasion four ambaxatores were to appear from both sides , plus two priests each. This astonishingly large round of negotiations met for a full three months.

The choice of a neutral place was justified, because occasionally the ambassadors were detained against their will. So held Azzo VIII. D'Este (1293-1308), a ambassaria at his court determined after negotiations had failed, and asked her to sit at his table.

An incomparably more complicated procedure existed at the Byzantine court. Pseudo-Kodinos alone lists 75 different court offices (see offices and titles in the Byzantine Empire ). In seventh place after the emperor he lists the Megas-Konostavlos (Groß-Comes Stabuli), who was at the head of the western traders called "Franconian". The third man after the emperor, the Protovestiarios , was busy with the reception ceremony . Waited in front of the Imperial Room Triklinium of Megas heteriarchos and the Court Primicerius . If the emperor sat on the throne, the officials and dignitaries could be called in - carefully separated into two groups according to their rank. Only then did everyone take their positions in their assigned position. The Megas-Primicerius handed the scepter , after he had received it from a bellboy, the emperor. Now the middle court batches were also called in, whereby the hierarchy levels were recognizable by the color of the clothes and shoes. At the emperor's request, the reception was ended by the primicerius tapping the floor lightly with his stick. Then the heteriarches, equipped with wooden sticks, went to those who were only allowed to enter after the scepter had been handed over. During the reception, urgent messages were only allowed to be passed on by the protovestiary , if he was absent, by the grand heterarch. Only when the latter was also absent did the Court Primicerius bring them.

That the Venetian ambassadors often disrupted this complicated ritual is handed down by pseudo-Kodinos for the Easter ceremony. First of all, at this annual celebration, churchmen presented candles to the emperor and his highest officials in front of Hagia Sophia . Thereupon people walked through the church gates with chants, the emperor kissed the Bible and the cross. Meanwhile, the imperial throne was being brought into the triclinium. After the service, the emperor returned to the palace. While he was seated holding the sword, all the officials walked past him and kissed the emperor's right foot, his right hand and his right cheek. At this point the Genoese podium was present and proceeded in the same way. Then he and his people received candles, but had to leave the (Orthodox) Easter ceremony afterwards.

When Michael VIII had signed a new treaty with the Venetians that made their return possible (1265), they were again headed by a Bailò . But the Venetians refused to throw themselves on the ground and did not kiss the emperor's right foot either. On the second visit, they didn't even bend their knee. Eventually they even refused, indignant pseudo-Kodinos, to wish the emperor a long life, and their ships did not even flag a greeting as they passed the imperial palace. The provocative behavior of the Venetians, who ignored all etiquette , can easily be explained before the ongoing preparations for war that were to lead to the reconquest of the lost Constantinople.

Oral and written reporting

On December 23, 1268, a resolution of the Grand Council stipulated that the ambaxatores , the ambassadors, had to put their written reports in writing within 15 days. Likewise, the council stipulated in 1296 that the oral report of the ambassadors was to be given not only to the Doge and his council, but also to the body that had sent the ambassador.

Apparently, from the beginning, a distinction was made between referir , the oral report, and the relazione , the written report, without these terms already being comprehensible. In a law of 1268, the ambassadors were not only required to report everything they had learned, but also to share rumors.

Since the ambassadors reported by letter during their mission, some of the events were already known when they returned. We do not have any relations from the time before 1300, but a very clearly formulated order shows what demands could be made of the investigations of an envoy. In 1307 Azzo VIII Este, Signore of Ferrara , Modena and Reggio, fell seriously ill. The Doge Pietro Gradenigo sent an embassy under the pretext of sympathy, which consisted of Giovanni Foscarini, Giovanni Soranzo (the later Doge) and Alvise Querini. The three politically experienced men were to convey the Doge's greetings and sympathy, if the condition of the Estonian allowed it. Should they find out that he had already died or was dying, it was important to find out the internal conditions in his area particularly quickly and to communicate them by letter. As in later relazioni , questions arose here about the person of the ruler, the state of the land and population, the will and political inclination of the population. The indications of discretion and secrecy made the legation trip similar to espionage.

The further instructions are also detailed. First of all, remembering the Doge's long-suffering, the ambassadors were to raise complaints about the breaches of treaty in recent years. They should also remember the last embassy that made demands for reparations and that only part of the demands had been fulfilled. These were just diplomatic phrases, because only recently Azzo had imposed duties on important wheat deliveries contrary to the contract, which had plunged Venice into considerable supply problems. Should Azzo refuse the demands or play for time, the ambassadors should break off their trip and return. If, however , he should partially adapt his capitularies to their demands, they should inform the Doge and wait for new instructions. The ambassadors were only given freedom of action if they received reports of damage from the local vice-dominus or from Venetian subjects. All in all, they were asked to act cum bona fide and always to the advantage and honor of the republic, while observing the duties of the envoy.

The content of the reports only occasionally referred to questions concerning people, their attitudes and their actions and ways of thinking, rarely to abstract questions such as the economic structure of the country.

Around 1400 a distinction was made between “relationes” and “ambaxiatas”, i.e. detailed reports including those from the rumor mill, and the more factual reports, mostly acquired through diplomatic channels. By the end of the 15th century at the latest, a distinction was made between reporting ( referir ) and creating a report ( relation ).

Only towards the end of the 15th century are regular relazioni handed down, which have been archived much more densely from around 1530, albeit still not completely.

Treaty negotiations between Venice and Byzantium (1283 to 1286)

Emperor Andronikos II holds a monastery in his hand that was privileged by him, fresco in Ioannis Prodromos monastery near Serres (Greece) .

From the Middle Ages, no closed progress reports on diplomatic processes have come down to us, but in individual cases an idea of ​​the process can be gained from the resolutions of the Great Council.

When the new Emperor Andronikos II put out feelers for peace after almost 24 years of more or less war-like conditions, the Grand Council met on September 16, 1283 in the Doge's Palace. First of all, the Council voted on whether negotiations should be started at all. 166 of those present voted in favor, 38 abstained and 40 voted against. Since the majority principle applied, it was decided two days later to send two nuncii to Constantinople, whose scope for the upcoming treaty negotiations was determined five days later. The term of the contract to be negotiated should not exceed seven to ten years. On September 25, an agreement was reached on the demand for the surrender of the two recently captured ships and the prisoners as well as the cargo. The Doge, his councilors, the heads of the Quarantia , the Supreme Court, wanted to negotiate other damage separately, together with a ten-person commission that had yet to be established. Their secret resolutions should have the same validity as those of the Grand Council. Two months were set as the maximum duration of the negotiations, plus the departure date of the negotiators.

Matapan , Venetian silver coin from 1280

On September 26th, 400 libra were fixed for each nuncius to cover travel expenses, which was not an unusual rate for an embassy to a monarch. Each envoy received six assistants or famuli ; there was also a notary and two tubatores or horn players . This corresponded exactly to the expenditure of a legation trip to Tunisia in the same time. It remains unclear whether this configuration was simply customary or whether the emperor, who claimed a higher position than all other monarchs, was wanted to snub.

To equip the embassy, ​​the two were allowed to take out a loan that was raised from the contributions of wealthy families (see Economic History of the Republic of Venice # Bonds ). On October 14th, the Chancellor was given the task of arranging everything necessary. This meant that he took oaths from all concerned, especially the ambassadors, concerning the return of the prisoners, the compensation and the loans to be taken out.

The amount of compensation was set at 100,000 libra . However, the emperor was unable to raise this enormous sum - he even had the Venetians write this, as the Grand Council noted - and asked for a new embassy. The Grand Council agreed, but decided by 272 to 8 votes to continue the trade embargo.

On June 20, 1284 it was expressly decided to send not just one, but two - perhaps they did not want to snub Andronikos too much - to send ambassadors on a galley, but they were only allowed to stay for a month to negotiate, another month until the delivery of Prisoners and money. The two Byzantine ambassadors present in Venice were allowed to travel with them and even received a large amount of money on their departure. The envoys were instructed to demand the inclusion of a feudal lord of Euboea in the contract, but the conclusion of the contract should not fail - a first indication of the weighting of conditions. It was finally decided to send three envoys. There were also men whose ships had been damaged.

The legation trip itself was intended to serve Venetian politics beyond the negotiation objectives by stipulating that the reparations sums had to be invested in grain. Venice was facing a war of blockades in northern Italy, and so attempts were made to prevent the worst. But this embassy also returned unsuccessfully.

A
hyperperon probably coined between 1143 and 1152

On February 18, 1285, the emperor was informed that the dominant , i.e. the doge, his councilors and the three heads of the Supreme Court, would negotiate for themselves. This responded to the emperor's proposal to pay 24,000 hyperpera . But the dominant was in a great hurry, because the ambassadors were supposed to leave within eight days. But rumors circulated that the emperor could be overthrown. If one of the ambassadors, their people, or accompanying injured parties should leave the group, he should not receive any remuneration for the duration of the absence. To be on the safe side, it was decided to negotiate with his successor if Andronikos was actually overthrown on arrival. On July 26, 1285, the Great Council recognized the treaty.

One day later the Doge solemnly swore the contract in person in the Grand Council. The blockade against Byzantium was ended the following day. At the end of November 1286, after more than three years, however, it was only so far that the Grand Council could request the dominant to appoint three boni homines who were to collect the money. The three experienced and reliable men could be equipped by means of a high five percent bond. You should have the coins remelted into gold ducats. These gold coins had only been introduced a year earlier - until then silver was the only coin metal in Venice - and Venice was able to quickly meet its gold needs.

The relazioni of the 16th century

Relazioni a stampa di ambasciatori veneti , 1939

The "classic" Relazioni of the 16th century regularly contained observations on domestic, social and financial conditions and were initially delivered orally to the Senate and Collegio in a relatively fixed sequence. After that, they should be made in writing within 15 days. The latter provision was already in place in 1268.

In the 16th century it was customary to first report on the events of the legation trip. Then the envoy went on to talk about the ruler and his family, the ruler's attitude towards Venice and other states, his regular and irregular income and expenses in times of war and peacetime, council bodies and influential people, the nobility and his relationship with the ruler to report. A simple, clear structure that apparently went back a long way.

Reception of a French envoy in Venice, Canaletto, 1740

swell

  • Annales Ianuenses. Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de 'suoi continuatori , eds. LT Belgrano and C. Imperiale; also as Annales Ianuenses, ed. K. Pertz, in: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores 18, 1–356
  • Martino da Canale : Les Extoires de Venise. Cronaca veneziana in lingua francese dalle origini al 1275 , Ed. A. Limentani, Florence 1972
  • Chronicon Estense , Rerum Italicarum Scriptores 15.3, Città di Castello 1908
  • Andreae Danduli Ducis Venetiarum Chronica per extensum descripta aa. 46–1280 , Ed. Ester Pastorello , Bologna 1938
  • Iacobi de Varagine Chronica Civitatis Ianuensis
  • Pseudo-Kodinos, Traité des affaires , Ed. Jean Verpeaux, Paris 1966
  • Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , 3 volumes, Bologna 1931–1950
  • Luigi Firpo (ed.), Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al Senato, tratte dalle migliori edizioni disponibili e ordinate cronologicamente , Torino, Bottega d'Erasmo, 1965–1984: vol. I, Inghilterra, Torino 1965; vol. II, Germania (1506-1554), Torino 1970; vol. III, Germania (1557-1654), Torino 1968; vol. IV, Germania, (1658-1793), Torino 1968; vol. V, Francia (1492-1600), Torino 1978; vol. VI, Francia (1600-1656), Torino 1975; vol. VII, Francia (1659-1792), Torino 1975; vol. VIII, Spagna (1497-1598), Torino 1981; vol. IX, Spagna (1602-1631), Torino 1978; vol. X, Spagna (1635-1738), Torino 1979; vol. XI, Savoia (1496-1797), Torino 1983; vol. XIII, Costantinopoli (1590-1793), Torino 1984; vol. XIV, Costantinopoli: relazioni inedite: 1512–1789, a cura di Maria Pia Pedani-Fabris, Padova 1996

literature

  • Willy Andreas , Statesmanship and diplomacy of the Venetians as reflected in their envoy reports , Leipzig 1943
  • Francesco Carabellese: Carlo I d'Angiò nei rapporti politici e commerciali con Venezia e l'Oriente , Bari 1911
  • Alexander Koller : Le diplomazie veneziane e pontificia presso la corte imperiale nella seconda metà del Cinquecento , Venice 1998
  • Nicola Nicolini: Sui rapporti diplomatici veneto-napoletani durante i regni di Carlo I e Carlo II d'Angiò , in: Archivio storico per le province napoletane ns 21 (1935) 229–286
  • Donald E. Queller : Early Venetian Legislation on Ambassadors , Droz, Geneva 1966 (Travaux d'humanisme et renaissance, LXXXVIII)
  • Donald E. Queller: The development of ambassadorial relazioni , in: John R. Hale (Ed.): Renaissance Venice , London 1973, pp. 174-196
  • Donald E. Queller: The Civic Irresponsibility of the Venetian Nobility , in: David Herlihy et al. (Ed.): Economy, Society and Government in Medieval Italy , Kent, Ohio 1969
  • Donald E. Queller: Representative Institutions and Law , in: Donald E. Queller (ed.): Medieval Diplomacy and the Fourth Crusade , London 1980
  • Giovanni Soranzo: La guerra fra Venezia e la S. Sede per il dominio di Ferrara (1308–1313) , Città di Castello 1905

Web links

See also

Remarks

  1. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, n. 108, 39f., August 3, 1283.
  2. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, April 12, 1284, January 17, 1285, December 17, 1286.
  3. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. I, n.74, p. 67
  4. ^ An embassy went to Padua (August 5, 1288), "in Lombardiam" (to Lombardy , September 21, 1288), to Piacenza (March 13, 1295), to Ortona (October 2, 1285, December 17, 1286) , to Sicily (May 6, 1285, March 22, 1287, January 25, 1289, March 30, 1297), to the Kingdom of Raszien (July 29, 1287, June 19, 1296), to Durazzo (June 19, 1296), after Tragurium (March 22, 1295), to Tunis (March 3, 1293).
  5. Nicolini 255.
  6. There is a corresponding decision of the Grand Council on diplomatic connections to Khan Nogai , who was dubbed “imperator” in Venice: Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, April 10th and 17th 1292.
  7. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. II, p. 128f.
  8. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, June 25, 1283.
  9. A three-headed embassy has come down to us for 1277 (Carabellese: Carlo I d'Angiò nei rapporti poltici e commerciali con Venezia e l'Oriente, Bari 1911, 117f.) However, in 1283 there were several embassies from Naples in Venice (Roberto Cessi (ed.) : Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, March 6, May 12 and 18, November 25 and 28 and December 2, 1283)
  10. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, May 10, 1292.
  11. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. I, March 19, 1224, p. 56.
  12. 1286 one listed legitimate reasons not to have to go on an embassy trip (Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , vol. III, n. 27, 142f., April 27, 1286) and this vol. III, September 5, 1293. General on the subject: Queller: Civil Irresponsibility .
  13. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, June 10 and 12, 1283.
  14. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, February 20, 1285.
  15. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, January 25, 1289, similar to December 6, 1289.
  16. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, July 26, 1291.
  17. ↑ For example, as Rugiero Badoer should be appointed as envoy and naval captain at the same time (Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , vol. III, n.81, 387, September 29, 1295).
  18. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, n. 13, 98, March 13, 1283, again three envoys on March 30, 1288.
  19. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, April 17, 1298
  20. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, March 30, 1297.
  21. Queller: Early Venetian Legislation on Ambassadors , Doc. 32.
  22. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. II, November 24, 1254, pp. 294f.
  23. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. II, February 2, 1265, 383.
  24. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. II, September 20, 1268, p. 101.
  25. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. II, April 10, 1272, pp. 102f.
  26. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. II, August 22, 1280, pp. 40f. and Queller: Early Legislature , Doc. n.4, August 26, 1293.
  27. Source: Early Legislation , Doc. n.8, March 5, 1296.
  28. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, September 22 and 23, 1292.
  29. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, May 30, 1296.
  30. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, n. 108f., 39f., August 3, 1283.
  31. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, n. 198, 94, January 29, 1285.
  32. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, n. 127f., 43, August 17, 1283.
  33. ^ Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, June 25, 1283.
  34. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, February 18, 1294.
  35. Roberto Cessi (ed.): Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, July 29, 1287, also on June 19, 1296.
  36. Source: Early Legislation , Doc. n.23.
  37. Caffaro IV, 31.
  38. Caffaro IV, p. 4f.
  39. ^ Chronicon Estense .
  40. Pseudo-Kodinos 137-139.
  41. Pseudo-Kodinos 179
  42. Pseudo-Kodinos 176-178.
  43. Hans-Jürgen Hübner: The beginnings of the relazioni and the reporting by correspondence in the 13th century , masch. Script, Münster 1992.
  44. That these laws were not always observed is evident from the fact that this provision had to be repeated in 1401.
  45. This and the following are based on Cessi: Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio , Vol. III, n.157, p. 49, September 16, 1283, n.160, September 18, n.163, September 23, n.166 –168, September 25, n. 170f., September 26, n. 184, October 14, n. 56, June 18, 1284, n. 59–61, June 20, 1284, n. 65, 27. June, n.74 and n.76, July 8, n.77, July 9, n.81, July 10, n.85, July 13, n.89, July 15, n.214, February 15, 1285, n.215, February 17, n.218, February 18, n.9, March 10, n.15-17 and n.19, March 12, n.21, March 13 , n. 25, March 14, n. 26-28, March 17, n. 30, March 20, n. 33, March 22, n. 120, July 26, n. 122, July 28 , n.123f., June 29, n.145, November 18, 1286, n.147, December 5, n.9, March 13, 1287, n.17, March 27, n.23, 15. April, n.25, April 17th.