Afghan Civil War (1989-2001)

The southwestern Kabul suburb of Dih-i Dānā in 2004: The Afghan capital was largely destroyed in the civil war.

The Afghan Civil War from 1989 to 2001 was a period of intra-Afghan fighting in the course of the conflict that had been going on in Afghanistan since 1978 . The beginning of the civil war was marked by the withdrawal of the Soviet Army in 1989, which ended the Soviet-Afghan War . The government under Muhammad Najibullah , which was still supported by the Soviets , was able to withstand the pressure of the mujahideen parties for another three years until it collapsed in the spring of 1992. The ten-year civil war that followed was marked by the withdrawal of the two superpowers and the international community's disinterest in the situation in Afghanistan . The power vacuum was filled by other powers in the region, particularly Pakistan , who tried to influence the conflict on their own terms and usually with escalating effects.

State power in Afghanistan has been fragmented since the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the rise of regional rulers in areas no longer controlled by the central government . After the end of the Soviet-backed government and the failure of an understanding between the rival mujahideen parties, the state finally collapsed . The Afghan capital Kabul , which was divided into different zones of influence and on which most of the fighting was concentrated, became a symbol of the country's fragmentation . Around 50,000 people were killed in fighting, artillery fire and massacres in Kabul between 1992 and 1996; the southern areas of the city were almost completely destroyed. In contrast, the rural regions devastated in the Soviet-Afghan war were hardly affected by the fighting between the mujahedin and reconstruction began.

Ideologically, the period of civil war after the attempted transformation of society under the communist government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was marked by the rise of Islamism , which had hardly played a role in Afghanistan until the 1980s. The mujahideen parties were already issuing Islamist decrees from 1992, and this development later culminated in the rule of the Taliban organization, which in some cases had totalitarian features. With Pakistan's support, the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 and pushed the remaining military opposition back to the far northeast of the country. With the advance of the Taliban from 1994 onwards, fighting also expanded to areas outside the capital. It was only after their control of most of the country was relatively consolidated in 1998 that the intensity of the fighting eased again.

The Taliban's government was largely isolated internationally due to its radical policies, but the willingness of other states to get involved in Afghanistan remained low. It was not until Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaida organization he led that the country was brought back into the focus of world politics. In response to the attacks carried out by members of al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 , among other things, a US-led intervention finally took place in October 2001 , which led to the overthrow of the Taliban government and ushered in a new phase of direct foreign involvement in the Afghan conflict.

Najibullah government 1989–1992

In April 1988 the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Accords to end the conflict, which had been going on since 1978, between the Soviet-backed central government and the Islamist resistance groups of the Mujahideen, which received financial and weapon aid mainly from the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Soviet Union and the United States acted as guarantor powers. In the agreements, the two states committed, among other things, to mutual non-interference and to repatriation of the approximately five million Afghan refugees from Pakistan. In addition, a schedule was set for the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in the country since 1979 by February 15, 1989. However, apart from the withdrawal of troops, the agreements did not provide for any further-reaching concrete steps to resolve the conflict between the central government and the guerrillas. In addition, the mujahideen parties who were not involved in the drafting of the treaties did not recognize the provisions laid down in them, so that the war continued even after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

The Soviet Union began gradual withdrawal in accordance with the agreements in May 1988 and withdrew all of its military personnel from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. The troops left a devastated country: around one million Afghans had perished in the Soviet-Afghan war, almost one and a half million of the survivors were severely and permanently physically injured, and six million people had fled the country. As a result of a Soviet warfare directed against the basic supplies of the rural population, large parts of the infrastructure had been destroyed and agricultural production had fallen to a third of its pre-war level.

Contrary to the expectations of almost all observers, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the Afghan government under Muhammad Najibullah, which was militarily on its own, did not collapse, but was able to withstand the pressure of the guerrillas for three years with Soviet support. It was not until the coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union that was completed a few months later that the end of Soviet aid and a little later also of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul.

Najibullah politics

The former head of the notorious KhAD secret police, Muhammad Najibullah, was appointed President of the Soviet Union in 1986 to succeed Babrak Karmal . He was a Ghilzai Pashtun and, like Karmal, belonged to the Partscham wing of the Afghan People's Party, which was dominated by Persian-speaking Kabulis . The ranks of the Partschamis were cleared of Karmal's supporters after he took office. Najibullah propagated his policy under the slogan of national reconciliation , which was intended to express the abandonment of a military solution to the conflict and the end of ideological fixation on the Soviet Union. The term was coined by Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1986 and with Āschti-yi Milli آشتی ملی translated into Persian.

In ideological terms, Najibullah took a U-turn with his policy after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops: the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric was completely dropped in favor of nationalist propaganda, which was directed specifically against the increasingly unpopular Pakistani interference and Arab Wahhabism . The social transformation of the rural regions, especially the controversial land reforms, has been completely abandoned. Najibullah also tried to give his government legitimacy by invoking Islam and to rid it of the stigma of disbelief. The Democratic Republic was renamed the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Sharia was anchored in the constitution. In June 1990, Najibullah finally founded the Hizb-i Watan (حزب وطن- Fatherland Party ), which functioned as the successor party to the Communist People's Party.

At the same time, Najibullah carried out limited political liberalization: the one-party system was officially abolished, an amnesty was granted for political prisoners and the use of torture was banned. However, although the number of political prisoners and the use of torture also declined in practice, a pluralistic multi-party system was not permitted and waves of arrests continued. The suppression of open opposition took the place of preventive state terror. The political scientist Barnett Rubin describes the politics of Najibullāh as a transition from a totalitarian state to a conventional authoritarian regime .

Despite Najibullah's demonstrative distancing from the Soviet Union, his regime continued to be heavily dependent on Soviet aid, which was increased even further after the troops withdrew. Kabul was supplied with civilian and military goods by a Soviet airlift, with deliveries worth $ 14.2 billion in the year of the withdrawal.

After the Soviet withdrawal, Najibullah tried to secure the power of his regime by concentrating government forces on the cities and important communication routes. He relied increasingly on the semi-regular regional militias , which were used not only to secure the cities, but also for the few offensive operations. The 30,000-strong Jozjani militia Raschid Dostum , which operated effectively against the rebels nationwide, played a central role . In total, the militia in 1990 comprised an estimated 50,000 - 70,000 men, roughly twice the strength of the Afghan army. Military pressure on the mujahedin-held rural areas has largely been eased. Instead, the regime tried to conclude unofficial ceasefire agreements with local commanders.

Military stabilization

Areas remaining under central government control after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989

The anticipated storm of the resistance groups against the government's positions began as early as the Soviet withdrawal. The guerrillas' morale was high given their historic victory, and Pakistan increased its arms deliveries considerably. In the summer of 1988, numerous government-held locations fell. After the completion of the Soviet withdrawal, the government only controlled the urban centers of the country and the roads connecting them. All rural regions and six entire provinces were in the hands of the mujahideen. During Najibullah's reign, state power was regionalized, ending Kabul's hundred-year dominance in Afghanistan.

Tensions between the two wings of the People's Party also emerged again in March 1990, when Najibullāh was able to fend off an attempted coup by the Chalq wing of the People's Party, led by his Defense Minister Schahnawaz Tanai . The coup was supported by Gulbuddin Hikmatyār , leader of the Hizb-i Islāmi-yi Gulbuddin mujahideen party . The Pashtun Hikmatyār maintained a probably from the beginning of the year Pakistan's ISI switched connection to also Pashtun-dominated Khalq wing of the government.

But despite the military successes and the tensions within the regime, the guerrillas did not succeed in seriously threatening the government strongholds. A stalemate was looming. The mujahideen lacked the planning and military means to carry out large-scale military operations. They continued to receive American arms deliveries, but from mid-1988 these were drastically reduced and nowhere near the extent of the increased support for the central government by the Soviet Union.

In this situation the city of Jalalabad east of Kabul became the main target, especially for the Pakistani military. Pakistan saw the conquest of Jalālābād as the key to the fall of the Afghan capital, which should enable the hikmatyār they favored to take over power. The Kabul government sent 15,000 soldiers to Jalālābād to secure the city. On March 6, 1989, about 10,000 fighters of the Hizb-i Islāmi-yi Chalis and the Mahāz-i Milli began the offensive on the city under the direction of the ISI. The government succeeded in repelling the attack through effective air support and functioning supply lines from Kabul. The massacre of government troops by Khalis fighters increased the resistance of the city's defenders.

Members of the Hizb-i Islāmi-yi Chalis in October 1987: In March 1989, Hizb and Mahāz-i Melli led the largest offensive to date against the central government.

The losses of the Mujahideen fighters are estimated at several thousand. This first military success of the government army on its own was a decisive setback for the guerrillas. The United States cautiously distanced itself from the factions it previously supported and continued to reduce its arms deliveries. Within the mujahideen, too, doubts arose for the first time about a military victory over government troops.

Another important military success was achieved by the government, this time on the offensive, when it captured the city of Paghmān, about ten kilometers west of Kabul . Paghmān had been under the control of the mujahideen since 1985 and was expanded by them into a fortress that served them as a strategically important position for attacks on the capital. Raschid Dostum led the decisive operations in the conquest of the city.

According to Afghan government sources, by early 1990, between 70% and 80% of resistance groups had ceased fighting. This trend is also supported by international intelligence reports, which assume a decline in active fighters from 85,000 to 50,000. An important part of this was that, in the eyes of many fighters, the jihad ended with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the quarreling mujahideen leaders were unable to agree on a credible alternative to the Najibullah government. However, the government was unable to decisively expand its territorial control or to sign formal agreements with important leaders of the insurgents.

Collapse of the central government

The weakened position of the Soviet Union after the attempted coup in Moscow and the détente between the two superpowers made it possible for the first time to bring about a fundamental convergence of positions on the conflict in Afghanistan. In September 1991, the Soviet Union and the United States signed an agreement to cease arms deliveries to all those involved in the Afghan civil war by the end of the year. In addition, the Soviet Union moved away from its earlier demand for a central role of Najibullāh in a transitional government and gave in to the American demand for free elections with the participation of opposition groups. In return, the American government accepted that Najibullah would remain in power until a transitional government was formed. A central role for the reassessment of the previous uncompromising support of the resistance groups, in addition to their division, was played by the disillusionment of the radical Islamist parties they supported, in particular the Hizb-i Islāmi of Gulbuddin Hikmatyār and the Ittihād-i Islāmi of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf , im Gulf War supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Raschid Dostum in 2002: The Dostum rebellion in January 1992 triggered the collapse of the central government

Meanwhile the United Nations worked out various compromise proposals to get the mujahideen parties and non-communist parts of the government to work together in an interim government. The plans to form a transitional government became obsolete when the state that it was supposed to govern collapsed. When the Soviet Union stopped its military support and also the food and fuel deliveries as agreed at the end of 1991, this quickly led to the collapse of the Najibullah government. The state he led was ultimately little more than a network of antagonistic leaders held together only by Najibullāh's redistribution of Soviet aid.

The decline of Najibullāh's regime was due to various factors. For one thing, the Hizb-i Watan was in an ideological crisis. Many former members of the People's Party did not convert to the newly formed party, as Najibullāh's policies based on Afghan nationalism found little support in the multiethnic country with no credible external enemy. In addition, Najibullah made little attempts to rebuild the ruined Afghan economy in order to allow the country a minimal level of self-sufficiency. The relatively lucrative recruitment opportunities from both the mujahideen and the government militias and the explosion of corruption meant that most Afghans had little incentive to return to normal work - a situation that Najibullāh himself had exacerbated through his support for the semi-autonomous militias.

Ultimately, the decisive factor for the collapse was the massive dependence on Soviet aid, which was reduced as early as 1990 and which did not materialize after the attempted coup in Moscow. The resulting extensive supply difficulties made it difficult for the party cadres, and especially the influential regional militias, to bind themselves to the government and resulted in military defeats even before the final collapse. The worst setback for the government since the relative stabilization in early 1990 was the loss of the city of Khost in April 1991, when entire garrisons deserted or defected to the mujahideen. Tensions grew within the regime as well.

The immediate cause of the collapse was the uprising of the northern militia leaders, who no longer needed Najibullāh as a middleman and allied with the regional mujahedin parties. Kabul's connections with the north of the country, secured by the regional militias, were particularly critical for the regime's survival. Since Najibullah could no longer bind these militias to himself by distributing Soviet aid, he tried to put Pashtun officers of the regular army loyal to him personally at their head. When the Tajik general Abdul Mumin in the province of Balkh refused to surrender his command to a Pashtun in January 1992 , Rashid Dostum took this as an opportunity to lead a rebellion by the garrison in Mazar-i Sharif, which was quickly joined by other militias in the northwest. Together with Moomin and other Uzbek and Ismaili militia leaders, he founded a new party, the Junbish-i Milli-yi Islāmi (جنبش ملی اسلامی- National Islamic Association ). Dostum's rebellion was also supported by members of the Partscham wing of the government who wanted to prevent a Pashtun control of the north sought by Najibullah.

The Partschamis and the northern militia leaders allied themselves with the Jamiat-i Islāmi of Burhānuddin Rabbāni and Ahmad Schāh Massoud and the Hizb-i Wahdat of the Shiite Hazara . Massoud, who as the popular leader of the resistance against the Soviet Union had the greatest reputation among the population, became spokesman for the alliance. Militarily dominating, however, were the Dostum militias, which comprised over 40,000 men. On March 18, 1992, the alliance took over Mazar-i Sharif without a fight, and other locations in the north were also taken over after relatively small skirmishes.

Najibullah announced on the same day that he would resign as soon as a neutral government was formed. On March 24, 1992, the Hizb-i Watan split up and individual party officials took power. In Kabul, members of the Partscham wing led by Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil , a cousin of Babrak Karmal, took control of the city.

Race to Kabul

Topographic map of Kabul province: The province became the site of most of the fighting between rival parties after the collapse of the Soviet-backed central government.

When the central government began to fall apart, the rival parties began a race to Kabul. While Dostum brought the north of the country under his control, Massoud's troops advanced on Kabul from the northeast and occupied the airfields near Bagrām practically without a fight . Previously, the Partschamis allied with Dostum and Massoud had already occupied the Kabul airport under the leadership of Karmal's brother Mahmud Baryalai and had Junbish troops flown into the capital. At the same time, Hikmatyār's troops advanced from the south on Kabul and took up positions at the gates of the capital. When Najibullah tried to flee to India on April 15, he was prevented from leaving the country by Baryalai's forces and sought refuge at the UN embassy. The Partschami rebels denounced Najibullah as a dictator and asked Massoud to step into Kabul as the new head of state. They hoped to be able to instrumentalize the national hero Massoud as a symbolic figure who was dependent on them.

Massoud was aware, however, that Pashtuns, both within the mujahideen and among the government cadre, feared a takeover of power by the Northern Alliance and the associated Pashtun marginalization. This fear was instrumentalized by Hikmatyār for his own ends. Massoud therefore saw a government he headed without Pashtun participation doomed to failure. Instead, he called on the divided leaders of the mujahideen parties in Peshawar, Pakistan, to form a joint transitional government. He also had the capital cordoned off from the outside to prevent fighters from the various parties from infiltrating. He was in constant contact with Pashtun militia leaders, whom he assured that he would not take power unilaterally. Nevertheless, Pashtuns in the government army, mostly members of the Chalq wing, smuggled unarmed Hizb-i Islamic fighters into the city and equipped them there with government weapons.

In order to forestall an impending coup by Hikmatyārs Hizb, Massoud finally let his troops penetrate into Kabul on April 25th. In addition, non-Pashtun Partschamis armed Shiites living in Kabul with the support of the Iranian embassy. The associations Dostums, Massouds and the Shiite Hizb-i Wahdat drove the Pashtun Hizb-Chalq forces from the city after heavy fighting. The defeated Pashtun fighters broke through Massoud's security ring around the capital, and other mujahideen poured into the city, erected roadblocks and began looting.

Politics of other states

The conflict in Afghanistan, which had been pushed into the background by the upheavals resulting from the collapse of the Eastern Bloc since 1989, almost completely disappeared from the world political stage after the fall of the Najibullah government. The United States halved its military aid from $ 600 million in the mid-1980s to $ 280 million after the Soviet withdrawal, and discontinued it entirely in 1992. Politically, the USA, like the other Western countries from 1992 onwards, largely abstained from any major influence. While the West unanimously supported the United Nations' calls to end the fighting, concrete action was not taken. The UN aid programs also received relatively little financial resources. Ahmed Rashid describes the US policy after the Soviet withdrawal as running away from the Afghan conflict, which became a running away after the victory of the Mujahideen in 1992.

The withdrawal of the superpowers gave the regional states a free hand to influence the conflict on their behalf. The civil war again took on the shape of a proxy war : Dostums Junbisch was supported by Uzbekistan, the Hizb-i Wahdat by Iran, the Jamiat received aid mainly from India and Iran, Hikmatyārs Hizb-i Islāmi and later the Taliban acted as representatives of Pakistan. Pakistan made by far the most extensive attempts to control Afghanistan's development. The aim of Pakistani politics was to establish a Pashtun-influenced central government under Pakistani control in order to gain strategic depth vis-à-vis India. Gulbuddin Hikmatyār received the majority of the financial and military aid channeled through Pakistani channels, despite the poor support for his radical Islamist policies among the Afghan population since the 1980s.

Relations between the regional powers and the groups they support in Afghanistan were shaped by mutual instrumentalisation; none of the Afghan parties was actually controlled from outside. The various states pursued diverging particular interests in their policies and, instead of pushing the parties they supported towards a peaceful settlement, often exerted an escalating influence on the conflict. In particular, there was polarization between Shiite Iran on the one hand and the Sunni-influenced states of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on the other, which further exacerbated the situation.

Government of the Mujahideen 1992–1996

Burhānuddin Rabbāni was President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan from 1992 to 2001.

While fighting was taking place in Kabul, the mujahideen leaders in Peshawar, Pakistan, finally announced an agreement on April 26th. The treaties called the Peshawar Accords were signed by the leaders of all the parties belonging to the Peshawar Seven . They planned to set up a transitional government led by Sibghatullāh Mujaddidi as the incumbent president. Mujaddidi was chosen as a compromise candidate because the Jabha-yi Nijāt party he led had little influence. After two months, according to the agreement of Burhānuddin Rabbāni, the leader of the Jamiat-i Islāmi, he was replaced in his office. The Ministry of Defense also fell to the Jamiat, which corresponded to the strong position of Massoud's troops of the Shurā-yi Nizār in the capital. The office of Prime Minister went to Hikmatyār, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Gailanis Nahzat-i Hambastagi . After six months, a council should give the Shurā-yi ahl-i hal wa aqd ( Persian شوراى اهل حل و عقد), come together and decide on a new interim government, which should then pave the way for general elections. The concept of shurā was based on the Islamic legal term Ahl al-hall wal-'aqd ( Arabic أهل الحل والعقد 'People of loosening and binding'), which was little known in Afghanistan.

Proclamation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan

The interim government arrived in Kabul from Pakistan on April 28 and proclaimed the Islamic State of Afghanistan while fighting continued in the city . Pakistan established diplomatic relations with the government on the same day, followed only a little later by the states of the European Community and the USA. The new entity, however, hardly met the characteristics of a state. There was chaos in the capital and the government had no income at all: aid from abroad had almost completely ceased, and all customs stations, which traditionally represented the main source of income for the Afghan state, were in the hands of local shurās, who did not pay taxes to the capital . A ministerial post meant no control over the institutional power concerned.

The establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan was an elite settlement in which various leaders acted not only on behalf of their party but effectively as representatives of entire ethnolinguistic groups. The step-by-step plan agreed in the Peshawar Agreement therefore assumed that all the leaders involved worked together. The mistrust between the mujahideen leaders, especially between Massoud and Hikmatyār, the escalating influence of the regional powers and the lack of a state led to the failure of such an understanding. As early as the spring of 1992 there were clashes in Kabul between the Shiite Hizb-i Wahdat and the radical anti-Shiite Ittihād-i Islāmi. Even more serious was the opposition of Hikmatyār, who refused to take office as prime minister. Instead, he denounced the government, especially its support for Dostum, as communist, and in August began firing rockets at Kabul from its positions in the south of the city.

After the fall of Kabul, there was no major purge or revenge against supporters of the fallen government. Nevertheless, for most of the inhabitants of Kabul, especially for the educated elite, the mujahideen came to power, the end of their urban, modern lifestyle. All rival parties, with the exception of Dostum's Junbisch, were Islamist and enforced Islamist laws to varying degrees. This included the introduction of Sharia law and the restriction of women's rights.

Battle for the capital

Positions in Kabul in May 1992 after the collapse of the Najibullah government

Until the Taliban captured the city in autumn 1996, control of the capital was the main military and political objective of the rival parties. Most of the fighting therefore took place in Kabul and the immediate vicinity. The capital, which was hardly affected by the fighting in the Soviet-Afghan war, was largely destroyed. Between 1992 and 1996, up to 50,000 people were killed and around 150,000 injured in artillery shelling, skirmishes and targeted massacres. Most fell victim to Hikmatyār's random rocket bombardment of residential areas. Of the population estimated at around two million at the time, a quarter fled the city in the months after the conquest by the Mujahideen; by the end of 1994 the population had fallen to around 500,000.

After the collapse of the old regime, six groups had been able to establish a presence in Kabul or the surrounding area: Massoud, who had come to the city the day after the Islamic State was proclaimed, occupied the northern part of Kabul with the troops of his Shurā-yi Nizār and the city center with most of the government buildings. The forces flown in by Dostums Junbisch-i Milli continued to control the airport and some ministries. The Harakat-i Inghilāb ruled the road to Jalalabad, but did not intervene in the events in the capital. The Ittihād-i Islāmi under Abdul Rasul Sayyaf established itself in the Paghmān district in western Kabul, the home of its founder, while the Hizb-i Wahdat controlled the districts in the west of the city center with a larger Shiite community. The Hizb-i Islāmi of Hikmatyār, who had been driven out of the urban area, set up their headquarters in Tschahār Asyāb in the south of Kabul and took up position along a wide arch in the southern suburbs of Kabul.

The Jāda-yi Maywand near the Kabul bazaar in 1993: The bazaar area at the time was on the front line between Shurā-yi Nizār, Junbisch and Hizb-i Islāmi.

After the capture of Kabul by Massoud and Dostum, two fragile alliances developed that fought for control of the capital. The core of the forces behind the interim government formed the Shurā-yi Nizār associated with the Jamiat under the command of Massoud and parts of the Partscham wing of the Hizb-i Watan. The alliance was supported by Dostum's Junbisch and the Shiite Hizb-i Wahdat. This alliance largely corresponded to the northern alliance that was constituted after Dostum's revolt against the government of Najibullāh. On the other hand, Hikmatyārs Hizb cooperated with former members of the Chalq wing, the Ittihād-i Islāmi of Abdul Sayyaf and voluntary Islamist fighters from Arab countries. The other mujahideen factions were local and did not take part directly in the fighting over the capital.

The two camps linked the long-standing rivalry between Massoud and Hikmatyār, between Jamiat and Hizb, with the equally long-running feud between Chalq and Partscham wings within the communist people's party. The polarization also took on the added dimension of a power struggle between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns for control of Afghanistan. Only the alliance around the Jamiat was basically able to form a government. The strategy of the Hizb-i Islami was limited to preventing effective government. The ongoing devastating rocket fire by Hikmatyār in the residential areas of Kabul had no military aims, but rather was aimed solely at preventing the situation in the capital from normalizing. The temporary support of Hikmatyār by other parties was therefore only of a tactical nature, in order to weaken the Rabbāni government or to improve one's own negotiating position. For example, Dostum and the Wahdat had no interest in a sustainable strengthening of the central power, as this would have run counter to their own aspirations for autonomy in the areas they ruled. But none of the other actors actually wanted to see Hizb-i Islāmi in power.

Break of the government coalition

Destroyed houses in western Kabul in 2004: The area was largely destroyed by the fighting between Jamiat, Ittihād and Wahdat and by Hikmatyār's artillery fire.

In December 1992, Rabbāni held the Shurā-yi ahl-i hal wa aqd, 45 days later than foreseen in the Peshawar Agreement, which confirmed him in his office. About a tenth of the members of the Shurā belonged to Dostum's Junbish, the rest were mostly associated with Rabbānis Jamiat. The other parties accused Rabbāni of manipulating and boycotted the assembly. In addition, Rabbani's refusal to accept his ally Dostum into the government eroded support for the government camp among ethnic Uzbeks.

At the same time, the government camp's original alliance broke up in the spring when Massoud tried to forcefully disarm the forces of the previously allied Shiite Hizb-i Wahdat. When the Wahdat then terminated the coalition, the anti-Shiite Ittihād severed its ties to Hikmatyār and joined the alliance around the Rabbani's government. Shurā-yi Nizār and Ittihād began a joint offensive against Hizb-i Wahdat positions in Afshar in western Kabul in February 1993. The aim was to take the Kabul headquarters of the Wahdat in order to enable the connection between the government-held areas in the north and east of Kabul on the one hand and the now allied Ittihād in the Paghmān district west of Kabul on the other. Massoud also cited the mistreatment of ethnic Tajiks by Vahdat troops in their area of ​​influence as the reason for the operation.

During and after the capture of Afshar there were serious attacks on the Hazara civilian population by the troops of the Ittihād and the Shurā-yi Nizār. A commission set up by the Rabbāni government under pressure from the Shiite community in the summer of 1993 estimated the number of civilians murdered at several hundred and the number of houses looted at several thousand. The offensive could not eliminate the Wahdat; instead, she temporarily drove the Shiite party to the side of Hikmatyār before signing another short-lived agreement with the government camp in autumn 1993.

Islamabad Agreement

Under pressure from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, Rabbāni signed the Islamabad Agreement with Hikmatyār and representatives of five other mujahideen parties on March 7, 1993 in the Pakistani capital Islamabad . Under the treaty, Hikmatyār was again appointed prime minister and mandated to form a new government in coordination with President Rabbāni and the other parties. The leaders of the Peshawar Seven drove together to Mecca , where they swore an oath on the treaty at the Kaaba . But the new agreement also failed. The Hizb-i Wahdat continued the attacks on the government and Hikmatyār formally put together a government, but remained outside of Kabul. In April he again carried out heavy attacks on government positions. For the remainder of 1993, the intensity of the fighting in Kabul decreased, while military successes by the Jamiat in other parts of the country increased the pressure on the Hizb-i Islāmi.

Formation of the Shurā-yi Hamāhangi

In view of the relative stabilization of the government, Dostum, who was not included in the Islamabad Agreement, feared a weakening of his own position. In January 1994 there was finally the second momentous regrouping since the fall of Najibullāh, when Dostum's Junbisch left the government alliance and joined Hikmatyār to form Shurā-yi Hamāhangi ( Persian شوراى هماهنگى- Coordinating Council ). The new alliance, which was based on a secret agreement between the Iranian and Pakistani intelligence services, included Hizb-i Islāmi and Junbisch-i Melli as well as the Hizb-i Wahdat, and the Shurā-yi Hamāhangi had loose contacts with Mujadiddi.

This was followed by the most violent fighting so far with the worst destruction in the history of Kabul, which caused the flow of refugees from the capital to continue to increase. The Jamiat and their allies were able to hold their lines in Kabul and even drive Dostum's troops from most of his positions despite Dostum's change of sides and the massive rocket and artillery attacks by Hikmatyār. However, the government alliance failed to extend its control in other areas of the country. The battle for the capital turned into a bloody stalemate in which none of the rival coalitions could gain a decisive advantage. All parties had regional strongholds as well as foreign support, but none of them had a national presence.

Development outside of Kabul

Simplified representation of the territorial control of Afghanistan after the fall of the Najibullah government: The regionalization of the various groups is clearly visible.

Besides the capital, fighting took place in the Kunduz region, where Jamiat, Junbish and Ittihād vied for influence in the city. There was also limited fighting for control of the Salang Tunnel and the Badghis and Kandahar provinces . Across the country, however, the number of victims fell drastically compared to those during the Soviet-Afghan war. While the fighting escalated in Kabul, which until then had been almost untouched by fighting, the bombing, which claimed enormous casualties in other cities and especially in rural areas, largely ceased. Other major combat operations also remained the exception. Reconstruction began in many areas and around 2.8 million Afghan refugees had returned from neighboring countries by 1994. The international reporting, which was concentrated on the capital, however, contributed to the distorted perception of a further escalating civil war.

The situation in the Pashtun-influenced and non-Pashtun regions developed very differently: In areas without a Pashtun majority, the administration and military from the time of the communist government mostly remained intact, although they were reorganized under the leadership of the regional rulers. The areas in the west, north, northeast and central Afghanistan came under uniform control of individual factions after the fall of the Najibullah government.

In contrast, the Pashtun regions in the south and south-east of the country fragmented along tribal borders. The central political role of the tribal groups prevented the rise of individual rulers as in other parts of the country. The army garrisons were disbanded and equipment distributed to local tribal leaders. Only the sarandoy militias of the Chalq-led Interior Ministry defected to Hizb-Islāmi-yi Gulbuddin and became the backbone of Hikmatyār's armed forces. Hikmatyārs Hizb, which, in contrast to the other parties, had no regional or tribal base, was the only Pashtun force that was able to maintain itself supra-regionally. In most of the areas, tribal shuras took over the remaining state power. The local Shuras, however, neither deployed supraregional troops nor did they set up an effectively functioning civil administration. Afghanistan's second largest town, Kandahar, has been split between rival commanders whose power struggles have turned the situation in the city into anarchy.

In the north, Dostum Mazar-i Sharif expanded into his power base. Lower partschamis cooperated with him and he gained control of the local mujahideen leaders who joined his junbish-i milli. The relative stability of the north under Dostum's rule and its proximity to Uzbekistan resulted in limited economic upturn. In August 1992, the United Nations moved its main office from Kabul to Mazar-i Sharif, and seven countries opened consulates there. Dostum built an effective administrative and tax system in his area of ​​influence. He saw himself as a representative of secularism , regional autonomy and minority rights. At the same time he led a brutal regime and financed his dissolute lifestyle from the scarce resources of the region.

Muhammad Ismāʿil Khan in 2002: In 1992, Ismāʿil took control of the Herat region.

In Herat, the local leader of the Jamiat-i Islāmi, Muhammad Ismāʿil , also known as Ismail Khan, took control of the city without a fight. Ismāʿil was able to repel attacks from allies of Hikmaytār with his troops, and he also successfully integrated the region's important Shiite population groups into his administrative system. As a result, Herat became the most stable region in Afghanistan and the economy recovered. The economic growth of the city made it possible for Muhammad Ismāʿil to get more regional militia leaders on his side and to expand his monopoly of power.

The northeast remained largely under the control of Ahmad Massoud's Shurā-yi Nizār, only Kunduz was largely controlled by Sayyaf's Ittihād-i Islāmi. Some regional army garrisons were integrated into the command structure of the Shurā-yi Nizār, which functioned through advanced institutionalization even during Massoud's absence. Most of the militia leaders organized in the Shurā-yi Nizār were, like Muhammad Ismāʿil, members of the Jamiat-i Islāmi, although both regions had only loose connections to the Jamiat-dominated government in Kabul.

The Soviet troops had already withdrawn from central Afghanistan, the Hazāradschāt, in 1981, so that the situation there changed little after the entire Afghan withdrawal. Iran's influence continued to increase as the central government weakened, and the Iranian-backed Hizb-i Wahdat increasingly assumed military and political control over the region. After the fall of the Najibullah government, central Afghanistan, like the north under Dostum, became an area autonomous from Kabul. This gave the Hazara ethnic group more influence than ever before in Afghan history. Their position was further strengthened by the fact that the Hizb-i Wahdat in Kabul was able to play off the two large Sunni alliances against each other.

Ethnification of the conflict

During the Soviet-Afghan War and the ensuing guerrilla war against the Soviet-backed government, members of all ethnic groups and larger tribes found themselves on both sides of the front. When, after the collapse of the regime, jihad on the one hand and socialism and Soviet aid on the other became less attractive, some leaders increasingly resorted to community rhetoric to mobilize support for their party. This change was particularly evident in the Hizb-i Islāmi-yi Gulbuddin, whose threatened marginalization Hikmatyār tried to counter by advocating the defense of Pashtun interests. The fragmentation into rival groups, some of which ran along ethnic-linguistic boundaries, was evident both among the former cadres of the communist regime and among the mujahideen. In post-Soviet Afghanistan, the four most important centers of power appeared to be clearly ethnically localized: the fighters of the Hizb-i Wahdat were exclusively Hazara , the Junbish was predominantly influenced by ethnic Uzbeks, most of the Jamiat members were Persian-speaking Sunnis , while Hikmatyār and later the Taliban were mainly Pashtuns recruited.

However, although ethnicity gained political importance during the civil war, the fighting was not primarily ethnically motivated. Ethnonationalism never dominated the strategies of the parties; for the Jamiat and the Taliban, who wanted to unify the country under a single central authority, it was even a hindrance. Even the only ethnically homogeneous party, the Hizb-i Wahdat, ideologically referred to the Shia, not Hazara nationalism. The increasing ethnic character of the various groups was only partly due to an ethnically oriented mobilization strategy, such as that used by Dostum in his Junbisch. Often it was an unintended consequence of the increasing regionalization of the parties, which made the local origins of their leaders a decisive factor in mobilizing supporters. The ethnologist Bernt Glatzer described the ethnification of the conflict as a mere epiphenomenon . The perception of the Afghan civil war as an ethnic conflict in the domestic and foreign media and among foreign governments also played an important role. This perception led to the fact that militia leaders received help from abroad because of their ethnic background and so ethnic differences from the outside were intensified.

Rise of the Taliban 1994–1996

Pakistan's Afghanistan policy, which continued to be geared towards an Afghan government dominated by Hikmatyār, found itself at an impasse by the summer of 1994 at the latest in view of the bloody stalemate in Kabul. It was obvious that Hikmatyār and the Shurā-yi Hamāhangi were neither able to conquer the capital, nor to unite the Pashtuns against the non-Pashtun government of Rabbani. Hikmatyār was also increasingly hated by Pashtuns because of its militarily senseless rocket attacks on Kabul. For the first time, Pakistan was left without a representative in Afghanistan.

In this situation, Pakistan decided to support the cross-border organization of the Taliban , which first appeared on the political map in 1994, as a new client in Afghanistan. The Taliban called themselves the Islamic Taliban Movement of Afghanistan ( Pashtun :د افغانستان د طالبان اسلامی تحریکِ- Da Afghānistān da Talibān Islāmi Tahrik ). Its classification as a movement organization is controversial, some authors characterize it as primarily a military organization. Starting from the politically fragmented south, the Taliban units quickly penetrated large parts of the country. Until the end of 1994, the Pakistani Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar was the most important patron of the Taliban in the Pakistani government, later the ISI also concentrated its support on the new grouping at the expense of its previous protégé Hikmatyār.

Roots and ideology

The Pashtun burqa became a symbol of the Taliban's gender policy in international perception.

The Taliban's ideology is based on an extreme form of Deobandism , such as that taught in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. The Pakistani party Jamiat-e Ulema Islam , founded by Deobandis, set up hundreds of madrasas in the Pashtun border areas of Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war , in which they offered young refugees free education, care and military training. The Jamiat splinter faction of Maulana Sami-ul-Haq played a special role , at whose madrasa Darul Uloom Haqqania numerous future Taliban leaders were trained.

The primitive interpretation of Sharia, as represented by the semi-educated mullahs teaching there, was far removed from the originally reform-oriented agenda of the Deobandis and strongly influenced by the Pashtun legal and honor code, the Pashtunwali . The elements adopted from Deobandism include, above all, the extreme image of women and the deep-seated antipathy towards Shiite Muslims. Rashid calls the Taliban's extreme interpretation of Islam that emerged in the Pakistani refugee camps an anomaly that in no way fitted into the spectrum of ideas and movements that had emerged in Afghanistan since the Saur revolution.

The interpretation of the Taliban ideology is not uniform. Classification as an anti-modern and fundamentalist movement - especially its messianic character due to the prominent role of its leader Muhammad Omar - is widespread, but a traditionalist orientation is controversial. The Taliban planned to introduce a moral law as they imagined it had existed in Afghanistan before the reforms of the 1950s - a goal that was aligned with the ideological orientation of fundamentalist mujahideen parties such as the Ittihād-i Islāmi and the Hizb-i Islāmi-yi Gulbuddin was in agreement. However, many Taliban had hardly ever experienced the traditional Afghanistan they were striving for; instead, their ideology referred to an imagined village life, as it existed in the imagination of refugees who had grown up in camps or madrasas.

Totalitarian elements of the ideology included the monopoly of both the political and private spheres and the exercise of terror as an instrument of psychological power. The terror particularly affected women, but also made their male relatives aware of their powerlessness. In contrast to other totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, however, the Taliban came to power in a country whose state structures had been completely destroyed, which explains the often inconsistent implementation of their decrees.

The members of the Taliban were generally ethnic Pashtuns of rural origin, most of whom had grown up during the war and had received no education other than the Pakistani madrasas. Some of them had already fought in different groups during the Afghan civil war, but only in rare cases had they reached positions of responsibility. In addition to the young madrasa students - the Taliban in the original sense of the word - the organization also comprised former mujahideen fighters, mostly the Hizb-i Islāmi-yi Chalis or the Harakat-i Inghilāb, whose commanders had joined the Taliban, and mostly former officers of the communist regime of the Pashtun-influenced Chalq wing.

Connections to Pakistan

The Pakistani government began supporting the Taliban under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto .

Although the key figures within the Taliban were Afghans and the organization was able to rely on local support from the population in some of the Pashtun-influenced areas, the connections to Pakistan were varied and extensive. Ahmed Rashid estimates that between 80,000 and 100,000 Pakistanis fought on the side of the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1992 to 1999. The rise of the Taliban is therefore often seen as an attempt at a stealthy invasion of the country by Pakistan.

The Pakistani government's support for the Taliban began in 1993 with Benazir Bhutto's election as prime minister. Bhutto's victorious People's Party formed a coalition with the Jamiat-e Ulema Islam led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman , which until then had received little support from the government. For the first time, the Jamiat was able to establish close ties to the ISI, the Pakistani army and foreign governments, especially Saudi Arabia. She used these channels intensively to solicit support for the Taliban organization that was forming. Bhutto's new interior minister, Nasirullah Babar , who took over the leadership of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy, played a decisive role as the Taliban's advocate .

Another connection of the Taliban to Pakistan was the powerful smuggler groups from Quetta and Chaman mentioned by the Rashid Transport Mafia, who were closely connected to the Taliban through tribal affiliation. The business of the transport mafia was severely restricted, however, as the land routes through Afghanistan were blocked by the fighting in Kabul and the fragmented situation in southern Afghanistan. The interests of the smuggler groups coincided with the plans of Bhutto and Babar to open an overland route from Pakistan to Central Asia.

Despite their many links to Pakistan, the Taliban were never controlled from outside. Unlike the mujahideen parties , whose contacts outside of Afghanistan were limited to the ISI and the Jaamat-e Islami , the extensive connections to state organs, political parties, Islamist groups, the Madrasan network and the drug and transport mafia enabled the Taliban to pit the Pakistani lobbies against each other . Instead of gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan that the Pakistani government was aiming for, there was Talibanization in Pakistan itself.

Military advance

Map of the Taliban's first hostilities in autumn 1994 in the Kandahar region

There is little reliable information about the exact origin of the Taliban. It is unclear whether the Pakistani Interior Ministry under Nasrullah Babar or individual Taliban fighters formed the new organization. The Taliban appeared for the first time with certainty on October 12, 1994, when about 200 men from Afghan and Pakistani madrasas conquered the strategically important town of Spin Baldak , held by Hikmatyārs Hizb-i Islāmi, in the province of Kandahar on the border with Pakistan. In the process, they got hold of large quantities of weapons and ammunition, which they claim to have stolen from a local weapons depot. However, this information is being questioned as an attempt to cover up arms deliveries through Pakistan.

This first military success of the Taliban marked the beginning of a power shift. However, under the impression of the ongoing heavy fighting of the Kabul government against the three parties of the Shurā-yi Hamāhangi, the events in the south of the country were hardly noticed nationally or internationally. Only the quarreling warlords in Kandahar saw the new organization as an immediate threat and asked Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban.

On October 29th, Babar sent a test convoy of 30 trucks driven by former Pakistani army personnel via Kandahar and Herat to Ashgabat in Turkmenistan . Bhutto himself had secured the securing of the route sections in their territories the day before at a meeting with Raschid Dostum and Muhammad Ismāʿil. When the convoy was stopped by units of the rulers there shortly before Kandahar, the Taliban intervened on November 3 and forcibly enabled the convoy to continue its journey. They immediately moved on in the direction of Kandahar, where after two days they captured the second largest city in the country with minor losses and ousted the ruling Pashtun warlords. The fall of Kandahar was celebrated by the Bhutto government and the Jamiat-e Ulema Islam. Rabbāni's government in Kabul still saw the Taliban as an ally in the fight against Hikmatyār at that time, which probably explained the passive role of the most powerful commander in Kandahar associated with the Jamiat, Mullah Naqib , in the conquest of the city.

After conquering Kandahar, they turned north towards Kabul, presumably with the support of ISI. In the following three months, the Taliban took control of 12 out of 31 provinces, partly by force and partly by bribery of local commanders, and advanced to the outskirts of Herat and Kabul. In January 1995 they captured Ghazni and in February the capital of Wardak Province , Maydān Shahr . In the same month they took Hikmatyār's power base, Chahār Asiyāb, in the south of the capital. Hikmatyār could only hold smaller areas of influence in parts of the provinces Paktiyā , Logar and Nangarhār . As a result of the advance, all of the Pashtun-influenced parties - Mahāz-i Milli, Jabha-yi Milli , Ittihād-i Islāmi, Harakat-i Inqilāb and Hizb-i Islāmi - were marginalized within a few months .

Due to the influx of thousands of mostly Afghan, but also Pakistani students from the madrasas in Pakistan who had since joined the units, the troop strength of the Taliban had grown to at least 10,000. Contrary to the founding myth spread by the Taliban themselves, their rise was by no means a non-violent pacification of previously lawless regions. With the exception of Zabul and Urozgān , the takeover of the provinces took place amid bitter fighting and sometimes heavy losses. In addition, unlike the region around Kandahar, which was actually plagued by anarchy, the areas later conquered by the Taliban were mostly peaceful and, in some cases, such as Ghazni and Herat, managed relatively effectively.

First setbacks

In early 1995, the Taliban conducted negotiations with both the Rabbani's government and its opponent, the Shiite Hizb-i Wahdat under Abdul Ali Mazari . Massoud, relieved of attacks by Hikmatyārs Hizb-i Islāmi by the advance of the Taliban, used the situation to drive the Wahdat out of their positions in southwest Kabul in a major offensive. In this desperate situation, Mazari turned to the Taliban and offered them the surrender of all heavy weapons if they would take over the wahdat positions in return and act as a buffer between Wahdat and Massoud's Shurā-yi Nizār. When the weapons and positions were handed over, however, there were skirmishes between Wahdat units and the Taliban. Mazari was captured by Taliban units and was killed in their custody under circumstances that have not yet been clarified. The escalation of events and especially Mazari's death made any understanding between the Taliban and the Shiite minority in Afghanistan impossible in the long term.

In another major offensive on March 11th, and after a week of very intense fighting, Massoud succeeded in driving the Taliban out of Kabul. This again led to the looting of Shiite residential areas in the city. In the summer of 1995, Rabbāni and Massoud were in sole control of the capital and all opponents were out of missile range. For the first time since the beginning of 1992, Kabul was no longer a city under siege. Aid organizations resumed their work and reconstruction projects began.

At the same time, Taliban units continued to advance in the west of the country and were moving towards Muhammad Ismāʿil's stronghold of Herat. At the same time, units from Dostum, who had de facto allied themselves with the Taliban, attacked Ismāʿil's positions from the north-west. Rabbāni's government flew 2,000 men in from the capital and used unrestricted air control to repel the attacks. In the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan since the Battle of Jalālābād in March 1989, the Jamiat units succeeded in driving the Taliban back to Dilaram . The Taliban suffered heavy losses, and many observers predicted the end of the organization after the defeats in Kabul and Herat.

Another advance and fall of Kabul

Taliban patrol in Herat in 2001

The Taliban used the break in fighting in the summer of 1995 to reorganize their units with crucial logistical support from the ISI and new weapons and vehicles from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Recruitment in the Pakistani madrassas reached a new high. Thousands of new fighters joined the Taliban units, whose troop strength reached around 25,000. In addition, with the help of ISI, the Taliban formalized their cooperation with Dostum in a secret agreement.

When Muhammad Ismāʿil, who saw the Taliban already on the verge of disintegration, let his troops advance in a poorly prepared offensive over the province of Helmand on Kandahar at the end of August 1995 , his units were surprised by the effectively conducted counter-offensive. Within a few days, the Taliban pushed the Jamiat troops back to Schindand , while Dostum carried out relief attacks on Herat. On September 3, Ismāʿil ordered a non-fighting withdrawal from Shindand under unexplained circumstances. His units fell into chaos, and two days later Ismāʿil also gave up Herat and fled to Iran.

On September 5, the Taliban took over the city without a fight. Muhammad Ismāʿil's units were weakened by increasing disintegration and constant attacks by Dostum's junbish. In addition, Ismāʿil received only hesitant support from the government in Kabul, which viewed his attempts at autonomy within the Jamiat with suspicion. The defeat of Muhammad Ismāʿil and the fall of Herat marked a turning point in the conflict. Since the Taliban were no longer enclosed on two sides by forces of the Jamiat, they could concentrate their units on the conquest of Kabul. In addition, the Taliban now controlled the road from Pakistan to Turkmenistan, a key demand made by the Bhutto government and the Pakistani transport mafia.

In the fall of 1995, the Taliban also retook the positions in southern Kabul from which they had driven Massoud in March. As before Hikmatyār, they began to bombard the residential areas of the capital with random rockets, ending the short summer peace period in Kabul. But even after a ten-month siege, they were unable to break through Massoud's defensive lines. Moderate voices within the Taliban, mostly among Pashtuns from the recently conquered areas, began to plead for negotiations with the government, while the Kandaharis around Omar wanted to continue the military conquest of the country by all means.

In order to force a development in their favor, the core group of the Kandaharis appointed Muhammad Omar as Amir al-Muʿminin (أمير المؤمنين- Leader of the Believers ), an Islamic title that made Omar the emir of Afghanistan and the undisputed leader of jihad. He underlined this claim on April 4 when he presented himself in the cloak of the Prophet Mohammed in Kandahar. A little later, a meeting of Pashtun mullahs and ulema convened by the Taliban proclaimed jihad against Rabbani's government. The declaration was a severe blow to the United Nations' ongoing efforts to find a peaceful settlement, and UN Special Envoy Mehmoud Mestiri subsequently resigned.

In May 1996, under the pressure of events, the Rabbāni government and Hikmatyār formed a new alliance. Hikmatyār again accepted the post of Prime Minister. The alliance saved Hikmatyār from falling into insignificance after the loss of his headquarters to the Taliban, but there was little benefit for Rabbāni and Massoud. The legitimacy of the government was severely weakened by the appointment of Hikmatyār, who the people of Kabul saw as the main culprit for the destruction of the capital. The government aroused further resentment when the first official act of Hikmatyār was to issue fundamentalist decrees, some of which anticipated future Taliban legislation. In addition, Massoud was forced by the alliance to overstretch his troops, estimated at around 30,000 men, to cover the positions of Hikmatyār's weakened Hizb-i Islāmi.

The Rabbani's government was further weakened in the course of the ongoing ethnicization of the conflict, which pushed the development of a multi-ethnic administration and armed force into the background in favor of ethnic loyalties. Rabbāni and Massoud were therefore increasingly dependent on people from their home areas of Punjschir and Badachschān . This development led to growing tensions between the various wings within the Jamiat-i Islāmi and the Shurā-yi Nizār, who represented a wide range of non-Pashtun groups.

In September the Taliban finally opened a quick indirect offensive on the capital from their positions in the south of Kabul with around 10,000 men. They initially swung past Kabul to the east into the province of Nangarhār. On September 12, they captured the city of Jalalabad after Pakistan had opened the border at the Chaiber Pass to Taliban supporters, so that the city came under pressure from the east. A little later, Taliban units also took over the provinces of Kunar and Laghmān . Then they turned from there again to the west and overran the positions of Hikmatyārs Hizb-i Islāmi in Sarobi in the east of the province of Kabul, which at the same time formed the eastern perimeter of Massoud's defensive ring around Kabul. Surprised by the speed at which the Taliban were advancing, Massoud decided on September 26th to give up the capital without a fight and withdrew with his troops and heavy weapons to the north into the Punjjir Valley.

Taliban government 1996–2001

As the first official act after the capture of Kabul, the Taliban tortured the former President Najibullāh, who was still on the premises of the UN mission, to death together with his brother and put their mutilated corpses on public display. In addition, within 24 hours the new rulers implemented the strictest interpretation of Sharia law the world had ever seen. They banned women, who at the time made up a quarter of the public sector and the majority of those in the education and health sector, from working outside their homes, closed all girls' schools, destroyed televisions and ordered all men to grow long beards. Around 25,000 families led by war widows faced starvation.

All Taliban leaders came from the poorest, most conservative and least literate Pashtun provinces in southern Afghanistan. They saw the cities and especially Kabul with its educated female population as a den of sin. For their recruits, typically orphans who grew up in a womenless society and other rootless people from the refugee camps, the control over women and their exclusion from public life was a symbol of their masculinity and their devotion to jihad. The oppression of women thus became the benchmark for the Taliban's Islamic radicalism and played a decisive role in their mobilization strategy.

Structure of the state

The Taliban were not a party in the classical sense, as they did not have a clear structure and after they came to power they became practically indistinguishable from the state. Its undisputed leader since the very beginning of the organization has been Muhammad Omar, who led the executive , legislative and judicial branches of the Taliban-led state. The main decision-making body of the Taliban was the Kandahar-based Supreme Shura, which was dominated by Omar's close comrades in arms, most of them Durrani Pashtuns from the Kandahar region. Even after the conquest of non-Pashtun areas, the shura was hardly expanded to include non-Pashtun members. The influence of Ghilzai Pashtuns also remained limited, making the Taliban leadership level completely unrepresentative. After the capture of Kabul in the autumn of 1996, the Kandahar Shurā waned and all power was concentrated on Muhammad Omar. This development was formalized in October 1997 when the Taliban renamed the Islamic State the Islamic Emirate and Omar, as the emir of Afghanistan, also formally became head of state.

Two later founded Shuras , the Military Shura and the Kabul Shura, were subordinate to the Supreme Shura. The shura in Kabul was headed by Muhammad Rabbāni and developed into the de facto government of Afghanistan. However, it had little effective power to govern, as even minor decisions had to be confirmed in Kandahar. Decisions of Muhammad Rabbani, who was considered relatively moderate, were regularly revoked by Muhammad Omar. The Military Shura also only implemented tactical guidelines; all strategic decisions were made directly by Omar.

The administration of the state came to an almost complete standstill: the Taliban cleared the government bureaucracy of higher non-Pashtun officials and replaced them with Pashtuns, who often had no qualifications and mostly did not even speak Persian, the lingua franca of the country. As a result, ministries and authorities largely ceased their functions; the only functioning organs in the Taliban state were the religious police and the military. In addition, due to the lack of ethnic, tribal and regional representativeness of their representatives in most areas, the new rulers were perceived as an occupying power. The situation was made worse by Omar's policy of rotating all functionaries and sending ministers who had become too competent or too powerful to act as commanders.

Military development after 1996

After the fall of Kabul in 1996, three power centers remained outside the Taliban-controlled areas.

After the fall of Kabul, the Taliban controlled around 65% of Afghan territory. Three power centers remained outside their sphere of control. The northeast of Afghanistan was occupied by Massoud's troops withdrawn from Kabul. The Hazāradschāt continued to be controlled by the Hizb-i Wahdat, which was led by Muhammad Karim Chalili after Mazari's death . The third region was the north, ruled by Dostum's Junbish, with Mazar-i Sharif as the center.

During the ongoing fighting between the Taliban and Massoud, it was long unclear what position Dostum and his Junbisch-i Milli would take. In view of the Taliban's absolute claim to power and their seemingly unstoppable advance, however, he decided on an alliance with Massoud and Khalili, with whom he allied on October 10, 1996 to form the Supreme Council for the Defense of the Fatherland . The union became the United Front ( Persian جبهه متحد, Jabha-yi Muttahid ), also known in the media as Northern Alliance, which, in addition to Jamiat, Wahdat and Junbish, also included Sayyaf's Ittihād-i Islāmi and Mohsenis Harakat-i Islāmi. Rabbāni was appointed political and Massoud military leader of the Alliance.

In February 1997 the Taliban advanced north through the Salang Tunnel from both Herat and Kabul. In May Dostum's deputy commander, Jamil Malik , mutinied and, with the help of the Taliban units advancing from the west, took over Mazar-i Sharif. Dostum then fled to Turkey. The invasion of the Taliban, who immediately began to proclaim Islamist decrees in Pashtun in the Persian- and Uzbek-speaking, secularly ruled city, provoked a popular uprising. The local Hizb-i Wahdat units joined the uprising that broke the alliance between Malik and the Taliban. The Uzbek troops of the Junbish also opened fire on their short-term allies. Hundreds of Taliban were killed trying to withdraw to the west, and up to 4,000 were killed in captivity in massacres. Massoud closed the Salang tunnel from the south, so that the Taliban units advanced from Kabul were also included in the region around Pol-e Chomri . Dostum returned from exile in September and restored his control over the Junbish, but was unable to regain his old position of power.

This so far worst defeat of the Taliban had military consequences, since the absolute troop strengths of all Afghan factions were relatively small - the total Taliban troops before the defeat in the north are estimated at around 25,000. From then on, the organization was even more dependent on Pakistani recruits and international jihadists, who were perceived by many Afghans as foreign occupiers. On the other hand, their international recruitment base enabled them to regroup and continue the fight despite the heavy losses.

From 1998–2001 the Taliban ruled around 90% of the country.

At the beginning of 1998 the Taliban increased the pressure on the Hazara of central Afghanistan through a hunger blockade. It was the first time in 20 years of war that a party had used food as a weapon. In the summer, Taliban units ventured again from Herat to the areas in the north controlled by Dostum and at the beginning of August captured Dostum 's headquarters, which had been relocated to Shibirghān . Mazar-i Sharif fell a week later, and Bamiyan, the capital of Hazāradschāt, a month later. After the capture of both cities, there were systematic massacres of Hazara civilians. The Red Cross and the United Nations estimate the number of civilians murdered by the Taliban at over 5,000 in Mazar-i Sharif alone.

The massacre of the Shiite Hazara and the murder of several Iranian diplomats by members of the Taliban in Mazar-i Sharif led to a diplomatic crisis with the Iranian government, which had 250,000 men of the regular army and the Revolutionary Guard take up positions on the Afghan border. Despite individual border battles, there was no Iranian invasion, but Iran continued to increase its aid deliveries to Massoud.

Massoud was the only opponent the Taliban could not eliminate. After the fall of the capital, the military conflicts between his units and the Taliban shifted to the northern areas of the province of Kabul, the Shomāli plain. The districts of Kalakān , Mir Batscha Kot , Qarabāgh and Farza , which are part of the Schomāli plain, were almost continuously the scene of heavy fighting from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban used a scorched-earth tactic specifically targeted against ethnic Tajiks. Conversely, Massoud's troops carried out attacks on ethnic Pashtuns, whom they suspected of being Taliban sympathizers. Many residents fled either north to the Punjir Valley or south to the slums of Kabul. According to estimates by the United Nations, more than 20,000 people fled the area within four days during the heavy fighting in August 1998 alone. In July 1999, mass executions and systematic mistreatment of women occurred as part of the Taliban's summer offensive. After the offensive, the plains were practically depopulated and the infrastructure completely destroyed. Despite their brutal tactics, the Taliban were unable to secure the plain; in September 2001 the front was still near the Bagram airfield.

International reception

Women's demonstration against the Taliban in Peshawar in 1998

After the rise of the Taliban had so far received little attention outside the region, its gender policy and the assassination of Najibullah were sharply condemned internationally after the takeover of Kabul. In contrast to the conquest of Herat and other cities, the fall of Kabul took place in the presence of international media in the city in front of a horrified world public.

The United Nations refused to hand over Afghanistan's UN headquarters to the new Taliban government; instead, the de facto disempowered Rabbāni government continued to act as the country's representative. The UN aid organizations were temporarily withdrawn in the summer of 1997 in response to ever more stringent restrictions. With the exception of the Taliban supporters Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, no state recognized the Islamic emirate of Afghanistan declared by the Taliban. Of all the Islamic states, Iran was the strongest critic of the Taliban's gender policy, while most of the other countries did not comment.

The US position was initially ambivalent. The Clinton administration has had no coherent Afghanistan strategy since the collapse of the communist regime, but tried to avoid positioning itself in the conflict to a large extent. Since then, American policy on Afghanistan has been limited to regular appeals to all parties involved to form a bipartisan government. After the Taliban conquered Kabul, the United States held back with an outright condemnation. Instead, there were sympathetic voices within the government who saw the Taliban as an anti-Iranian and pro-Western movement organization that, as a potential force for order, could help stabilize the country and curb opium cultivation. The plans of the CentGas consortium formed by the American Unocal and Saudi Delta Oil to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan from Central Asia to Pakistan also played a role . Such a pipeline was part of the American strategy to isolate Iran, but its realization required a stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan.

Madeleine Albright initiates a new policy towards the Taliban.

These statements led the Iranian government, in particular, to accusations that the Taliban organization had been built up and upgraded by the American CIA . In fact, the Clinton administration did not provide the Taliban with any financial or military aid, although it initially gave the US allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia a free hand in their massive support for the organization. At the same time, the US refused to comply with Pakistani demands to establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban government.

From 1997 onwards, American attitudes towards the Taliban changed fundamentally. The initially confused policy, which ultimately allowed the Taliban's supporters to tacitly let it go, was replaced by a line decidedly against the Taliban. This U-turn in American Afghanistan policy began with Madeleine Albright's appointment as Secretary of State and was initially driven primarily by campaigns by Afghan and American women's rights groups. In 1998, the Taliban's continued refusal to compromise with political opponents, the inadequate containment of opium cultivation, and support for bin Laden led to a further tightening of American policy towards the organization and its supporters in Pakistan. The retaliatory strikes against al-Qaeda training facilities in Khost after the attacks on US embassies in Africa in August 1998 finally marked the temporary low point for relations between the Taliban and the United States. Unocal also gave up its pipeline plans in December 1998 under American pressure and withdrew from the CentGas consortium.

Bin Laden and the radicalization of the Taliban

Under the influence of Osama bin Laden , the Taliban became radicalized.

After the conquest of Kabul, for the first time since the 1980s, thousands of foreign fighters, mainly from Arab states, streamed into Afghanistan. Their units were organized by Osama bin Laden , who returned to Afghanistan from Sudan in May 1996 under the protection of the Taliban. The Taliban provided bin Laden with training camps in which Islamist fighters from all over the world were trained. The fighters, known as Arab-Afghans , supported the Taliban's offensives and were heavily involved in the massacres against the Hazara.

Under the influence of bin Laden and his Wahhabi al-Qaeda, the Taliban began to radicalize further. After the attacks in Africa in August 1998, Muhammad Omar's decrees and speeches increasingly focused on support for global jihad rather than the situation in Afghanistan. While he had previously sought recognition from Western states, he now switched to the radically anti-Western line of al-Qaeda. When Omar insulted the Saudi government in the fall of 1998, Saudi Arabia also stopped supporting the Taliban, and Pakistan remained the organization's only ally.

Two catalogs of sanctions against the Taliban adopted by the UN Security Council in October 1999 and December 2000 bear witness to the advanced isolation of the Taliban regime. In 2001 the Taliban took increasingly radical measures against non-Muslims. On March 10th, despite enormous protests, they destroyed the Buddha statues in Bamiyan with explosive charges and artillery shelling, including in the Islamic world . A month later, Omar issued a decree forcing Sikhs and Hindus to wear yellow dog tags to identify them in public as non-Muslims, and that summer arrested Christian aid workers. At the same time, Pakistani support for the Taliban began to hit its country of origin, where neo-Taliban parties had been gaining influence in Balochistan and the Northwestern Frontier Province since 1998 and were issuing Islamist decrees based on the Afghan model.

But despite their radicalization and rhetorical support for the goals of al-Qaida, the Taliban stood aloof from bin Laden's global jihad. As an ethnocentric party, its own activities were always limited to the national framework. Overall, only a few Afghans joined international jihad networks such as al-Qaida, and Afghanistan was alien to their preferred tactics, such as attacks on the civilian population and suicide bombings.

Eve of western intervention

→ Main article : War in Afghanistan since 2001

The presence of Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaida he led in Afghanistan became the main source of conflict with the international community and a burden for the Taliban government from 1998 onwards. Citing the hospitality offered by the Pashtunwali, Muhammed Omar categorically refused to comply with the increasingly insistent demand for bin Laden to be extradited by the US, Saudi Arabia and the United Nations.

The consequences of the decision to place foreign jihadists under their protection were completely underestimated by the Taliban until the US-led intervention in October 2001. Although the Taliban's policies were strongly condemned internationally, no western country was willing to go beyond appeals and sanctions in Afghanistan. But when a global jihad was waged from Afghanistan against the only remaining superpower, the country moved back into the focus of world politics. Eventually, events that were beyond the control of the organization led to the overthrow of the Taliban.

On September 9, 2001, agents of al-Qaeda acting as journalists murdered Ahmad Shah Massoud, the commander of the remaining military opposition to the Taliban. Two days later, al-Qaeda members carried out suicide attacks in mainland America, killing nearly 3,000 . The US and its allies responded with a military intervention in Afghanistan directed against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Under enormous American pressure, Pakistan also ended its support for the Taliban.

Massive US air strikes began on October 7th on Taliban positions as United Front units advanced on the ground. Within ten weeks of the start of the intervention, all positions in the organization collapsed. Far from following the Taliban's calls for a new uprising against the invaders, most Afghans hoped for protection from the foreign troops from their own discredited rulers and from a renewed slide into civil war.

further reading

Afghan civil war in general

• Larry P. Goodson: Afghanistanʿs Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press 2001, ISBN 0-295-98050-8 .
• William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars . Palgrave Macmillan, Second Edition, Basingstoke 2009, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 .
• Gilles Dorronsoro: La révolution afghane: des communistes aux tâlebân . Ed. Karthala, Paris 2000, ISBN 2-8458-6043-9 (English Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present , translated from French by John King, Columbia University Press, New York 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 ).
• Antonio Giustozzi: Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords of Afghanistan . Columbia University Press, New York 2009, ISBN 978-0-231-70080-1 .
• Kristian Berg Harpviken : Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan . s. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 3., pp. 271-287

Najibullah government until 1992

• Barnett Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, Second Edition, New Haven, CT 2002, ISBN 0-300-09520-1 .
• Antonio Giustozzi: War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992 . Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 2000, ISBN 0-878-40758-8 .
• Olivier Roy : Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War. Darwin Press, Princeton, NY 1995, ISBN 0-87850-076-6 .

Battle for Kabul 1992–1996

• Gilles Dorronsoro: Kabul at War (1992-1996): State, Ethnicity and Social Classes . South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal [Online], Research Articles, (online) since October 22, 2007
• Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity . Human Rights Watch Report on War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses in the Battle of Kabul, 2005, ISBN 1-56432-334-X . (on-line)

Rise of the Taliban

• Ahmed Rashid : Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 0-300-08902-3 (German Taliban. Afghanistan's warriors of God and jihad , translated by Harald Riemann, Droemer Knaur, Munich 2001, ISBN 3-426-27260-1 ).
• William Maley (Ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn ?: Afghanistan And The Taliban . New York University Press, New York 1998, ISBN 0-8147-5585-2 .
• Neamatollah Nojumi: The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region. Palgrave, New York 2002, ISBN 0-312-29402-6 .
• Robert D. Crews, Amin Tarzi (Ed.): The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan . Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2008, ISBN 978-0-674-02690-2 .

Individual evidence

1. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , pp. 116-118
2. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , pp. 154-156
3. ^ Theodore L. Eliot: Afghanistan in 1989: Stalemate . In: Asian Survey , Vol. 30, No. 2, University of California Press, Berkeley 1990, pp. 158-166
4. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , pp. 193-195
5. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , pp. 164-165
6. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , pp. 166-167
7. ^ Anthony Arnold: The Fateful Pebble: Afghanistanʿs Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire . Presidio Press, Novato 1993, ISBN 0-788-15836-8 , p. 185
8. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , pp. 171-174
9. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 227
10. ^ Thomas Barfield: Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History . Princeton University Press, Princeton 2010, ISBN 978-0-691-14568-6 , pp. 245-246
11. ↑ Larry P. Goodson: Afghanistanʿs Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press 2001, ISBN 0-295-98050-8 , p. 72
12. ^ Theodore L. Eliot: Afghanistan in 1989: Stalemate . In: Asian Survey , Vol. 30, No. 2, University of California Press, Berkeley 1990, p. 159
13. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 228
14. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , pp. 228-229
15. ^ A. Marshall: Phased Withdrawal, Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction . Conflict Research Studies Center 2006, ISBN 1-905058-74-8 , p. 7
16. ↑ Antonio Giustozzi: War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992 . Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 2000, ISBN 0-87840-758-8 , p. 187
17. ^ Shah M. Tarzi: Afghanistan in 1991: A Glimmer of Hope . In: Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 2, University of California Press, Berkeley 1992, pp. 189-96
18. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , pp. 266-69
19. ↑ Antonio Giustozzi: War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992 . Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 2000, ISBN 0-87840-758-8 , pp. 232-236
20. ↑ Antonio Giustozzi: War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992 . Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 2000, ISBN 0-87840-758-8 , pp. 234-235
21. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , pp. 237-238
22. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , pp. 269-270
23. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , p. 270
24. ^ ^{A b} Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , p. 271
25. ↑ Amin Saikal: Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival . IB Tauris, London 2004, ISBN 1-850-43437-9 , p. 205
26. ^ Zalmay Khalilzad: Afghanistan in 1994: Civil War and Disintegration . In: A Survey of Asia in 1994 , University of California Press 1995, pp. 151-152
27. ↑ the USA began to walk away from the Afghan issue after the Soviet troops completed their withdrawal in 1989. That walk became a run in 1992 after the fall of Kabul from Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , p. 175
28. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 236
29. ↑ The doctrine of strategic depth was formulated in 1989 by the Pakistani General Mirza Aslam Beg . It provided for Pakistani units to be stationed in post-Soviet Afghanistan beyond the reach of the Indian military, as Pakistan's small east-west expansion was perceived as insufficient for a long-term defense against an Indian attack. See, for example, Rizwan Hussain: Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan . Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire 2005, ISBN 978-0-754-64434-7 , p. 172
30. ↑ Husain Haqqani: Insecurity along the Durand Line in: Geoffrey Hayes, Mark Sedra (eds.): Afghanistan: Transition under Threat . Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo 2008, ISBN 978-1-554-58011-8 , pp. 227-228
31. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 236
32. ↑ Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan in William Maley (ed.): Fundamentalism reborn? : Afghanistan and the Taliban . Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , pp. 120-122
33. ^ ^{A b} Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , p. 272
34. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , p. 167
35. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , pp. 165-167
36. ↑ Amin Saikal: The Rabbani Government, 1992-1996 . In William Maley (ed.): Fundamentalism reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban . C. Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1850653607 , pp. 179-180
37. ^ Gilles Dorronsoro: Kabul at War (1992-1996): State, Ethnicity and Social Classes . South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 2007, § 47
38. ^ Larry P. Goodson: Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press 2001, ISBN 0-295-98050-8 , p. 75.
39. ^ Gilles Dorronsoro: Kabul at War (1992-1996): State, Ethnicity and Social Classes . South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 2007, § 5–6
    Population 1994 from Cary Gladstone: Afghanistan revisited . Nova Publishers, 2001, ISBN 978-1-590-33421-8 , p. 198.
40. ^ Gilles Dorronsoro: Kabul at War (1992-1996): State, Ethnicity and Social Classes . South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 2007, § 5-6
41. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , pp. 241–242.
42. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: Afghanistan in 1993: Abandoned but Surviving . In: Asian Survey , Vol. 34, No. 2, 1994, pp. 185-186
43. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , pp. 242–243
44. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , p. 169
45. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 243
46. ↑ Amin Saikal: Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival . IB Tauris, London 2004, ISBN 1-850-43437-9 , p. 216
47. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , pp. 169-170
48. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , p. 162
49. ^ Gilles Dorronsoro: Kabul at War (1992-1996): State, Ethnicity and Social Classes . South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 2007, §3, footnote 4
50. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: Afghanistan in 1993: Abandoned but Surviving . In: Asian Survey , Vol. 34, No. 2, 1994, pp. 187-188
51. ↑ Antonio Giustozzi: Tribes and warlords in southern Afghanistan 1980-2005 . Working Paper No. 7, Crisis State Research Center, London 2006, p. 17
52. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , p. 265
53. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: Afghanistan in 1993: Abandoned but Surviving . In: Asian Survey , Vol. 34, No. 2, 1994, pp. 277-278
54. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 241
55. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , p. 209
56. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: Afghanistan in 1993: Abandoned but Surviving . In: Asian Survey , Vol. 34, No. 2, 1994, p. 189
57. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , p. 276
58. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 240
59. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , p. 264
60. ^ Barnett R. Rubin: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . Yale University Press, New Haven 2002, ISBN 978-0-300-09519-7 , p. 278
61. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , pp. 257-258
62. ↑ Bernt Glatzer: Afghanistan: Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration? In William Maley (ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban . C. Hurst Glatzer 2001 Co, London 2001, ISBN 1850653607 , pp. 179-180
63. ^ Thus for much of 1994, Pakistans's Afghan policy was stranded like a beached whale, directionless and without powerful surrogate. in: Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 Maley, p. 74
64. ↑ Kristian Berg Harpviken: Review: The Taliban Threat . Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1999, pp. 868-869
65. ^ Anthony Davis: How the Taliban became a military force . In: William Maley (Ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan And The Taliban , Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , p. 52
66. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , pp. 291-292
67. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 88-90
68. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , p. 93
69. ^ William Maley: Interpreting the Taliban . In William Maley (ed.): Fundamentalism reborn? : Afghanistan and the Taliban . C. Hurst Maley 2001 Co, London 2001, ISBN 1850653607 , pp. 16-29
70. ^ William Maley: Interpreting the Taliban . In William Maley (ed.): Fundamentalism reborn? : Afghanistan and the Taliban . C. Hurst Maley 2001 Co, London 2001, ISBN 1850653607 , pp. 19-20
71. ^ William Maley: Interpreting the Taliban . In William Maley (ed.): Fundamentalism reborn? : Afghanistan and the Taliban . C. Hurst Maley 2001 Co, London 2001, ISBN 1850653607 , pp. 21-22
72. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 273
73. ^ Anthony Davis: How the Taliban became a military force . In: William Maley (Ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan And The Taliban , Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , p. 55
74. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: The Taliban: Exporting Extremism . Foreign Affairs 1999, 78, 6, p. 27
75. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , p. 221
    Amin Saikal: Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival . IB Tauris, London 2004, ISBN 1-850-43437-9 , p. 219
76. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 Maley, pp. 75-76
77. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 245
78. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 185-188
79. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , p. 222
80. ^ Anthony Davis: How the Taliban became a military force . In: William Maley (Ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan And The Taliban , Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , pp. 45-46
81. ^ Anthony Davis: How the Taliban became a military force . In: William Maley (Ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan And The Taliban , Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , pp. 46-47
82. ^ Anthony Davis: How the Taliban became a military force . In: William Maley (Ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan And The Taliban , Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , pp. 47-48
83. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , p. 29
84. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 247
85. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 250
86. ^ Anthony Davis: How the Taliban became a military force . In: William Maley (Ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan And The Taliban , Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , p. 55
87. ^ Anthony Davis: How the Taliban became a military force . In: William Maley (Ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan And The Taliban , Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , pp. 57-58
88. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , pp. 206-207
89. ^ Anthony Davis: How the Taliban became a military force . In: William Maley (Ed.): Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan And The Taliban , Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , pp. 59-60
90. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , p. 39
    Troop strengths according to Ralph H. Magnus: Afghanistan in 1996: Year of the Taliban. In Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 2, University of California Press, Berkeley 1997, p. 113
91. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 39-40
92. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , pp. 251-252
93. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , p. 41
94. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 42-43
95. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , pp. 215-216
96. ↑ Amin Saikal: The Rabbani Government, 1992-1996 . In William Maley (ed.): Fundamentalism reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban . C. Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1850653607 , p. 36
97. ^ Ralph H. Magnus: Afghanistan in 1996: Year of the Taliban. In Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 2, University of California Press, Berkeley 1997, pp. 113-114
98. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 49-51
99. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , p. 110
100. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 273
101. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , p. 102
102. ^ Martin Ewans: Afghanistan: A New History. Routledge, London 2002, ISBN 978-0-415-29826-1 , p. 196
103. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , p. 98
104. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 100-102
105. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , p. 191
106. ↑ Larry P. Goodson: Afghanistanʿs Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press 2001, ISBN 0-295-98050-8 , pp. 78-79
107. ^ Thomas Barfield: Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History . Princeton University Press, Princeton 2010, ISBN 978-0-691-14568-6 , p. 260
108. ↑ Angelo Rasanayagam: Afghanistan: A Modern History . IBTauris, London 2005 ISBN 978-1-850-43857-1 , p. 155
109. ↑ Neamatollah Nojumi: The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region. Palgrave, New York 2002, ISBN 0-312-29402-6 , pp.
110. ^ Larry P. Goodson: Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press 2001, ISBN 0-295-98050-8 , p. 80
111. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , p. 193
112. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 113-116
113. ^ Richard Mackenzie: The United States and the Taliban in William Maley (ed.): Fundamentalism reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban . Hurst, London 2001, ISBN 1-850-65360-7 , pp. 96-97
114. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , p. 182
115. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 176-182
116. ↑ Gilles Dorronsoro: Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present . Columbia University Press / Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, New York / Paris 2005, ISBN 0-231-13626-9 , p. 304
117. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 139
118. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia . Yale University Press, New Haven 2001, ISBN 978-0-300-08902-8 , pp. 138-140
119. ^ William Maley: The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 978-0-230-21313-5 , p. 256
120. ↑ Ahmed Rashid: The Taliban: Exporting Extremism . Foreign Affairs 1999, 78, 6, p. 5
121. ^ Thomas Barfield: Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History . Princeton University Press, Princeton 2010, ISBN 978-0-691-14568-6 , p. 267
122. ^ Thomas Barfield: Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History . Princeton University Press, Princeton 2010, ISBN 978-0-691-14568-6 , pp. 268-269
123. ^ Thomas Barfield: Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History . Princeton University Press, Princeton 2010, ISBN 978-0-691-14568-6 , pp. 269-270

	This article is available as an audio file:
	Save | Information  | 7:37 min (23 MB) Text of the spoken version
	More information on spoken Wikipedia

This article was added to the list of excellent articles on November 11, 2010 in this version .