Yom Kippur War
| date | October 6, 1973 to October 26, 1973 |
|---|---|
| place | Golan Heights , Sinai Peninsula |
| output | UN Security Council Resolution 338 |
| consequences | Oil crisis |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
|
|
|
| Commander | |
|
Moshe Dajan |
Saad El Shazly |
| Troop strength | |
 Israel : 300,000 soldiers in 1700 tanks 488 aircraft United States : 2.2 billion US dollars  |
.svg){kind=small} Egypt : 650,000 soldiers 2600 tanks 680 aircraft
|
| losses | |
|
2,656 dead |
7,000–8,000 *** or 8,528 * –15,000 ** dead |
;_Flag_of_Syria_(1963%E2%80%931972).svg){kind=small}
.svg){kind=small}
** Israeli estimate
*** Eastern estimate
The Yom Kippur War ( Hebrew מלחמת יום הכיפורים Milchemet Yom HaKippurim orמלחמת יום כיפור Milchemet Yom Kippur ) was a war from October 6 to 25, 1973, waged by Egypt , Syria and other Arab states against Israel . After the Palestine War (1948/49), the Suez Crisis (1956) and the Six Day War of 1967, it was the fourth Arab-Israeli war in the context of the Middle East conflict .
On the Arab side, the war becomes Ramadan War or October War ( Arabic حرب أكتوبر, DMG Ḥarb Uktūbar orحرب تشرين / Ḥarb Tišrīn ) because it took place during the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan , which fell in October that year. It was also called the October War in the GDR, although the GDR specialist literature often used the neutral term fourth Arab-Israeli war .
overview
The war began with a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on October 6, 1973, the highest Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur , on the Sinai and the Golan Heights , which had been conquered by Israel six years earlier in the course of the Six Day War . During the first two days the armed forces of Egypt and Syria advanced, but after that the war turned in favor of the Israelis, who had to mobilize their troops first. After the second week of the war, the Syrians had been completely pushed out of the Golan Heights. In Sinai, the Israel Defense Forces broke through between two Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal (the old armistice line) and cut off an entire Egyptian army before the UN armistice came into force on October 24, 1973.
The war had far-reaching consequences for many states. In Israel, the government was heavily criticized for underestimating Egypt and Syria and thus making the enemy's initial success possible. The Arab world, deeply humiliated by the complete defeat of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance in the Six Day War, benefited psychologically from the initial successes of the war; their troops saw their honor at least partially restored. This psychological confirmation was the prerequisite for the peace negotiations that were to follow. It also made economic liberalizations such as the Egyptian Infitah policy possible. The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty that followed five and a half years after the war normalized relations between Egypt and Israel - for the first time an Arab state recognized Israel.
background
This war was part of the Middle East conflict , which had led to several clashes and wars. During the Six Day War in 1967 the Israelis conquered Sinai as far as the Suez Canal, which became the armistice line. Israel had also conquered about half of the Golan Heights from Syria. In the years after the Six Day War, Israel built military fortifications in both Sinai and the Golan Heights: In 1971, Israel spent $ 500 million on the Suez Canal fortifications - a chain of fortifications with huge earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line became known (named after the Israeli general Chaim Bar-Lev ). The overwhelming victory in the Six Day War and the at least not lost War of Attrition led the Israeli government to have almost unlimited confidence in its own possibilities.
Egypt and Syria sought to regain the territories lost in 1967. However, they had already rejected negotiations on this in the same year with the " Three Nos of Khartoum ". In September 1970 the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser died . His successor was Anwar as-Sadat , who decided to fight Israel in order to get the territories back. After the failure of the Jarring mission, Sadat hoped to be able to change the status quo and thus achieve negotiations even with a minimal defeat for Israel . The Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad , however, had other motives and was only interested in the military reclamation of the Golan Heights. Since the Six Day War, Assad had made tremendous efforts to make Syria a dominant military power in the Arab world. Assad was convinced that he could defeat the Israeli forces together with Egypt and thus secure the Syrian role in the region. Assad, on the assumption that the Golan had already been conquered, at best considered negotiating whether the Israelis would give up the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Sadat also had important domestic political reasons for war. The Egyptian economy was destroyed, but Sadat was aware of the immense resistance in parts of Egyptian society to the necessary reforms. After a military victory, he hoped to gain the popularity needed to carry out necessary reforms. Many Egyptian students were extremely dissatisfied with Sadat's reluctance in the first three years of his term in office and called in mass protests to regain Sinai. The American historian Abraham Rabinovich describes the first three years of Sadat's reign as generally marked by a strong demoralization of the Egyptian population. In the depressed economic situation and the nationwide hopelessness, war seemed the only way out. In his biography of Sadat, Raphael Israeli writes that Sadat saw the root of the problem in the great shame of the Six Day War and said that before any reform could be carried out, the shame must first be overcome.
The other Arab states took a more reluctant position with regard to a renewed war against Israel. The Jordanian King Hussein feared another great loss of Jordanian territory after the loss of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as a result of the Six Day War. Sadat supported the PLO's claim to power in these areas and promised Yasser Arafat control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Hussein still saw the West Bank as part of Jordan and sought unification with the lost territories to form the United Arab Kingdom , which the PLO and most of the Arab states rejected. Jigal Allon , however, endorsed the proposal and saw it as a solution to the conflict. In addition, the events of Black September , a near-civil war between the PLO and the Jordanian government, had led to Hussein's strong rejection of the Syrian leadership, which had intervened militarily on the PLO's side.
Iraq and Syria also had strained relations, but Iraq had promised Syria and Egypt its brotherhood in arms in the event of war. From Lebanon was not expected that he participated in the Arab war effort since it due to internal instability and a small army was not able to wage war.
Before the war, Sadat tried to gain support for the war through diplomatic channels. Throughout 1973, Sadat claimed more than a hundred states supported him. The supporter states included most of the Arab League , the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization for African Unity .
Preceded
The Soviet Union was blamed for the Egyptian failure in the war of attrition , so Nasser was only able to build up his air defense after receiving a commitment from the Soviet Union. Nasser threatened to join the Americans in the future.
In contrast to Egypt, the Soviet Union had a strong interest in cooling the conflict in order to avoid dangerous friction with the United States. Therefore, after a meeting in Oslo, the superpowers decided to maintain the status quo - a decision that was unacceptable to the Egyptian leadership. After Egyptian attack plans were leaked, the Soviets were forced out of Egypt in July 1972; almost all 20,000 Soviet military advisors had to leave the country. Egypt began a gradual rapprochement with the United States.
Anwar Sadat publicly stated in 1972 that Egypt had committed itself to the war against Israel and was ready to “sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers”. From the end of the same year, the country began a concentrated effort to build up its troops. The Soviet Union supplied MiG-21 , 2K12 Kub , RPG-7 and especially the anti-tank guided missiles 9K11 Maljutka . Military tactics were also improved: political generals responsible for the defeat in the Six Day War were replaced by other officers.
The Soviet Union saw Sadat's chances of success as slim. She warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez Canal would result in heavy losses. They pursued a policy of détente and therefore had no interest in destabilizing the Middle East. After meeting Richard Nixon in June 1973, Leonid Brezhnev called on Israel to withdraw to the borders it had before the Six Day War, otherwise the Soviet Union could not prevent an escalation. This was interpreted as an indication of the loss of Soviet influence over Sadat.
In an April 9, 1973 interview published in Newsweek , Sadat again threatened war. During 1973 the Egyptian army carried out various exercises, each time putting Israel on the highest alert, but at the same time convincing it that it could repel any attack with the Israeli air force.
On September 12, 1973, a summit between Sadat, Assad and the Jordanian King Hussein took place in Cairo. At this meeting, Sadat and Assad set October 6, 1973 as the date for the attack. Hussein was not informed, but felt that “something is in the air”. He then flew to Tel-Aviv on September 25, 1973 to warn the Israeli government that he did not want to be drawn into another war. According to Aviezer Yaari , the head of Aman's Syria / Lebanon / Iraq office , he announced that the Syrian army was ready for war. When Meir asked, he said that Syria would not attack without Egypt. According to the head of the Aman, Major General Eli Zeira , Golda Meir did not attach great importance to the warning of Hussein and did not even ask about the specific date of the planned attack.
Almost exactly a year before the war, on October 24, 1972, Sadat said at a meeting of the highest military council that he wanted to go to war even in the absence of Soviet support. The plans for this were made known to even the highest levels of command no earlier than a week before the war began. The Ministry for State Security of the GDR informed Erich Honecker on October 5, 1973 about the beginning of the war. The Soviet Union apparently knew about the attack plans even earlier, because the information letter mentioned the following: "The Soviet military specialists were instructed by their organs to cease their activities immediately and to leave with their families".
Lower ranks did not know anything a few hours before the attack. The concerted plan of attack was eventually called Operation Badr ( Arabic for full moon).
Outbreak and course of war
On October 6, 1973, the Jewish festival of reconciliation, Yom Kippur , Syria and Egypt began to attack the Syrian and Egyptian territories occupied by Israel (4th Israeli-Arab War, October War). According to the Jewish calendar it was the 10th Tishri 5734.
The Egyptian artillery opened fire on the Suez Front from 1650 guns in preparation for a canal crossing. Over 50 Mi-8 helicopters brought Egyptian soldiers to the east bank at the south end of the Suez Canal, while engineer units at Gabasat broke through the Israelis' defenses with flamethrowers and explosive charges. The soldiers crossed the Suez Canal in five places: near al-Qantara, al-Firdan, Ismailia, near the bitter lakes and north of Suez. PT-76 amphibious tanks crossed the channel, destroyed Israeli bunker positions and formed bridgeheads on the east bank. This was followed by the rapid construction of pontoon bridges, so that the Egyptians were able to move T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks to the east bank. The Egyptian Air Force attacked al-Mulaiz Bir Thanada and as-Sur airports with 220 aircraft. Further air strikes were directed against Hawk bases, artillery positions in the hinterland, radar stations and communication centers. The attack on the Israeli bases in Bir Gifgafa and Tasa was carried out with FROG missiles. This was followed by an attack by the Egyptian air force on Umm Kuschaiba and on communication centers between al-Qantara and Abu Aghaila. Targets further to the east were attacked with KSR-2 missiles fired by Tupolev Tu-16s . The Israeli air force with its Mirage and Phantom fighter aircraft was successfully fought by the Egyptians using the S-75 , 2K12 Kub and S-125 Neva anti-aircraft missile systems , which recorded around 85 kills, including 50 phantoms, by the 5th day of the war.
At the same time, the Syrian air force attacked with around 30 machines in the area of Mount Hermon . On October 6, helicopters carried a command unit of the Syrian 82nd Paratrooper Regiment to the 2800 m high snow-covered mountain on which there was a listening post of the Israeli military secret service Aman with 41 military technicians, who was protected by only 13 infantrymen. The storm succeeded, with 18 Israelis falling and 31 wounded. An attempt to recapture Israel on October 8th failed with the loss of 25 dead and 51 wounded. It was not until October 22nd that the Golani Brigade managed to retake, with 55 soldiers of the brigade falling and 79 injured.
The attack surprised the unprepared Israelis and initially brought the attackers initial military success. On the Israeli side, contrary to what the Arab strategists had expected, the surprise attack on the draft did not have a negative effect. On the contrary, the mobilization of the reservists was extremely rapid, despite the initial surprise and some confusion in the mobilization depots . During the highest Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur, public life was almost completely idle, which is why no road traffic obstructed military transports and the reservists could be quickly located in their homes and synagogues. Less than 24 hours after the fighting began, the first parts of two reserve divisions under Avraham Adan and Ariel Sharon reached Baluza and Tasa, each 250 kilometers from their home bases.
The Syrians first penetrated the Golan Heights with over 1,400 tanks , the Egyptians broke through the Israeli defensive positions and crossed the Suez Canal. With the exception of a small area around Port Said on the Mediterranean coast, the Egyptians succeeded in taking the Bar Lev Line . Two Egyptian armies occupied a strip parallel to the Suez Canal.
It took several days for the Israeli forces to counterattacks, initially concentrating on the Syrian front. In the north, the counter-offensive led to a defeat for the Syrian army, which was defeated in a few days - by October 10 - and had to leave behind 870 tanks as well as thousands of vehicles and artillery. An Iraqi tank unit that was supposed to support Assad's forces also suffered a heavy defeat. The Syrians were pushed back to 20 miles from Damascus , and the Syrian capital was massively bombed, causing many civilian casualties. However, the Israeli troops failed to break through the Syrian front.
Meanwhile, on the Sinai Peninsula , Israeli troops also pushed back the Egyptians and crossed the Suez Canal on October 16. South of the bitter lakes , the Israelis, led by General Ariel Sharon , succeeded in encircling the Egyptian 3rd Army that remained on the east bank. The Israeli army was now across the Suez Canal, 120 km from Cairo.
The use of Israeli nuclear weapons was considered during the initial phase of the war: after being informed by Moshe Dayan on the night of October 8th to 9th that a military defeat against Syria and Egypt was imminent, Golda Meir , 13 To prepare nuclear bombs with an explosive force of 20 kilotons of TNT each for the Jericho missiles ( Cairo and Damascus within range) on the Sdot Micha missile base and the F-4 on the Tel Nof airbase . US President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger learned of this measure on the morning of October 9th and, in order to avoid a nuclear strike, ordered Operation Nickel Grass , a massive support with military material for Israel.
Result
On October 22, the calling of the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 338 to US pressure on all parties to cease fire. When the armistice came into force on October 22 (northern front) and October 24 (southern front), the Syrians were defeated; the trapped and unsupervised Egyptian 3rd Army was facing annihilation. On October 25, 1973, the United States feared that the Soviet Union could send troops to the southern front and thus undermine the policy of détente. In military circles it was feared that the Soviet Union would order up to four airborne divisions to Egypt with An-12 transport aircraft. So far, the Soviet transport aircraft have only flown weapons, including T-62 tanks , as well as other SA-6 Gainful anti-aircraft missile systems and ammunition, to Egypt. US Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and the National Security Council ordered alert level 3 ( Defcon 3) on October 25, and thus the alert for the readiness of the nuclear forces. US troops in the Federal Republic of Germany were also put on alert and occupied their staging areas on the border with the GDR and ČSSR . US President Richard Nixon saw the situation as "the worst crisis since Cuba ". After talking to the Soviet side and realizing that no Soviet troops had landed in Egypt, the alert in the United States was withdrawn the following day.
After the start of the armistice, negotiations on the disengagement of troops between the warring parties began in a tent at milestone 101 on the road between Cairo and Suez. These negotiations dragged on for months.
The losses were high on both sides. There were over 8,500 deaths on the Arab side. More than 2,600 Israeli soldiers fell, 7,500 were wounded and 300 were captured. The Israeli Air Force suffered heavy losses from the use of anti-aircraft missiles made by the Soviet Union.
The war resulted in a traumatization of the Israeli public, which had hardly noticed the foreign policy threat because the Israeli army had been considered invincible until then. The allegations due to the massive losses forced the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to resign in April 1974.
For Anwar as-Sadat, however, the war lost militarily represented a political success. With the war he was able to show Israel that the Arab world was an enemy that should not be underestimated militarily. In 1977, he met with Menachem Begin together and in 1979 both signed in Washington the peace agreement of Camp David .
Through the demonstration of strength, the Arab governments regained more self-confidence, which initially contained Islamism .
The Yom Kippur War, together with production cuts in the Arab oil-producing countries, triggered the 1973 oil crisis. The OAPEC imposed a total oil embargo on the United States when the US Congress decided to officially support Israel in this war with war material an airlift of the US armed forces was flown to Israel. The embargo was later extended to the Netherlands because its government was the most supportive of US policy.
reception
In Syria , the state media and state-controlled historiography portrayed the war as a victory and successful revenge for the Six Day War . The dictator Hafiz al-Assad was assigned a decisive leadership role and he was portrayed as a war hero. Many places in Egypt today are called Sitta Oktubr (October 6th). On the access road to Cairo airport there is a panorama that describes the course of the war that was perceived as victorious in Egypt.
See also
- Bloodbath on the 40th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War
- Chronology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- Aleppo secret operation
literature
- Zeev Elron: When Israel held its breath: Sinai, October 6-24, 1973 . In: Stig Förster, Markus Pöhlmann, Dierk Walter (ed.): Battles of world history. From Salamis to Sinai. CH Beck, Munich 2001, ISBN 3-406-48097-7 , pp. 374-393.
- Gerhard Konzelmann : The battle for Israel. The war of the holy days. Kurt Desch publishing house, Munich 1974. ISBN 3-420-04700-2 .
- Mayer, Werner; Schmidt-Polex, Carl: Black October. 17 days of war for Israel. Schulz, Kempfenhausen 1973. ISBN 3-7962-0033-8 .
- Abraham Rabinovich: Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East , New York, NY: Schocken Books 2017, ISBN 978-0-8052-1124-5 .
Documentation and film
- 1973. Yom Kippur. A War in October, two-part documentary, Arte France, 2012
- The Yom Kippur War is part of the plot of the 2002 film The Attack .
Web links
- Literature on the Yom Kippur War in the catalog of the German National Library
- haGalil.com: The Yom Kippur War
- Tagesschau.de: The Yom Kippur War (tagesschau.de archive)
- Jewish virtual library: Yom Kippur War (English)
- Der Spiegel October 15, 1973: "Israel's myth is badly shaken"
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i Martin Gilbert (Ed.): The Arab-Israeli conflict. Its history in maps 3rd edition. Weidenfeld & Nicolson , London 1979, ISBN 978-0-297-77592-8 , pp. 91-92.
- ↑ a b c Martin Robbe : Scheidewege in Nahost , pages 289, 291 and 295. Military publishing house of the GDR, Berlin 1983.
- ^ Louis Perez : Cuba - Between Reform and Revolution , Oxford University Press 1995, ISBN 978-0-19-509482-4 , pp. 377-379.
- ↑ Approval from Israel for the Hussein Plan ( Memento from July 27, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ a b film report “1973. Yom Kippur. A War in October ”by Vincent de Cointet. Aired on arte on October 15, 2013.
- ↑ Wolfgang G. Schwanitz : Honecker was informed about the attack on Israel in advance, in Berliner Zeitung , October 6, 1997, web version 4-2009 (PDF; 590 kB)
- ^ Jericho 1. In: Missile Threat. June 15, 2018, accessed July 6, 2019 .
- ↑ Erich Follath: The Phantom of Dimona . In: Der Spiegel . No. 4 , 2004, p. 110-114 ( Online - Jan. 26, 2004 ).
- ^ Israel 'ready to drop 13 atom bombs'. In: The Age , April 6, 1976 ( online )
- ↑ Violent Week: The Politics of Death. In: Time , April 12, 1976 ( online )
- ↑ The Last Nuclear Moment. In: New York Times , October 6, 2003 ( online )
- ^ A b Warner D. Farr: The Third Temple's Holy of Holies: Israel's Nuclear Weapons. Counterproliferation Paper No. 2, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air War College, September 1999 ( online ).
- ↑ October 9, 1973 conversation (6: 10–6: 35 pm) between Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz, Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and Peter Rodman. Transcript. George Washington University National Security Archive ( online ; PDF; 173 kB).
- ^ Henry A. Kissinger: Memoirs 1973-1974, Volume 2, Munich 1982, ISBN 3-570-00710-3 , pp. 1018-1033.
- ^ Mordechai Kedar: Asad in Search of Legitmacy - Message and Rhetoric in the Syrian Press under Hafiz and Bashar , Portland, 2005, pp. 145-148.