Exercise Strikeback

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Operation Strikeback was a major naval exercise of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that took place over a ten-day period in September 1957.

As part of a series of exercises to simulate an all-out Soviet attack on NATO, Operation Strikeback was tasked with two objectives. Its initial objective was the deployment of NATO's naval forces (designated the "Blue Fleet") against other NATO forces attempting to simulate an "enemy" navy that featured a large number of submarines (designated the "Orange Fleet"). Its other objective was to have the Blue Fleet execute carrier-based air strikes against "enemy" formations and emplacements along NATO's northern flank in Norway.

Operation Strikeback involved over 200 warships, 650 aircraft, and 75,000 personnel from the United States Navy, the United Kingdom's Royal Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy, the French Navy, the Royal Netherlands Navy, and the Royal Norwegian Navy. As the largest peacetime naval operation up to that time, military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin of the New York Times characterized Operation Strikeback as "constituting the strongest striking fleet assembled since World War II."[1]

Background

Strategic doctrine issues

United States Army General and Supreme Allied Commander Europe Alfred Gruenther
United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles with President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956

Faced the overwhelming numerical superiority of Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact military forces, NATO embraced the concept of the nuclear umbrella to protect Western Europe from a Soviet ground invasion.[2] This strategy was articulated in January 1954 by U.S. Army General and then-Supreme Allied Commander Europe Alfred Gruenther:

We have... an air-ground shield which, although still not strong enough, would force an enemy to concentrate prior to attack. In doing so, the concentrating force would be extremely vulnerable to losses from atomic weapon attacks...We can now use atomic weapons against an aggressor, delivered not only by long-range aircraft, but also by the use of shorter range planes, and by 280 mm. artillery...This air-ground team constitutes a very effective shield, and it would fight very well in case of attack. We think that it is of such strength that the Soviets do not now have in occupied Europe sufficient air and ground forces to be certain of overwhelming this shield. Of course, the Soviets can move in additional forces to overcome that deficiency. But if they do, we should be able to get some warning of an impending attack. As a result of that warning, we ought to be able to increase our defensive strength considerably. In particular, we should be able to alert our air forces.[3]

This strategic concept reflected the American strategy of massive retaliation of the Eisenhower administration as set forth by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles:

We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power.

This is accepted practice so far as local communities are concerned. We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, would be aggressors are generally deterred. That is the modern way of getting maximum protection at a bearable cost.

What the Eisenhower administration seeks is a similar international security system. We want, for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him.[4]

Previous NATO exercises

HMS Vanguard during NATO's Operation Mainbrace in 1952.

Starting in 1952, NATO undertook a number of a major military exercises to improve NATO's integration and effectiveness, including:

  • Mainbrace — NATO's first naval exercise
  • Mariner — Naval exercise involving convoy protection, naval control of shipping, and striking fleet operations in north Atlantic
  • Italic Weld — Combined air-naval-ground exercise in northern Italy involving the United States, Italy, Turkey, and Greece
  • Grand Repulse — Military exercise in Germany involving the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR), the Netherlands Corps and Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE).
  • Monte Carlo — Simulated atomic air-ground exercise involving the Central Army Group (CENTAG)
  • Weldfast — A combined amphibious landing exercise in the Mediterranean Sea involving British, Greek, Italian, Turkish, and U.S. naval forces

Operation Strikeback and the other concurrent NATO exercises held during the fall of 1957 would be the most ambitious military undertaking for the alliance to date, involving more than 250,000 men, 300 ships, and 1,500 aircraft operating from Norway to Turkey.[5]

NATO military command structure

NATO military command and areas of responsibilities (1954)
File:NATO Allied Command Atlantic - July 1954.svg
SACLANT command structure (1954)
File:NATO Allied Command Europe - July 1954.svg
SACEUR command structure (1954)

With the establishment of NATO’s Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) on 30 January 1952, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) joined the previously-created Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as one of the alliance’s two principal military field commanders.[6] Also, a Channel Command was established on 21 February 1952 to:[7]

  • Control the English Channel and North Sea area and deny it to the enemy.
  • Protect the sea lanes of communication.
  • Support operations conducted by SACEUR and SACLANT.

The following key NATO military commands were involved in a series of alliance-wide exercises, including Operation Strikeback, during the Fall of 1957.

Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

Allied Channel Command (CHANCOM)

  • Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN) – Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, RN

Operational overview

The "GIUK Gap".

Scenario

As part of the response to a theoretical Soviet attack against NATO on all fronts, Operation Strikeback would test the capabilities of Allied naval forces (Blue Fleet) by tasking them to destroy the enemy navy (Orange Fleet) and its huge submarine fleet, protect transatlantic shipping, and undertake sustained carrier-based air strikes against the enemy positions.[8]

Operation Seaspray

Beginning on 3 September 1957, American and Canadian naval forces got underway to join British, French, Dutch, and Norwegian naval forces in eastern Atlantic and northern European waters under the overall command of Vice Admiral Robert B. Pirie, USN, the Commander of the U.S. Second Fleet, acting as NATO's Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic (COMSTRIKFLTLANT).

While en route, the U.S.-Canadian naval forces executed Operation Seaspray, a bilateral naval exercises to protect Blue Fleet’s vitally-important underway replenishment group (URG) from enemy submarine attacks.[9]

The nuclear submarine Nautilus and the conventional submarine Trigger completed operations in the Arctic and joined 34 other U.S. and allied submarines temporarily assigned to the Orange Fleet.[10]

Operation Fend Off and Operation Fishplay

Operation Strikeback began on 19 September 1957, involving over 200 warships, 650 aircraft, and 65,000 personnel. To provide a more realistic simulation of protecting transatlantic shipping, over 200 merchant marine vessels, including the ocean liners Queen Mary and SS Ile de France, also participated as duly-flagged target ships for this NATO exercise.[11] Blue Fleet hunter-killer (HUK) groups centered around the carriers Essex, Wasp, and Tarawa, as well as submarines and land-based anti-submarine patrol aircraft, executed Operation Fend Off/Operation Fishplay to identify, track, and contain the breakout of the enemy Orange Fleet’s submarine force along the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap.[12]

Carrier-based air strike operations

Operating above the Arctic Circle in the Norwegian Sea, the Blue Fleet, which included the new U.S. supercarrier Saratoga and USS Forrestal, launched carried-based air strikes against enemy positions in Norway. Time magazine provided the following contemporary coverage of Operation Strikeback:

With that alert...simulated hell broke loose in the North Atlantic.

From somewhere southeast of Greenland came the crackle of an urgent radio message: "Being fired on by Orange surface raider Inchcliffe Castle."[13] With that alert from a famed but fictitious merchant vessel, simulated hell broke loose in the North Atlantic. Out to punish the "aggressors," a six-nation Blue fleet totaling nearly 160 fighting ships began steaming toward Norway. In the Iceland-Faeroes gap, 36 Orange submarines, including the atom-powered Nautilus, lay in wait. The U.S. destroyer Charles R. Ware was "sunk"; a "torpedo" slowed down the carrier U.S.S. Intrepid, and H.M.S. Ark Royal had a hot time beating off the assaults of Britain-based Valiant jet bombers. But by early afternoon, Blue carrier planes got through to make dummy atom attacks on Norway's ports, bridges and airfields. Into the midst of this earnest make-believe strayed a Russian trawler - a real one. The Russian, being overtaken, had the right of way and held it, passing diagonally through the entire NATO fleet as the big ships refueled and moved beyond her.[14]

Operation Pipedown

Following the conclusion of Operation Strikeback, U.S. naval forces conducted Operation Pipedown, involving the protection of its underway replenishment group while en route back the United States.[15]

Naval forces for Operation Strikeback

The following is a partial listing of naval forces known to have participated in Operation Strikeback based on public sources (e.g., Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships and on-line ship histories), contemporary and archival news accounts, and historical reference works as set forth here.

Aircraft carriers and embarked air groups

Naval aircraft

United States Navy:


Royal Navy:

Aircraft losses

Surface warships

Battleships:

Cruisers:

Destroyers:


Destroyer Escorts:

Amphibious Vessels:

Royal Canadian Navy:

Submarine forces

Nuclear Submarines:



Support Vessels:

Diesel-Electric Submarines:


Naval auxiliaries

Underway Replenishment Group (URG):


Fleet Support:

Land-based ASW patrol aircraft

U.S. Navy Fleet Air Wing 3

The United States Navy deployed two patrol squadron from its Fleet Air Wing 3 (FAW-3) to participate in Operation Strikeback:

Both squadrons flew Lockheed P2V-5F Neptune ASW patrol aircraft.

RAF Coastal Command

The Royal Air Force assigned two squadrons from its Coastal Command to participate in Operation Strikeback:

Both squadrons flew Avro Shackleton patrol bombers.

U.S. Marine Corps units

The following units of the United States Marine Corps participated in Operation Strikeback and Operation Deep Water in September 1957 are listed below.[22]

Operation Strikeback

  • Regimental Landing Team 8 (RLT-8)
  • Battalion Landing Team 1/2 (1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment)

Operation Deep Water

Port visits

Following the conclusion of Operation Strikeback, NATO naval forces paid visits to the following European ports.[23]

Port-of-call Ships
Amsterdam, Netherlands Ingraham, Moale , Allen M. Sumner
Belfast, Northern Ireland Abbot, Courtney
Brest, France Wisconsin, Dealey, Hammerberg
Brussels Intrepid
Chatham, England Abbot
Cherbourg, France Ault, Dealey
Clyde River, Scotland Becuna, Croaker, Pompon
Copenhagen, Denmark Forrest Sherman, Charles H. Roan
Dublin, Ireland Odax
Dunkirk, France Peterson
Faslane, Scotland Nautilus
Isle of Portland Trigger, Nautilus, Becuna Croaker, Pompon, Iroquois, Ottawa, Nootka, Grand Canyon, Papago, Luiseno, Fulton, Angler, Jallao, Sea Owl, Trumpetfish, Bergall, Chopper, Barbero, Cavalla, Croaker, Grouper, Piper, Pompon, Ray, Redfin, Runner, Torsk, Hammerberg
Le Havre, France Peterson, Trigger, Nautilus, Becuna, Croaker, Pompon
Largs, Scotland Decatur
Milford Haven, Wales Hammerberg
Oslo, Norway Intrepid
Plymouth, England Forrest Sherman, Charles H. Roan, Beale, Courtney, Dealey, Nautilus
Rosyth, Scotland Decatur, Nautilus
Southampton, England Forrestal

Other NATO operations

File:NATO Operation Deep Water 1957.jpg
NATO Operation Deep Water (1957)

In addition to Operation Strikeback, which concentrated on its eastern Atlantic/northern European flank, NATO also conducted two other major military exercises in September 1957.

Operation Counter Punch

This air-ground exercise involved the national air-defense systems of Britain, France, Belgium and The Netherlands on the NATO’s central European front, with Général d'Armée Jean-Étienne Valluy, French Army, NATO's Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT), in overall command.[24]

Operation Deep Water

This exercise involved protecting NATO’s southern European flank, specifically the Dardanelles, from a Soviet invasion. Operation Deep Water culminated in the landing of 8,000 U.S. Marines at Saros Gulf near Gallipoli, Turkey, from a 38-ship amphibious task force, with air support provided by aircraft carriers from the U.S. Sixth Fleet. This operation was under the command of Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown, USN, NATO's Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKFORSOUTH). Operation Deepwater saw the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, become the first unit of the United States Marines Corps to participated in a helicopter-borne vertical envelopment operation during an overseas deployment.[25]

Legacy

File:USS Nautilus SSN-571 - 0857177.jpg
USS Nautilus
File:USS Seawolf (SSN-575) underway 02.jpg
USS Seawolf
File:USS Wisconsin Operation Strikeback 1957.jpg
USS Wisconson getting underway for Operation Strikeback - 3 September 1957
File:USN Photo - 1043094 - ASW Task Force ALFA 1959.jpg
U.S. Navy ASW Task Force Alfa (1959)

SACLANT

SACLANT Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN, described Operation Strikeback as being “remarkably successful” while also noting “[that] there is considerable scarcity of both naval and air forces in the eastern Atlantic.”[26] Wright’s Eastern Atlantic allied commander, Vice Admiral Sir John Eccles, RN, also noted:

I am not in a position to criticize political decisions, but I say this as a professional man with over 40 years' experience — I cannot carry out my task as given to me at the moment without more forces. In recent years the submarine has, without any doubt at all, gone a very long way ahead of the devices with which we are presently equipped to sound and destroy it.[27]

Particularly significant was the performance of nuclear-powered submarines with the U.S. Navy's first two such vessels, the USS Nautilus (SSN-571) and USS Seawolf (SSN-575), participating in Operation Strikeback. According to naval analyst-historian Norman Friedman, Nautilus "presented a greater threat than all 21 snorkle submarines combined" during Operation Strikeback, making 16 successful attacks against various naval formations while maintaining effective on-station tactical and high-speed pursuit capabilities. Nautilus cruised 3,384 nautical miles (6,267 km) with an average speed of 14.4 knots (26.7 kph).[28] In addition to the Nautilus, the Seawolf departed New London on 3 September for Operation Strikeback. Before she surfaces off Newport, Rhode Isand, on 25 September, Seawolf had remained submerged for 16 days, cruising a total of 6,331 miles (10,189 km).

Recognizing the need to meet this anti-submarines warfare (ASW) challenge, the following actions were taken:

  • Task Force Alfa was created by the U.S. Navy to develop improved ASW tactics and technology by integrating carrier-based ASW aircraft, land-based patrol aircraft, refitted destroyers, and hunter-killer submarines.[29]
  • NATO Undersea Research Centre was established by SACLANT on 2 May 1959 in La Spezia, Italy, to serve as a clearinghouse for NATO's anti-submarine efforts.[30]

Operation Strikeback was the final deployment for the battleships Iowa and Wisconsin until their re-activation in the 1980s as part of the 600-ship program of the Reagan Administration.

Finally, on the technical level, Operation Strikeback saw the first use of single sideband (SSB) voice communications for tactical operations by the United States Navy,[31] and the HMS Bulwark was the first Royal Navy carrier to use a magnetic loop communication system.[32]

SACEUR

SACEUR General Lauris Norstad, USAF, noting the numerical superiority of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces over NATO ground forces, called for "about 30 divisions” to augment NATO’s central European front.[33]

Also, Operation Counter Punch revealed deficiency regarding NATO's air defense systems as well as air force responsiveness to theoretical Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground advances.[34]

FALLEX

To improve alliance military readiness and integration, NATO continued to hold annual alliance-wide military exercises each autumn (FALLEX) that was jointly planned and executed by SACEUR and SACLANT forces.[35]

600-ship Navy

USS America in Norwegian waters during NATO Exercise Ocean Safari '85
Launch of F-14 Tomcat during NATO Exercise Ocean Safari '85
USS Nimitz off Norway during NATO Exercise Northern Wedding '86

The carrier-based air strike operation in the Norwegian Sea during Operation Stikeback would serve as a template for the 600-ship Navy maritime strategy championed by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, during the Reagan Adinistration, which was summarized in a 1987 article by retired General Bernard E. Trainor for the New York Times:

According to this strategy, should war ever break out with the Soviet Union, the Navy plans to send submarines and aircraft carrier battle groups directly north into the north Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, home waters of the Soviet Navy above the Arctic Circle.

At the same time, a United States Marine contingent would be rushed to northern Norway to keep the Russians from seizing airfields there that would be crucial for supporting the Navy.

A primary goal of this offensive would be to destroy Soviet nuclear missile submarines situated in the area and to prevent other Soviet submarines from pouring into the Atlantic to sink ships taking critical supplies and reinforcements to Western Europe.

Another major goal would be to threaten the Soviet homeland on its northern flank and thus weaken an anticipated Warsaw Pact attack against NATO defenses along the border between West and East Germany.[36]

In a 2008 article, General Trainor noted the success of this maritime strategy that helped to end the Cold War:

By going on the immediate offensive in the high north and putting the Soviets on the defensive in their home waters, the Maritime Strategy not only served to defend Scandinavia, but also served to mitigate the SLOC problem. The likelihood of timely reinforcement of NATO from the United States was now more than a pious hope.

With the emergence of an offensive strategy in the 1980s, a change in mindset was energized by concurrent dramatic advances in American technology, especially in C4ISR and weapon systems, that were rapidly offsetting Soviet numerical and material superiority in Europe.

No lesser light than the USSR Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov warned that American superiority was shifting the "correlation of forces" in NATO's favor. He called the phenomenon a "military technological revolution."

By the end of the decade the military threat from the Soviet Union was consigned to the dust bin of history and with it, the Cold War.[37]

The 1984 Maritime Strategy that provided the strategic rationale for the 600-ship Navy program would be superseded in 2007 by A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

See also

References

Notes

  1. ^ Hanson W. Baldwin, "100 Fighting Ships in Vast Exercise" New York Times, 22 September 1957 (Sunday), page 3
  2. ^ NATO the first 15 years, Chapter 3, Chapter 5, Chapter 7, Chapter 9 & Annex - Chapter IX-B, accessdate=2008-09-04
  3. ^ "Chapter 9". NATO the first 15 years. 2008-09-04. Retrieved 2008-09-03.
  4. ^ ""The Evolution of Foreign Policy"". Department of State, Press Release No. 81. 12 January 1954. Retrieved 2008-09-04. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |accessdaymonth=, |month=, |accessyear=, |accessmonthday=, and |coauthors= (help)
  5. ^ "Operation Mainbrace" - TIME - Monday,22 September 1952; Chapter 9 – The Increase in Strength - International Exercises - NATO the first five years 1949-1954; David M. Key Jr. Admiral Jerauld Wright: Warrior among Diplomats (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 2001) p. 333; "Emergency Call" — TIME, Monday, 30 September 1957
  6. ^ NATO The first 5 year, Chapter 7 - The Military Structure - Channel Committee and Channel Command
  7. ^ Chapter 7 - The Military Structure - Atlantic Command & Appendix 1 — Chronicle
  8. ^ ‘’Warrior among Diplomats.’’ p. 333 - 334
  9. ^ USS Wasp, p. 119
  10. ^ “The day Nautilus came to Portland”
  11. ^ “The day Nautilus came to Portland”
  12. ^ USS Wasp, p. 119; Norwegian subs during the Cold War -Warships1 and NavWeaps Discussion Boards
  13. ^ Inchcliffe Castle is a fictional ship from the Satevepost Glencannon stories by Guy Gilpatric.
  14. ^ "Emergency Call" - TIME - Monday, 30 September 1957
  15. ^ USS Wasp, p. 119
  16. ^ Loss and Ejections: F4D-1 Skyray; Sea Story - USS Essex Association; United States Navy Crew Crashes While On NATO Maneuvers In The Atlantic 24 September 1957 - Arlington National Cemetery
  17. ^ Neptune paper III: Naval nuclear accidents at sea, p. 21; A-3 Skywarrior aircraft lost with crew lists, p. 2 - A-3 Skywarrior Association; Descriptive List of Accidents, p. 2 - A-3 Skywarrior Association
  18. ^ "Second VP-8" (PDF). Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons Volume 2, Chapter 3. Naval Historcal Center. Retrieved 2008-09-03.
  19. ^ "Third VP-10" (PDF). Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons Volume 2, Chapter 3. Naval Historcal Center. Retrieved 2008-09-03.
  20. ^ "Ballykelly's Shackleton Era 1952-1971". Retrieved 2008-09-03.
  21. ^ "History - No. 269 Squadron RAF". Retrieved 2008-09-03.
  22. ^ Ralph W. Donnelly, Gabrielle M. Nuefield, and Carolyn A. Tyson. A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1947 – 1964 Volume III, p. 35; USS Tarawa - GoNavy
  23. ^ Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships - Naval Historical Center; "The day Nautilus came to Portland " - Dorset Echo; A Brief History of HMCS Iroquois (Postwar)
  24. ^ "Emergency Call" - TIME - Monday, 30 September 1957
  25. ^ "Emergency Call" - TIME - Monday, 30 September 1957; “All Ashore” - TIME - Monday, October 7, 1957; A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1947 – 1964 Volume III, p. 35; William K. Jones. A Brief History of the 6th Marines, p. 130
  26. ^ ’’Warrior among Diplomats’’, p. 334
  27. ^ “All Ashore” - TIME - Monday, October 7, 1957
  28. ^ Norman Friedman. U.S. Submarines Since 1945: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis Maryland: Naval Instiute Press, 1994) p. 109
  29. ^ "The Unraveling and Revitalization of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare" by John R. Bendict. Naval War College Review (Spring 2005), p. 98; "The Goblin Killers" - Time - Monday, 1 September 1958; "Antisubmarine Boss" - Time - Monday, 7 April 1958
  30. ^ Warrior among Diplomats, p. 357; History - NATO Undersea Research Centre
  31. ^ Chronological History – U.S. Naval Communications, p. 16
  32. ^ HMS Bulwark - Fleet Air Arm Archives
  33. ^ "Emergency Call" - TIME - Monday, 30 September 1957
  34. ^ Igor Trauschweizer. “Creating Deterrence for Limited War: The U.S. Army and the Defense of West Germany, 1953-1982,” p. 189
  35. ^ John Clearwater. Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Arsenal, p. 121
  36. ^ "Lehman's Sea-War Strategy Is Alive, but for How Long?" by Bernard E. Trainor. New York Times. 23 March 1987
  37. ^ "Triumph in Strategic Thinking" by Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired). United States Naval Institute Proceedings Vol. 134, No. 2 (February 2008) p. 42; For a brief overview on the Sovier concept of correlation of forces, see Major Richard E. Porter, USAF. "Correlation of Forces: Revolutionary Legacy" Air University Review, March-April 1977

Sources


Bibliography

Public Domain This article incorporates text from the public domain Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships.

External links

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