Mayak nuclear facility

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Satellite image of Mayak and the surrounding area
Mayak (Russia)
Mayak
Mayak
Location of the Mayak nuclear facility in Russia

Majak ( Russian производственное объединение "Маяк" "production network, Mayak '" by Russ. Majak for "Lighthouse"; also referred to as chemical combine Mayak or Chelyabinsk-65) is a nuclear facility in Russia in the Chelyabinsk region in Ozersk . It was the first plant for the industrial production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union . Mayak has not produced any material suitable for nuclear weapons since 1987. Since then, the main fields of activity have been the production of radionuclides and the reprocessing of nuclear fuels . Due to the regular operation of the facility and various accidents, including the Kyshtym accident in 1957, very large amounts of radioactive substances were released into the environment. Due to the fact that secrecy and strict access restrictions to the plant and the city of Osjorsk are still in place, only limited reliable information is known to this day.

history

The "Mayak Chemical Combine" was built in great haste from 1945 to 1948 as "Combine 817" together with the associated city (today Osjorsk) as part of the Soviet nuclear weapons project . It was partly created from a previous industrial complex. The first buildings in the city were erected in November 1945. Jakow Dawydowitsch Rapoport, previously deputy construction manager for the White Sea-Baltic Sea Canal, was in charge of the overall construction . From 1947, Mikhail Mikhailovich Zarewski took over the construction of the first reactor building and other buildings in the complex. Chief engineer was Nikolai Antonowitsch Dolleschal , who was also responsible for the construction of the first reactor A.

A uranium- graphite reactor went into operation in June 1948 as the first reactor . In December of the same year, a radiochemical plant for processing the plutonium produced in the reactor went into operation. The first scientific director was Vitali Chlopin , who was responsible, among other things, for reprocessing plant B. Plant V for further metallurgical processing, in which the plutonium hemispheres for nuclear weapons were manufactured, went into operation in 1949. Andrei Anatoljewitsch Botschwar was in charge of it .

According to a report by the CIA , about 70,000 forced laborers were used in the construction work.

In Mayak, weapons-grade plutonium was primarily extracted for nuclear weapons production during the Soviet era , including for the first Soviet atomic bomb . At times up to 25,000 people were employed in Mayak, in 2003 around 14,000 people.

Between 1948 and 1987 a total of ten nuclear reactors went into operation there. Mayak has not produced any material suitable for nuclear weapons since 1987. By 1991 eight of the ten reactors were shut down. The two reactors still in operation produce, among other things, isotopes for medical, military and research purposes. In addition, fuel for nuclear power plants and submarines is produced in Mayak and spent fuel elements are reprocessed .

The general director of the entire facility has been the physicist Sergei Baranow (* 1957) since December 2007.

When it was commissioned in 1949, the facility had no way of disposing of its radioactive waste. As a result, it was disposed of in the nearby Tetscha River , which led to severe radioactive contamination . From 1951 the residents were no longer allowed to use the river. However, since no justification was given for the measure, the instruction was ignored. At the same time, people began to secretly examine residents for radiation damage. In 1953 the first village was evacuated, and in 1956 the river was closed; 19 villages along the river with a total of about 10,000 inhabitants were cleared. The buildings were destroyed. It is estimated that by this point 100 petabecquerels had already entered the river and its full length was contaminated.

In 1957 a tank for radioactive waste exploded in the facility (see Kyschtym accident ). The accident was classified at the second highest level 6 (serious accident) on the International Rating Scale for Nuclear Events (INES), making it the third worst nuclear accident in history after the Chernobyl disaster (1986) and the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011). 20,000 km² with around 270,000 inhabitants were radioactively contaminated. The following year, the exclusion zone that still exists today was established.

The Mayak area was one of the last targets Francis Gary Powers flew over on his spy flight on May 1, 1960, before his plane was shot down.

In 1967 the nearby Karachay Lake fell dry. The radioactive sediments were blown up and formed a plume about 100 km long. The lake remained the most radioactive body of water in the world for decades; in 2015 the lake was emptied and concreted over.

News of the accident in Mayak did not reach the West until November 1979 through the dissident Shores Medvedev , and the residents were only informed in 1989 as part of glasnost .

Several times in the last few years, Mayak's operating license was withdrawn in whole or in part for a short time. In the spring of 1997, the reprocessing plant was shut down because the operating permit required vitrification of highly radioactive waste, but this could not be carried out due to a defective vitrification system. In the same year, the reprocessing plant resumed operation after evidence of sufficient interim storage until the new vitrification plant was put into operation.

On January 1, 2003, the operation of the nuclear facility was temporarily stopped again by Russian authorities because radioactive waste was still being discharged into open waters, which was not permitted under Russian environmental protection laws. A resumption of operation could only be approved after the installation of new technical systems that reduce the release of radioactive waste water.

Plans to sell the fuel element factory in Hanau to Mayak , which had never been in operation , were abandoned in 2000.

In 2010, the environmental protection organization Greenpeace criticized the Swiss energy supplier Axpo for using reprocessed fuel rods in Mayak without disclosing this. The fuel rods are used in the Beznau and Gösgen nuclear power plants. The company then announced that it would better control the origin of the fuel rods and review the supply contracts.

The plant was threatened in 2010 by the forest and peat fires in Russia . On August 9, 2010, the authorities declared a state of emergency near the facility because the flames were approaching the facility. Shortly afterwards, however, the all-clear was given.

In September 2010, plans became known that 951 fuel elements from the research center Dresden-Rossendorf , which are currently stored in the Ahaus nuclear waste storage facility , should be sent to Mayak. There they should be reprocessed so that they can then be used in Russian nuclear power plants. The project met with criticism from German and Russian environmental protection organizations, which, among other things, questioned the possibility of safe storage in Mayak. At the beginning of December 2010, Federal Environment Minister Norbert Röttgen refused the export license because he was not convinced that the prescribed harmless recycling of nuclear waste could be guaranteed there.

designation

In the course of time, the plant was renamed more frequently: From 1946 to 1967 Mayak was referred to as "Kombinat 817" (Russian Комбинат № 817 ), from 1967 to 1989 as "Chemical Combine Mayak" ( Химический комбинат "Маяк" ). Between 1990 and 2001 was the term "production network Mayak" ( Производственное объединение "Маяк" ), since 2001 "Federal state unitary operating production network Mayak" ( Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие Производственное объединение "Маяк"; ФГУП ПО "Маяк" ).

The associated closed city of Osjorsk also had no official name for a long time, but was initially only referred to as Chelyabinsk-40 and later as Chelyabinsk-65 (a kind of post office box address).

Structure and structure

Fencing of the Mayak nuclear facility

The area of ​​the plant covers about 90 km². Adjacent is Osjorsk, where most of Mayak's workforce lives. The facility - like Mayak itself - was not shown on publicly accessible maps in the Soviet Union . The location of the city built together with the facility was chosen so that it would be affected as little as possible by the harmful exhaust gases from the facility in the prevailing winds there. The site includes several nuclear reactors, a reprocessing plant and several storage facilities for fissile material, especially for radioactive waste . Mayak is surrounded by an approximately 250 km² exclusion zone.

The construction site of the South Urals nuclear power plant is located about 7 km to the northeast .

Reactors

Nuclear reactors of various types commissioned in Mayak
Reactor name Reactor type Start of operation Shutdown Remarks
A (Anuschka) Uranium- graphite reactor 06/01/1948 06/16/1987 100 MW therm , later upgraded to 500 MW therm
AI 12/22/1951 05/25/1987 Research reactor
AW-1 07/15/1950 08/12/1989 300 MW therm
AW-2 03/30/1951 07/14/1990
AW-3 09/15/1952 11/10/1991
OK-180 Heavy water reactor 10/17/1951 03/03/1966
OK-190 December 27, 1955 10/08/1965
OK-190M 1966 04/16/1986
Lyudmila (LF-2) December 31, 1987 In operation 1000 MW therm
Ruslan Light water reactor 06/18/1979 In operation converted, previously heavy water reactor, 1000 MW therm
New reactor Unknown Planned for 2023 Under construction Replacement for Ruslan and Lyudmilla

The first reactor in Mayak was the water-cooled graphite-moderated reactor A, also called Anuschka by the workforce. It first became critical on June 7, 1948 . It was loaded with 150 tons of uranium, almost the entire amount available in the Soviet Union at the time. The fissile material (plutonium) of the first Soviet atomic bomb, RDS-1 , was recovered in reactor A. Reactor A originally had a thermal output of 100 MW, but was later upgraded to 500 MW. In the event of malfunctions and accidents, released fission products were passed through a system of several air filters that were supposed to filter out various radioactive elements.

There were numerous technical problems with the reactor, especially during the first few years of operation. The main problem was the aluminum tubes for the uranium pellets , which became brittle and leaky due to corrosion and overheating. The repairs required unloading the reactor. Typically, the fuel should be discharged downwards and collected underwater. However, since there was too little further fuel available for reloading, the fissile material was discharged upwards into the reactor room, exposing the workers to high levels of radiation.

Between 1950 and 1952, three more graphite reactors, the AW reactors, went into operation, the design of which was similar or identical. In 1951 the first OK heavy water reactor was put into operation, two more followed in 1955 and 1966. The first two OK reactors were shut down after 15 and 10 years respectively; the reasons for this are not known.

The two reactors currently in operation (2019) Ruslan and Ljudmila (also known as LF-2) have a thermal output of 1000 MW each and are used to produce 14 C , 60 Co , 192 Ir , 238 Pu and tritium, among other things . Both reactors are to be replaced by a new one, which has been under construction since 2018 and is scheduled to go into operation in 2023. On February 14, 2019, there was a small fire on the construction site of the new reactor.

Remanufacturing

For the production of nuclear weapons or for reuse in nuclear reactors, spent fuel elements have to be reprocessed. In 1948, plant B went into operation for the extraction of plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons from spent fuel elements . From 1960 it was then replaced by the DB facility , which was in operation until 1987. In a further processing step, the treated plutonium was then metallurgically processed in Plant V, built in 1949 near the Tatysch settlement (see satellite image of Mayak and the surrounding area ) for use in nuclear weapons. Even after nuclear weapons production stopped in 1987, this facility continues to operate. Your current responsibilities are unknown.

For civil use, fuel elements have been reprocessed in the RT-1 facility since 1977 . Fuel elements from the (nuclear power plant) reactor types WWER -440, BN -350 and BN-600 as well as from some marine and research reactors are currently being processed there. The reprocessed nuclear fuels are then used, among other things, to produce fuel elements for RBMK nuclear power plants or MOX fuel elements . Although designed for 410 tons per year, the plant processed only about 150 tons of spent fuel in 2004, partly due to the wear and tear on the plant and legal restrictions on the discharge of radioactive waste into the environment. The reprocessing for civil purposes is next to the production of radioactive isotopes the main field of activity of Mayak today.

The highly radioactive waste generated during reprocessing is prepared (after intermediate storage in liquid form) in a vitrification plant for intermediate or final storage. Medium and low level radioactive waste from reprocessing is mainly discharged into Lake Karachay .

Production of radioactive isotopes

Special radioactive isotopes ( radionuclides ) have been produced in Mayak since the early 1950s . Among other things, tritium was obtained for use in nuclear weapons (for example for so-called boosted fissure bombs ). Other isotopes have been obtained for use in radionuclide batteries or for medical, agricultural or industrial use.

Today the two remaining reactors are producing isotopes for medical, military and research purposes. According to its own information, Majak is the world market leader in the sale of 137 Cs and neutron sources based on 241 Am and supplies 30% of the world market to 60 Co ; over 90% of the production is exported.

Storage facilities for fissile material

Storage for fissile material during construction
Ventilation system and the warehouse for fissile material during the construction period

The camp fissile material ( English fissile material storage facility , just FMSF , Russian хранилище делящихся материалов , shortly ХДМ , 55 ° 42 '45 "  N , 60 ° 50' 53"  O ) was developed in cooperation between Russia and the United States under of the Nunn - Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The aim was to build a storage facility for highly enriched and weapons-grade fissile material that was both nuclear-safe and protected against physical access. Construction began in 1993 and opened in 2003. However, the first material was only stored in July 2006 because the plant was not fully functional beforehand, there was no agreement on monitoring rights from the US side and there were not yet sufficiently trained personnel for operation and the guard was available. Various civil and military US and Russian partners were involved in the construction, including the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the American construction company Bechtel Corporation . The total construction costs amounted to about 400 million US dollars .

The camp is designed to withstand earthquakes with a magnitude of 8 on the Richter scale , a flood and a plane crash. It has a capacity of 50 tons of plutonium and 200 tons of uranium and can thus hold material from up to 12,500 dismantled nuclear warheads. However, in 2004 only around 25% utilization was planned. The planned useful life of the warehouse is 100 years.

There is also a wet storage facility for up to 560 t of uranium on the site of the RT-1 reprocessing plant. In 2004, a storage facility for 154 40-t containers for fuel from nuclear submarines was also under construction.

Waters

Development of the Tetscha cascade of reservoirs from 1949 to 1964 (animated)

Waters around the facility were and still are used for the disposal and storage of radioactive waste. Liquid radioactive waste, which was mainly generated during processing, was discharged into the Tetscha River in the early years of plutonium production . In order to prevent the radionuclides deposited in the sediment of the river near the point of discharge from being washed further downstream, an extensive system of canals and reservoirs was created over time. Originally, the Tetscha flowed from Lake Irtjasch through Lake Kyzyltash. In the meantime, most of the river's water is diverted in advance via the left (northern) embankment canal for around 40 km before it is fed back into the original river bed. In between there are several artificially created reservoirs (V-3, V-4, V-10 and V-11) over the original course of the river, of which V-10 with around 8,500  Tera - Becquerel (TBq, 8.5 · 10 15  Bq ) is most heavily radioactive. The Misheljak River, which used to flow into the Tetscha at the level of the V-10 reservoir, is also routed past the reservoirs via the right (southern) embankment canal. The canals flow into the Asanowski swamps, which are around 30 km² in size and are polluted with 220 TBq (2.2 · 10 14  Bq).

Basin V-3 with an area of ​​0.78 km² was created in 1951. V-4 (1.6 km²) was built over the former Metlinski Basin when an existing dam was raised in 1956. The capacity of V-3 and V-4 roughly corresponded to the annual discharge of low-level radioactive waste water. Basin V-10 (18.6 km²) was created in October 1956 and dammed the water flowing out of V-4. The rearmost reservoir V-11 is the largest of the reservoirs at 47.5 km². It was built in 1963 to create another barrage for the fast-filling V-10 basin. The level of V-11 is now dangerously high. In order to lower the water level, the basin will serve as a source of cooling water for the South Urals nuclear power plant under construction, as the increased water temperature would lead to increased evaporation. The northern embankment canal was built in 1962, the southern one in 1972.

Other stagnant waters into which liquid radioactive waste was discharged are the Karachay Lake (pollution approx. 4  Exa -Becquerel, 4 · 10 18  Bq) and the Staroje-Boloto Basin (approx. 74  Peta - Becquerel, 7.4 x 10 16  Bq). The Karachay Lake has meanwhile been largely filled with concrete to prevent radioactive material from being drifted away. The area was reduced from 0.51 km² in 1962 to 0.15 km² in 1994.

Accidents

According to the Society for Plant and Reactor Safety , eight documented, more serious events occurred between 1948 and 2008:

date Event description INES level Victim
03/15/1953 Criticality accident in container with plutonium nitrate 3 3 injured
04/21/1957 Criticality accident in container with HEU 4th 1 dead, 10 injured
09/29/1957 Explosion of a storage tank (Kyschtym accident) 6th 1 injured by explosion, unknown number of victims by radioactivity
01/02/1958 Criticality accident in container with HEU 4th 3 dead, 1 injured
05.12.1960 Criticality accident in container with plutonium carbonate 3
07.09.1962 Criticality accident with plutonium waste 3
December 16, 1965 Criticality accident with HEU waste 3
December 10, 1968 Criticality accident in a container with a plutonium solution 4th 1 dead, 1 injured

From September 25 to October 7, 2017, a ruthenium-106 concentration was measured near Mayak that was 986 times the permitted value. So far there is no official confirmation of an accident. However, it is assumed that the accident is related to an order from the Laboratori Nazionali del Gran Sasso particle physics laboratory . Years earlier this had ordered a strong radiation source in Mayak. Shortly after the radiation cloud appeared, Mayak canceled the order and stated that it could not fulfill it.

Due to the radioactive pollution of the workers and the population through the operation of the plant, there has been an increasing number of investigations into the effects of such radioactive pollution on people in recent years.

April 21, 1957: criticality accident in a container with highly enriched uranium

Too much uranium solution accumulated in a container that was in a glove box , so that it became critical. The container then burst open and some of the solution spilled into the glove box. One worker received a radiation dose of 30 to 46 Gray and died 12 days later. Five other workers in the same room were irradiated with over 3 Gray each and then radiation sick . Five other people received doses of up to 1 gray.

On the international assessment scale for nuclear incidents (INES), the incident was classified at level 4 (accident).

September 29, 1957: Kyshtym accident

Area contaminated by the Kyshtym accident (Ostural Trail)
Memorial to the rescue workers of the Kyshtym accident

On September 29, 1957, the spark from an internal control device triggered an explosion of the crystallized nitrate salts in a 300 cubic meter tank with residues created during processing. Large amounts of radioactive substances were released in the chemical, non-nuclear explosion. These included long-lived isotopes such as 90 Sr ( half-life 29 years), 137 Cs (30 years) and 239 Pu (24,110 years). According to information from the production company Mayak and the authorities, material with a radioactivity of 400 PBq (4 · 10 17  Bq) was distributed over an area of ​​around 20,000 square kilometers. Around 270,000 people were exposed to increased doses of radiation.

A comparative calculation based on the radioactive exposure specified by the authorities estimates around 1000 additional cancer cases from the accident.

In the International Rating Scale for Nuclear Incidents (INES), the accident of 1957 is in the second highest category 6, whereas the worst-case scenario in Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) are in the highest category 7. This makes it the third worst nuclear accident in history. According to the Helmholtz Zentrum München , the effects of the Kyschtym accident were underestimated for a long time.

January 2, 1958: Criticality accident in a container with highly enriched uranium

After a criticality experiment, the uranium solution should be transferred to geometrically safe containers. In order to save time, the experimenters bypassed the standard procedure for decanting because they assumed that the remaining solution was far subcritical. However, due to the changed geometry during the transfer, the presence of people was sufficient to reflect enough neutrons for the solution to promptly become critical. The solution exploded and three workers received radiation doses of about 60 gray and died after five to six days. A worker 3 meters away received 6 Gray, survived the acute radiation sickness, but suffered from serious secondary diseases. The criticality experiments in this factory were then discontinued. On the international assessment scale for nuclear incidents (INES), the incident was classified at level 4 (accident).

1967: Contaminated dust storms

A period of drought in the spring of 1967 caused the water level of Lake Karachai, which was used as an interim storage facility, to sink. Between April 10 and May 15, strong winds carried radioactive sediment dust from the dry shores over an area of ​​1,800 to 5,000 km 2 . Their total activity is estimated by various sources at 22 TBq to 220 TBq (2.2 to 22 · 10 13  Bq).

December 10, 1968: Criticality accident in a container with a plutonium solution

When a plutonium solution was improvised from a 20 liter container to a 60 liter container, the solution in the target container became critical. After the resulting flash of light and heat shock, the worker dropped the 20-liter container, and the remains of the plutonium solution in it spilled onto the floor. The building was evacuated and the radiation protection officer prohibited entry to the area. However, the shift supervisor insisted on entering the building and went together with the radiation protection officer to the room in which the accident occurred. Despite dangerously high gamma radiation values, the shift supervisor went in after he had sent the radiation protection officer away. Presumably he then tried to lead parts of the plutonium solution into a waste water tank, which however led to renewed criticality. The shift supervisor was exposed to an estimated 24 Gray and passed away about a month later. The worker received about 7 gray and developed severe acute radiation sickness; both of his legs and one hand had to be amputated.

On the international assessment scale for nuclear incidents (INES), the incident was classified at level 4 (accident).

August 31, 1994: Fire on a fuel rod

On August 31, 1994, during reprocessing, the shell of a fuel rod caught fire. This released radioactive material with an activity of 8.8 GBq (8.8 · 10 9  Bq), which corresponds to 4.36% of the permitted annual emission. Failure to comply with work instructions was identified as the cause.

September 9, 2000: power failure

After a 42-minute power failure in the control room of the Ludmilla nuclear reactor, the reactor's cooling system stopped and it almost melted.

June 26-28, 2007: Pipeline leak

Due to a defect in a pipeline for radioactive liquids, it leaked for two days from a leak. The director of the facility, Vitaly Sadovnikov, was suspended from his post because of this incident.

October 25, 2007: Radioactive waste leaked

According to official Russian information, radioactivity was released from the reprocessing plant on October 25, 2007, but there were no injuries or damage to the environment. Liquid radioactive waste was said to have run down a street from a tank. The official reason given was that safety rules had not been sufficiently implemented. The earth along this road had been removed.

October 22, 2008: Three workers injured from a leak

Radioactive material leaked from a collecting basin in Block No. 20 through a defective seal and injured three engineers working there. One of them had to have a finger amputated in order to stop the spread of an α-emitter in his body.

25./26. September 2017: Relief of ruthenium-106

According to the Russian weather service Rosgidromet, an “extremely high” concentration of radioactive ruthenium -106 was found in parts of Russia at the end of September . The highest concentration was loud Rosgidromet in the measuring station Argajasch , registered about 30 km from the nuclear plant Mayak removed. In the week from September 25 to October 7, the concentration of ruthenium-106 there was 986 times the permitted value. In the west this was first noticed by measurements of anomalous ruthenium concentrations in Milan (for the first time after Chernobyl), which was soon followed by many more reports. The nuclear company Rosatom denies a related incident or breakdown in a nuclear facility. In an ARTE broadcast, the Russian environmental activist Nadezhda Kutepova in Paris suspects these measurements of increased ruthenium-106. The cause then lay in the vitrification plant for radioactive waste in Mayak. Further details were published by researchers at the French IRSN in the scientific journal "Science", according to which the ruthenium-106 could presumably be connected to the production of neutrino generators for scientific purposes.

This presumption of causes is also expressed in a study published in 2019 in the scientific journal “ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America ” (USA). The study, in which 69 scientists were involved, is based on the analysis of 1100 atmospheric and 200 soil data. The release of ruthenium 106 by a crashed satellite (as suggested by Russia as a possibility) or in Romania (the highest ruthenium values ​​in the EU come from the Romanian small town of Zimnicea ) has been excluded. The authors believe that the most likely accident at a reprocessing plant in the southern Urals, possibly Mayak. The recalculation of the wind conditions indicates that the cloud at Zimnicea was previously at Mayak on September 25 or 26, 2017. Nuclear fuel reprocessing produces gaseous ruthenium oxide, but is normally captured and collected. The cloud contained only ruthenium, no other radioactive products one would expect in a reactor accident, and the dose was too high for a hospital accident. One of the coordinators of the study, Georg Steinhäuser , accuses Russia of not reporting the incident to the IAEA.

In response to a request from the IAEA in 44 countries after the incident, all countries, including Russia, had denied an incident. There are, however, differences in the interpretation of the international agreement on reporting nuclear accidents, according to which this only has to be done in the case of cross-border incidents above the health thresholds (here the ruthenium was too diluted to cause health damage outside of Russia). An international investigation commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences was not allowed to take measurements near the suspected sources (Mayak), which is why the Swedish participants got out. According to the Russian Atomic Energy Agency Rosatom, however, this commission had dispelled the suspicion of Mayak.

According to the research results published in 2019, the isotope ratio of ruthenium 106 to 103 indicates that fuel rods were processed that did not have a decay time of at least 4 years, as usual, but at most two. Such “young” fuel rods can cause unforeseen problems in reprocessing plants because of their radiation. An order from the neutrino laboratory in Gran Sasso , Italy , which ordered a delivery of Cer-144 and received notification two months after the ruthenium cloud appeared that Mayak could not deliver, is seen as a possible cause for the processing of such fuel rods . Cer-144 can also be obtained from old nuclear fuel rods, but with the required high radiation activity only if they have not yet had a long decay time. Dealing with such relatively young, more radiant fuel rods in reprocessing involves risks that may have been underestimated in Mayak. The chemical composition also indicates that the ruthenium passed through very high temperatures not reached in the normal reprocessing process, which indicates the possibility of an explosion ( ruthenium tetraoxide is known to be explosive at temperatures above 100 ° C). The accident probably had level 5 on the INES scale (the total activity of ruthenium was one seventh of that in Fukushima 2011). From the analysis of the measurement data, a total release of about 250 to 400 terabecquerel of ruthenium-106 can be derived. Scientists limit the time of the release to the time between September 25, 2017, 6:00 p.m., and noon on September 26, 2017 - almost exactly 60 years to the day after the accident in 1957.

Radioactive contamination

Large amounts of radioactive material were released through the facility, including the Kyshtym accident in 1957. The consequences have been investigated as part of the Southern Urals Radiation Risk Research (SOUL) since August 1, 2005. A scientific study by the Russian and Norwegian governments in 1997 came to the conclusion that since 1948, 90 Sr and 137 Cs of Mayak with a total activity of 8.9 Exa Becquerel (EBq, 8.9 · 10 18  Bq) have been released into the environment were submitted. This almost corresponds to the total activity of the material that was released during the Chernobyl disaster (approx. 12 EBq, 12 · 10 18  Bq). In addition, there are emissions of other radioactive elements such as 239 Pu. Environmental organizations estimate that around 500,000 people received increased radiation doses as a result.

Workers exposure to radiation

During the early years, those responsible were more interested in a high level of plutonium production than occupational safety. Especially in the reprocessing plants (Plant B and Plant V), but also in the reactors, the workers were exposed to high doses of radiation between 1948 and 1958. During that time, 2,089 cases of radiation sickness were reported.

For a total of 17,245 people, the annual exposure exceeded 0.25 Sievert  (Sv) at least once  . About 6,000 workers received total doses of over 1 Sv. Only after 1958 did work safety improve gradually.

Water contamination

Cows grazing on the banks of the radioactively contaminated Tetscha River

Between the start of production in 1948 and September 1951, 78 million cubic meters of highly radioactive liquid waste with a total activity of about 106 peta becquerels (PBq, 1.06 · 10 17  Bq) was discharged into the Tetscha River , from which the inhabitants of the region partly obtained their drinking water. After this had led to severe environmental pollution along the course of the river, from 1951 the liquid, highly radioactive waste was primarily discharged into Lake Karachai, which has no surface drainage. The highly radioactive waste has been stored in tanks since 1953; Medium-level radioactive waste continues to be dumped into Lake Karachay.

Due to the radioactive contamination of the river, the residents of numerous villages within the upper 130 km of the river's course have been relocated. The river was cordoned off with barbed wire and warning signs were put up. However, not all villages have been evacuated: The Musljumowo settlement still exists around 70 km downstream, and its 4,000 residents are waiting to be resettled. The environmental protection organization Greenpeace accused those responsible in 2011 of embezzling 2 million rubles (about 50,000 euros) that were earmarked for the resettlement. Despite the ban, residents still use areas on the Tetscha, for example as grazing grounds for livestock.

A study of people who were born before 1950 and who lived in one of the 41 villages on the Tetscha between 1950 and 1960 found that around 3% of cancer deaths and 63% of leukemia deaths were due to the increased radioactive contamination from discharges in the Flow are due.

According to the responsible public prosecutor's office, liquid radioactive waste was once again discharged into the Tetscha between 2001 and 2004. Charges were brought against the director of the nuclear facility, but the trial was suspended due to an amnesty .

Waste with an estimated activity of 20 EBq (2 · 10 19  Bq) was discharged into Lake Karachay until 1993 , especially before 1980. Due to disintegration, partial cleaning, but also spreading into the underlying groundwater layers, the activity in 2004 was approx 4.4 EBq (4.4 · 10 18  Bq) decreased. The lake is still considered one of the most radioactively contaminated places on earth. In 1995 it contained over four times as much 90 Sr and 137 Cs as the remnants of all surface nuclear weapons tests combined. The contaminated lake water seeps into the groundwater and thus pollutes the environment.

According to the operator of the facility, there has been a new regulation since November 19, 2010, according to which low-level radioactive waste is no longer considered waste and can now be released into the environment in an uncontrolled manner.

Floors

The areas of the Eastern Urals are also considered to be heavily contaminated. The radioactive pollution of the region is the subject of the long-term research project Southern Urals Radiation Risk Research (SOUL) . Four Russian and eleven foreign project partners are involved in SOUL, including the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection , the Technical University of Munich , the Karolinska Institutet , the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki , the University of Leiden , the University of Palermo , the University of Florida and health authorities from several countries. The Helmholtz Center in Munich is responsible for coordination.

See also

reception

literature

  • Igor Kudrik, Aleksandr Nikitin, Charles Digges, Nils Bøhmer, Vladislav Larin, Vladimir Kuznetsov: The Russian Nuclear Industry - The Need for Reform. Bellona Report Volume 4: 2004. (PDF; 3.0 MB) Bellona Foundation, November 1, 2004, pp. 47–69 , accessed on April 24, 2010 (English).
  • Carola Paulsen: Morbidity in 80 residents of the Techa River (Southern Urals) who have accidentally been chronically exposed to radiation since 1949 . Ulm University, 2001, (Dissertation Ulm University, December 6, 2001, http://vts.uni-ulm.de/docs/2001/900/vts_900.pdf , 1.9 MB, 253 pages).
  • Thomas B. Cochran, Robert Stan Norris, Oleg Bukharin: Making the Russian bomb: from Stalin to Yeltsin . Ed .: Natural Resources Defense Council. Westview Press, Boulder, CO 1995, ISBN 0-8133-2328-2 , Chapter 3 Chelyabinsk-65 / Mayak Chemical Combine (English, online [PDF; 2.1 MB ; accessed on August 6, 2011] Online version scanned and without images).
  • Nils Boehmer, Thomas Nilsen: Reprocessing plants in Siberia. In: Bellona Working Paper 4: 1995. 1995, archived from the original on December 22, 2001 ; accessed on November 14, 2010 (English).

Movie

  • Documentary: Traces of a nuclear accident in the Urals (Director: Sebastian Mez , 2014)

Web links

Commons : Mayak nuclear facility  - album with pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d e f g h i j Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg A. Bukharin: Making the Russian Bomb - From Stalin to Yeltsin. (PDF; 2.2 MB) Natural Resources Defense Council, 1995, pp. 65-109 , archived from the original on December 14, 2010 ; accessed on November 14, 2010 (English).
  2. a b c d L. Anspaugh, M. Degteva, E. Vasilenko: Mayak Production Association: Introduction. In: Radiation and Environmental Biophysics. 41, 2002, p. 19, doi : 10.1007 / s00411-002-0148-5 .
  3. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Igor Kudrik, Aleksandr Nikitin, Charles Digges, Nils Bøhmer, Vladislav Larin, Vladimir Kuznetsov: The Russian Nuclear Industry - The Need for Reform. Bellona Report Volume 4: 2004. (PDF; 3.0 MB) Bellona Foundation , November 1, 2004, pp. 47–69 , archived from the original on February 15, 2010 ; accessed on April 24, 2010 (English).
  4. Heinz-Jörg Haury: The Gau in Mayak - Eternal fire in the secret city. Süddeutsche Zeitung , September 28, 2007, accessed on November 13, 2010 .
  5. Fred Pearce, Zone of Secrets , New Scientist # 3103, December 10, 2016
  6. ^ Richard Lee Miller: Under the cloud: the decades of nuclear testing . Two-Sixty Press, 1986, ISBN 978-0-02-921620-0 , pp. 326 ff .
  7. a b Igor Kudrik: Mayak to resume waste processing. Bellona Foundation, October 30, 2001, archived from the original April 14, 2013 ; accessed on December 13, 2010 (English).
  8. Rashid Alimov: Revoked License Grinds to a Halt Mayak. Bellona Foundation, January 16, 2003, accessed December 13, 2010 .
  9. Gosatomnadzor Refuses to Renew Mayak's License on Environmental Grounds. Nuclear Threat Initiative / James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, March 2013, archived from the original on November 29, 2011 ; accessed on March 26, 2018 (English).
  10. Hendrik Munsberg: Export of the Siemens Mox factory to Russia is on the brink , Berliner Zeitung , article from September 8, 2000, last accessed on June 13, 2009
  11. Embarrassing uranium origins - Greenpeace knew more than Axpo. Neue Zürcher Zeitung , September 10, 2010, accessed on February 20, 2011 .
  12. Tobias Bühlmann: Axpo continues to purchase uranium from a controversial plant in Russia. In: Tagesschau. Swiss television , November 19, 2010, accessed on February 20, 2011 .
  13. ^ Dpa: State of emergency in the Urals: fire is approaching nuclear facility. n-tv, August 9, 2010, accessed November 12, 2010 .
  14. dpa: Russian nuclear facilities at risk: Experts suspect cover-up. n-tv, August 10, 2010, accessed November 10, 2010 .
  15. Michael Bauchmüller, Frank Nienhuysen: Radiant exports - atomic transport to Russia. Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 9, 2010, accessed on November 13, 2010 .
  16. Reuters: Röttgen stops the transport of nuclear waste to Russia. December 6, 2010, accessed December 6, 2010 .
  17. ФГУП ПО «Маяк»: ПО Маяк - История в датах. Archived from the original on May 27, 2011 ; Retrieved February 13, 2011 (Russian).
  18. MO Degteva, MI Vorobiova, NB Shagina, EA Shishkina, LR Anspaugh, BA Napier: A review of data on releases of radioactive wastes from the "Mayak" production association into the Techa river in 1949-1956. (PDF; 488 kB) In: Report on ISTC Project No.2841. January 2008, archived from the original on January 1, 2015 ; accessed on August 1, 2011 .
  19. ^ A b Nuclear Engineering International: Small fire reported on site of reactor being built at Russia's Mayak facility , February 21, 2019. Retrieved on February 23, 2019. ( Archived version at Wayback Machine )
  20. a b c Weapons of Mass Destruction - Chelyabinsk-65 / Ozersk, Combine 817 / Production Association Mayak. GlobalSecurity.org, April 28, 2005, accessed November 20, 2010 .
  21. ФГУП ПО «Маяк»: ПО Маяк - Производство радиоактивных изотопов. Archived from the original on May 27, 2011 ; Retrieved February 13, 2011 (Russian).
  22. ^ A b Matthew Bunn: Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials - Mayak Fissile Materials Storage Facility. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), September 8, 2007, archived from the original on November 5, 2010 ; accessed on November 13, 2010 (English).
  23. Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier: Securing the Bomb 2006. (PDF) Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), July 28, 2006, p. 15 , accessed on August 1, 2011 (English).
  24. a b Russia: Mayak Fissile Material Facilities. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), February 17, 2004, archived from the original on December 6, 2011 ; accessed on August 1, 2011 .
  25. Dmitriy Burmistrov, Mira Kossenko, Richard Wilson: Radioactive Contamination of the Techa River and its Effects. 2000, accessed November 14, 2010 .
  26. a b c M.V. Mironenko, M.Yu. Spasennykh, VB Polyakov: The cascade of reservoirs of the “Mayak” Plant: Case history and the first version of a computer simulator . Lawrence Berkeley Lab , USDOE, 1994, doi : 10.2172 / 10114733 .
  27. Standring WJF, Dowdall M, Mehli H .: Mayak Health Report: Dose assessments and health of riverside residents close to "Mayak" Production Association. (PDF; 1.8 MB) In: StrålevernRapport 2008: 3. Statens strålevern (Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority), 2008, accessed on November 20, 2010 .
  28. a b c d M. Wehrfritz, V. Hannstein, H. Uhlenbruck, B. Gmal: Evaluation of the harmlessness of the further processing of irradiated fuel elements of the Rossendorf research reactor in the Russian Federation . Ed .: Society for Plant and Reactor Safety. 2010.
  29. a b c d e f g Robert Johnston: Database of Radiological Incidents and Related Events. April 2, 2011, accessed August 1, 2011 .
  30. bad / AFP: Radioactive ruthenium-106: Russia confirms extreme concentration. n-tv.de, November 21, 2017, accessed on November 21, 2017 .
  31. Puzzle about radioactive cloud solved. July 27, 2019, accessed July 27, 2019 .
  32. a b c Thomas P. McLaughlin, Shean P. Monahan, Norman L. Pruvost, Vladimir V. Frolov, Boris G. Ryazanov, Victor I. Sviridov: A Review of Criticality Accidents . 2000 revision. Ed .: National Laboratory Los Alamos . Los Alamos, New Mexico 2000 (English, PDF, 3.7 MB - LA-13638).
  33. ^ International Atomic Energy Agency : INES - The international nuclear and radiological event scale. (PDF; 193 kB) Information Series / Division of Public Information 08-26941 / E. Accessed on March 13, 2011 (English).
  34. a b Helmholtz Zentrum München : 50 Years of Radiation Accident at Kysthym (PDF, 55 kB) , transcript of the audio contribution, September 25, 2007
  35. ^ Proceedings of the Commission on Studying the Ecological Situation in Chelyabinsk Oblast , Vol. I, p. 11 and Vol. 11, p. 32
  36. MV Nikipelov et al .: Practical Rehabilitation of Territories Contaminated as a Result of Implementation of Nuclear Material Production Defense Programs , Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. TN (1990)
  37. ^ William J. Standring, Mark Dowdall, Per Strand: Overview of Dose Assessment Developments and the Health of Riverside Residents Close to the “Mayak” PA Facilities, Russia . In: International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health . tape 6 , no. 1 , 2009, p. 174-199 , doi : 10.3390 / ijerph6010174 .
  38. Blaze at Mayak power plant Russia. WISE-Amsterdam, September 16, 1994, accessed on August 6, 2011 .
  39. Metamorphoses - traces of a nuclear accident in the Urals swr April 28, 2016. April 28, 2016, archived from the original on April 28, 2016 ; Retrieved April 28, 2016 .
  40. Radioactive material leaks during transport at Mayak - no one hurt, says plant. Bellona Foundation, October 26, 2007, accessed August 1, 2011 .
  41. Schweizerische Depeschenagentur / Reuters: Radioactivity leaked at Russian Mayak nuclear power plant. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 29, 2007, accessed on August 6, 2011 .
  42. Bellona / Yelena Yefremova: Accident at Mayak leads to apparently contained radiation leak, and seriously injures one worker, October 28, 2008 . Retrieved July 9, 2011
  43. a b c Konrad Schuller, Die Wolke aus der Atomfabrik, FAS, July 28, 2019, p. 3
  44. bad / AFP: Radioactive ruthenium-106: Russia confirms extreme concentration. n-tv.de, November 21, 2017, accessed on November 21, 2017 .
  45. Mikhail Bushuev, Irina Filatova: Nuclear accident in Russia covered up? dw.com, November 23, 2017, accessed November 23, 2017 .
  46. ^ Daniel Lingenhöhl: New track in radioactive cloud. Spektrum.de, February 16, 2018, accessed on February 21, 2018 .
  47. On the trail of the hushed up GAU of Mayak . Among other things in: arte HD, December 21, 2017, 12: 15–12: 45, "Re: Russlands Atomkatastrophe", Reportage, Germany 2017, 30 min
  48. mishandling of spent nuclear fuel in Russia may have Caused radioactivity to spread across Europe . In: Science | AAAS . February 14, 2018 ( sciencemag.org [accessed March 9, 2018]).
  49. Edwin Cartlidge: Isotope cloud linked to failed neutrino source , Science, Volume 359, February 16, 2018, p. 729
  50. Where did the radioactive cloud over Europe come from? Retrieved March 9, 2018 .
  51. a b O. Masson et al .: Airborne concentrations and chemical considerations of radioactive ruthenium from an undeclared major nuclear release in 2017 . In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America . 2019, doi : 10.1073 / pnas.1907571116 .
  52. Editor: Radioactive Cloud: Precision analyzes clear up. In: ingenieurmagazin.com. July 29, 2019, accessed on July 29, 2019 (German).
  53. ^ Southern Urals Radiation Risk Research. In: www.helmholtz-muenchen.de. Archived from the original on September 11, 2010 ; accessed on August 10, 2010 .
  54. ^ Rob Edwards: Russia's Toxic Shocker . In: New Scientist . December 6, 1997, p. 15 ( online ).
  55. ^ A b Thomas B. Cochran, Robert Standish Norris, Kristen L. Suokko: Radioactive Contamination at Chelyabinsk-65, Russia . In: Annual Review of Energy and the Environment . No. 18 , 1993, p. 507-528 , doi : 10.1146 / annurev.eg.18.110193.002451 .
  56. a b c Deborah H. Oughton, L. Keith Fifield, J. Philip Day, Richard C. Cresswell, Lindis Skipperud, Marianne L. Di Tada, Brit Salbu, Per Strand, Eugeny Drozcho, Yuri Mokrov: Plutonium from Mayak: Measurement of Isotope Ratios and Activities Using Accelerator Mass Spectrometry . In: Environmental Science & Technology . tape 34 , no. 10 , 2000, pp. 1938–1945 , doi : 10.1021 / es990847z .
  57. Nikolaus von Twickel: Ex-Rosatom Executive Hero in $ 3.9M Inquiry. The Moscow Times , July 21, 2011, accessed July 27, 2011 .
  58. ^ Tara Sonenshine, Jay LaMonica: The horrors of Musljumowo. In: 1992, No. 13. DIE ZEIT, March 20, 1992, accessed on July 27, 2011 .
  59. L. Yu. Krestinina, DL Preston, EV Ostroumova, MO Degteva, E. Ron, OV Vyushkova, NV Startsev, MM Kossenko, AV Akleyev: Protracted Radiation Exposure and Cancer Mortality in the Techa River Cohort . In: Radiation Research . No. 164 , 2005, pp. 602-611 , doi : 10.1667 / RR3452.1 .
  60. ^ Leonid Ragozin: Russia challenged by nuclear woes. BBC News, February 28, 2006, accessed April 20, 2010 .
  61. ^ Russian court amnesties nuclear waste plant chief. RIA Novosti, May 11, 2006, accessed April 20, 2010 .
  62. Thomas Angeli: Mayak Director: "Come on, we'll show you everything." November 25, 2010, accessed August 1, 2011 (interview with Mayak director).
  63. ^ Southern Urals Radiation Risk Research - Contractors ( Memento of October 17, 2013 in the Internet Archive )


Coordinates: 55 ° 41 ′ 37 ″  N , 60 ° 48 ′ 16 ″  E