De statu imperii Germanici

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De statu imperii Germanici ( Latin on the constitution of the German Empire ) is a constitutional document by the natural law teacher Samuel von Pufendorf and deals with the development, the state and in particular the state-theoretical assessment of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire .

It is considered the most important and at the same time the most controversial work of imperial journalism and appeared for the first time in 1667 in The Hague under the pseudonym Severinus von Monzambano . The characterization of the imperial constitution contained therein as an “irregular body similar to a monster” (irregular aliquod corpus et monstro simile) brought it to great contemporary fame . The full title of the script, which was originally written in Latin, is Severini de Monzambano Veronensis, De statu imperii Germanici ad Laelium fratrem, Dominum Trezolani, liber unus .

To the history of origin

Elector Karl I. Ludwig von der Pfalz (copper engraving by Christoph Le Blon, 1652)

Due to his early works and helpful relationships, Samuel Pufendorf was appointed to Heidelberg University in 1661 . Elector Karl I. Ludwig protected him probably because of his journalistic support for the Count Palatine in the so-called wild - catching dispute . Pufendorf turned down the chair in Roman law that he had first been offered , and his request for a chair in politics was not granted. Probably in order to be able to keep him in spite of this, the elector appointed him in the same year to a professorship created especially for him , which was later converted into a chair for natural and international law .

That this chair in the Philosophical d. H. the artistic faculty and not the legal, should be the basis for legendary glorifying the emergence of the imperial constitutional writing De statu imperii Germanici in later times: So, since the beginning of the scientific study of Pufendorf's life and work, the story has been passed that he had the Writes written out of anger that he was passed over in 1664 when filling a professorship for German constitutional law at the law faculty of Heidelberg University. The lawyer Johann Friedrich Böckelmann was preferred to him on the grounds that he - Pufendorf - did not have the necessary qualifications for the professorship in question. As a result, Pufendorf is said to have drafted the constitution in order to demonstrate to the academic public his knowledge of German constitutional law and his ability to exercise a legal teaching post.

Detlef Döring was able to show that this genesis must be characterized as a legend: On the one hand, not only the prominent tradition that Böckelmann Pufendorf was "preferred" must be viewed critically, but also the "preference" in the sources generally referred to in this regard, the foreword posthumous edition of the writing (1706) and that of its German translation by Peter Dahlmann, could not be understood as a postponement of Pufendorf with regard to the said chair:

“ 'Preference' here means 'hold better and higher or honor', 'preference' is to be seen in the sense of 'privilege, priority, privilege'. Obviously, this is not about competition for a chair, but about one of the disputes over rank that were fought out with particular intensity in the baroque age. [...] Pufendorf, who only had a master's degree in philosophy, [...] was a professor of international law and philology in the philosophy faculty, while Böckelmann was a member of the legal department. The disdain with which the artist faculty was generally regarded at that time is well known and does not need to be explained in more detail. [...] So if anything about the story handed down by Dahlmann corresponds to the facts, then it is the news that the self-confident Pufendorf was annoyed at having to let Böckelmann go 'in ordine' at the university, despite his Subject, international law, would be of greater importance. "

On the other hand, the basis of the traditional genesis outlined above turns out to be doubtful if one takes a look at its own tradition:

" With Heinrich von Treitschke [...] the legend gets its final polish by naming the professorship for German constitutional law as a specific subject of dispute. The fact that Pufendorf replied to his postponement by writing a pamphlet on the imperial constitution then appears as an understandable 'revenge'. Most authors of the 20th century have taken over this story without checking and dated it to the year 1664 (without explanation). The observation that in Pufendorf's time there was no professorship for German constitutional law in Heidelberg should have made one suspicious. "

Even of the three law professorships that existed at that time, not a single one was filled in the period in question. Döring can also show, on the basis of preserved files, that when the first professorship for Roman law was re-appointed in 1665, Friedrich Böckelmann was the favorite from the start, while Pufendorf is nowhere mentioned in this context. Ultimately, there is no evidence of competition between Böckelmann and Pufendorf for a chair in German constitutional law, as has been passed down time and again in legend. According to Döring, it is difficult to imagine that Pufendorf applied instead for the first professorship in the Faculty of Law, which was to be filled a year later. Against this background, it seems more plausible to assume that Pufendorf wrote the constitution primarily out of an academic interest in the fundamental question of Reich journalism , namely how it is about the distribution of power within the Reich constitution and how this emerges from the form of the Reich results.

Plant and structure

Samuel von Pufendorf, alias Severinus de Monzambano , copper engraving by Joachim von Sandrart

To create the font

Probably in view of the great political and scientific explosiveness of the work, Pufendorf considered it advisable to initially publish the font under a pseudonym , namely " Severinus von Monzambano ". In this way he believed he could do without consideration for political and religious sensitivities in order to deliver a relentless and sometimes highly provocative description of the state of the German Reich. Apart from his motives for writing the work, in the introduction to the work, the so-called dedication letter (see below), through the fictitious report of Monzambano, he provides clear information on how the layout of the script is to be understood: Pufendorf clearly criticizes it in the jurisprudence of his time, the doctrine of constitutional law and its scholars, as they met and became known to him so far. Horst Denzer sums them up as follows:

The doctrine of constitutional law is trapped in a “conservative positivism ”, according to Pufendorf, and neglects interdisciplinary cooperation: it adheres to outdated theories in imperial constitutional law and thus misunderstands reality and loses any practical relevance. The main problem here is the great authority of Roman law . As a result, jurisprudence fails to question authorities and laws and to measure them against principles of reason and justice as well as political necessity. Reasons for legal clauses should be given. Ultimately, political considerations would also have to flow into the doctrine of the state ( reason of state ), i. H. the appropriateness of certain law for a specific state can be checked.

In order to avoid these mistakes and, moreover, to be able to provide an approximately correct picture of the imperial constitution, knowledge of German history and the "science of politics" is required above all. According to Pufendorf, those who do not have this can only fail at the task, as the German constitutional lawyers have apparently so far done.

structure

The writing is divided into eight chapters, which in turn consist of a changing number of paragraphs . While the chapters always deal with individual subject areas, the paragraphs often delimit individual units of meaning, and more rarely do they simply structure the text without any clearly recognizable delimitation of content.

The first five chapters deal with the constitutional history of the empire from Franconian times up to Pufendorf's presence with the latest developments at the time due to the Peace of Westphalia and, for example, the electoral surrender of Emperor Leopold I. In Chapter I, the author describes the beginnings of the empire as its title announces ; in chapters II and III follows the history of the imperial estates and their development; Chapter IV deals with the Holy Roman Emperor , his election and his voters, the electors , and Chapter V focuses on the limitation of the emperor's monarchical power. This is where the constitutional part of Scripture ends.

The assessment of the form of government of the empire finally follows in Chapter VI, which culminates in the "monstrosity thesis". This is followed by well-founded considerations on the strengths and weaknesses of the empire (Chapter VII) as well as an analysis of the raison d'être of the same in Chapter VIII. The conclusion of this chapter (and with it that of the entire treatise) is one in the form of a reproduction of a probably fictional conversation between scholars Composed, detailed and harsh criticism of the Catholic religion and its institutionalization in the Reich in the form of the German Reich Church and its - from Pufendorf's point of view - highly reprehensible structures and practices, whereby the author often slips into polemics .

Content (selection)

In the following, the summary of a section is preceded by the headings from the original text.

dedication

Laelio de Monzambano Trezolani Domino Severinus de Monzambano salutem plurinam dicit

In the dedication at the beginning of the work, the author expands the fictitious plot of the same: He identifies himself as Severinus von Monzambano , an Italian traveler to Germany who tells his brother Laelius the reason for his long journey. Pufendorf has the Italian scholar put forward a plausible motive for his research: “ As I now read about the significant events and the many fierce battles [of the Thirty Years War , author's note ] , I was amazed how this country was so badly damaged could survive, even though locals and strangers had worked on its demise for thirty years. I therefore longed to get to know the strength and power of this people, their different tribes and the bond that holds this misshapen body together [the empire ] better. “This announces the further subject matter of the text, although this statement should certainly not indicate Pufendorf's own motives, since it merely provides a picture of the intentions of the equally fictitious author, which corresponds to the fictitious framework.
In the following, Monzambano describes how he fared at the beginning of his research into the empire. For this, after he had learned the German language, he was able to fall back on the extensive library of a fellow scholar. In the run-up it was his conviction that only someone who knows the teachings of all constitutional law scholars in the country can understand the German state. That is why he had an unimaginably large number of writings and treatises brought to him and started to study them. At this point, Pufendorf, through Monzambano's words, for the first time clearly criticizes contemporary imperial constitutional law and its thinkers:

“ Fortunately, after sweating for a long time, I remembered the word of one of our scholars that Germans are obsessed with an insatiable writing mania, but very few would produce anything that could be applauded by educated contemporaries through sharpness of invention or through ingenuity. But in order not to spare the paper from being wasted, most of the parts that have been collected everywhere join together into a mass, often without a trace of their own judgment. It is also not considered plagiarism for them to sell the books of others as new if only a few passages have been added. After all, some believe that they can occupy a place among writers simply because they have compiled a detailed work in a compendium or, God willing, in tables to aid memory or stupidity. "

Therefore, Pufendorf Monzambano announces, he thinks he only has to read one of the more extensive writings in order to know all of them, since the German lawyers copied all of them anyway. So he picked up one of the works that was one of the most important in terms of scope and reputation. But this had disappointed him: Although the author of the work constitutes an extensive knowledge of the civil law on display, devoid however of any knowledge of the science of politics. But nobody can understand the structure of the empire who is not familiar with its constitutional history and political science at the same time - he has to queue up, as it were, “ like a donkey playing strings. “After this experience, he put all the learned writings (the“ silly pamphlets ”) aside and on an extensive trip asked various German politicians about their experiences, which was a more worthwhile procedure. So he came from Munich to Regensburg (the new seat of the Reichstag ), then to Vienna, to Saxony and Brandenburg. From Berlin the journey continued to Braunschweig, where he met Hermann Conring . For this he is full of praise. Thereupon he continued his journey, went to Düsseldorf, Bonn and Mainz and finally returned to the Electoral Palatinate . Here Pufendorf / Monzambano praises the Elector Karl I. Ludwig with all its heart. All the good things that are said of him in the empire are entirely true. (Among other things, because of such passages in Monzambano's statements that suggest a relationship between the author and the Elector and the Palatinate, Pufendorf was suspected of authorship of De statu imperii Germanici throughout his life .) After this brief episode and another brief stay in Stuttgart, his journey was already there come to an end. Monzambano then closes the dedication letter with thanks and greetings to his brother Laelius, who had stayed at home, to whom he gratefully dedicates the following text, in which he wants to draw a faithful picture of the empire.

Chapter I.

De origine Imperii Germanici

In the first chapter, Pufendorf expands a history of the origin of the empire, beginning with an indication of the geographical location and the conditions of Germania (§ 1), including the adjacent areas. In § 2 the constitution of the Germanic tribes is dealt with, as Pufendorf imagines it in retrospect. He then made the Franks responsible for the unification of the Germanic tribes (§ 3–5). In § 6 Charlemagne is discussed. With § 7 the investigation of the history of the imperial constitution begins, as Pufendorf derives the sovereignty of Charles over the different parts of his empire from different legal titles. In § 8 he attests that the Frankish king has unlimited rule, which he exercised with the help of counts and margraves of Franconian origin.

In this chapter one already finds an important topos of the entire text: the disastrous increase in power of the king's vassals , which is later identified as the root of the decline in power of the German rulers. Further in § 9: “ With the division of the empire under the sons of Ludwig, the decline of the Frankish rule and the Carolingians began. Germany separated from the rest of France and got its own king in Ludwig, the son of Louis the Pious. [...] During the disastrous battles among the late Carolingians, the power of the German princes grew tremendously; [...] the Germans finally chose their kings from among the nobles of their people. Since that time Germany has been regulating its own affairs and has no longer formed a common empire with France. “This is followed by a brief investigation into what the designation of the empire as the“ Holy Roman Empire ”is all about and to what extent and with what justification it could be called a“ Roman ”.

Chapter II

De membris, ex quibus iam Imperium Germanicum componitur

In the second chapter, Pufendorf deals with the members, the estates of the empire. He first approaches the subject of systematic analysis of in determining what an empire state of mind (§ 1): " One of the more important members of the kingdom are expected, calls the one imperial estates and the seat, speak and vote in the Imperial Diet have . "On this further in § 2:" In general, two things are sufficient for recognition as an imperial class; he must in the Reichsmatrikel be enrolled, the list of items, and the imperial taxes directly into the general Treasury, not pay to that of another object. "

In view of the diversity and partial confusion of the status of the Reich, Pufendorf is problem-conscious with regard to defining a fixed number of classes by means of the Reich register or even being able to specify it at all: “ There are also no Reich registers that are not too many or too few Lists stands that would not have been objected to by any party. [...] In my opinion, the old registers of the Reich, which list many realm estates that are no longer represented in the Reichstag, are more like mere registers of attendance of the Reichstag than authorized documents from which someone can derive an indubitable legal title. One can also deduce from the diversity of the registers that there was no fixed number of estates at this early period, but that anyone who considered himself important in the state either in power or in intelligence could appear at the Reichstag. "On the further development of the order of the estates up to his own time, the author states :" Later, the weaker ones, who were concerned about their private affairs, did not allow themselves to be free for public duties, stayed away, others were excluded by the more powerful estates, until you finally reach today's number. “This is one of the reasons why Pufendorf considers it to be in vain or at least unnecessary to report on the entire inventory of the imperial estates; it suffices to list the largest and most important members of the empire.

In Pufendorf's order and terminology, the following statuses are brought up, with general and special information about the political position and history of the respective rule being given:

Finally, at the end of the chapter, Pufendorf mentions the division of the empire and its estates into circles, the imperial circles (Section 15), which was carried out by Emperor Maximilian I in 1512. His final verdict on these: “ The division primarily serves to make it easier to maintain peace and the enforcement of judgments against unruly classes. [...] It is at least not improbable that this division contributes to the disunity of Germany, since the evils that threaten one district only slightly affect the rest. "

Chapter III

De origine Statuum Imperii, et quibus gradibus ad istam potentiam ascenderint

According to Pufendorf at the beginning of the third chapter, it is important for a precise knowledge of the constitution of the empire that one examines the emergence of the significant power position of the estates, because without this consideration it is not possible to understand how the irregular form of government of the empire comes about.

Pufendorf in his investigation goes back to the time of the Germanic tribes. During the later rule of the Franks , counts and dukes were appointed administrators and governors for the first time in the subject areas of what would later become Germany . Pufendorf continues: “ Strictly speaking, all of these only had the violence of officials. In the course of time the dukes, after they had been appointed for life and the office mostly passed from fathers to sons, did not miss the excellent opportunity to consolidate their own power; they began to respect the authority of kings less and to regard the provinces entrusted to them as hereditary property. "Pufendorf immediately characterizes this abuse as a great mistake on the part of the Franconian kings:" Now no mistake is more pernicious for monarchs than when they let such administrative offices become hereditary, [...] [because] when a master gives all his servants freedom, he has to shine his own shoes after all. “At this point the author addresses the problem of this development in more detail and at the same time takes a position within the contemporary scholarly discourse on the same topic.

Initially, however, this problematic development was pushed back under Charlemagne (§ 3). He dissolved the duchies and redistributed the land. The provinces or districts of the realm - Pufendorf's terminology is inconsistent here - he assigned counts to the administration, who were to exercise this office “not forever and not hereditary”. After Karl's death, however, in Pufendorf's opinion, history repeated itself and the rule of royal vassals became hereditary again, just as duchies were again created from several counties. “ The dukes, ambitious like all men, wisely seized the opportunity to consolidate their power, while the authority of the Frankish rulers waned more and more and internal discord destroyed their power. Above all Otto, the Duke of the Saxons, [...] became so powerful that he only lacked the title to rule. That is why King Conrad I , after unsuccessful efforts to subjugate Heinrich of Saxony [Otto's son] , persuaded the great [of the empire] on his deathbed to transfer the royal dignity to him; for he thought it wiser to voluntarily give what could be taken away from him by force, and thus prevented the separation of Saxony from the German Empire. "

But with such compliance on the part of the kings, the history of the empire began to take an unfortunate course in Pufendorf's eyes (§ 4): “ Since the power of the princes, once won, could not be destroyed without the disruption of all of Germany and perhaps not without its downfall For those who tried, the kings thought it more advisable to confirm the possession of the princes, especially since they would not have come to rule without this condition. The princes took their territories as fiefs from the emperor and swore allegiance to him and the empire. “Since then, all possessions of the princes have been viewed as fiefdoms and the princes as vassals , even if this title in no way diminished their dignity and reputation due to its creation. The real problem with this process, known as oblatio feudorum and historically not verifiable, is that the princes could not be effectively made responsible in this way. Pufendorf's verdict on this: " Anyone who subsequently takes property that already belonged to him from someone else, concludes an unequal federal treaty with him whom he recognizes as a feudal lord and whose sovereignty he is willing to respect ." This unequal relationship between king or emperor and vassals or princes was the central grievance for Pufendorf, its emergence the "fall into sin" of German constitutional history. This explains the imbalance between the far-reaching powers of the princes and the narrow power position of the imperial authority, even if Pufendorf was never able to provide historical evidence for this theory, even by his own admission.

The following constellation, which shaped the history of the Holy Roman Empire, was already for Pufendorf the consequence of the constitutional course of the oblatio feudorum : “If an emperor possessed a large household power and had a reputation for excellent efficiency, he could count on the obedience of the princes; the rule of weak and discouraged emperors, on the other hand, depended on their grace. “Attempts by rulers to break or diminish the power of their own vassals were mostly in vain.

Paragraphs 5-10 are finally devoted to the development of the position of power of the prince-bishops and that of the imperial cities . On the one hand, Pufendorf briefly deals with the development up to the investiture dispute and explains his view that the bishops owed their wealth primarily to the imperial generosity (§ 7), which they in turn badly thanked the emperors by undermining their position (§ 8) . The political position of the imperial cities, however, had lapsed since the expiry of the last urban trade alliances (Section 9), as did the imperial rule over them (Section 10).

Chapter IV

De capite Imperii Germanici, Imperatore; ubi de electione et Electoribus

The fourth chapter deals with the history of the Roman-German Empire , the election of emperors and the electors . The empire has had a head since the time of Charlemagne, which is why it was always viewed as a unified state, although it consisted of many and in some cases powerful member states.

Since Karl and his successors, according to Pufendorf, a distinction has to be made between the Roman empire and the Frankish kingdom: He received the Roman empire “ by a unanimous decision of the Roman people and the Pope. “The emperor's elevation was more likely to have had the character of a solemn inauguration, which is why it cannot be assumed that the emperor's title will be chosen and therefore inherited from among Karl's descendants. The Franks could, however neither a pure inheritance nor an elective monarchy speak here a mixed procedure had been used, in which the nobles (the nobility) and the people of the suitable candidates from the descendants of the king by acclamation elevated to king . In the Franconian Empire this electoral procedure was largely retained for the time being, although the imperial title was not accepted. It was only with Otto the Great and his submission of Italy that all German kings assumed the title of Roman emperor at the same time, and that the coronation by the Pope had only a ceremonial meaning. With the reign of Henry IV (1056–1105), however, the hereditary succession to the throne in the empire gradually expired.

While the election used to be done by the whole people, whereby the opinion of the princes has probably always been decisive, " for several centuries [...] the emperor has been exclusively chosen by the seven and after the Peace of Osnabrück the eight most important princes who are therefore called electors . “These are the three archbishops of Mainz, Cologne and Trier, the so-called ecclesiastical ones, as well as the five secular electors (the King of Bohemia, the Dukes of Bavaria and Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg and the Count Palatine of the Rhine). In the following, Pufendorf discusses some views on the question of when and in what way the privilege of voting was established: From around 1250 to around 1500 it was believed that Emperor Otto III. and / or Pope Gregory V would have appointed the electors. This view was contradicted by a certain Onuphrius Panvinius - although every insightful German would have to agree with his argument that “ nobody has found this Constitutio of Otto or Gregory until today and all writers in the 240 years of Otto III. remain silent about it until the time of Frederick II. “The first to mention the electors was Marinus Polonius (Pufendorf probably means Martin von Troppau ), who - although his statements are not beyond all doubt - speaks of a king election by the“ officials ”of the empire for the time after Otto. One could understand this either in such a way that the holders of the most important court offices received the greatest rulers of the empire or vice versa their rulers received the offices. Regardless of this, nobody could credibly deny that in the early days of Germany all princes participated in the election of a king. In this regard, Pufendorf notes that it is unlikely that the other princes (apart from the seven later voters) would have voluntarily given up their right to vote all at once.

For this reason, the opinion gained among those familiar with German history: “ Even before the time of Frederick II , the seven princes had gradually outstripped the other princes in terms of influence in the elections of emperors because of their imperial offices and the size of their territory. “This custom would have become common through the turmoil of time, until finally the Golden Bull (1356) solemnly established the electoral mode and the prominent position of princes entitled to vote. The latter permanently linked the imperial or court offices, the electoral dignity and the possession of the largest imperial fiefs, so that the lords of the corresponding territories have since then also been legally electoral princes (§4). Pufendorf then explains how the electors get into their respective positions: the ecclesiastical electors through the election by a cathedral chapter (although the papal confirmation of an archbishop, which is otherwise necessary for the election of emperor, does not (yet) have to be present) and the secular electors without exception through the " agnatic Ruler sequence [lat. successio linealis] with the condition that neither the electoral dignity nor the Kurlande may be divided. “In the case of a new electoral dignity or the dismissal of an elector because of a crime, according to law and tradition, the emperor according to Pufendorf is not free in his decision, but must involve the imperial estates or at least the electors - although he is aware that the past centuries have provided counterexamples .

In paragraph 5 of the fourth chapter, Pufendorf describes the process of electing a king or emperor, in accordance with the provisions of the Golden Bull , chap. II and IV (see there or the online version in the MGH). Section 6 briefly deals with the question of the possibility of the electorate removing someone who has been elected. The following paragraph is devoted to other prerogatives of the electors: the right to meet without a monarch and to discuss imperial affairs, as well as the tasks associated with their imperial offices , such as the archchancellor offices of the three archbishops and the offices of archbishop (Bohemia), archtruchseß (Bavaria) , Arch marshal (Saxony), arch chamberlain (Brandenburg) and arch treasurer (palatinate).

The penultimate, eighth paragraph briefly explains the regulations and rights associated with the imperial vicariate and deals with some historical conflicts over the possession of this electoral privilege. In the short section 9, the practice is discussed that the Roman-German emperor is sometimes assigned a " Roman king " while still alive . This regulation was intended to allow the king to rule the empire as “vicar general” in the absence, inability or sudden death of the emperor (e.g. for security in politically troubled times), which, according to Pufendorf, has always been just a pretext . “ The real reason was [...] that the emperors could more easily secure the succession for their sons, brothers or close relatives during their lifetime if they acted for them as holders of the supreme imperial power. "

Chapter V

De potestate Imperatoris limitata per capitulationem, leges atque consuetudines Imperii et iura Ordinum

The fifth chapter of the book deals with the restrictions imposed by the electoral surrenders , the laws and customs of the empire and the rights of the imperial estates to which the imperial position of power is subject. Due to the acquired position of the princes of the empire, the kings could no longer rule the affairs of the empire as they pleased and would have to rule over the imperial princes who are actually subordinate to them more through their reputation than through authority. Even in the election of a king, this relationship was anchored in the form of (electoral) surrender. If the Golden Bull speaks of the duty of the elected emperor to confirm the rights, freedoms and duties of the electors , then, according to Pufendorf, this is to be distinguished from an electoral surrender, since this refers to the freedoms of the entire empire and the former duty only a special provision for the electoral princes. In any case, no example of an electoral surrender was proven before the reign of Charles V.

The electoral capitulations were then worked out by the electors alone and without the participation of the other imperial princes. A provision was then included in the Peace of Westphalia that a capitulatio perpetua , i.e. a "permanent electoral surrender", should be worked out, which should bind every elected ruler to the same principles of his rule. Pufendorf: “ This formula means, in good German, to postpone the matter for an indefinite period of time. However, during my stay in Regensburg I learned that this matter was being dealt with seriously and that no effort had been spared to use up paper. “He then reported on the various possible concerns about the issuing of such a surrender. “ In general, it is not in accordance with German custom to deprive someone of their rights, in whatever way they have acquired them, through violence or conspiracy. In addition, even if the demand of the other estates is justified in the surrender to be taken into account in the same way as the electors, it is difficult to find a formula that does not need to be corrected at some point in the event of changed circumstances. "

In §3 Pufendorf finds that it is a healing institution for the empire that the imperial position of power is positively and legally fixed. It consolidates the position of the imperial estates and protects their rights, which the emperor can only diminish by breaking the law, and the emperor also benefits from it, who can take over his rule under clear conditions and, in the event of non-compliance, he either rejects the royal dignity or demands a change in the electoral surrender could. However, once he has consented to the quasi-contractual limitation of his power, then he could no longer strive for complete monarchical power over the estates, as this would represent a breach of law, on the basis of which the imperial princes could probably refuse obedience and allegiance. For Pufendorf, however, this situation does not represent a contradiction: “ Only the particularly astute teachers of politics can see that there is also a power of rule as is due to the head of a confederation , which differs from the form of rule of full royal power. "

Chapter VI

De forma Imperii Germanici

The sixth is, so to speak, the central chapter of Scripture; this is where the systematic part of the investigation begins. In it, Pufendorf finally deals directly with the question of the form of government of the empire. In the introduction he already states that the constitution, the quality of a "moral body" (ie of a state) is judged as strong or weak according to whether its parts are correctly connected to one another or not - whether the state has an ordered structure or something Represents “the irregular ” and “ monstrous ”.
The results of the research to date have made it clear that the empire contains something that makes it impossible to assign it to the known forms of government . Pufendorf uses this passage to criticize his predecessors in Reichspublizistik : The question of the form of the state of the Reich must be examined with particular care, " because most German writers have spread the worst heresies out of ignorance of the doctrine of politics about it ".

So much for the introduction. Section 2 of the chapter is first devoted to the form of government of the imperial estates . His judgment here is clear: All secular and spiritual territories or principalities and counties are monarchies , with the throne in the former being occupied by succession in the latter by election . In the secular rulers monarchical power is absolute, in the spiritual rulers it is limited by electoral capitulations . The imperial cities are generally aristocracies . Its sovereign is the Senate , into which citizens can be admitted without the citizens of the whole city being able to control it. However, some imperial estates are constituted democratically because the guilds there appoint and control the city council.

State form debate

The empire as a democracy

However, what form of government the empire as a whole has (§ 3) is controversial in the academic debate, said Pufendorf. No one has so far called it a democracy , even if some - here Pufendorf obviously refers to Conring's theory of the empire - claim that the imperial estates are citizens of the empire; an Aristotelianism that takes up the ancient Greek term "politics". From this (rather unusual) perspective, the emperor would appear as princeps in the literal sense. Pufendorf rejects such a use of ancient terms in his time, however. a. because it is untenable to deprive free men, subjects of a monarchy or aristocracy, of the title of citizen just because they do not participate in the government of the state.

The empire as an aristocracy

Most thinkers who are well versed in political doctrine describe the empire as a pure aristocracy , according to Pufendorf in Section 4 of the chapter. They give the following reasons for this view:

  • One should not be fooled by titles that indicate a monarchical form of government: in reality , in any state and also in the empire, only those are sovereign who have the right to decide on state affairs at their own discretion.
  • Furthermore, it does not contradict the aristocratic form of government that there is a head in it who surpasses the other aristocrats in rank and authority and to whom, for example, the management of the affairs of state (and not the rule ) belongs.
  • In addition, a distinction must be made between the form of government and the mode of government. Thus a state can resemble one of the forms of government in its mode of government in different ways. In the example: If a king has to coordinate government affairs with a senate, the state in question does not yet become an aristocracy, it remains a monarchy. If a democracy has a top official in whose name the laws are passed, the government takes on a monarchical appearance; However, the form of government is still democratic if the sovereignty, i.e. the right to determine the affairs of the state as they see fit, remains with the people.
Scheme of government forms
according to Pufendorf
sovereign
One monarchy
Few aristocracy
All democracy

Pufendorf decided this debate for himself as follows: “ The various forms of government arise from the fact that the bearer of sovereignty is either a single person [monarchy] or an assembly of all [democracy] or less [aristocracy] . Which subordinate or executive organs the sovereign uses does not matter . "

According to Pufendorf, however, these considerations cannot convince anyone who has a real knowledge of the doctrine of politics (§ 5). The prerequisite for the existence of an aristocracy is that there is a permanent senate in the state , which advises and decides independently on all state affairs, while the execution of state affairs is delegated to officials responsible for it. However, the German Reich does not have such a senate: Neither the Reich Chamber of Commerce nor the Reichstag meet these criteria. It is particularly foolish to regard the Reichstag and its majority resolutions as signs of an aristocratic form of government, since such councils also existed in other kingdoms . Furthermore, allies hold joint Bundestag ( comitia ), which have a similar power over the Graubünden as the Reichstag over the imperial estates. In general, it is a sign of a genuine aristocracy that the Senate is superior to all senators or aristocrats and the latter owe it obediently; this is by no means the case in the Reich, and especially with regard to the Reichstag.

The empire as a monarchy

Finally, Pufendorf examines whether the empire can be characterized as a monarchy (§ 6). First, he differentiates between two types of monarchy: absolute and limited monarchy. In an absolute monarchy, the king (above) has the power to decide on the most important state affairs at his own discretion (cf. the article on monarchy ). In a limited monarchy, the ruler is bound by certain laws in exercising his sovereign power.

In this context, however, it would be a complete mistake to grant the Roman-German emperor absolute power. The arguments that are put forward for this point of view are not worth refuting, said Pufendorf. “ Because it is equally absurd to try to derive the violence of the German emperor from the vision of Daniel or from the books of Roman law. “(With this statement, Pufendorf turned against the two most important arguments of the older Caesarean imperial journalism , which on the one hand represented the historical- theological idea of the empire that the Holy Roman Empire was the last of the so-called four world monarchies and, on the other hand, propagated the view derived from it that this was exactly the case Empire would be identical to the Imperium Romanum , which is why its late antique imperial law was also valid for the Roman-German Empire). The statement that the emperor furthermore does not recognize any master over himself (except God) does not give him absolute control over the princes of the empire either. The empty titles, which the latter bring to the emperor, arise only from the zeitgeist and be without real meaning. Ultimately, the imperial estates swear allegiance to the emperor only subject to their freedoms and rights.

It remains to Pufendorf to discuss (§ 7) whether one can call the rule of the emperor, if not an absolute, then at least a limited monarchy , as defined above. At this point, however, Pufendorf first and foremost has a dispute with Hippolithus a Lapide , actually Bogislaw Philipp von Chemnitz , an extremely imperial journalist of his time who was also the antagonist of Dietrich Reinkingk , who most resolutely represented the reading of the imperial constitution as a limited monarchy.
On the whole, Pufendorf initially agrees with him, although he also attests to Hippolithus / Chemnitz many errors and mistakes. Chemnitz rightly took away the emperor's sovereignty and ascribed it to the estates. In his further course of action, however, it was absurd to subject the emperor to the estates and to make him a civil servant. This suggests that a state must necessarily be an aristocracy as soon as it is not an absolute monarchy! Also, nobody has to recognize an overlord just because he cannot rule without restriction. However, some of Chemnitz's anti-monarchical considerations require closer examination:

  • The obvious sovereignty of the imperial estates during an interregnum is the first reason for him to ascribe constant supreme power in the state to them. Pufendorf replies that this is common practice in all kingdoms and that therefore alone does not have any evidential value.
  • The fact that the emperors are accountable to the estates for their sovereign acts cannot yet be seen as a sign of their subservience to the latter, since this can also be done simply out of contractual obligation or appreciation.
  • The fact that the princes of the empire can depose the emperor (as Chemnitz finds) would also not be a sign of their rule over the monarch, since this - like the imperial rule itself - could be the subject of a contractual arrangement between equals, which is the argument compelling evidential value loses.
  • Chemnitz's statements on the Reichstag are factually correct, but do not prove what he claims: The emperor cannot decide anything against the estates, but they are just as incapable of doing anything against the will of the emperor or forcing him to do something ! It would also be correct that the electors prescribe how the emperor should govern in the royal election surrender, but they do so not by virtue of any rule over him, but by means of a contract with him. Thus the powers of the estates against the emperor arise from the nature of the treaty and not from their sovereignty.
  • Finally, Pufendorf cannot convince the widespread argument that the emperor can be sued before the Count Palatinate according to old imperial law confirmed by the Golden Bull . This legal principle is not based on the emperor's subordination to the Count Palatine or his court, but on the ruler's voluntary consent to allow disputed legal cases to be decided fairly and lawfully.

Thus, most of the arguments of Bogislaw Philipps from Chemnitz to Pufendorf are easy to refute. In return, those who describe the empire as a limited monarchy are given more weight (§ 8). The mixed constitutional theory, on the other hand, is to be rejected, “ because apart from the fact that a mixture of forms of government can only produce a monster of the state, none of them fit the German Reich. Because in it neither have several undivided sovereignty, nor are their components distributed among different persons or colleges. “In this rejection of the mixed constitutional theory that was current at the time and decades later in constitutional theory, Pufendorf apparently takes up approaches by the early Reich journalist Henning Arnisaeus , who at the beginning of the 17th century had thematized various types of mixed constitutions and favored a model that incorporated elements of state power distributed various instances.

In any case, according to Pufendorf, the supporters of the limited monarchy claim that the rules of royal election surrender are compatible with the model of a limited sovereign monarchy. The fact that the imperial estates also swore allegiance to the emperor could then be explained by the fact that they promise obedience to the emperor, subject to the fact that his service was only for the common good and within the framework of imperial laws.

According to Pufendorf, however, two facts stand against the classification of the Holy Roman Empire as monarchia limitata : “ In a real monarchy, even if he is bound by certain laws in his government, the king is so high above all citizens that nobody can exercise his freedoms and Dare to equate rights with royal power [...]. As is well known, this is not the case in Germany “because no imperial class would be willing to admit that their country is more subject to the emperor than to him. In addition, " even the most limited monarch [...] ultimately retains the control and use of all the forces of the state ". The fact that this also does not apply to the empire shows, first, that the emperor receives no income from the empire, but has to maintain himself from his own property; Secondly, that there is neither a state treasure nor a permanent Reichsheer, but that each class only supports the Reich militarily as it sees fit and much more

Monstrosity thesis

For this reason, because the empire is neither democracy nor pure aristocracy or a pure form of monarchy, there would be nothing else but the Holy Roman Empire,

" If one wants to classify it according to the rules of the science of politics, to call an irregular and a monster-like body ".

The whole paragraph in the Latin original:

" Nihil ergo aliud restat, quam ut dicamus, Germaniam esse irregulare aliquod corpus et monstro simile , liquidem ad regulas scientiae civilis exigatur ".

According to Pufendorf, this theoretical determination of the German constitution is necessary because the empire, (1.) through the " negligent courtesy of the emperors " to the princes, (2.) through the correlating ambition of the imperial estates (which strive for independence) and (3.) through the " machinations of the clergy ", has developed from a pure monarchy to a very unbalanced form of government.

This classification is based on Pufendorf's theory of state forms, which is an early modern adaptation of the Aristotelian theory of state forms , in that the form of the state is determined by the socio-political authority (king, people, etc.) to which sovereignty is assigned. However, since he had to establish with regard to the German Empire that the sovereignty, i.e. the power to decide on central state affairs at its own discretion, does not belong to any state body, neither the emperor nor the electors or the imperial estates in their entirety, the imperial constitution literally falls “out of line”: It is not an ideal type, no form of government in its pure form, to be applied to the empire - they “do not fit”. That is why Pufendorf describes the empire as an "irregular body" precisely because it does not conform to the rule . It is precisely in this sense that the designation as “monster” or “monstrous” is to be understood: With this, he neither wanted to deny the Reich statehood nor even to dismiss it as a non-form or state freak. The characterizations as “irregular” and “monstrous” were rather judgments from a constitutional perspective with regard to the ideal-typical categories of constitutional theory.
In terms of state theory, however, Pufendorf does not consider the empire to be a “monster”. This becomes clear immediately after the monstrosity thesis when he describes the consequences of the disharmonious constitutional structure for the form of the state of the empire:

The empire is “ no longer a limited monarchy, although appearances suggest it, but also not yet a federation of several states [...] , rather something in between. [...] So we can best describe the state of Germany as one that comes very close to a federation of several states, in which a prince has a prominent position as leader of the federation and is surrounded by the appearance of royal power. "

This shows that Pufendorf distinguished between constitutional law and state theory (and also the respective research results), which only a few of his later critics noticed. In this respect, the constitutional structure of the Reich against the background of the abstract theory of the form of the state must indeed appear as a misshapen, monstrous structure, while the "Reichs-Staat" - viewed as it were "from the outside" and in a comparative perspective - as an intermediate form, halfway from a regular monarchy to a disordered confederation, can be characterized without creating a contradiction.

Pufendorf's disordered state is now the source of the weakness of the empire, since the conflict between the emperor and the imperial estates inherent in the system is a heavy burden on the state as a whole: the state as a whole strives for the restoration of full monarchical power, while the latter strives for complete freedom. “But it is the nature of all degenerations that a state, when it has already moved far away from its original state, approaches the other extreme in rapid decline as if by itself, while it can only be brought back to its original form with great effort. “Therefore the empire will not be able to be brought back to the monarchy without the greatest tremors and confusion, although it will develop into a confederation of states on its own, according to Pufendorf.

Chapter VII

De viribus et morbis Imperii Germanici

In this chapter, Pufendorf weighs up strengthening and weakening factors in the political and social constitution of the empire against each other and assesses its strength in comparison with its European neighbors and potential enemies. First he devotes himself to the population and the material goods of Germany, which should provide the basis for an "absolute" assessment of the strengths of the empire. Paragraphs 1-3 consequently deal with the population based on the number of settlements, the vastness of the German states and their great economic usability, the trade and the wealth of the imperial territories.
In paragraphs 4-6, Pufendorf undertakes a “relative” assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the empire, for which he examines the political-military situation at the empire's borders or towards the empire's neighbors and also considers the case that hostile powers are confronting each other ally. Here he discusses - in the order in which they appear - the Ottoman Empire , Italy, Poland, Denmark, England, the Netherlands , Spain, Sweden and ultimately France, which he sees as the greatest threat to the integrity and continued existence of the German Empire.
The third section of the chapter is an analysis of the domestic and foreign policy weaknesses of the empire caused by its form of government (§§ 7-10). Pufendorf claims that the empire, which is in itself very prosperous, could pose a threat to all of Europe if it were only a real monarchy . Instead, “ it is so weakened by internal illnesses and upheavals that it can hardly defend itself. The main cause of the evil is the inharmonious and disorderly context of the state. "The renewed criticism of the German constitution is interrupted by a brief intermezzo of state theory: against the background of the poorly" established "empire, the absolute monarchy appears to be the most perfect form of government, since neither the aristocracy nor a federation of states , if they have a good constitution, would achieve comparable stability. Now, however, according to Pufendorf, the empire is in the unfavorable position of uniting two great evils: it seems as if its constitution on the one hand is a poorly established (i.e. weak) monarchy and on the other hand also a disordered confederation (i.e. with member states unequal right). As a result, both emperors and imperial estates seek to improve their position, which is why the empire is torn between their conflicting interests, which explains its weakness. Furthermore, conflicts between the estates themselves invalidate the imperial association, which would be fueled by the inequality of power among them and the religious division as a result of the Reformation . The fact that there is neither a common imperial treasure nor a unified imperial army are obvious signs of the weakness of the German state structure for Pufendorf.

Chapter VIII

De ratione status Imperii Germanici

In the last chapter, Pufendorf deals with the “ratio” of the Reich constitution, by which he means interests and requirements that are obvious and advisable in view of the state and shape of the constitution: the raison d'être of the German Reich. This special Reichs raison d'état is entirely in the context of Pufendorf's judgment on the German constitution: if the illnesses from which the country is suffering have been shown in the previous , he now turns to the remedies . First, however, he reports on the related considerations of Bogislaw Philipp von Chemnitz , which he put forward in his Dissertatio de Ratione Status in imperio nostro Romano-Germanico of 1640. In paragraph 2 of the chapter, Pufendorf first presents Chemnitz 'six principles of German state interests and then in the following paragraph 3 reports on its six “remedies” for the diseases of Germany. Basically, Pufendorf rejects all proposals of the anti-imperial constitutional lawyer and even criticizes a few passages in the sharpest possible way.
At the beginning of the fourth paragraph he turns to his own considerations. These are surprisingly not very original. According to Horst Denzer, Pufendorf's central ideas of the German raison d'état can be summarized in two points: “ 1. Internal unity is to be preserved or created, and disputes are to be buried, 2. In the interests of the Reich, the current situation, namely the unstable balance between limited monarchy and confederation of states, because attempts to change this situation can lead to the fall of the empire. “
The main part of this last chapter, however, is a critique of the Catholic Church and its institutional connection with the Empire. In paragraphs 5 to 10, Monzambano / Pufendorf describes two fictitious conversations, i.e. H. he lets a guest who is not named by name bring harsh criticism, which means that he distances himself practically twice from the statements by (1.) reproducing the comments of another under a pseudonym (2.). The initial question of the “conversation”, which essentially turns out to be a monologue by the unknown scholar, is “ why in Germany religion is the cause of such a dispute ”, while in the Netherlands, for example, there is religious freedom. First and foremost, the scholars' aversion to dissent is a cause of denominational disputes and conflicts. It quickly becomes clear that Pufendorf applies this criticism above all to theology , since he reproaches its scholars for quickly defaming dissenting opinions as godlessness. In essence, however, the different political implications of the confessions are the cause of denominational tensions. Pufendorf lets the scholar explain the direction of his investigation:

“ But it is not our task to examine the extent to which each of the creeds can prove its beliefs from the Holy Scriptures ; [...] But we can rightly consider the extent to which the path to eternal salvation, which the clergy care for, is compatible with our political principles. Because I cannot believe that the all-good God wants to disturb the peace of civil life through his worship. "

In this, Pufendorf expresses a fundamental attitude towards the relationship between church and state or religion and politics that runs through all of his works. His lay theological writings also deal only with the relationship between church and state. Furthermore, his point of view becomes more than clear: “ In Lutheranism one finds nothing that contradicts the principles of the doctrine of politics. [...] Moreover, just as no religion could be more useful to the German princes, there is generally no more suitable one for the monarchical constitution. “ Calvinism, furthermore, differs only slightly from Lutheranism, whereby, as Pufendorf notes,“ Lutheranism favors the emergence of democratic freedom (libertas democratica) . “Ultimately, the cause of all the conflict between the denominations is the stubbornness of the clergy on all sides, who defend their own view much more persistently than they do with doctrine. The only remedy against religious conflicts is, as Pufendorf indirectly indicates to the unknown scholar, to limit the influence of the churches on state power and administration, as well as on the public and schools.

Theoretical aspects

Doctrine of sovereignty

In De statu Imperii , Pufendorf did not explicitly explain his doctrine of sovereignty. Although he used the term "sovereignty" is rarely used - falling instead the terms " summa potestas " ( lat. Supreme power), " summum imperium " or " majesty " - he uses it in the same sense as already Bodin and the other imperial publicists ago to him: The sovereign (the monarch or similar) does not recognize a master over himself (except God), he is not accountable to anyone and cannot be brought to justice against his will. Its power is based on the early conception of contract theory that the citizens of a community have freely transferred their will (concerning social coexistence) to the ruler, i.e. that is, that the sovereign's unrestricted rule is in the general interest .

The sovereign state power is therefore legibus solutus ( Latin: released from the laws), it is not subject to any positive law . For Pufendorf it is essential to sovereignty that it is indivisible: It is an indivisible supreme power in the state. This distinguishes his concept of sovereignty, for example, from that of Arnisaeus or that of other supporters of the mixed constitutional theory ; he also seems to have distanced himself from the contemporary notions of “double” sovereignty . In this sense, Pufendorf formulates in several places in the constitution that it is sovereign who “has the authority ” to “ decide on the most important state affairs at their own discretion. “A division of this supreme power is therefore not allowed; if necessary, its legal powers can be delegated. In this case, ministers and / or officials exercise the sovereign rights of sovereignty on behalf of the sovereign. If, however, essential components of sovereignty are permanently distributed among different instances, it is an irregular, defective state.

Forms of State

“ The various forms of government arise from the fact that the bearer of sovereignty is either a single person or an assembly of all or a few. Which subordinate or executive organs the sovereign uses does not matter . "

In this paragraph of the sixth chapter (§ 4) of the constitution, Pufendorf outlines the essence of his theory of the forms of the state in a nutshell. This version of the Aristotelian schema of forms of government ( monarchy , aristocracy , democracy ), expanded to include the modern element of the idea of ​​sovereignty, is not his creation, however, he adopted it - like many of his contemporaries - from Bodin. This had broken through the classic six-figure scheme for the first time by only making the assignment of the highest potestas in the state the distinguishing criterion and rejecting the telos of the state in the differentiation of state forms. For this reason, the degenerate forms of tyranny , oligarchy and democracy / ochlocracy are missing in the state form schemes of the sovereignty theorists of the early modern period.

Furthermore - and this is particularly important in the context of the Reich journalist debate - there is no mixed constitution in this spectrum of forms of government. This can best be explained using Pufendorf's concept: In his theory of the form of the state, in addition to the above Bodinian criterion, there is an additional argument as to how strictly the sovereignty of the authority to which it is to be assigned is located in constitutional reality. He therefore differentiates between regular and irregular forms of government, as well as amalgamations of regular states.

Furthermore, with the font, Pufendorf made an important contribution to the theory of reasons of state .

To the reception

Immediately after its publication, the “Monzambano” aroused great unrest and sometimes even protest in the scholarly world. In particular, the thesis of the “monstrosity” of the imperial constitution aroused the minds, it was mostly understood as a devaluation of the dignity of the Holy Roman Empire. At the center of the early discussion were, of course, the main question about the form of the state of the empire and in particular that about its statehood , which Pufendorf's considerations seemed to have raised.

The earliest recipients therefore mainly defended the unity and statehood of the empire against the initially unknown Italian author; because of the imperial reservation rights it is clearly a monarchia limitata , a limited monarchy ( Johann Ulrich Zellner , 1667). Philipp Andreas Oldenburger characterized the empire in 1668 as respublica mixta , although due to its imperial position it was a single civitas ( Latin for state). Only Johann Wolfgang Rosenfeld knew where he 1669 performance Pufendorf " formulated the realization that Aristotle in his State morphology of, perfectissimae societates 'had gone out that, Gentium societates seu imperialist' [= the real States, n. Of Ed. ] But are not such, and thus it comes to the conclusion that measured against the Aristotelian ideal types, reality must always be 'irregular'. "

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 's reaction stands out among the comments on De statu imperii , among others. a. because Leibniz developed his own theory of empire in this context. In his work " In Serverinum de Monzambano " (1668/72) he deals with Pufendorf's work, criticizing less the monstrosity thesis or Pufendorf's irregularity of the empire than its judgment that the empire is approaching a confederation . In the widespread assumption that Pufendorf was questioning the statehood of the empire, he argued that the feudal system that existed between the emperor and the imperial estates established the statehood of the empire. For Leibniz, the existence of the unified legal person “Reich” and its state will is also a criterion of statehood. How the Reich system works, however, he leaves open. Ultimately, he does not judge the empire under the aspect of sovereignty, but finally describes it as a “family of states”, which is a unified structure overall.

The unity of the empire ( unitas imperii ), in which its state character is reflected, is also emphasized by Christian Thomasius , who at the same time supports Pufendorf's theory of the empire in that Aristotle's forms of government are unsuitable for describing the structure of the imperial constitution. Thomasius for his part also defends the criticism of Monzambano or Pufendorf insofar as a scholar must be allowed to criticize the imperial constitution if it shows deficiencies.

literature

expenditure

Reprints

  • Samuel von Pufendorf: The constitution of the German empire . Edited and translated by Horst Denzer. (= Library of German State Thought, edited by Hans Maier and Michael Stolleis, Vol. 4) Leipzig, 1994.
  • Samuel von Pufendorf: The constitution of the German empire . Edited and translated, notes and epilogue by Horst Denzer. Stuttgart (Reclam), 1985.
  • Severinus de Monzambano (Samuel v. Pufendorf): About the constitution of the German empire . Translation and introduction by Harry Breßlau. Berlin, 1922.
  • Severinus de Monzambano: De statu imperii Germanici . Edited by Fritz Salomon. Weimar, 1910.

Original editions

  • Severini de Monzambano, Veronensis: De statu imperii Germanici ad Laelium fratrem, Dominum Trezolani, liber unus. Geneva (ie The Hague), 1667 (first edition).
  • Samuelis LB de Pufendorf: De statu imperii Germanici liber unus . In usum regiae berolinensis academiae cum praefatione in lucem editus cura Jacobi Pauli Gundlingi, Editio posthuma, Coloniae ad Spream (ie Berlin), 1706.

The first German translation appeared in 1670, followed by numerous other editions and also translations in French, English and Dutch.

Secondary literature

  • Horst Denzer: Samuel Pufendorf and the constitutional history . In: Samuel von Pufendorf: The constitution of the German empire . Edited and translated by Horst Denzer. (= Library of German State Thought, edited by Hans Maier and Michael Stolleis, Vol. 4) Leipzig, 1994. pp. 279–322.
  • Horst Denzer: Late Aristotelianism, Natural Law and Imperial Reform: Political Ideas in Germany 1600–1750 . In: Fetscher, Iring / Münkler, Herfried: Piper's manual of political ideas. Volume 3/5, Munich, 1985. pp. 233-274.
  • Detlef Döring: Investigations into the history of the genesis of the imperial constitution by Samuel Pufendorf (Severinus de Monzambano) , in: Der Staat, Vol. 33 (1994), pp. 185-206.
  • Julia Haas: The theory of empire in Pufendorf's "Severinus de Monzambo". Monstrosity thesis and imperial debate as reflected in the political and legal literature from 1667 to the present day . Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2007, ISBN 978-3-428-12315-5
  • Henning Ottmann : History of Political Thought, Vol. 3, Die Neuzeit , Teilbd. 1, from Machiavelli to the great revolutions. Stuttgart, 2006.
  • Notker Hammerstein: Samuel Pufendorf . In: Michael Stolleis (Ed.): State thinkers in the early modern times . Frankfurt am Main, 1995. pp. 172-196.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ The indication that Geneva was the place of publication of the work served to conceal its origin, cf. Julia Haas: The theory of empire in Pufendorf's "Severinus de Monzambo". Monstrosity thesis and imperial debate as reflected in the political and legal literature from 1667 to the present day . Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2007, p. 12.
  2. ↑ Samuel von Pufendorf: The constitution of the German empire . Edited and translated by Horst Denzer (= Library of German State Thought, edited by Hans Maier and Michael Stolleis, Vol. 4). Leipzig, 1994, c. VI, § 9 (p. 198 f.).
  3. ↑ See Horst Denzer: Samuel Pufendorf and the constitution history . In: Samuel von Pufendorf: The constitution of the German empire. Edited and translated by Horst Denzer. (= Library of German State Thought, edited by Hans Maier and Michael Stolleis, Vol. 4) Leipzig, 1994. pp. 279–322. Here: p. 283f.
  4. ↑ See Detlef Döring: Investigations into the history of the genesis of Samuel Pufendorf's imperial constitution (Severinus de Monzambano) , in: Der Staat, Vol. 33 (1994), pp. 185-206. Here: p. 185.
  5. ↑ a b Döring, p. 188.
  6. ↑ Döring, p. 189.
  7. ↑ See Döring, pp. 190f.
  8. ↑ See Haas, p. 11.
  9. ↑ See Denzer, p. 291.
  10. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), Dedicatio (p. 15).
  11. ^ As also taken from: Samuel von Pufendorf: The Constitution of the German Empire . Edited and translated by Horst Denzer. (= Library of German State Thought, edited by Hans Maier and Michael Stolleis, Vol. 4) Leipzig, 1994. Here: Dedicatio (p. 10).
  12. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), Dedicatio (p. 11).
  13. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), Dedicatio (p. 13).
  14. ↑ Denzer as well as Henning Ottmann suspect that Pufendorf is alluding to Johannes Limnaeus ' Ius publicum Imperii Romano-Germanici from 1629/34.
  15. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), Dedicatio (p. 15).
  16. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), Dedicatio (p. 15).
  17. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. I, §8 (p. 33f.).
  18. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. I, §9 (p. 35).
  19. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. II, §1 (p. 51).
  20. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. II, §2 (p. 51).
  21. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. II, §2 (p. 53).
  22. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. II, §2 (p. 53).
  23. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. II, §§3–14 (pp. 53–83).
  24. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. II, §15 (p. 83).
  25. ↑ Magistratus in the Latin original, cf. Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. III, §2 (p. 86).
  26. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. III, §2 (p. 87).
  27. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. III, §2 (p. 87).
  28. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. III, §3 (p. 89).
  29. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. III, §4 (p. 91) emphasis not in the original.
  30. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. III, §4 (p. 91).
  31. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. III, §5 (p. 93).
  32. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. IV, §1 (p. 105).
  33. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. IV, §1 (pp. 105f.).
  34. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. IV, §2 (p. 107f.).
  35. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. IV, §2 (p. 109).
  36. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. IV, §2 (p. 109).
  37. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. IV, §3 (p. 111).
  38. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. IV, §4 (p. 111).
  39. ↑  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / mdz1.bib-bvb.de
  40. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. IV, §7 (p. 117).
  41. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. IV, §9 (p. 120f.).
  42. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. V, §2 (p. 125).
  43. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. V, §2 (p. 125).
  44. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. V, §3 (p. 129).
  45. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §1 (p. 181).
  46. ↑ According to this, only those citizens are entitled to political participation rights in the community and its government. Conring transfers this term to the imperial estates and their seat and voting rights at the imperial diets.
  47. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §4 (p. 183ff.).
  48. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §4 (p. 185ff.).
  49. ↑ Bogislaw Philipp von Chemnitz in particular proceeds in this way in his Dissertatio de ratione status (...) from 1640.
  50. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §6 (p. 189ff.).
  51. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §6 (p. 191.).
  52. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §7 (p. 191ff.).
  53. ↑ While Pufendorf expressly mentions examples of such a process that is controversial under imperial law (the dismissals of Heinrich IV and Adolf von Nassau ), he also shows that he probably doubts the legality of this process. On this see Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §7 (p. 193ff.).
  54. ↑ a b Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §8 (p. 197.).
  55. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §8 (p. 198/199.).
  56. ↑ a b c Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §9 (p. 198/199.).
  57. ↑ See Haas, p. 98.
  58. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §9 (p. 199ff.).
  59. ↑ See Haas, pp. 95f.
  60. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §9 (p. 201).
  61. ↑ Compare the article Reunionspolitik
  62. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VII, §7 (p. 223)
  63. ↑ See Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VIII, §1 (p. 235).
  64. ↑ Denzer, p. 319.
  65. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VIII, §5 (p. 247).
  66. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VIII, §7 (p. 251).
  67. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VIII, §7 (p. 253).
  68. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VIII, §7 (pp. 252/255).
  69. ↑ See Denzer, p. 299.
  70. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §5 (p. 189).
  71. ^ Pufendorf: Constitution (Denzer), C. VI, §4 (p. 185ff.).
  72. ↑ See Denzer, p. 303.
  73. ↑ a b c See Haas, p. 89f.
  74. ↑ a b See Haas, p. 91f.
  75. ↑ Cf. his lecture: Christian Thomas opens the student youth in Leipzig in a discourse, from the deficiencies of the Aristotelian ethics, and from other matters pertaining to the Jus Publicum, two collegia on the Christian moral doctrine and on the Jus Publicum , in: Ders . : All sorts of little published German writings. Colligated and collected with diligence; Along with a number of supplements and a preface, Hall 1701. Quoted from Haas, p. 155.
  76. ↑ See Haas, p. 15f.

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