Evolutionary psychology

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The evolutionary psychology (also evolutionary psychology ) is a research branch of psychology. He tries to explain man's experience and behavior with knowledge about evolution . The basic assumption and logic of evolutionary psychology can be summed up as follows: every direct ancestor of every human being has necessarily logically survived long enough to produce at least one offspring. Behavioral preferences that are useful for this (e.g. food preferences, choice of partner) must therefore also bear within them all people living today as their descendants as behavioral potentials - on the basis of so-called evolved (but environmentally sensitive) psychological mechanisms - provided that behavior is also under genetic influence. The latter is seen as evident on the basis of empirical research results in behavioral genetics .

In contrast to disciplines such as social psychology , learning psychology and cognitive psychology , evolutionary psychology claims to be applicable to every branch of psychology. Classical psychological data continue to play a major role in evolutionary psychology, but these are supplemented by insights into human tribal history , hunter-gatherer studies or economic models.

Despite its great success, evolutionary psychology is in part controversial. On the one hand, the method of evolutionary psychology is often criticized from an epistemological point of view: Stephen Jay Gould criticizes, for example, that assumptions about the evolutionary formation of cognitive mechanisms are often no more than plausible-sounding stories that cannot be confirmed or refuted in the context of a scientific investigation. In addition, popular scientific discussions of the topic in particular are often criticized: for example, differences in gender-specific behavior are allegedly attributed to innate, biological characteristics in a simplistic way ( reductionist ). In particular, classical social scientists who are oriented towards milieu theory feel threatened by evolutionary psychology.

Evolutionary psychologists counter this criticism, among other things, by stating that it is less scientifically than politically motivated and is based on numerous misunderstandings and on the moralistic fallacy .

Emergence

The term evolutionary psychology was coined in 1973 by Michael Ghiselin ; Related theses can, however, also be found in Charles Darwin's The Descent of Man and The Expression of Emotional Movements in Man and Animals . As early as the mid-1980s, ideas of evolutionary psychology with the catchphrase "atomic bomb in the hand of the Neanderthal man" were widely discussed.

Despite the approaches of its forerunners, evolutionary psychology only became an independent and influential approach in the early 1990s, among other things through the anthology The Adapted Mind published in 1992 . Evolutionary Psychology and The Generation of Culture by Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby . In the years that followed, evolutionary psychology was regularly the subject of popular science publications by scientists such as David Buss and Steven Pinker . Similar to cognitive neuroscience , evolutionary psychology is often understood as a central element of the increasingly biologically oriented cognitive science .

theory

Evolution of bodies and behaviors

Typical examples of the evolution of living things relate to physical characteristics. The genetic basis that enables a gazelle to run faster will increase the animal's chances of survival, as the gazelle is better able to escape from pursuers. As a result, the corresponding alleles are likely to gradually establish themselves within the gazelle population and become a common feature of gazelles. In the opinion of evolutionary psychologists, it is no different with regard to mental characteristics. For example, memory, perception, problem-solving or learning performance should influence the survival chances of individuals in a comparable way. In evolutionary psychology, this is based on the assumption that beneficial mental characteristics - insofar as they can be inherited - assert themselves within a population and consequently cognitive abilities are a product of evolutionary adaptation.

An evolutionary formation of the mind can also be argued with reference to behavior . For example, the care and protection of the offspring in many species can lead to an increased survival and reproduction probability of the offspring and ultimately to an evolutionary advantage. The possibility that such behavior patterns could develop in the course of tribal history is understandable - also in relation to humans. People experience the corresponding behavior to a large extent in the form of mental phenomena such as “affection” and “concern for their own children”. It therefore makes sense to try to explain the formation of such emotions in the context of an evolutionary theory.

Another basic assumption for the development of the mind through natural evolution is that mental processes are correlated with processes in the brain and are caused by the activity of nerve cells - that the brain is a product of a long process of adaptation . The evolutionary formation of the “building blocks” of the brain also implies the evolutionary formation of the mind.

Adaptation and the environment

It is undisputed within the sciences that the human psyche is also a consequence of evolutionary processes. However, it is controversial to what extent people's thinking and feeling are shaped by evolutionary and thus innate mechanisms and how much of this evolutionary psychologists can actually find out about the evolution of the mind. The main proponents of contemporary evolutionary psychology have quite specific theses on these issues.

The starting point of the current evolutionary psychological theory is often the observation that many human behaviors in no way ensure the reproductive and survival success of people, and sometimes even oppose it. Participation in a sperm bank , for example, is a cost-saving way of increasing one's own reproductive success. Nevertheless, men usually do not show a pronounced need to act as sperm donors. From today's perspective, the fear of cars would also make far more sense than the fear of snakes, the disgust for alcohol would make more sense than the disgust for saliva. Still, most people are more likely to fear snakes and more disgusted with saliva. Such observations can give the impression that human needs and feelings are not limited to issues that are directly relevant to survival.

Evolutionary psychologists encounter such observations through the theory of the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA, German: "Environment of evolutionary adaptedness"). They indicate that humans essentially evolved during the Pleistocene period (1.8 million to 10,000 years ago). The Pleistocene people were organized into relatively small hunter-gatherer societies. Agricultural societies, on the other hand, have only existed for around 10,000 years, modern industrial cultures only for a few hundred years. Evolutionary psychologists now argue that a look at human history makes it clear that the human mind is adapted to a stone age rather than a modern environment. Cosmides and Tooby explain in this sense: “ Our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind. ” (German: “Our modern skulls harbor a Stone Age spirit.”)

Evolutionary psychologists argue that behaviors that are well adapted to a Stone Age environment do not necessarily have to be well adapted to a modern environment. That is why one can observe behavior patterns in contemporary cultures that in some cases radically oppose the reproductive and survival success of humans. At the same time, this consideration implies that evolutionary psychological theories about the emergence of cognitive characteristics must be based on the Stone Age environmental conditions.

Modularity of mind

Evolutionary psychologists assume that the brain is made up of numerous cognitive systems, each of which specializes in processing information from a delimited area or class of stimuli. In evolutionary psychology, the term “module” has established itself, so that a module for recognizing faces, a fear module or a module for assessing spatial relationships is accepted. Evolutionary psychologists posit that these specialized modules enabled our ancestors to respond quickly and effectively to environmental challenges. For this reason, these modules were selected instead of a non-specific multi-purpose intelligence, which according to evolutionary psychologists works more slowly and has not established itself evolutionarily.

Current evolutionary psychology is therefore tied to a particular theory about the structure of the mind: it assumes that the mind is not a general, unspecific intellectual faculty. Rather, the mind itself should have a fine structure and be composed to a large extent of cognitive mechanisms with specific tasks.

Noam Chomsky's nativism is a central point of reference for evolutionary psychologists

This so-called theory of modularity of mind goes back to nativism developed by Noam Chomsky in connection with his theory of universal grammar . Chomsky had argued that human language ability (and language acquisition in particular ) can only be explained by assuming innate grammatical principles by which natural languages ​​are organized. Cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor expanded Chomsky's approach to a general theory of the modularity of mind. According to Fodor, there are numerous innate and evolutionary cognitive mechanisms, for example in the area of ​​perception and memory. These mechanisms, called “modules”, specialize in a specific input that they analyze quickly and unconsciously. According to Fodor, however, higher cognitive functions are not organized in a modular manner; rather, there is a central processing unit that serves the conscious and complex analysis of information.

Evolutionary psychologists go beyond Fodor by claiming that the human mind is largely modularly organized. Through adaptation , numerous innate, cognitive mechanisms have developed that fulfill special tasks. In this sense, Tooby and Cosmides explain: “ our cognitive architecture resembles a confederation of hundreds or thousands of functionally dedicated computers (often called modules). ”(German:“ Our cognitive architecture is similar to an amalgamation of hundreds or thousands of computers (often called 'modules') each with a specific function. ”) The aim of evolutionary psychology is therefore to identify these modules and to clarify their origins. From the point of view of the prehistorian Steven Mithen , the modularity in the thinking of the anatomically modern human (Homo sapiens) is characterized above all by the fact that the modules no longer operate strictly isolated from one another, but are connected to one another.

Central assumptions of current evolutionary psychology are: There is a very large number of cognitive mechanisms (modules) that are a) innate, b) highly specialized and c) can be explained by an adaptation process in d) a Stone Age environment. With these theses, contemporary research goes beyond the general definition of evolutionary psychology (as research into the psyche from an evolutionary perspective). Many researchers therefore understand evolutionary psychology as a new research paradigm that puts new questions, research methods and theories at the center of psychology.

The theory of the modularity of the mind is criticized for the fact that it has been little researched empirically and that confirmation for this theory comes almost exclusively from studies with variations of the Wason Selection Task . In a series of experiments with the Wason Selection Task, the evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby were the first to determine that it is much easier for people to recognize deviations from social rules as rule violations than logically similar deviations from rules that have no social reference. For example, test subjects made fewer mistakes when they see violations of the rule “Anyone who wants to drink alcohol must be at least 18 years old” than when they see the rule “A card with a vowel on one side has an even number on the Check the back “using cards. From this, Cosmides and Tooby concluded that the human brain contains a module for recognizing fraudsters in social negotiation situations, and interpreted the results as evidence of the modular structure and against a content-independent general-purpose intelligence. Critics object that Cosmides and Tooby's interpretation contains a number of logical fallacies . For example, the variation of the Wason Selection Task used only captured one aspect of deductive logic . However, since human thinking is based on a number of other, unexplored logical systems (e.g. syllogistic logic , predicate logic , modal logic , inductive logic , etc.), the result of the investigation cannot be viewed as a refutation of general-purpose intelligence. It is also criticized that the rules differ fundamentally not only in their degree of abstraction but also in their logical structure and that they incorrectly depict actual social negotiation situations. According to Cosmides and Tooby, there is always fraud when someone receives a service without paying for it. In real interactions, this is not necessarily the case, as you are not cheating when you e.g. B. receives a gift. Cosmides' and Tooby's findings therefore say nothing about actual negotiations and are not evidence of a fraud detection module.

Of neuroscientists is neural plasticity cited as an argument against the theory of modularity. Studies show that neural networks change over a lifetime depending on environmental stimuli and experiences of the person, and raise the question to what extent the structure of the brain is programmed in the genes. In particular, the higher systems in the neocortex , which are responsible for complex tasks, do not reveal a modular structure in neurobiological studies.

Methods and methodological challenges

Directions of explanation

The evolutionary psychology project allows for various explanatory strategies. On the one hand, one can start by describing a psychological characteristic (such as spatial perception, jealousy or disgust). In a second step, an adaptation hypothesis is then developed, i.e. which environmental conditions could have led to the development of a characteristic is described. Ultimately, it is important to defend this hypothesis against alternatives. Classical studies in evolutionary psychology, however, reverse this explanatory strategy. You do not begin with the description of psychological characteristics, but with the description of Stone Age environmental conditions and try to predict certain psychological characteristics on the basis of this description. For example, it is argued that the gender division of labor in Stone Age societies made different demands on the spatial imagination of women and men and that it can therefore be assumed that spatial cognition has developed in a gender-specific manner. In the following, an attempt is made to demonstrate corresponding differences in cognitive psychology in today's people (see section: Spatial perception).

From a methodological perspective, there are two key advantages to starting with a description of environmental conditions and using it to predict psychological characteristics. On the one hand, predictions can serve to confirm evolutionary psychological theses, and evolutionary psychologists thus have an argument against the objection that their theories are fundamentally not verifiable ( verifiable and falsifiable ). On the other hand, corresponding predictions can lead to the discovery of new characteristics of the mind and thus have a productive effect on psychological research. However, the method described can also be problematic, as it requires a sufficiently precise knowledge of the Stone Age living conditions.

One can distinguish between three central methodological challenges: First, evolutionary psychologists must have a sufficiently precise knowledge of the Stone Age environmental conditions. The limits of knowledge arise here from a lack of archaeological or paleontological data and the fact that not only a homogeneous environment could be found in the Stone Age. Furthermore, evolutionary psychologists have to make statements about innate, universal psychological characteristics and, for example, separate them from socially and culturally formed structures. Finally, it must be shown that the innate psychological characteristics are actually due to an adaptation to the described Stone Age environmental conditions.

Determination of the Stone Age environment

Evolutionary psychologists assume that the human mind was formed by adapting to a stone age environment. They are therefore trying to reconstruct the origin of its present-day nature from the initial conditions. On the one hand, they are based on archaeological and paleontological data; on the other hand, they rely on currently existing hunter-gatherer cultures in order to infer the living conditions of Stone Age people with the help of an analogy. However, it remains controversial how helpful such a conclusion by analogy actually is, after all, the living conditions of today's hunter-gatherer cultures have changed in the last 10,000 years. All cultures currently in existence have been influenced, for example, by trade, imported diseases, enslavement, migratory pressure or colonial politics.

Whether the available data are sufficient to derive evolutionary psychological hypotheses from empirically obtained data also depends on the specific topic. For example, one can assume that predators were a danger to most Stone Age people and their ancestors - regardless of their specific living conditions. The assumption of an innate fear mechanism can therefore seem obvious. It becomes more complicated, however, if psychological characteristics are to be examined that are essentially dependent on the social structure and interpersonal interaction - e.g. on partner choice , aggression or jealousy . Nevertheless, some general statements can be made about Stone Age communities. For example, the lack of agricultural techniques meant that Stone Age people generally lived in relatively small communities. On the other hand, it can be assumed that there are considerable differences in the social structure of Stone Age communities, just as one finds considerable differences in present-day hunter-gatherer cultures. Corresponding differences are suggested by the geographical variations (tropics, steppe, mountains, desert, etc.), which in turn bring with them different dangers and food sources. In the face of such differences, evolutionary psychologists are faced with the challenge of making general, yet sufficiently substantial statements about the Stone Age communities.

Another problem is the fact that the evolution of the mind results from adaptation to the physical and psychological environment. Critics argue that evolutionary psychological descriptions of the Stone Age environmental conditions always contain a certain arbitrariness, because paleontological data say little about the social interactions that were of particular importance for the evolutionary development of the spirit. Phenomena such as jealousy or partner choice depend to a large extent on the sexual morality and behavior of the community. It is difficult to gain knowledge of these conditions because one has no written testimony and of course cannot find a "petrified spirit". In addition, it can be assumed that sexual morality and behavior were not static even in Stone Age communities, but rather developed in different ways over time. David Buller describes this problem in terms of the theory of the arms race:

Many arms races are between predators and prey. As predators get better in catching their prey, this creates a selection pressure on the prey to become better at escaping the predator, which creates a selection pressure to catch the more adept prey and so on. [...] But this means that, as human psychology evolved, the adaptive problems driving human psychological evolution would have evolved in a lockstep, so that there would have been no stable adaptive problems driving human psychological evolution.

Many arms races take place between hunter and prey. If the hunter gets better at catching the prey, this triggers a selection pressure on the prey to improve in fleeing from the hunter, which in turn exerts a selection pressure on the hunter to catch the better adapted prey, etc. […] But This means that the evolution of the human psyche also brings about a change in the adaptive problems of the human evolution of the psyche and therefore there are no stable adaptive problems of the evolution of the human psyche.

In addition, one must not only have knowledge of the physical and social environment, but also of the motivational and cognitive processes of our ancestors that determined which environmental factors were perceived as relevant and which were not. Finally, there is also the fact that evolutionary adaptation depends on the modifiability of existing features. To find out how an adaptation came about, one needs to know something about the existing feature that was modified and selected to solve the adaptive problem. Without knowledge of the already existing psychological characteristics of our ancestors, no statements can be made about how selection changed them and how today's characteristics arose.

Evolutionary psychologists are faced with two methodological challenges when referring to the Stone Age environmental conditions: On the one hand, it must be shown to what extent there was a stable and homogeneous Stone Age environment at all. On the other hand, data must be obtained about this environment, which dates back many thousands of years. It is critical that these problems be gradual. Proponents and critics of evolutionary psychological hypotheses agree that there were differences and similarities between Stone Age communities. They also agree that there are still some things that can be found out about these communities today and that there are still limits of knowledge. The decisive issues are rather how big the differences were, how much one can know about the Stone Age environment and which hypotheses can be reasonably justified with this knowledge.

Universality of mind

Evolutionary psychologists assume a universal human nature. Humans therefore have innate and universal psychological characteristics that arose in response to the Stone Age environmental conditions. This assumed universality of the mind does not fundamentally rule out variations in behavior, since the universal genetic program takes place depending on the respective context.

To show that certain traits are indeed universal, evolutionary psychologists use cross- cultural studies . If a psychological characteristic can be proven independently of culture and life situation, it is plausible that it is an innate and universal characteristic in the sense of evolutionary psychology. The best-known, cross-cultural study with an evolutionary psychological background comes from David Buss , in which 10,047 people from different cultures, classes and ages were asked about their partner preferences. Buss assumed that men would tend to prefer younger women because they have a greater reproductive potential. He saw this thesis confirmed by his study. However, the debate surrounding Buss' study also shows that comparative studies always raise questions of interpretation, since the results never show completely identical results for different cultures, classes or age groups. The crucial question is, therefore, whether the results are clear enough to support a specific evolutionary psychological thesis. For example, a re-analysis of Buss' data revealed that a social psychological approach, especially social structural theory , can explain the data better than an evolutionary psychological approach. (See also section: Partner selection.)

Another methodological challenge arises from the fact that evolutionary psychologists assume universal cognitive structures even where no universal behavior can be observed. Of course, there are people who show little or no jealousy in relationships. However, according to evolutionary psychologists, this does not preclude the existence of a universal jealousy module. Another example is the male sexual preference for women with certain morphological characteristics. Of course there are men who have absolutely no sexual preference for women. Nevertheless, many evolutionary psychologists assume that there are corresponding, universal preference modules. Her argument is based on the theory of modularity of the mind and Chomsky's evidence for an innate universal grammar. Chomsky assumes that an implicit knowledge of grammatical principles is innate - even if these grammatical principles do not appear in all languages ​​and some people even have no language and grammar at all (for example so-called wolf children ). The idea is that such grammatical principles only come into play when they are activated by a corresponding linguistic input from the environment.

In the same way, one can imagine the work of other innate and universal psychic modules. For example, an innate and universal jealousy module does not have to lead to jealous behavior everywhere. For actually observable jealousy behavior, two factors are necessary, which only together represent a sufficient condition: a) an innate and universal module; b) a corresponding input from the current environment. In addition, the input may have to be restricted to a certain ontogenetic phase. For example, developmental studies have shown that the learning of grammatical principles depends on experiences in childhood. Those who spent their childhood without linguistic input will find it very difficult to acquire very faulty grammatical knowledge in later years.

The approach described has advantages and disadvantages from a methodological perspective. It is advantageous that heterogeneous behavior patterns do not necessarily have to lead to a refutation ( falsification ) of an evolutionary psychological hypothesis. On the other hand, it becomes more difficult to test an evolutionary psychological hypothesis. If a universal module does not lead to universally observable behavior, indirect ways must be found to confirm or refute the assumption of existence. Chomsky justifies his thesis with the help of developmental psychological arguments: Fast and efficient language acquisition can not be explained at all without the assumption of innate knowledge - a research subject in biolinguistics .

Evolutionary psychologists are accused of ethnocentrism in connection with their explanations of the universality of the mind . Critics argue that evolutionary psychologists see behaviors and psychological characteristics from the perspective of their western and capitalist culture and explain them to be universal. For example, evolutionary psychological theories state that kinship is primarily determined by genetic factors and that people only “invest” in their biological children or close relatives because this would increase their own reproductive success. Critics argue that this understanding of kinship is based on a particular cultural context. In Anglo-American cultures, kinship categories (such as "mother") are predominantly defined using genetic traits, in other cultures, however, characteristics such as social status and marital status, not genetic ancestry, determine who is considered a relative.

The accusation of adaptationism

The main challenges for evolutionary psychologists are the descriptions of the Stone Age environmental conditions and the psychological characteristics. In particular, Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin , however in the article The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossion paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programs argued that another challenge should occur: It must be shown, a described psychological feature that actually due has developed adaptive advantage. Indeed, according to Gould and Lewontin, many innate and universal traits have not established themselves at all because of their apparently obvious function.

Characteristics that have prevailed regardless of their function are called exaptations after Gould and Elisabeth Vrba . A distinction can be made between two types of exaptations. For one thing, a trait may have prevailed in the past due to a certain evolutionary advantage, but it may have a completely different function in the present. An example of this type of exaptation is, according to Gould, the origin of feathers . According to Gould, the earliest forms of feathers did not gain acceptance because they enabled living things to fly. Rather, they had a central function in the thermoregulation of organisms. Although feathers in today's birds serve as flight feathers essentially for the ability to fly, they were not created because of this function. According to Gould, similar phenomena are also to be expected in psychological phenomena. Even if it is established that a psychological characteristic fulfills a certain function, the evolutionary origin of this characteristic can be completely independent of this function.

The second type of exaptation is called Spandrel by Gould . The spandrels are features that have established themselves as by-products without any use of their own. The development of a spandrel can be imagined as follows: A gene leads to two characteristics, with one characteristic having a significant evolutionary advantage and the other having neither a positive nor a negative effect. In the following, the corresponding gene prevails and thus also a characteristic that is itself characterized by no use at all. According to Gould, a significant part of the human mind is to be understood in this sense as Spandrel. For example, it is implausible to assume that the awareness of one's own mortality or even religious beliefs have developed due to a survival or reproductive advantage. Rather, one should assume that such psychological phenomena emerged as spandrels in the course of the development of the general cognitive ability to abstract.

The existence of spandrels and exaptations is mostly accepted by evolutionary psychologists. However, they argue that an adaptive explanation is often much more plausible and better documented than the reference to spandrels and exaptations. A conclusion to the best explanation does not rule out alternative hypotheses with absolute certainty. In addition, it is replied that evolutionary psychologists do not want to attribute every conviction of people to an adaptation advantage. Rather, it is about an evolutionary explanation of basic cognitive mechanisms. In this sense, Steven Pinker explains :

the major faculties of the mind [...] show the handiwork of selection. That does not mean that every aspect of the mind is adaptive. From low-level features like sluggishness and noisiness of neurons, to momentous activities like art, music, religion and, dreams, we should expect to find activities of the mind that are not adaptations in the biologists' sense.

The essential faculties of the mind [...] are the work of selection. This does not mean that every aspect of the mind is an adjustment. From low-level properties such as the indolence and noise of the neurons to meaningful activities such as art, music, religion and dreaming, we should expect activities that are not adaptations in the sense of biologists.

However, claims of adaptation are controversial even for basic cognitive skills such as language skills . Certain types of information are required for a reliable evolutionary explanation of an adaptation. Since the Pleistocene environments of our ancestors were very diverse, it is questionable whether one can speak of an “environment of evolutionary adaptation”, identify the exact ecological challenges and assume constant selection pressure in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. In addition, little is known about the population structure of our ancestors (e.g. the social organization of the groups) and, with regard to the heredity of basic cognitive mechanisms, it is unclear which parts are inherited how. There is also the question of which hominid group Homo sapiens should be compared with, since no information is available about the type of selection pressure that influenced the emergence of mechanisms such as language.

Nature and culture

Various researchers see evolutionary psychology as a form of reductionism and genetic determinism . Evolutionary psychologists see the human psyche and physiology as a genetic product and assume that genes contain the information for the development and control of the organism and that this information is transmitted from one generation to the next via genes. Evolutionary psychologists see physical and psychological properties of humans as genetically programmed. Even if evolutionary psychologists recognize the influence of the environment on human development, they only understand the environment as an activator or trigger for the programmed development instructions encoded in the genes. Evolutionary psychologists are z. B. believes that the human brain is made up of innate modules, each of which specializes only in very specific tasks, e.g. B. a fear module. According to evolutionary psychologists, these modules are given before the actual development of the organism and are then activated by some environmental event. Critics object that this view is reductionist and that cognitive specialization only comes about through the interaction of humans with their real environment, instead of the environment of distant ancestors. Interdisciplinary approaches are increasingly striving to mediate between these opposing viewpoints and point out that biological and cultural causes do not have to be in contradiction in explaining human behavior and even complex cultural achievements.

Individual research programs

Emotions

See also: Evolutionary Emotion Research

Pride serves to signal a high social status . Individuals who successfully communicate high status can improve their access to scarce resources and high quality reproductive partners. A stratification according to status within a group can also facilitate power relations, cooperation and social interactions.

For what purpose the ability to disgust developed in the course of evolution is not clear. Some scientists like Paul Rozin believe that a strong defensive reaction to inedible substances is the origin of the emotion. The psychologist Anne Schienle also suspects that the disgust arose in connection with the gag reflex, which is used to prevent the ingestion of inedible or harmful food. According to this theory, disgust reactions were later extended to include substances such as body products and smells as a protective mechanism.

Amounted to

Evolutionary psychological work on fraud detection often begins with the phenomenon of reciprocal altruism , i.e. with behaviors of the scheme I help you with p if you help me with q . Although reciprocal altruism is to the advantage of everyone involved, it has only established itself in a few living beings; in addition to humans, vampire bats, baboons and chimpanzees, for example, show corresponding behavior. A simple explanation for the inadequate enforcement of reciprocal altruism arises from simple game theory considerations: A reciprocal altruistic community is superior to an egoistic community, since mutual aid generally results in a higher profit for all parties than the investment. However, reciprocal altruistic communities are not stable because they quickly generate fraudulent behavior: Fraudsters enjoy all the benefits of a reciprocal altruistic community without having to invest any labor themselves. Since fraudulent behavior brings the greatest benefit, it will eventually prevail and thus bring the reciprocal altruistic community to collapse.

Task according to Cosmides A statement of the form If p, then q is presented. The test persons have to recognize that only the sentence of the form p and not -q contradicts the initial statement. The success cases are shown in percent in the diagram. Examples: a) Example with a social agreement (fraud case) b) Concrete example c) Abstract example (with numbers, variables, etc.) d) Concrete example with familiar facts

It follows from these considerations that a reciprocal altruistic community can only be stable if effective strategies for recognizing and sanctioning fraudulent behavior are developed. Evolutionary psychologists therefore assume that an innate mechanism (a module) for recognizing fraudulent behavior has developed in humans. However, the previous considerations do not necessarily mean that such a specialized module exists. An alternative hypothesis would be that the detection of fraudulent behavior simply arises from the general ability to reason: people have the ability to draw inferences of the form If p, then q. to understand what is reciprocal altruistic agreements of the form If you help me with p, then I'll help you with q. includes. Consequently, the detection of fraudulent behavior could result from the general ability of logical reasoning without the need for a specialized and innate module for fraud detection.

However, Cosmides and Tooby claim to be able to exclude this alternative hypothesis experimentally. They performed a series of experiments based on the Wason Selection Task . The selection task checks to what extent people have mastered simple logical end patterns such as tollens mode . The result, which has been confirmed many times over, is that a large number of mistakes are made in such tests. For example, test subjects are presented with a sentence of the form If p, then q . In the following, the test subjects have to decide which statements contradict this sentence. The statements usually have the form p and q. , p and not-q , not-p and q and not-p and not-q . In these tests, less than 30% of the subjects can solve the task correctly. The results are only slightly better if one uses example sentences that are familiar to the test subjects. The situation changes radically, however, using examples that include social agreements. Cosmides used the following sentence, for example, if you give me your watch (p), I'll give you $ 20 (q). In this case, most people could easily determine whether the agreement had been violated.

According to Cosmides and Tooby, these experiments show that recognizing fraudulent behavior cannot simply be derived from the ability to reason logically. After all, performance in recognizing such behavior is far better than the general ability to recognize contradictions. One should therefore assume the existence of a special fraud detection mechanism.

However, the interpretation of Cosmides and Tooby is only permissible if their assumption is correct that subjunctions with a social reference and those without a social reference are identical in their logical structure. According to this assumption, the two sentences "Anyone under 25 must not drink alcohol" and "A card with a vowel on one side has an even number on the other" have the same logical properties. However, it is the case that the two sentences are fundamentally different: The first sentence is a deontic conditional connection, while the second sentence is an indicative conditional connection. The former describes a norm or an obligation and draws attention to its violation, while the latter describes a fact. In the first case, the test subjects are asked to determine whether someone has obeyed the rule, and in the second case, they have to think about the rule themselves to decide whether it applies. The difference in performance can therefore be an expression of the different logic underlying conditional connections with and without social reference and is not necessarily the result of a module that specializes in recognizing fraudsters in social situations. Another explanation for the difference in performance is that the relationship between p and q, that is, between a vowel and an even number, is random. Studies have shown that additional background information improves performance in the indicative test condition, aligns it with the deontic condition, or even reverses the result completely, so that test subjects made fewer mistakes in sentences without social than with social reference.

food

The survival of a living being is the prerequisite for its reproduction and is therefore central to any successful evolutionary strategy. An adequate supply of food is in turn a prerequisite for survival. From an evolutionary psychological point of view, it is therefore obvious that mechanisms have developed that allow an assessment of potential food sources. Such modules are particularly plausible for humans, since as omnivores they are faced with an unspecialized food spectrum. Although this offers him the opportunity to use a variety of food sources, on the other hand there is also the increased risk of consuming toxic substances.

One possible adaptation strategy can be the development of taste mechanisms that make food sources appear good or bad tasting. People tend to rate sweet and high-fat food sources as being tasty. Developing an appropriate taste mechanism has the advantage of letting people fall back on foods with a high nutritional content. In today's societies, such a preference can be harmful, but evolutionary psychologists point out that cognitive mechanisms developed at a time when there was no excess food.

Other innate mechanisms could be feelings of disgust . From today's perspective, disgust often seems irrational : You don't feel disgust towards your own saliva as long as it is in your own mouth. Still, many people would refuse to eat soup they spit on before. Also, many people would be reluctant to drink from a container that had previously held excrement - even if they knew the container was properly cleaned. Feelings of disgust influence the food spectrum without being controlled by rational considerations. Evolutionary psychologists argue that the emergence of a mechanism of disgust is understandable from an evolutionary perspective, as feelings of disgust protect against the consumption of harmful and disease-transmitting substances. Such feelings may seem out of date under today's hygienic conditions, but are genetically firmly anchored.

Differences between women and men

General discourse

Differences between women and men are a central and at the same time extremely controversial research topic in evolutionary psychology. The investigation of gender differences is obvious for evolutionary psychologists for various reasons: On the one hand, reproduction is central to evolutionary dynamics and women and men obviously have different starting conditions for reproduction. In addition, women and men were exposed to different environmental conditions for millennia due to their different social roles. Since psychological characteristics are supposed to develop in adaptation to the existing environment, divergent developments can be assumed.

Despite undisputed differences in reproductive and environmental conditions, gender theories are the most controversial branch of evolutionary psychology.

The following important information is missing from this article or section:
Gender stereotypes: The reference given The Fragile Male is not a popular science, just a pop. Book; the author is not an evolutionary biologist or psychologist. Trending publications of individual opinions are numerous and cannot be considered representative of the Evol. Psychology. In order to maintain the criticism, quotes of unproven material from recognized specialist authors should be cited.
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Corresponding theories are often accused of explaining gender stereotypes through unsubstantiated speculations about innate and universal characteristics. This accusation is particularly directed against popular science publications that describe gender differences in sometimes drastic terms. You can already read on the spine of Ben Greenstein's The Fragile Male :

First and foremost, man is a fertilizer of women. His need to inject genes into a female is so strong that it dominates his life from puberty to death. This need is even stronger than the urge to kill. [...] It could even be said that production and supply of sperm is his only raison d'etre, and his physical power and lust to kill are directed to that end, to ensure that only the best examples of the species are propagated. If he is prevented from transmitting his genes he becomes stressed, ill, and may shut down or go out of control.

In essence, the man is a pollinator for women. His need to inject genes into women is so strong that it dominates his life from puberty to death. This need is even stronger than the urge to kill. […] One can even say that the production and distribution of semen is its only reason for existence. His physical strength and eagerness to kill are directed towards this end, ensuring that only the best specimens of the species breed. If he is prevented from transmitting his genes, he becomes stressed, sick and can break down or get out of control.

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Corresponding statements are met with sharp protest from many scientific theorists, biologists and psychologists. The intra- and intercultural variability of gender behavior is so great that corresponding claims are absurd or at least completely unfounded.

In this context, however, it should also be noted that the general project of evolutionary psychology does not result in any of the aforementioned hypotheses about male behavior. Rather, evolutionary psychologists can also argue that gender-specific behaviors are culturally shaped to a large extent and that purely evolutionary answers are often insufficient in this topic. Richard Dawkins , one of the most influential thinkers in evolutionary psychology, explains in his book The Selfish Gene :

What this astonishing variety suggests is that man's way of life is largely determined by culture rather than by genes. However, it is still possible that human males in general have a tendency towards promiscuity, and females a tendency towards monogamy, as we would predict on evolutionary grounds. Which of these two tendencies wins in particular societies depends on details of cultural circumstance, just as in different animal species it depends on ecological details.

This astonishing diversity suggests that human sexual lifestyles are determined to a greater extent by culture than genes. However, it is possible that there is a general tendency towards promiscuity in men and a tendency towards monogamy in women, as we would predict for evolutionary reasons. Which of these tendencies comes into play in a society depends on the cultural conditions, just as it depends on ecological details in different animal species.

However, other evolutionary psychologists, such as David Buss, advocate very extensive theories about innate causes of gender-specific behavior.

Spatial perception

Typical tasks for mental rotation: Test subjects have to determine whether the objects shown have the same shape

Gender differences in spatial imagination are well documented. Traditional cognitive psychology experiments on spatial imagination usually involve mental rotation tasks . In these tasks, objects are presented from different perspectives and the test subjects have to decide whether the objects have the same shape (see illustration). To successfully solve this task, one must rotate at least one object in the imagination and then compare the shapes. Corresponding experiments have shown that men on average solve such tasks more successfully than women.

Irwin Silverman and Marion Eals examined gender differences in spatial perception from an evolutionary psychological perspective. They argue that differences in spatial perception can be explained by the distribution of work in hunter-gatherer societies. In such societies, women often had the job of gathering vegetable food, while men were more likely to hunt than women. Such a distribution of work could not explain a general superiority of spatial imagination in men. However, it would make a specialization of the mechanisms of imagination in men and women plausible.

Based on these considerations, Silverman and Eals attempted to further define the cognitive challenges of collecting. In contrast to hunted animals, plants remain in one place. However, they develop over time, different plants can only be used at different times of the year. So collectors must have the ability to find spatially distributed sources of food at different times of the year. Silverman and Eals now developed experiments designed to test such skills. They presented test subjects with a series of distributed objects in a room. In the following, the subjects should remember these objects and their location. In fact, it was found that women were on average better able to solve these tasks than men - according to Silverman and Eals, evidence for the thesis that gender-specific differences in spatial perception can be explained by adaptation conditions in hunter-gatherer societies.

Partner choice

Evolutionary psychological theories of partner choice are based on the model of parental effort . The basic idea is that having offspring does not only mean reproductive success, it also involves costs for the parents. These costs are different for women and men, since fathering children results in a pregnancy of several months for women, while sperm production is comparatively low for men. On the other hand, the parental investment does not end with the birth of the child; bringing up a child requires time and material resources. Mothers and fathers are usually responsible for this investment.

According to many evolutionary psychologists, the differences in parental investment lead to differences in the partner preferences of women and men. The minimum investment required by women is relatively high, as it always implies a pregnancy of several months . In contrast, the minimal investment made by men is very low, as it only requires a one-time sexual act. Accordingly, it is advantageous for women to be very picky when choosing a partner. You should find sexual partners who are willing to invest resources in having children after they are born. In contrast, the low minimum investment by men leads to a less picky strategy. Having sex with large numbers of women would maximize reproductive success with little investment. Men prefer healthy, young, physically attractive partners who signal a maximum of reproductive success but express sexual maturity despite their youth.

The central investment by men is made indirectly through the provision of resources. According to evolutionary psychologists, the ability to provide such resources and make them clearly visible is a central criterion when choosing a partner. Evolutionary psychologists put this idea into concrete terms with the theory of socioeconomical status ( SES), which includes material income and social standing. According to the theory of SES, women will prefer men with a high SES, while for men the focus is on criteria that indicate the reproductive potential of the potential partner. According to this theory, it is predicted that men prefer younger women as partners because they have a high reproductive potential. In contrast, age is less important for women; older men even tend to have a higher SES and are therefore preferred.

Numerous studies have been carried out to check such statements. A well-known study on SES comes from John Marshall Townsend and Gary Levy, who asked 112 undergraduate students at Syracuse University about their preferences. Townsend and Levy presented the test subjects with photos of two men, one rated as generally attractive, the other as unattractive. The men were dressed in three different ways: 1) in Burger King work clothes (low SES); 2) in neutral clothing (medium SES); 3) in a suit and with an expensive watch (high SES). In the following, the test subjects were asked whether they could imagine various forms of relationship with such a person (e.g. an appointment, a steady relationship, a marriage). The results showed that willingness to have relationships generally increased with increasing SES. Indeed, steadfast relationships and marriages were more likely to be considered in the unattractive man with high SES than in the attractive man with low SES. According to Townsend and Levy, these results show that the SES is indeed central to female partner preferences.

Appropriate evolutionary psychological studies are not accepted by all researchers and are rejected by critics such as David Buller with reference to alternative data interpretations. On the one hand, it is not at all clear whether universal and innate partner preferences can be determined at all. The preference for men with high SES can also be explained with reference to the social context and the economic disadvantage of women. If one wants to exclude this possibility, one would have to show that the partner preference of women is independent of the socio-economic context. In fact, there are attempts to show this in cross-cultural studies, but the interpretation of these data is again controversial. Although it was found that women in different cultures attach greater importance to financial aspects when choosing a partner than men, at the same time there were quite large differences. For example, women in Japan attached 150% more importance to financial aspects than men, whereas in the Netherlands it was only 36%.

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In addition, cross-cultural studies do not rule out the importance of the socio-economic context if there is cross-cultural socio-economic disadvantage for women.

In addition, one can try to trace the preferences established by Townsend and Levy back to the phenomenon of homogamy . “Homogamy” is the term used to describe the preference for culturally, economically and socially similar partners. The subjects from Townsend and Levy were all white students from a renowned American private university, so they had a high SES themselves. The approach of homogamy and the approach of evolutionary psychology therefore predict a preference for a high SES among partners in the study mentioned.

The SES debate is characteristic of evolutionary psychological research into partner choice. Evolutionary psychologists develop a hypothesis about the development of partner preferences and undertake studies to test these hypotheses. Critics claim that social factors are neglected or point to alternative explanatory models such as homogamy. Most researchers accept that social causes, homogamy and evolutionary factors are not mutually exclusive - the choice of partner is always caused by multiple causes. However, it remains controversial whether and how the individual factors can be separated and what relevance they have when choosing a partner. Situational influences such as stress have an influence on general partner preferences: While people in their normal state tend to be homogamy, i. H. If you prefer similar partners, this pattern can be reversed under stress, so that dissimilar people appear more attractive under the influence of stress. This can be explained by evolutionary mechanisms insofar as a conclusion can be drawn from the phenotype to the genotype - people who look alike should therefore have more genes in common. Similarity between two people leads to a higher level of trust, and similar people are rated as more likeable and trustworthy. At the same time, however, the appearance of common genes can lead to possible genetic damage in the offspring. Seen in this way, similarity should play a greater role for a long-term partnership, while dissimilar partners are more advantageous for purely biological reproduction. The influence of stress can manifest itself in that a threatening external environment is signaled to the organism and resources are invested in the short term; thus the biological aspect of the pairing becomes more important than a long-term partnership.

See also

literature

  • Christopher Badcock: Evolutionary Psychology: A Critical Introduction . Polity, Cambridge 2000, ISBN 0-7456-2206-2 - Academic introduction with many references to social sciences, genetics and Freud
  • Jerome H. Barkow, John Tooby , Leda Cosmides (Eds.): The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and The Generation of Culture . Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992, ISBN 0-19-510107-3 - Classical collection of articles
  • David Buller: Adapting Minds . MIT Press, Cambridge 2005, ISBN 0-262-02579-5 - Extensive discussion and criticism of evolutionary psychology. Contains an epistemological-methodological part and a part on individual research programs
  • David Buss : Evolutionary Psychology (Orig. Evolutionary Psychology ). Pearson Studium, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-8273-7094-9 - textbook by one of the most famous evolutionary psychologists, especially with regard to gender theories
  • Robin Dunbar , Louise Barrett: Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, ISBN 0-19-856830-4 - Current, scientific manual, standard work
  • John Dupré : Human Nature and the Limits of Science . Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003, ISBN 0-19-924806-0 - Sharp epistemological criticism of the claims of modern life sciences, contains an equally sharp rejection of evolutionary psychology
  • Benjamin P. Lange , Sascha Schwarz (ed.): The human psyche between nature and culture . Pabst, Lengerich 2015. - Collection of essays on the interplay of biological-evolutionary and cultural factors
  • Steven Pinker : How the mind arises (Orig. How the Mind works ). Kindler, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-463-40341-2 - Easily readable, popular science introduction from a well-known evolutionary psychologist
  • Ulrich Hoffrage, Oliver Vitouch: Evolutionary psychology of thinking and problem solving . In: Jochen Müsseler (Ed.): General Psychology . 2., rework. Edition. Spectrum Akademischer Verlag, Heidelberg 2007, pp. 630-679, ISBN 978-3-8274-1780-0 (book), 978-3-8274-1985-9 (CD-ROM) - compact academic introduction to the subject
  • Doris Bischof-Köhler : Naturally different. The psychology of gender differences . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2011, ISBN 3170216252 . Comprehensive overview for researching the causes of gender differences including the conclusion that these differences are not just the result of environmental factors, but have strong biological-evolutionary influences

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Benjamin P. Lange , Sascha Schwarz: Behavior and experience in the field of tension between culture and nature. In: Benjamin P. Lange, Sascha Schwarz (ed.): The human psyche between nature and culture. Pabst, Lengerich 2015, pp. 10–17.
  2. ^ Aaron Sell, Edward H Hagen, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby: Evolutionary Psychology: Applications and Criticisms. In: Lynn Nadel (Ed.): Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken 2006, ISBN 0-470-01619-1 , p. 54.
  3. ↑ Stephen Jay Gould: Evolution: The Pleasures of Pluralism. New York Review of Books 44 (11), 1997, pp. 47-52
  4. ↑ See e.g. B. Hilary Rose, Steven Rose , Charles Jencks (Eds.): Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology , Harmony Books, Nevada City 2000, ISBN 0-609-60513-5 , pp. 209-227.
  5. ↑ Lesley J. Rogers: Sexing the brain: The science and pseudoscience of sex differences . In: The Kaohsiung Journal of Medical Sciences . 26, No. 6 (Suppl.), 2010, pp. 4-9. doi: 10.1016 / S1607-551X (10) 70051-6 , PMID 20538246 .
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  31. ↑ David J. Buller: Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology And The Persistent Quest For Human Nature . MIT Press, Cambridge MA 2005, ISBN 978-0-262-02579-9 , p. 424 f .
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  35. ↑ A detailed review can be found in: David Buller: Adapting Minds . MIT Press, Cambridge 2005, ISBN 0-262-02579-5 , Chapter 5, pp. 201-258 .
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