Minsk II

This article deals with the second Minsk Agreement. For "Minsk I" see the Minsk Protocol .

The heads of state and government of Belarus, Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine in Minsk

With Minsk II , including the Minsk agreement called, is the French President Francois Hollande , German Chancellor Angela Merkel , Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin negotiated and contact group signed by the participants of the Trilateral on 12 February 2015 set of measures to Implementation of the Minsk agreements called. Contracting parties as signatories in 2015 were: The former President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma , the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabow , the militia leaders of the self-proclaimed and internationally unrecognized "People's Republics" Luhansk and Donetsk Igor Plotnitski and Alexander Sakharschenko as well as the OSCE -Commissioner Heidi Tagliavini .

The agreement aims to de-escalate and pacify the war that has raged in eastern Ukraine since 2014 and to achieve a political settlement of the conflict. With the agreed set of measures, it concretizes the way in which Minsk I will be implemented .

Before the summit, US President Barack Obama had telephoned Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko. At times, the delegations of the negotiating partners with the foreign ministers of the four countries also took part in the discussion: French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius , Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin , Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier .

Observers doubted early on that the agreement was well thought out: shortly after the agreement was signed, militants loyal to Russia took to the attack on Debaltseve and conquered the town three days after the officially announced ceasefire, which had already broken the agreement. As the process progressed, the conflict continued to smolder with changing intensity. In June, the anti-government troops attacked the town of Marjinka west of Donetsk, and in August 2015 there was a heavy attack in the Mariupol section of the front. The historian Yuri Felschtinski analyzed: “For Putin, the Minsk Treaties are a military ruse to regroup the armed forces and rethink the situation. They are put together in such a way that Russia is not bound to anything. The "separatists" or Kiev, and even Europe - but not Russia - assume all obligations. The interpretation of the contracts is arbitrary - from each of the parties involved. It is absolutely impossible to find out who has violated what, the "separatists" are not responsible to anyone. "

prehistory

Talks in the Kremlin on February 6, 2015 between Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin and François Hollande

Negotiating delegations in the conference hall in Minsk , February 11, 2015

On January 29, 2015, the EU foreign ministers decided at a special meeting in Brussels to extend the sanctions previously imposed on Russia until September. For their next regular meeting, scheduled for February 9, 2015, new, additional sanctions should be identified.

On January 30, 2015, Hollande and Merkel also met with EU Parliament President Martin Schulz in the Alsatian city ​​of Strasbourg . The conversation was described as a confidential exchange on current issues; no content was announced.

On February 6, 2015, François Hollande, Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin discussed the situation in eastern Ukraine in the Kremlin.

On February 9, 2015, it was announced that the EU foreign ministers at their meeting in Brussels would enforce new sanctions in the form of e.g. B. wanted to postpone further travel and property freezes to February 16.

On February 10, 2015, citing the Russian news agency TASS, it was reported that before a crisis summit planned for February 11, Hollande and Merkel had agreed with Poroshenko and Putin in Minsk that a cease-fire and a withdrawal of heavy weapons for eastern Ukraine had been agreed. This happened at a meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group that evening in Minsk and through the mediation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Participants were the Ukrainian ex-President Leonid Kuchma (with a mandate from the pro-European leadership in Kiev), the separatist representatives Vladislav Dejnego and Pushilin from the unrecognized “People's Republics” Donetsk and Lugansk, as well as the Russian diplomat Mikhail Zurabow and Heidi Tagliavini from the OSCE .

negotiations

The agreement was signed on February 12, 2015 in the Belarusian capital Minsk. The four heads of state Hollande, Merkel, Poroshenko and Putin conducted most of the negotiations in private, with interpreters, advisors and foreign ministers also sometimes being present. The leaders of the self-proclaimed “People's Republics” were absent and, according to Hollande, were not seen by any of the participants. The negotiations lasted a total of 17 hours. According to the Badische Zeitung , Putin saw a main reason for the long negotiations in the fact that Poroshenko did not want to speak directly to the rulers of the rebel areas. However, according to Hollande, the reason was that Putin wanted to delay an agreement in order to give his troops enough time to surround the Ukrainian army and take up new positions. At the time of the negotiations, 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers were encircled in Debaltseve. In his memoirs, Hollande writes that Putin wanted to postpone the ceasefire by three weeks, but Merkel and himself negotiated it down to a few days. Hollande reports that Putin made several voices and, addressed to Poroshenko, threatened to crush the Ukrainian troops. With this, Putin admitted the presence of Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine, said Hollande.

It was only after renewed negotiations that began on September 1, 2015 that the fighting that had taken place on a daily basis subsided, i.e. at the time when Russia was simultaneously establishing its military presence in Syria . There was also a UN General Assembly in September and renewed negotiations in Normandy format . The time frame there was extended into 2016 after the rebel areas had previously threatened to leave the process through non-protocol elections.

According to Hrant Kostanyan from the Center for European Policy Studies and Stefan Meister from the German Society for Foreign Policy , the EU was undermining its own negotiating position by promising that the sanctions would be lifted without any concession from Russia. The Kremlin had therefore gained the impression that it could remove the sanctions without having to make concessions on its part. Statements by European politicians and especially German diplomats such as Sigmar Gabriel and Frank-Walter Steinmeier would undermine the common European line.

content

The agreements include 13 points:

1. Immediate and all-round ceasefire in individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts of Ukraine and strict observance of this from 00:00 minutes (Kiev time) on February 15, 2015.
2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides, at the same distance, around a safety zone with a width of at least 50 kilometers for artillery systems with a caliber of 100 mm and more, a safety zone 70 kilometers wide for rocket artillery systems and a width of 140 kilometers for rocket artillery of the Russian type Tornado-S as well as the types Uragan , Smertsch and tactical systems of the Tochka type to ensure:
   • For Ukrainian armed forces: measured from the actual line of contact;
   • For the armed units of the individual areas of Donetsk Oblast and Lugansk of Ukraine: measured from the line of contact on September 19, 2014.
   The withdrawal of the above-mentioned heavy weapon systems must begin no later than the second day of the ceasefire and be completed within 14 days.
   This process is supported by the OSCE and the Tripartite Contact Group.
3. Efficient monitoring and verification of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons systems must be carried out by the OSCE, starting with the first day of the withdrawal of the weapon systems, including all necessary technical means, including satellites, drones, positioning systems, etc.
4. On the first day after the withdrawal [of heavy weapons], a dialogue is held on the modalities of holding regional elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Ukrainian law “On the Temporary Order of Local Self-Government in Individual Areas of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts” begin, likewise on the future status of these areas, on the basis of the aforementioned law.
   Immediately, within 30 days of the signing of this document, the Supreme Rada of Ukraine must pass a resolution specifying the territory to which the special regulations in accordance with the Ukrainian Law “On Temporary Order of local self-government in individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts ”, [and that] on the basis of the line defined in the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.
5. A pardon and amnesty must be granted by passing a law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts of Ukraine.
6. A release and an exchange of all hostages and illegally detained persons must be carried out according to the principle of “all against all”. This process must be completed no later than the fifth day after the withdrawal [of the heavy weapons].
7. Secure access, delivery, storage and distribution of humanitarian aid to those in need must be ensured on the basis of international mechanisms.
   Restoring social and economic links with Kiev.
8. Modalities are set out how the full restoration of social and economic links will be made, including the transfer of social benefits such as pension payments and other payments (additions and income, timely payment of all municipal bills, restoration of taxation within the legal field of Ukraine ).
   To this end, Ukraine will restore the functioning of its banking system in the areas affected by the conflict and an international mechanism may be created to facilitate such transfers.
9. Complete control of the state border on the part of the Ukrainian government in the entire conflict area will be restored, starting on the first day after the holding of regional elections and ending after an all-round political settlement (regional elections in individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts based on the law Ukraine and a constitutional reform) by the end of 2015, provided that point 11 is implemented - through consultations and coordination with representatives of individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts within the framework of the tripartite contact group.
10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed units and their military equipment, including mercenaries, from the territory of Ukraine under observation by the OSCE. Disarm all illegal groups.
11. Implementation of constitutional reform in Ukraine and entry into force of a new constitution by the end of 2015. [This constitution must] have a key element of decentralization (taking into account the specifics of individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts), which is coordinated with the representatives of these areas, as well as Adopt a permanent law on the special status of individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts, in accordance with the measures listed in the Notes¹, by the end of 2015.
12. On the basis of the Ukrainian law “On the Temporary Order of Local Self-Government in Individual Areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts”, questions relating to regional elections are to be discussed with the representatives of the individual areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts within the framework of the tripartite contact group. The elections are conducted in compliance with the relevant OSCE standards and under observation by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
13. The work of the tripartite contact group will be intensified, including the creation of working groups to implement relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. The composition of these [working groups] will reflect the composition of the tripartite contact group.

In addition, Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine want to set up a supervisory body made up of diplomats to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire, which should meet regularly.

development

On site

On February 13, 2015, the Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenjuk reaffirmed his claim to the territories of the pro-Russian separatists and control of Donetsk and Luhansk . President Petro Poroshenko said at a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Kiev that the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine had been "significantly expanded" after the Minsk Agreement.

According to press reports, the pro-Russian separatist leader Alexander Sakharchenko ordered a ceasefire in Donetsk on the afternoon of February 14. According to various reports, the fighting in the area had intensified again, especially around the Debaltseve transport hub . “In the Lugansk separatist area, heavy weapons withdrawals reportedly began. Insurgent representative Denis Pushilin called on the pro-Western government in Kiev to hold a new contact group meeting, in which Russia and the OSCE are also involved. "

Before the start, various heads of state spoke to each other on the phone.

The Ukrainian President Poroshenko ordered the country's troops to start a ceasefire at midnight local time by televised address.

The "Defense Minister" of the "Donetsk People's Republic", Eduard Bassurin, recommended that OSCE observers avoid Debaltseve.

The Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov announced in Moscow after the signing of the treaty that Hollande, Merkel, Poroshenko and Putin wanted to call each other again after the ceasefire began; In the course of this telephone call, the four heads of government called on those involved on February 15 to comply with the ceasefire at Debaltseve as well.

On February 16, 2015, it was reported that the Ukrainian army was ruling out the withdrawal of heavy weapons until further notice because of the fighting near Debaltseve . OSCE President Ilkka Kanerva condemned the separatists' actions and stressed that the ceasefire also applies to Debaltseve. On February 18, Poroshenko announced the withdrawal of the Ukrainian army from Debaltseve.

On February 24, 2015, according to their military spokesman Eduard Bassurin, the separatist militias began with the agreed withdrawal of heavy weapons. At the same time, however, they attacked a village in the Mariupol area and killed and wounded several Ukrainian soldiers. The OSCE complained about the impossibility to monitor the withdrawal and the whereabouts of the heavy weapons.

On March 8, 2015, OSCE observers reported prolonged exchanges of fire at Ukrainian checkpoints, around 41 km north of Donetsk. The number of violations of the rules on the withdrawal of heavy weapons was limited to a total of 13 incidents in which one side accused the other of having fired with heavy artillery. On March 10, heavy fighting broke out again with separatists loyal to Russia around Schyrokyne , 20 km east of Mariupol. Separatists told the OSCE that they controlled half of the place. The battles were fought with mortars, handguns and tanks. Further fighting took place in the vicinity of Donetsk Airport .

On June 6, 2015 in Bern , the Swiss Foreign Ministry confirmed a declaration of intent from the Ukraine representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Heidi Tagliavini , that she wanted to give up her office. The reason assumed by a Russian news portal was that Tagliavini wanted to implement the binding Minsk II agreement and therefore not take part in any new negotiations on further changes ("Minsk III").

Leonid Kuchma resigned as representative of Ukraine in autumn 2018, but was reappointed by the new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyj at the beginning of June 2019 .

EU

At the summit of the EU heads of state and government on February 12, 2015, the further sanctions that had already been discussed were retained and their implementation decided.

G7

A statement by the French presidential office said that the seven leading industrial nations ( G7 ) had warned the conflicting parties in Ukraine against actions that could jeopardize the agreed ceasefire. "They are ready to take appropriate measures against those who violate the Minsk resolutions."

IMF

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced in February 2015 that Ukraine would receive loans totaling 17.5 billion dollars over the next four years.

Russia

The release of the Ukrainian air force pilot Nadia Savchenko , who was imprisoned in Moscow, was ruled out: she was not covered by the prisoner exchange agreed in Minsk because she was "neither a prisoner nor a hostage".

United States

On February 9, 2015 , after meeting with Chancellor Merkel, US President Barack Obama continued to reserve arms deliveries to Ukraine as an option; Ms. Merkel pointed to the still different views. On February 14, 2015, the US reported the provision of additional heavy weapons on the Russian side of the border and their delivery to the combat areas.

World security council

Russia brought on 13 February 2015, a draft resolution in the UN Security Council one with which recorded the agreements Minsk II and its implementation should be required. Moscow is expecting a unanimous approval on February 15, 2015, reported the Interfax agency, citing foreign ministry circles. Russia had blocked previous UN resolutions. The draft was passed unanimously as Resolution 2202 (2015) on February 17, 2015.

rating

The Minsk Agreement is seen as beneficial for Russia and disadvantageous for Ukraine. Stefan Meister from the German Society for Foreign Policy sees the agreement as a victory for President Putin, who pushed through his demands without making any concessions. Both Minsk agreements were signed by President Poroshenko in dire straits when the Ukrainian army in Ilovaisk and later in Debaltseve was Russian because of the offensive troops from collapse. Ukrainian media and politicians distrusted the Russian promises and pointed out that the first Minsk Agreement of September 2014 had already been violated and troops loyal to the Kremlin captured large areas after Minsk I was signed.

It is viewed critically that Russia is not openly named as a warring party in the agreement, although it supplies the “people's republics” with fighters and military equipment. Political scientist Fyodor Lukyanov regards it as a triumph for President Putin that he was able to impose a formulation in the agreement that ignores Russia's role as a warring party. This enables the Russian leadership to play its role as a participant in the war. For example, the Russian government rejected an exchange of prisoners prescribed in Minsk-II on the grounds that Russia was not a party to the conflict and was therefore not bound by the Minsk agreements. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly stresses, however, that the Minsk Agreement also provides for the release of people kidnapped on Ukrainian soil and illegally detained in Russia, including the fighter pilot Nadia Savchenko and the filmmaker Oleh Sentsov .

While Russia is not named as a party to the war in the Minsk Agreement, the internationally unrecognized "People's Republics" are elevated to negotiating partners and thus de facto recognized. They also have a say in changes to the Ukrainian constitution. Russia wants to use these areas to influence the domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine in the future.

The chronological sequence of the agreed steps is not clear. According to Ukraine and commentators, the arms must first be ceased and Ukraine must regain control of its borders before a political process in the country can begin and elections can be planned in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts . As long as Russia controls the areas and the media there, OSCE and ODIHR observers do not have free access to the regions, Ukrainian parties and displaced persons are not allowed to vote, and pro-Ukrainian activity is dangerous, there can be no free and fair elections in the Areas are carried out. According to the Russian interpretation, on the other hand, the non-military points must be met before a ceasefire occurs. Specifically, the Russian government demands that Ukraine implement constitutional changes and give the occupied territories a special status before Russia considers withdrawing troops and military equipment from the territories. The German ambassador to Ukraine, Ernst Reichel , said in an interview that Ukraine could hold elections in Donbass while Russian troops were still operating there. As a historical example, the ambassador cited elections in the GDR, which had taken place despite the Soviet occupation. However, the Federal Foreign Office did not want to decide whether the Russian armed forces would have to withdraw before the elections in eastern Ukraine.

The OSCE ceasefire monitoring mission is considered by some commentators to be unsuitable. The fighters of the “People's Republics” have only granted access to OSCE observers at two border crossings. Since Russia denies its role as a warring party, Russians are allowed to participate in the OSCE mission as observers, while Ukrainians are not allowed to act as OSCE observers. Russia is the second largest contingent of the OSCE mission and has a decisive influence on operational planning and situation reports. Russia is acting both as a war party and as a mediator.

The approximately 500 km² area that was conquered by the self-proclaimed “People's Republics” in disregard of the first Minsk Agreement, as well as the Crimea occupied by Russia, are not mentioned in the new Minsk agreements. This is seen as a concession to the Kremlin. This point is received positively in the Russian media. “Nobody talks about Crimea any more,” comments the newspaper Vedomosti on the Minsk Agreement.

According to Heiko Pleines from the Research Center for Eastern Europe at the University of Bremen , another problem with the Minsk agreements is that the course of the armistice line is not fixed because no maps are attached to the agreement. Immediately after the start of the armistice, fighters from the Donetsk “People's Republic” conquered Debaltseve on the grounds that Delazewe was on their side of the armistice line. The OSCE observer mission, however, confirmed that the site was under Ukrainian control on the agreed deadline. The fighters of the “People's Republics” therefore wanted to create “new facts” with the conquest, according to the OSCE.

It is also criticized that the two other guarantee powers of the Budapest Memorandum - the United States and Great Britain - were not included in the negotiations. At that time, Ukraine renounced its nuclear weapons. In return, Russia, the United States, and Great Britain pledged to respect Ukraine's existing borders.

Perspectives and Validity

President Poroshenko threatened to impose martial law in Ukraine if the agreement failed . This meant u. a. the rationing of food. In August 2015, Poroshenko said the Minsk Accords had given Ukraine time to strengthen its defensive capabilities and, in part, helped close the obvious military and technical gaps with Russia. The Minsk II agreement is still valid with talks in Minsk, but is repeatedly violated by both sides. Power-political reasons play the main role; According to the head of the OSCE observer, the population "doesn't believe" in artificially drawn lines "and said:" This is not our conflict. "

The United States' special envoy for Ukraine, Kurt Volker, affirmed in spring 2018 that the existence of the "so-called People's Republics" contradicts the aim of the Minsk Agreement to restore the sovereignty of Ukraine.

Web links

• The binding new implementing provisions for the Minsk Agreement signed by the Ukraine Contact Group on the OSCE website in the original Russian and in the German translation at Ukraine-Nachrichten.
• The text of the Minsk Declaration (Minsk II) signed by Putin, Merkel, Hollande and Poroshenko (in Handelsblatt)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Documentation: The Minsk Agreement of February 12, 2015 , Federal Agency for Civic Education, February 26, 2015
2. ^ What was signed in Minsk . In: chartophylakeion.de , February 12, 2015.
3. ↑ Will Minsk bring peace? In: Badische Zeitung . February 12, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
4. ↑ Ukraine Talks: Efforts to find a peace solution continue. In: Deutschlandfunk . February 11, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
5. ^ ^{A b} Peace Summit for Eastern Ukraine: The Long Night of Minsk . In: spiegel.de , February 12, 2015.
6. ^ Minsk: Laurent Fabius raconte les coulisses de la negociation . Europe 1 . In: europe1.fr , February 15, 2015.
7. ^ Klimkin defends Minsk II in Parliament . Euromaidan . In: euromaidanpresspress.com , February 14, 2015.
8. ↑ Severin Weiland and Matthias Gebauer: Heavy fighting in Eastern Ukraine: The mistakes of Minsk . In: Spiegel Online , February 18, 2015, accessed on February 18, 2015.
9. ↑ Heavy weapons are used again in Ukraine , Tages-Anzeiger, June 4, 2015
10. ↑ Despite ceasefire: Ukraine reports fierce fighting near Mariupol , Spiegel, August 10, 2015
11. ^ FSB junta. Moscow Politburo scenarios for Ukraine , nv.ua, June 8, 2015
12. ↑ EU extends sanctions against Russia. In: Badische Zeitung . AFP , January 30, 2015, accessed January 30, 2015 . 
13. ↑ No comment - No lashes. In: Badische Zeitung. January 31, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
14. ↑ EU postpones new sanctions. In: Badische Zeitung. February 10, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
15. ↑ A ceasefire agreed before the crisis summit in Minsk. In: Badische Zeitung. February 10, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
16. ↑ ^{a b c} The Minsk Negotiations: A Russian Game . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , February 15, 2015.
17. ^ ^{A b c} François Hollande: Les leçons du pouvoir . Éditions Stock, Paris 2018, ISBN 978-2-234-08474-2 , pp. 64–69 .
18. ↑ ^{a b} Truce without illusions. In: Badische Zeitung. February 13, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
19. ↑ Putin made a telling blunder in a shouting match with Ukraine's president, France's Hollande says . In: Business Insider , September 3, 2018.
20. ^ Prohibited rocket launchers and controversial elections , Tagesspiegel, October 2, 2015
21. ^ Hrant Kostanyan and Stefan Meister: Ukraine, Russia and the EU: Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process . Center for European Policy Studies, June 2016.
22. ^ Minsk II: The text of the agreement in German. February 13, 2015, accessed June 19, 2019 . 
23. ↑ 13 points for peace. In: Der Tagesspiegel. Verlag Der Tagesspiegel GmbH, February 12, 2015, accessed on June 19, 2019 . 
24. ↑ ^{a b c} The war in Ukraine continues. In: Badische Zeitung. February 14, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
25. ↑ ^{a b c} Eastern Ukraine: USA accuses Russia of further arms deliveries. In: Der Spiegel . February 14, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
26. ↑ Mistrust between conflicting parties in eastern Ukraine remains high . In: Badische Zeitung. February 14, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
27. ↑ DLF-Nachrichten, February 15, 2015, 4:00. More u. U. here:
28. ↑ "I want peace". In: Deutschlandfunk . February 15, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
29. ↑ ^{a b} The situation in eastern Ukraine is still tense. In: Badische Zeitung. February 16, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
30. ^ Implementation of the ceasefire in Donbass uncertain. In: Badische Zeitung. February 13, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
31. ↑ Mutual allegations about breaking the ceasefire. In: Deutschlandfunk . February 16, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
32. ↑ OSCE PA President calls for strict adherence to Ukraine ceasefire, deplores Debaltseve fighting. OSCE, Parliamentary Assembly, February 16, 2015, accessed February 16, 2015 . 
33. ↑ Poroshenko announces withdrawal from Debaltseve. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung . February 18, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
34. ↑ Separatists speak of unilateral weapons withdrawal. In: The world . February 24, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
35. ^ After the crisis summit in Paris: Kerry accuses Russia of lying. In: Der Spiegel . February 24, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
36. ↑ http://www.wsj.com/articles/osce-says-heavy-weapons-moving-in-ukraine-but-unsure-of-withdrawal-1425061682 OSCE: Differences between the words and deeds of the separatists , Radio Free Europe , March 3, 2015
37. ↑ "Latest from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 18: 00hrs (Kyiv time), 9 March 2015" OSCE of March 10, 2015, viewed on March 10, 2015
38. ↑ "Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 10 March 2015" OSCE from March 11, 2015, viewed on March 11, 2015
39. ↑ A bad sign? Ukraine's OSCE Representative has had enough , Sputnik , June 8, 2015
40. ↑ Ukraine crisis: OSCE special envoy Tagliavini resigns [1] , FAZ Online, June 6, 2015.
41. ↑ Zelenskyi brought Leonid Kuchma back to the Donbass Contact Group , Novaya Gazeta, June 3, 2019
42. ↑ ^{a b} Peace plan for Ukraine meets with cautious echo. In: Deutschlandfunk . February 12, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
43. ↑ G7 warns conflicting parties in Ukraine against violation of the Minsk agreements. In: Deutschlandfunk. February 13, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
44. ↑ USA reserve the right to continue delivering weapons to Ukraine. In: Deutschlandfunk. February 9, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
45. ↑ Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2202 (2015), Security Council Calls on Parties to Implement Accords Aimed at Peaceful Settlement in Eastern Ukraine. UN Security Council , February 17, 2015, accessed February 21, 2015 . 
46. ↑ Stefan Meister: Welcome, Escalation: Why Minsk 2 is Not Going to Work . German Society for Foreign Policy, DGAP Standpunkt, February 2015.
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    Putin as the "winner": Minsk-II increases pressure on Poroshenko in Ukraine . In: Abendzeitung Munich , February 13, 2015.
    Jacques Schuster : In Minsk there is only one winner - Putin . In: Welt Online , February 12, 2015.
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47. ↑ Stefan Meister: Welcome, Escalation: Why Minsk 2 is Not Going to Work . German Society for Foreign Policy, DGAP Standpunkt, February 2015.
48. ↑ Marieluise Beck and Ralf Fücks : Ukraine conflict: No carte blanche for Putin . In: Zeit Online , April 13, 2016.
    Andreas Umland : Why the EU Should Decouple Sanctions Against Russia from the Minsk Agreements . In: Harvard International Review , July 15, 2016.
    Hrant Kostanyan and Stefan Meister: Ukraine, Russia and the EU: Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process . Center for European Policy Studies, June 2016.
49. ↑ Marieluise Beck and Ralf Fücks: Ukraine conflict: No carte blanche for Putin . In: Zeit Online , April 13, 2016.
    Bernd Johann: Comment: The Minsk Treaty is dead. Long live Minsk! . In: Deutsche Welle , February 12, 2016.
    Gerhard Gnauck: Versailles was a fair work against Minsk . In: Welt Online , July 26, 2016.
    Iryna Ivashko and Anton Krut: Comment: Why are the Minsk agreements so fragile? Federal Agency for Civic Education , February 26, 2015.
50. ↑ Hans Monath, Nina Jeglinski, Elke Windisch and Lukas Hermsmeier: Agreed ceasefire for the Ukraine: There is great skepticism . In: Tagesspiegel , February 13, 2015.
51. ↑ Marieluise Beck and Ralf Fücks: Ukraine conflict: No carte blanche for Putin . In: Zeit Online , April 13, 2016.
    Gerhard Gnauck: Versailles was a fair work against Minsk . In: Welt Online , July 26, 2016.
52. ↑ Marieluise Beck and Ralf Fücks: Ukraine conflict: No carte blanche for Putin . In: Zeit Online , April 13, 2016.
53. ↑ RESOLUTION ON ABDUCTED AND ILLEGALLY DETAINED UKRAINIAN CITIZENS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (PDF) oscepa.org. July 9, 2015. Archived from the original on July 13, 2015. Retrieved on April 8, 2016. p. 47
54. ↑ Gerhard Gnauck: Versailles was a fair work against Minsk . In: Welt Online , July 26, 2016.
    Taras Kuzio: Special issue: Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia . In: Journal of Common Market Studies . 55, No. 1, 2017, pp. 103-120. doi: 10.1111 / jcms.12447 .
    Paul Roderick Gregory: Putin Comes Out On Top In New Minsk Agreement . In: Forbes , February 13, 2015.
    Stefan Meister: Welcome, Escalation: Why Minsk 2 is Not Going to Work . German Society for Foreign Policy, DGAP Standpunkt, February 2015.
55. ^ Paul Roderick Gregory: Putin Comes Out On Top In New Minsk Agreement . In: Forbes , February 13, 2015.
56. ↑ Taras Kuzio: Special issue: Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia . In: Journal of Common Market Studies . 55, No. 1, 2017, pp. 103-120. doi: 10.1111 / jcms.12447 .
    Oliver Tamminga: Comment: A fine line - Russia between military escalation and de-escalation in eastern Ukraine . Federal Agency for Civic Education, May 4, 2015.
57. ↑ Claudia von Salzen : Two Years of the Minsk Agreement A History of Failure in Ukraine . In: Tagesspiegel , February 12, 2017.
    Taras Kuzio: Special issue: Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia . In: Journal of Common Market Studies . 55, No. 1, 2017, pp. 103-120. doi: 10.1111 / jcms.12447
58. ↑ Marieluise Beck and Ralf Fücks: Ukraine conflict: No carte blanche for Putin . In: Zeit Online , April 13, 2016.
    Gerhard Gnauck: Versailles was a fair work against Minsk . In: Welt Online , July 26, 2016.
    Hrant Kostanyan and Stefan Meister: Ukraine, Russia and the EU: Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process . Center for European Policy Studies, June 2016.
    Andreas Umland: Why the EU Should Decouple Sanctions Against Russia from the Minsk Agreements . In: Harvard International Review , July 15, 2016.
59. ^ Andreas Umland: Why the EU Should Decouple Sanctions Against Russia from the Minsk Agreements . In: Harvard International Review , July 15, 2016.
    Svitlana Kobzar: Mind the Gap: interpreting the Minsk II Agreemen . Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, March 2016.
60. ^ Sabine Adler : Scandal about the German ambassador in Kiev . In: Deutschlandfunk , February 8, 2017.
61. ^ Hrant Kostanyan and Stefan Meister: Ukraine, Russia and the EU: Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process . Center for European Policy Studies, June 2016.
62. ↑ Gerhard Gnauck: Versailles was a fair work against Minsk . In: Welt Online , July 26, 2016.
63. ↑ Marieluise Beck and Ralf Fücks: Ukraine conflict: No carte blanche for Putin . In: Zeit Online , April 13, 2016.
64. ↑ Andrew Denison: Minsk Agreement failed - The provocateur is in the Kremlin, not in the West . In: Cicero , February 17, 2015.
    Paul Roderick Gregory: Putin Comes Out On Top In New Minsk Agreement . In: Forbes , February 13, 2015.
65. ↑ Putin as the "winner": Minsk-II increases pressure on Poroshenko in Ukraine . In: Abendzeitung Munich , February 13, 2015.
66. ^ Heiko Pleines: Comment: Dividing lines in Eastern Ukraine . Federal Agency for Civic Education, February 26, 2015.
67. ↑ Marieluise Beck and Ralf Fücks: Ukraine conflict: No carte blanche for Putin . In: Zeit Online , April 13, 2016.
    Hrant Kostanyan and Stefan Meister: Ukraine, Russia and the EU: Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process . Center for European Policy Studies, June 2016.
68. ↑ Poroshenko: Russia was planning another eight Ukrainian regions to annex to UNIAN on August 22, 2015
69. ↑ «The violence can be stopped at any time» , Tages-Anzeiger, February 3, 2018
70. ↑ 112.ua: Volker says so-called People's Republics in Donbas should be eliminated , Kyivost, March 4, 2018; "The so-called Luhansk People's Republic and Donetsk People's Republic are the entities created by Russia to help disguise Russia's role and strengthen the conflict, and they must be eliminated," Volker said.