History of the RWE

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After the First World War, the Goldenberg plant was the largest lignite power plant in Europe (with the 12 apostles on the right)
After the First World War, the Reisholz power plant was the world's largest hard coal power plant

The history of RWE begins with its foundation as Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG in Essen in 1898.

Empire and First World War

On April 25, 1898, the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG (RWE) was founded. The new subsidiary took over from the parent company, Elektrizitäts-AG formerly W. Lahmeyer & Co., the obligation to supply the city of Essen with electricity. The first power plant was built in 1900 on the site of the Victoria Mathias colliery by the entrepreneur Hugo Stinnes and generated electricity from the coal mined there. Stinnes' idea of ​​selling the steam generated in the boiler houses on his colliery to RWE for power generation in its directly adjacent generator hall instead of the coal saved the coal surcharge to the Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlen-Syndikat . In this way, Stinnes secured regular sales and a supervisory board position without being involved in RWE. During the electrical crisis in March 1902, the Lahmeyer Group had to sell the majority of RWE shares to a consortium led by August Thyssen and Hugo Stinnes with the participation of Deutsche Bank , Dresdner Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft . Under the new chairman of the supervisory board, Stinnes, RWE was expanded from a municipal power station to an intercity center:

"[We] we intend to fulfill our task for ourselves and the general public by providing consumers [...] with the greatest possible amount of electricity at the lowest possible prices."

- Annual report 1902/03

He reduced the load peaks through reciprocity agreements with other mine power plants . In the mornings he supplied electricity to the mines, which in return for the late afternoon peak loads of his power plants supplied him with electricity. In this way, he ensured that his power plants were utilized more evenly, and the mines were able to save reserve capacities in the mine power plants. RWE expanded by concluding further supply contracts with communities in the Ruhr area and the Rhineland . In order to finance the growth as well as to gain municipal concessions and rights of way more easily , Stinnes offered the municipalities shares in RWE:

" Cologne. The Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerk in Essen has offered the state, the relevant provinces and larger municipalities a decisive stake in its company. Like the “Cöln. Ztg. ", The responsible ministries will be advised tomorrow in Berlin with the involvement of representatives of the local state and municipal authorities involved on the question of whether and in what form this offer should be approached."

- Short message in the Dresdner Journal, 1906, No. 2, Wednesday, January 3rd

The expansion of the mixed-economy company with private and state shareholders met with resistance from the competitor Elektrizitätswerk Westfalen , an amalgamation of the AEG , municipalities and mine power stations. On March 10, 1908, the competitors agreed to define the boundaries of the supply areas on the Dorsten line , east of Gelsenkirchen to Barmen . Stinnes acquired electric street and light rail companies to sell electricity. The transport companies acquired in this way were brought together in the RWE railway department. Further developments led to the foundation of the subsidiary Rheinisch-Westfälische Straßen- und Kleinbahnen GmbH in Essen in 1936 , which was active in this field until 1966. Due to an aggressive acquisition policy and the establishment of numerous power plants and supply companies, RWE quickly expanded to become one of the largest German energy companies under the directors Alfred Thiel (director 1902–1903) and Bernhard Goldenberg (director 1904–1917). In 1910, the contract negotiations with the city of Cologne on electricity deliveries failed because Rheinbraun made a better offer under Paul Silverberg . In 1905, RWE acquired the Berggeist lignite power station near Brühl. When the brown coal was running out there, was named after the main power station concept Klingenberg's the gold mine on the site of the mine United Ville of Roddergrube built, produced the beginning April 1914 large amounts of electricity from lignite. During the war, the golden mine and the Reisholz power plant were expanded into the largest and most modern brown and hard coal power plants in Europe in order to supply the energy-intensive armaments industry. In 1924, both plants generated 76% of RWE's total output. In November 1920, RWE took over the majority of the Roddergrube.

Weimar Republic

In December 1919, the Weimar Republic tried to socialize the electricity industry into an imperial monopoly . Stinnes referred to the existing influence of the municipalities, which had held the majority on the supervisory board since 1910 and the majority of shares since 1920, so that RWE was already more or less socialized. Under the influence of the new Reich Treasury Minister von Raumer 1920, the former executive member of the board of the Association of the Electrical Industry, the enactment of the concrete implementing laws was not passed in 1920. Due to inflation-related changes to the Rentenmark , the municipalities lost their majority of shares on July 1, 1924. Therefore, a twenty-fold voting right for registered shares was introduced at RWE .

After Goldenberg's death, Arthur Koepchen became the company's board member, a pioneer of the network economy . Under the chairman of the supervisory board, Albert Vögler, Koepchen pushed for the expansion of hydropower (1926/1930 Koepchenwerk ; 1928/1931 Schluchseewerke ; 1929/1933 Rheinkraftwerk Albbruck-Dogern ; 1926/1930 Vermuntwerk ). In 1930 he connected lignite power plants in the Rhineland with hydropower plants in the Alps through the north-south line he initiated in 1924 , a high-voltage interconnection: during the day, electricity from the hydropower plants flowed northwards, at night to the south to pump water into the storage power plants. With the expansion, RWE opened up sales areas in the southern Rhineland, Swabia and Switzerland. In 1923 RWE had already acquired the former parent company Elektrizitäts-AG, formerly W. Lahmeyer & Co. with its subsidiaries Main-Kraftwerke AG , Kraftwerk Altwürttemberg AG and Lech-Elektrizitätswerke AG . In order to enable the interconnection, RWE concluded the so-called electrical peace with the state-owned Preussische Elektrizitäts AG and the empire-owned EWAG in 1927 , with which delivery areas were defined. Through the demarcation line along the Weser to the Main near Frankfurt, RWE handed over its stake in the Braunschweig coal mines and the State of Prussia handed over the BIAG Zukunft acquired from the Stinnes bankruptcy .

With RWE since 1932/33

With the Gelsenberg affair , RWE was able to acquire the majority in Rheinbraun with the help of Friedrich Flick in the Rheinbrauncoup at the end of 1932 . Silverberg's supervisory board had opposed the takeover of its lignite mines by RWE for years. He had assumed that the takeover would financially overtax RWE AG, which expanded through American bonds from 1925, since the debt amount in 1930 exceeded the share capital and a capital increase by the inflation-damaged municipalities would be blocked. However, Flick and Thyssen passed on their Rheinbraun shares in exchange for RWE shares in the hard coal company Harpener Bergbau AG and were thus able to disempower Silverberg. The regional advisory councils were created in 1932 to replace the number of supervisory boards restricted by law. Up to now, every acceding municipality got a supervisory board position (in 1930 75 of 107 supervisory board positions were occupied by the municipalities).

time of the nationalsocialism

On May 1, 1933, the RWE board joined the NSDAP in Essen. In the early days of the Nazi regime , RWE, as an exponent of the major energy suppliers, was under pressure. At the time of the Weimar Republic, the NSDAP had propagated the decentralization of the energy supply through small power plants.In addition to the pricing policy, it also criticized the vulnerability of the large energy suppliers during the war: the north-south line with the main control point in Brauweiler and the golden mine were within range of enemy long-range guns. Despite polemical attacks, RWE board member Koepchen was able to gradually implement his ideas in the 'Reichsverband der Elektrizitätsversorgung' (REV), founded in 1934, and with his reports. The decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior of August 1935, which favored the energy supply as a (decentralized) municipal task contrary to the municipal code of 1935, was averted by the Energy Industry Act 1935 , which laid down the centralized network economy. Because of the upgrade, the regime was dependent on the power plant capacities of the large energy suppliers, and the upgrade was also the solution to the market structure crisis for RWE, in which it found itself due to the incorrect planning of oversized large power plants in the 1920s: in 1930 there were 1250 MW, in 1932 2310 MW overcapacities ( 28% of the nationwide total output under reserve of 25% output above the annual peak load) with declining consumption since 1929 (beginning of the global economic crisis ). Only the energy-intensive armament of the Wehrmacht made large power plants profitable. With the Energy Industry Act, the regional monopolies were finally established against the longstanding resistance of RWE. From the takeover of power in 1933, NSDAP members took over the municipal mandates; this brought them to the group management. The third chairman Dillgardt acted as GBEn with the plan of a state empire busbar against the interests of RWE with its vertically integrated group . In 1937, the achieved coal syndicate with the STEAG -Incorporation a partial success in the years of dispute over the electricity with their grade coal with the area monopoly RWE and VEW, who had to fend off by the electricity industry to a subsidization of uncompetitive hard coal to syndicate prices. In his inaugural speech in 1943, RWE board member Wilhelm Ricken stated that Germany would lose the war. Denounced by his colleagues, he was sentenced to death by the People's Court in 1944. During the Second World War, RWE was a backbone of the arms industry; In 1943, every eighth kWh of the public supply came from the golden mine alone .

Federal Republic

"The energy policy in the Federal Republic (...) is today largely determined by RWE" ( Luz Mez ), because this "mammoth corporation is so ramified that it is hardly possible to estimate its influence even approximately correctly". The division of Germany meant that RWE rose to by far the largest energy supply company in Germany, as most of the areas of the state's pre-war competitors were in the east. In 1948, RWE board member Heinrich Schöller reestablished an exclusive interest group for the major energy suppliers, the Deutsche Verbundgesellschaft . Wilhelm Werhahn had been chairman of the supervisory board since 1945 , successors then came alternately from Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank : Hermann Josef Abs (1957–1977); Jürgen Ponto (1977); Friedrich Wilhelm Christians (1977–1992), Wolfgang Röller (1992–1997).

RWE was initially reluctant to take part in the government-sponsored development of nuclear energy in Germany. One of the best-known atomic pessimists in the atomic euphoria of the 1950s was RWE consultant Oskar Löbl, who countered with cost calculations. In 1957, Schöller, the board member responsible for nuclear issues, replied to the Ministry of Economic Affairs that the costs of disposing of the waste were just as expensive as generating electricity itself. In the 1950s, there were no financing options. In the energy gap forecasts at the time, RWE relied on lignite instead of crude oil.

Frimmersdorf II power plant, the world's largest thermal power plant in 1966

RWE invested in the Schluchsee and Illwerke and the lignite power stations Fortuna , Frimmersdorf , Weisweiler and Goldenberg because it controlled 80% of the lignite. At that time, RWE tried " with all means of propaganda (...) to present nuclear power as a utopia ". In 1956, RWE commissioned the Kahl experimental nuclear power plant as a test balloon . From the 1960s, at the urging of the atomic pope Heinrich Mandel , RWE built a power plant in Gundremmingen, over two-thirds of which was paid for by the federal government, and so gave up its resistance to state subsidies for nuclear energy. The RWE decision for the boiling water reactor model was made due to the low construction costs. In 1962 the company had 15,000 employees and an annual turnover of 2.1 billion DM. In 1972 RWE had 56,600 employees and achieved an annual turnover of 6.8 billion DM. In 1966, Frimmersdorf II, the world's largest thermal power plant (2300 MW), was completed . RWE's enormous lignite investments were viewed internally with concern by the Federal Ministry of Economics, as it gave it a monopoly on the energy market and called for “nuclear energy to compete”. In 1969 RWE commissioned Biblis A, the world's largest nuclear power plant at the time, “ in a dramatic turnaround ” ( Radkau ) . The capital shortage of the electricity industry was over at the end of the 1960s and the entry was partly due to the " lack of profit promises investment sectors " ( Joachim Radkau ). The acquisition of 42, initiated by Mandel's opponent, RWE board member Helmut Meysenburg , electricity sector department, contributed to this. 5% of the Gelsenberg oil company . The purchase provided insights into the oil business in the Middle East and led the board to realize that there were no alternatives to nuclear energy. However, even before the oil price crisis in 1973, RWE had sold the Gelsenberg package (48%) to the federal government at a profit.

The largest police presence in the Federal Republic of Germany at the demonstration against the Kalkar fast breeder in 1977

In contrast, Kalkar , which was never connected to the grid, turned out to be an investment ruin with construction costs of over € 3.6 billion. It was the nuclear power plant that provoked the largest public protest: the 1977 police presence against 40,000 demonstrators is considered the largest in Germany. The exchange of blows between the licensing authority ( Ministry of Economic Affairs ) and the federal supervisory authority ( Ministry of the Environment ) ended in 1991 in favor of the state with the halt of the " Hellfire of Kalkar " ( Farthmann ) for safety concerns and costs (7 billion DM). In 1977 there was Germany's only major accident with a total loss in Gundremmingen Block A. RWE was one of the three parent companies (45% of the shares) of Hanauer Nukem , whose operating license was revoked in 1988 as a result of the scandal of its subsidiary Transnuklear . Although RWE was involved, it was critical of the GROWIAN project. The Mülheim-Kärlich nuclear power plant, which has been partially approved since 1975, had to be taken off the grid in 1988 after almost two years of trial operation and 100 days of regular operation due to its location in the earthquake-prone Neuwied basin. RWE failed with its complaint for breach of official duties with the partial construction permit before the BGH, after which the lower courts awarded RWE 2 billion DM. It was also doubtful whether the Biblis nuclear power plant and most of the RWE nuclear power plants were built and operated in accordance with the permit.

In 1981 RWE contributed to a third of the SO 2 emissions from power plants in Germany. The former GDR was the largest lignite producer in the world with a share of around 25%. The special regulation in the ordinance on large combustion, gas turbine and internal combustion engine systems from 1983, that most lignite power plants were allowed to emit 650 instead of 400 mg SO 2 / m³, was named "Lex RWE" after the beneficiary. The dry additive process developed by RWE, which was half the price and which achieved SO 2 emissions of 650 mg / m³, was then abandoned.

Since 1990

By the end of the 1980s, RWE had become a conglomerate with a wide range of activities outside of the electricity business. In 1990 the operative business in the five company divisions Energy, Mining and Raw Materials, Mineral Oil and Chemicals, Waste Management as well as Machine, Plant and Equipment Construction was done by the management companies RWE Energie, Rheinbraun, RWE Dea , RWE Disposal, Rheinelektra and Lahmeyer . The newly created position of CEO was taken over by Friedhelm Gieske. The chairman of the supervisory board had been Wolfgang Röller since 1992 , who resigned in 1997 on alleged suspicion of tax evasion. His successor was Friedel Neuber . In the course of the 1990s, activities in the chemical and petrochemical sector (RWE Condea) and telecommunications ( RWE Telliance ) were added.

In 1990, together with Preussenelektra and Bayernwerk, RWE acquired a large part of the entire East German electricity industry from the Treuhandanstalt in the " electricity contract " and subsequently Energieversorgung Spree-Schwarze Elster AG (ESSAG), Oder-Spree-Energieversorgung (OSE) and Westsächsische Energieǘersorgung Mitteldeutschland AG (WEMAG) . The bypassed East German municipalities successfully defended themselves against the expropriation and in 1992 forced an understanding ("current comparison") before the Federal Constitutional Court in their favor. After the electricity comparison, Energieversorgung Südsachsen AG (EVS AG) was added to the holdings, which was later merged into Envia Mitteldeutsche Energie . The Lusatian lignite AG was privatized in 1994 by a consortium under Rheinbraun taken. In 1992, RWE acquired 50% of the shares in the third largest North American hard coal company Consol Energy through Rheinbraun . Consol was wholly acquired by joint venture partner DuPont in 1998 and sold again in 2003.

With the sensational purchase of Deutsche Texaco , RWE got back into the oil business. RWE began to operate on a large scale in the waste disposal business with RWE Disposal AG, which was founded in 1989. When the dual system in Germany got into a financial crisis in 1993 , RWE in particular ensured that the disposal companies waived outstanding bills of around DM 870 million. RWE received one sixth of the seats on the supervisory board and provided one of four managing directors. When it became clear that the telecommunications monopoly was falling, RWE pushed into the telecommunications business. In October 1994, RWE Energie became the fourth largest mobile communications provider with the acquisition of Preussag Mobilfunk. At the end of 1996, RWE brought parts of RWE Telliance into a joint venture with VEBA in O.tel.o , which was sold again in 1999 and a little later its stake in E-Plus .

literature

Empire and Republic

  • Norbert Gilson: The error as the basis of success. The RWE and the implementation of the economic calculation of the network economy up to the 1930s, in: Helmut Maier (Ed.): Electricity economy between environment, technology and politics: Aspects from 100 years of RWE history 1898-1998, Freiberg 1999,
  • Edmund Todd : “From Essen to Regional Power Supply, 1890-1920. The Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerk “, in: Helmut Maier (Hrsg.): Electricity economy between environment, technology and politics: Aspects from 100 years of RWE history 1898–1998, Freiberg 1999.
  • Gerald D. Feldman : Stinnes - annexationist, financial juggler and pioneer, in: Dieter Schweer / Wolf Thieme (ed.): RWE - a group becomes transparent. The glass giant. Gabler, Wiesbaden 1998. ISBN 3-409-01898-0 , pp. 9-17.
  • Gerald D. Feldman: Hugo Stinnes. Biography of an industrialist 1870–1924. Munich (CH Beck) 1998, ISBN 3-406-43582-3 , especially pp. 118-142; 238-290.
  • Hans Pohl : From public utility to large electricity company. Foundation, development and expansion of the "Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerke AG" (RWE) 1898–1918, Stuttgart 1992.
  • Thomas P. Hughes : Networks of Power. Electrification in Western Society. 1880–1930, London 1983, especially pp. 407–428 ( PDF )
  • Camillo Asriel: Das RWE, Zurich economic research volume 16 (= Diss. Zurich 1930).

Nazi dictatorship

  • Peter Döring: Ruhr mining and electricity industry. The dispute between the Ruhr mining industry and the public electricity industry about hard coal power generation from 1925 to 1951, Klartext Verlag Essen 2012, ISBN 978-3-8375-0521-4
  • Helmut Maier : "National economic model boy" without fortune. Developments in energy policy and RWE in the “Third Reich”, in: Ders. (Ed.): Electricity industry between environment, technology and politics: Aspects from 100 years of RWE history 1898–1998, Freiberg 1999
  • Manfred Grieger : The RWE in the economic crisis and the Nazi dictatorship 1930-1945, in: Dieter Schweer / Wolf Thieme (ed.): RWE - a group becomes transparent. The glass giant, Wiesbaden 1998, pp. 117–172.

Federal Republic

  • Joachim Radkau: The RWE between lignite and atomic euphoria 1945–1968, in: Dieter Schweer / Wolf Thieme (eds.): RWE - a group becomes transparent. The glass giant, Wiesbaden 1998, pp. 173–220.
  • Joachim Radkau : The RWE between nuclear energy and diversification 1968–1988, in: Dieter Schweer / Wolf Thieme (eds.): RWE - a group becomes transparent. The glass giant, Wiesbaden 1998, pp. 221–260
  • Joachim Radkau: The rise and crisis of the German nuclear industry. 1945-1975. Replaced Alternatives in Nuclear Technology and the Origin of the Nuclear Controversy. Rowohlt, Reinbek 1983, ISBN 3-499-17756-0
  • Lutz Mez , Rainer Osnowski: RWE - a giant with charisma. Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Cologne 1996, ISBN 3-462-02550-3
  • Lutz Mez (Hrsg.): New ways in the air pollution control. A case study on informal administrative action in environmental policy using the example of RWE, International Institute for Comparative Society Research (IIVG) report 84-3, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 1984.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ https://www.siemens.com/history/de/aktuelles/1112_ssw.htm
  2. ↑ Die Zeit , February 22, 1985 No. 09 http://www.zeit.de/1985/09/ein-versorgungsunternehmen-nicht-nur-fuer-die-kunden/komplettansicht
  3. ^ Last report "'Volkswirtschaft.'" In Dresdner Journal, 1906, No. 2, Wednesday, January 3rd in the afternoon
  4. ↑ Walter Wagner : The People's Court in National Socialist State - With a research report for the years 1975 to 2010 by Jürgen Zarusky , Munich 2011, p. 344 .
  5. ^ A mixture of omnipotence and felt , Der Spiegel, February 24, 1986.
  6. ^ Helmut Gröner : The order of the German electricity industry, Baden-Baden 1975, p. 63; Electricity: There is deliberate discrimination , Der Spiegel from March 14, 1977.
  7. ↑ Helmut Gröner: The order of the German electricity industry, Baden-Baden 1975, p. 64 (with tables p. 64ff).
  8. ↑ Ulrich Jochimsen : Der Stromstaat, p. 66ff. ( PDF ).
  9. ↑ Atomic Minister Balke to Vialon 1960, Radkau 1983, p. 121, 503./Radkau/Hahn 2013, p. 88.
  10. ↑ See who gets how much electricity , Der Spiegel from January 1, 1958.
  11. ↑ The AKS financing model preferred by the state opposed the "RWE model" of subsidizing the nuclear power plant builders / Radkau / Hahn: Aufstieg und Fall der deutschen Atomwirtschaft, Munich 2013, p. 129.
  12. ↑ Biblis dispute - The story of a split ( Memento of the original from April 9, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Hessischer Rundfunk from April 15, 2011. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hr-online.de
  13. ^ Joachim Radkau: Rise and Crisis of the German Nuclear Industry. 1945-1975, 1983, p. 31 with additional information / cf. 134ff./Radkau/Hahn: Rise and fall of the German nuclear industry, Munich 2013, p. 43 ( PDF )
  14. ↑ Willy Marth [1] : Interior views of the electricity company RWE on http://www.rentnerblog.com/ from December 7, 2013, accessed on March 26, 2014
  15. ^ Fritz Vahrenholt: The expensive progress , Der Spiegel of December 21, 1998.
  16. ↑ Radkau / Hahn: Rise and Fall of the German Nuclear Industry, Munich 2013, p. 342.
  17. ↑ Hasso Hofmann : Private Sector and State Control in Energy Supply through Nuclear Power, in: Constitutional Perspectives: Articles from the years 1980-1994, Mohr, Tübingen 1995, p. 373 ; Radkau / Hahn: The rise and fall of the German nuclear industry, Munich 2013, p. 344.
  18. ^ Judgment of January 16, 1997, BGHZ 134, 268.
  19. ↑ AGAI (AG Atomindustrie) / AKCI (Working Group Chemical Industry) (Ed.): RWE - A giant with charisma. Cologne 1984, p. 126.
  20. ↑ AGAI (AG Atomindustrie) / AKCI (Working Group Chemical Industry) (Ed.): RWE - A giant with charisma. Cologne 1984, p. 138ff .; Heidi Fichter: “Environmental Policy and Economic Interests. An examination of the decision-making processes for the Large Combustion Plant Ordinance (GFAVO) ” , FFU reports 88-1, Berlin 1988; Outrage with sulfur , Der Spiegel, May 2, 1983; see also A few back doors , Der Spiegel, November 19, 1984; BVerfG (preliminary examination committee) of September 14, 1983, 1 BvR 920/83, NJW 1983, 2931.
  21. ↑ Heinz-Günter Kemmer: " Nature's trick lowers costs " , Die Zeit from August 8, 1980.
  22. ↑ BT-Drs. 9/872: "Energy and Environment" , special report March 1981 of the Council of Experts for Environmental Issues, p. 71 ( PDF ).
  23. ^ Franz Joos: Technical Combustion - Combustion Technology, Combustion Modeling, Emissions, Berlin / Heidelberg 2006, p. 712.
  24. ↑ Alexandra Bültmann / Frank Wätzold: The implementation of national and European legislation concerning air emissions from large combustion plants in Germany, Helmholtz Center for Environmental Research - UFZ August 2000, p. 20 ( ( page no longer available , search in web archives: PDF ) ).@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.cerna.ensmp.fr
  25. ↑ Wolfgang Röller 75 years , FAZ from October 18, 2004.
  26. ↑ Udo Leuschner: Energy Chronicle: 971219 , December 1997.
  27. ↑ Udo Leuschner: ENERGY KNOWLEDGE: The electricity industry in the new federal states is structured in the same way as in the west ; Joachim Kahlert : Decentralized Energy Supply in East Germany: State of Development and Perspectives , Conference of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on October 25, 1991 in Brandenburg / Havel, Bonn 1991; Fritz Vorholz: Wrong Connection , The time of August 31, 1990
  28. ↑ agreement to settle the dispute before the Federal Constitutional Court on the structure of power in the new countries (2 BvR 1043/91, 1183/91, 1457/91) was brought to court on 22 December 1992 against the current contract in 1990 and the unification treaty of 31 August 1990 ( ( page can no longer be called up , search in web archives: amendment of § 4 paragraph 2 ) of the KVG , Federal Law Gazette II p. 889, 1199), cf. Higher Regional Court Rostock Az. 1 U 187/98 ; Felix Christian Matthes: Electricity Industry and German Unity. A case study on the transformation of the electricity industry in East Germany, Berlin 2000 (= Diss. FU Berlin 1999): Peter Becker : Rise and Crisis of German Electricity Companies, Bochum 2011, p. 51ff.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.gesetze-im-internet.de
  29. ↑ Heinz-J. Bontrup / Ralf-M. Marquardt: Critical Handbook of the German Electricity Industry, Berlin 2010, p. 219
  30. ↑ cf. Tenth main report of the Monopolies Commission 1992/1993 July 22, 1994, BT-Drs. 12/8323 ( PDF )
  31. ↑ Udo Leuschner: Kurzschluss, Münster 2007, p. 44.
  32. ↑ Gunhild Lütge: Dynamics or Hysteria? , The time of October 21, 1994; Udo Leuschner: Kurzschluss, Münster 2007, p. 45ff.
  33. ↑ Takeover of Preussag Mobilfunk GmbH as good as certain - RWE Energie holds war chest for further TC activities , Computerwoche , September 30, 1994.
  34. ↑ Gunhild Lütge: Strong, but discouraged , Die Zeit from April 8, 1999.
  35. ↑ Udo Leuschner: Kurzschluss, Münster 2007, pp. 45ff.