Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute

The Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute is a conflict between Russia and Ukraine that has flared up again and again over the years and revolves around questions of natural gas supplies to Ukraine and questions of transit to Europe.

The conflict first began in March 2005 with the Russian announcement that it wanted to give up the old Soviet trading model, according to which the prices for both services were offset against each other and were often subject to extremely discounted, non-market-oriented pricing policies. The dispute was of great international importance because in 2005 around 65 percent of Russian gas exports to Europe flowed through Ukraine (in 2010 it was around 75 percent) and because Ukraine itself was one of the largest importers of gas.

overview

The conflict began in March 2005 when Russia redefined the conditions for the transit of natural gas across Ukrainian territory to Western Europe and the price Ukraine should pay for natural gas imports in favor of a market-oriented pricing policy. Because Ukraine refused to agree to the new terms and conditions and a contract for 2006 did not last until the end, Russia stopped gas exports to Ukraine on January 1, 2006. This briefly led to delivery bottlenecks in various European countries.

From an economic point of view, OAO Gazprom on the Russian side and NAK Naftohas on the Ukrainian side were the opponents.

Ukraine is the world's fourth largest importer and sixth largest consumer of natural gas, according to The World Factbook . The reasons for this are the poorly energy-efficient industrial companies as well as waste and inefficiency, which were promoted by the previously low gas prices: In relation to gross domestic product , Ukraine has the highest gas consumption in the world.

Ukraine currently consumes 80 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. 20 billion come from our own production, around 36 billion are bought in Turkmenistan. Ukraine receives 17 billion in exchange for the transport of Russian natural gas to Europe and the rest (6 to 8 billion) is bought by Russia.

• In Ukraine, Russian natural gas converges from several large pipeline routes from Northern Siberia ( Druzhba route , southern branch Jamal / Northern Lights ) and Central Asia ( Soyuz ) and is forwarded to Western Europe via the Transgas route via Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Before the Nord Stream alternative route went into operation in 2011, around 80 percent of Russian natural gas for Europe was transported via the Ukrainian pipelines.
• The opportunity cost Russia incurs annually from reduced gas prices to Ukraine is about four billion dollars.
• The proportion of gas addressed to Ukraine in the total amount pumped through it is around 20 percent.
• The Ukrainian economy is very energy-intensive (not least because of the cheap gas). Ukraine is the sixth largest consumer of natural gas in the world, its consumption is around 73 billion cubic meters annually.
• Ukraine produces around 25 percent of its natural gas requirements itself, and receives another 40 percent from Turkmenistan via Russia . The rest comes from Russian production.
• Due to the Russian subsidization, the gas price in Ukraine has so far been significantly lower than in Russia itself. In many areas, especially in the metal industry, Ukraine supplied the Russian market at dumping prices and thus took advantage of Russian producers.
• Ukraine sold some of the gas it had bought for $ 50 to Romania for $ 260 .

history

Map of existing and planned gas pipelines in Europe

Agreement from 2002 and additional clause from 2004

According to the 2002 contract between the Russian state company Gazprom and the Ukrainian state company Naftohas, signed on June 21, 2002 and valid until the end of 2013, payment for the transport of Russian gas through Ukrainian pipelines is a kind of barter . Ukraine is allowed to keep part of the natural gas for the provision of the transport infrastructure. Originally, the amount of gas to be delivered and the transfer price were to be renegotiated between the governments every year.

On August 9, 2004, the two state-owned companies agreed on additional clause 4. Ukraine was to receive $ 1.09 per 1000 cubic meters and 100 kilometers for natural gas transit. Ukraine was also entitled to purchase Russian natural gas at a fixed price of $ 50 per 1,000 cubic meters. According to the addition, the price should not be changed until the end of 2009.

Gazprom argues that Addendum 4 is only applicable with the signing of the superordinate, annually renewable intergovernmental protocol, which specifies the transit conditions and must meet the condition that gas transit is offset against gas deliveries. Since this is no longer the case with the currently targeted transition to market-based pricing, the addition 4 is void.

Conflict 2005/2006

In spring 2005 Russia had asked for a fixed price of 160 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters. In November, Gazprom asked for $ 230 per 1,000 cubic meters and justified this with the usual world market price. In contrast, the compensation for the transit should be increased to 1.74 dollars per 1000 cubic meters and 100 kilometers. Ukraine believes that the Russian demands contradict the 2002 Treaty and Amendment 4 of 2004.

For comparison: the usual tariff in Western Europe is a maximum of 250 dollars per 1000 cubic meters, the price of the gas, which is simultaneously supplied via Russian pipelines from Turkmenistan to Ukraine, was 50 dollars. However, there are no world market prices for the transit price , it is formed from the specific service costs of the pipeline.

negotiations

During the renegotiations, Ukraine strictly opposed any increase in the price of gas and proposed payment in arms deliveries. But then the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko agreed that the price should be increased gradually. Russian President Vladimir Putin believed that Ukraine had enough money to pay the world market price: “This is a heavy burden on the Russian budget… Ukrainian consumers today get gas for a lower price than Russian citizens in their own country have to pay! And we still have 25 million citizens living below the poverty line ”.

Yushchenko warned that Ukrainian industry could no longer operate profitably if the price climbed above $ 90. He also called for unnecessary politicization of the dispute and was confident that the problem could be solved in an economic rather than a political way.

At least 50 percent to around two thirds of Russian gas exports to EU countries in 2005 went through Ukraine. Russia would not have been averse to a merger between Gazprom and Naftohas, while Ukraine opposed it. It was feared that Ukraine would otherwise lose control of its own pipelines. In Ukrainian government circles it was called for an increase in the rent that Russia has to pay for the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol in the Crimea . Various Ukrainian circles were of the opinion that the lease payments were too low and demanded a complete inventory of the facilities, which are estimated to be worth two billion dollars. Russia, on the other hand, resisted any renegotiations. It warned Ukraine against bringing up this issue because, unlike the gas market, a fixed price was set until 2017. In addition, the agreement on the Black Sea Fleet was part of a framework agreement that also included the mutual recognition of the borders. There is speculation that the claims were made under pressure from the United States (US) . All the more so since they took place just a few hours after the visit of then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Kiev on December 8, 2005.

Delivery setting

On December 13, 2005, Gazprom made it clear that gas supplies to Ukraine would cease on New Year's Day unless an agreement is reached on the new prices soon. On 14 December 2005, Gazprom announced that it has a price would require 220 US dollars to 230 dollars for 1,000 cubic meters. Ukraine concluded that such a move would be in violation of the Treaties and proposed international mediation. On December 19, 2005, the Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuri Jechanurov traveled to Moscow , but was unable to reach an agreement. One day later, Jechanurov said that Ukraine could do without Russian gas in the future and called for the development of energy-efficient technologies.

Vladimir Putin at the conference on the gas dispute on December 29, 2005 with ministers and industrialists

On December 26, 2005, Yekhanurov stated in a television interview that the treaty gave Ukraine the right to withhold 15 percent of Russian gas that is pumped to Western Europe. On December 29, Vladimir Putin offered Ukraine a $ 3.6 billion loan to cover the cost of moving to world market prices, but Viktor Yushchenko turned down the offer. On December 31, the Russian President offered to suspend price increases until April 2006, but Ukraine also refused.

On January 1, 2006, Russia stopped gas supplies to Ukraine as threatened and only fed the gas intended for the EU into the Ukrainian pipeline system. Temporary delivery fluctuations were registered in the numerous Eastern and Central European countries. Russia explained this by saying that Ukraine had continued to divest domestic gas and stole $ 25 million worth of European natural gas.

This article or the following section is not adequately provided with supporting documents ( e.g. individual evidence ). Information without sufficient evidence could be removed soon. Please help Wikipedia by researching the information and including good evidence.

To prove this, a group of experts from Switzerland was hired to measure the gas quantities on the Russian-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Slovak borders . The official Ukrainian observers refused to put their signature on the record, even though a significant difference in volume was recorded.

Effects

Many European countries temporarily reported a drop in deliveries:

• Austria - decrease by 33 percent
• Croatia - down around 33 percent
• France - 25-30 percent decline
• Germany - unspecified decline
• Hungary - Russian imports decline by 40 percent
• Italy - Russian imports decline by 24 percent (6 percent of total imports)
• Poland - down 14 percent
• Romania - down around 33 percent
• Slovakia - decrease of around 33 percent
• Slovenia - down around 33 percent

On January 3, Gazprom stabilized delivery volumes. The failure to deliver to Ukraine continued.

agreement

On January 4, 2006, the two countries agreed to resolve the conflict. A contract has been signed that will be valid for five years. Gazprom was granted the desired price increase, the group sells the gas through the intermediary RosUkrEnergo and receives 230 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters. RosUkrEnergo got their purchase rights from Ukraine to the much cheaper Turkmen natural gas for 50 dollars and then sold it a mix of Russian and Turkmen gas for a price of 95 dollars. The share of Turkmen gas in this mix is ​​around two thirds and that of Russian around a third.

It was also decided to increase the tariff for natural gas transit from $ 1.09 to $ 1.60 per 1,000 cubic meters per 100 kilometers. This applies to both Russian gas to Europe and Turkmen gas to Ukraine. According to a Gazprom spokesman, the tariffs would fluctuate depending on the market situation.

Most analysts believed that this allowed both sides to save face.

This result was achieved by the Secretary General of the European Council, Javier Solana , who mediated the gas dispute, although the Austrian EU Presidency, which had just assumed the Presidency of the Council on January 1, 2006, did not consider mediation to be urgently necessary. Nevertheless, according to the Herald Tribune, EU officials were engaged in "aggressive diplomacy" behind the scenes. Witnesses said that Solana "aggressively invaded Moscow". It was not clear whether it was an EU mission or whether Solana acted on her own initiative.

Conflict 2007/2008

On October 2, 2007, shortly after the Ukrainian parliamentary elections , the Gazprom Group threatened to suspend gas deliveries if Ukraine did not settle its debt of around 900 million euros by the end of October . The Ukrainian leadership promised an early payment and then settled it.

During the winter there were delivery failures from Central Asia, particularly Turkmenistan , the main supplier to Ukraine. As a result, Gazprom spontaneously helped Ukraine out with its own gas. However, Ukraine refused to pay the more expensive Gazprom price and continued to insist on the previously agreed price. In this way, from Gazprom's point of view, a difference accumulated, which was regarded as Ukraine's fault.

On March 3, 2008, immediately after the presidential election in Russia , Gazprom cut back gas supplies to Ukraine by 25 percent (according to other sources, 35 percent), as announced, because the country had not paid the bills. However, the Ukrainian government claimed to have paid the outstanding amounts in the meantime. The renewed conflict also led to tensions between Ukrainian President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko , who in an open letter accused the head of state of failing to resolve the crisis to the government cabinet.

On March 4, 2008, the Russian gas company cut deliveries by a further 25 percent.

After a cabinet meeting on March 5, Prime Minister Tymoshenko said at a press conference that, according to Gazprom, the outstanding bills had been paid long after the gas price agreed at the end of 2007. Representatives of the Ukrainian Naftohas said that if Gazprom continues to deliver less, everything will be done to "ensure security of supply for Ukrainian consumers". The Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohrysko contradicted the allegations that European gas supplies were being tapped by Ukraine and assured Europe of a trouble-free transit. According to reports from Russia, Naftohas temporarily reduced transit to Europe on March 5 in favor of its own extraction. But this has not been confirmed. After telephone negotiations between representatives of both companies, Gazprom finally agreed on the same day to resume gas deliveries in full. At the same time, further negotiations should take place and delivery conditions for 2008, starting March 1, 2008, should be determined. Gas delivered by then should be billed according to the conditions agreed since the end of 2007.

On March 6, 2008, Prime Minister Tymoshenko published an open letter to Yushchenko, in which she describes her view of the cause of the dispute and the ways in which she can get there. She repeatedly emphasized that future gas supplies from Russia to Ukraine should take place exclusively in direct cooperation between Gazprom and Naftohas without any intermediaries. On April 29, 2008, at the joint meeting of the Russian and Ukrainian prime ministers in Kiev, the Ukrainian prime minister announced that Naftoha's debt to Gazprom had been fully paid.

Conflict 2008/2009

course

The conflict broke out again in November 2008 when Russian President Dmitri Medvedev demanded that the Ukrainian gas debts be settled as soon as possible. The Russian side mentioned a sum of 2.4 billion US dollars. Naftohas, on the other hand, speaks of only $ 1.3 billion in debt to the middleman Rosukrenergo . Since the currency reserves of Ukraine fell sharply in connection with the international financial crisis and the national currency fell sharply against the dollar, the demands from Moscow hit Ukraine at a very inopportune time. However, Gazprom cited the settlement of debts and late payment fees as a condition for a new contract for 2009.

At the end of December 2008, Gazprom did not rule out the possibility that Ukrainian branches could lead to delivery problems in Western Europe. As Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanow told the Itar-Tass news agency, company boss Alexei Miller announced this in a letter to major European customers.

Gazprom finally stopped deliveries to Ukraine on January 1, 2009 because of the dispute over the payment of gas bills and the lack of a contract for 2009. After just a few days, the dispute had an impact on supplies to other European countries. On January 6, 2009, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia reported that supplies through the Ukrainian transit pipelines had been suspended. In Austria, the supply decreased by 90 percent. According to the Ukraine, the supply bottlenecks are due to the reduced feed-in, while Russia accused Ukraine of illegally tapping the transit pipelines. On January 7, Gazprom finally stopped deliveries through Ukraine to Western Europe. In view of the escalation of the gas dispute, the European Union has started talks with Russia and Ukraine.

Ukraine's 2008 gas debt issue appears to have been resolved in the meantime, with some $ 650 million contractual late payment fees still outstanding, according to Russian sources. However, the main point of contention in the new year is the price of gas supplies to Ukraine. Gazprom originally offered Ukraine gas for $ 250 per 1,000 cubic meters, which is just below the average world market price for gas Gazprom expects in 2009. This is between $ 260 and $ 300. The Ukrainian side was only prepared for a price of 201 to a maximum of 235 US dollars and repeatedly referred to an agreement from October 2008, according to which the gas price for Ukraine should rise to world market level, but gradually spread over the next three years. After the Ukrainian delegation left, Gazprom boss Alexei Miller announced that he wanted to sell the gas for Ukraine for 450 US dollars in the future, which is likely to be more than the Western European countries will pay in 2009.

In response to the dispute, a Kiev court ruled on January 6 that the transmission of Russian gas through the Ukrainian pipeline network was invalid. However, there is a contract for transit until 2010, which the Ukrainian jurisdiction is not entitled to cancel under the contract rules.

During the negotiations in Brussels on January 8, Gazprom boss Alexei Miller said his company wanted to resume deliveries to EU countries, but only on condition that the pipelines in Ukraine are monitored internationally. Under pressure from the European Union, Ukraine finally agreed to an observer mission. Russia was also able to assert itself with the demand that the mission should include Russian members. This meant that the delivery stop to Europe was expected to end soon, although the issue of deliveries to Ukraine itself remained unresolved.

The dispute was further delayed when, after Russia had signed the agreement, Ukraine added a few passages in which it denied that it had ever drawn off part of the gas from the transit deliveries, declared itself debt-free for the gas year 2008 and the observer mission on only one month reduced with the option to extend. Russian President Medvedev called these additions “lying” and declared the agreement null and void until the controversial passages were removed again. The next day, Ukraine withdrew the passages so that the agreement could finally be signed. The first deliveries were expected on January 13th.

Gazprom resumed deliveries on January 13th. Shortly thereafter, however, Ukraine blocked the lines again, this time openly, because in their view the transit conditions were "unacceptable". These were negotiated in a contract in 2006 for four years in advance. This includes both the amount of the transit fees and the Ukrainian obligation to provide the so-called technical gas that is required for the compressor stations along the line. After the agreement on the previous evening, Ukraine announced that it would continue to extract technical gas from Russian transit volumes.

consequences

Due to the gas blockade for which Ukraine is responsible, the south-eastern European countries in particular are suffering. Most affected are Slovakia , Bulgaria , Serbia and Moldova . Their dependence on the gas that flows through Ukraine is very high, while their storage facilities are relatively small. In Bulgaria numerous schools had to be closed, firewood and coal are in short supply due to the flood of demand. Bulgaria is demanding compensation from Gazprom for the loss of 124 million cubic meters of natural gas.

Due to the loss of most of its gas sales, Russia is losing up to 120 million US dollars a day, which is why the country is interested in resuming supplies as soon as possible. According to Vladimir Putin, the cumulative damage on January 14th, excluding the long-term reputational damage. The only positive effect that the experts see for Russia is the seemingly greater need to build the Baltic Sea pipeline.

Observers see the solution to the conflict as being made more difficult by the domestic political chaos in Ukraine.

Conflict 2014

As a result of the Crimean crisis , Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev questioned the validity of the 2010 agreement in Kharkiv on March 21 . The basis of the previously granted discount of 100 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters was the use of a naval base on the Crimean peninsula. The Russian energy company Gazprom asked Ukraine to pay outstanding bills for gas deliveries totaling 1.55 billion dollars (1.12 billion euros). In the event of non-payment, a delivery stop was threatened. Moscow had previously granted Kiev price discounts on natural gas after the (later disempowered) President Viktor Yanukovych had declared under pressure from Moscow not to sign an EU association agreement that had been negotiated for years. In early April 2014, after the fall of Yanukovych, Russia returned at the gas price of $ 485.50 per 1,000 cubic meters. It corresponds to the starting position that was reached in the course of the last major gas conflict at the end of 2009.

In response to the political dependence on Russian energy imports, the Ukrainian ambassador to the USA, Olexander Motsykden, asked US companies to invest in renewable energies in Ukraine in April 2014 in order to reduce their dependence on Russian energy supplies.

On the evening of October 30, 2014, Ukraine, Russia and the European Union came to an agreement in Brussels on several contentious points; This “package” was supposed to secure the gas supply to Ukraine - and ultimately also to Europe - during the winter of 2014/15. This agreement was reached thanks to the negotiations by EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger and represented the greatest negotiation success so far in this conflict, which has been swelling for a decade. Oettinger repeatedly pushed for a successful conclusion between the partners in order to ensure the security of supply for the European Union.

In the spring of 2017 was attributable to a first award of the Stockholm Arbitration Court, the latent threat of a billion lawsuit against Naftogaz, a remnant of the gag Treaty of 2009. Russia at that time had the possibility to take the judgment on. The final award awarded Ukraine $ 2.5 billion in total. By then, Ukraine had also made itself independent of direct deliveries from Gazprom.

Political background

While Russian politicians spoke of a policy of extortion by Ukraine against Russia and Western Europe and only emphasized economic aspects, the press spoke about the political background to the dispute. In addition to the escalation of the dispute immediately after the presidential election in Russia, connections with the internal Ukrainian dispute over Ukraine joining the NATO Membership Action Plan were discussed. On the day the dispute was settled, Ukrainian politicians announced that no negotiations on Ukraine's accession would take place during the NATO meeting in Romania from April 2-4, 2008, although the US ambassador to Ukraine reported on February 4th Ukraine's willingness to negotiate and good prospects for their success.

Numerous political observers assume that Russia initiated the price increases including the pressure of delivery boycotts in order to punish Ukraine for rapprochement with the West after the so-called " Orange Revolution ". Another reason given is that the popularity of the president and his party with the Ukrainian people was to be harmed before the spring 2006 elections. Russia is also trying to take control of the Ukrainian pipelines. The renewed flare-up of the conflict immediately after the Ukrainian parliamentary elections in 2007 also indicates political motives. Observers suspect that after it became clear that the more western-oriented parties would achieve a narrow majority, Russia wanted to get the party of the regions, which is more oriented towards Russia and the Russian-speaking population group within Ukraine, to participate in the new government. Even in the run-up to the election, the Russian ambassador to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin , had spoken of a possible increase in the price of gas should Yulia Tymoshenko from the camp of the forces of the "Orange Revolution" become the new prime minister.

Russia argues that the increase in gas prices is for purely economic, not political, reasons. The sale of the gas to Ukraine at greatly reduced prices is a de facto subsidy that, against the background of better sales opportunities, burdens the Russian state budget by up to four billion euros annually, regardless of economic consequences such as dumping exports by the Ukrainian steel industry . Russia also points out that other ex-Soviet countries such as Armenia , Georgia , Moldova and the Baltic states will also have prices increased. However, in 2006 these countries only have to pay between 110 and 125 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters. What Ukraine and many Western media often ignore is the fact that the gas destined for Transcaucasia comes from deposits that are not connected to the pipeline structure to Europe and, unlike Ukraine, there are no opportunity costs for Russia from not being sold Europe emerge. The Transcaucasian gas market must be viewed in isolation.

In the case of Belarus , which purchases Russian natural gas at a price of only $ 128, Russia points to a completely different situation in terms of ownership of the Belarusian pipeline system and associated land. In order to maintain an extremely reduced price, Belarus handed its management system under the control of a Russian-led consortium.

Gazprom has made a similar proposal to Ukraine; Ukraine refused to merge the Ukrainian Naftohas with Gazprom.

In these negotiations the Russians combine numerous demands.

In autumn 2011, Ukraine and Russia negotiated again about prices and delivery conditions for Russian natural gas. The Ukrainian side used their necessary approval for Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as leverage to get the Russian side to give in. According to the First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Andrij Kljujew in November 2011, Ukraine paid 414 US dollars for 1,000 cubic meters of Russian natural gas at that time. The negotiations initially remained fruitless. The Ukrainian side stated in January 2012 that the tariff paid by Ukraine for Russian deliveries was meanwhile significantly overdone, and that more western trading partners were now offering significantly lower tariffs. For this reason too, Ukraine wants to further reduce its gas consumption and the import of Russian gas. Since attempts to negotiate lower prices with Russian gas suppliers failed, the Ukrainian government announced in November 2012 that it would now buy natural gas from Europe. Among other things, a contract was signed with the German energy supply group RWE for the purchase of five billion cubic meters of gas for 2013. At the same time, Ukrainian gas purchases in Russia were drastically cut. For this reason, Gazprom charged the Ukrainian side a contractual penalty of seven billion US dollars. Ukraine said it did not want to pay this fine.

literature

• Roland Götz: After the gas conflict, January 2006
• Russia sits on the longer lever Information about the natural gas conflict January 2006 Telepolis
• Leonid Grigoriev, Marsel Salikhov: Ukraine - Growth and Gas, in: Russia in Global Affairs, 2/2006, April - June 2006; English
• Global Witness (nongovernmental organization that investigates corruption in the natural resources sector, London): It's a Gas - Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, April 2006; English
• PACE Global Energy Services: Russia-Ukraine Natural Gas Dispute, January 2006; English
• Jonathan Stern: The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis; January 16, 2006; English (PDF file; 1.64 MB)
• Jonas Grätz / Kirsten Wetsphal: All's well that ends well? The Russian-Ukrainian gas agreement on the test bench, SWP-Aktuell A03, January 2009
• Kirsten Westphal: Russian natural gas, Ukrainian pipes, European security of supply. Lessons and consequences from the gas dispute in 2009. SWP study , 18, Berlin 2009.
• Oprach, Marc and Gerrit Weber: A policy of dreamers. German energy policy and the longing for dependence, in: Civis with probe. Political newspaper of the RCDS, 04/2009, pp. 25–33. ( Memento from February 10, 2013 in the web archive archive.today )
• The Russian-Ukrainian natural gas conflict of January 2009 . Working papers and materials No. 101, Research Center for Eastern Europe Bremen , February 2009 (PDF file; 0.75 MB)

Web links

• russland.RU - Russia in the gas dispute with Ukraine ( Dossier of the German-language web newspaper, 2005 f.)
• Map of the gas pipelines 2005 (BBC)
• Natural gas conflict in Ukraine (analyzes, statistics, surveys) in Russia analyzes No. 176 (PDF file; 445 kB)
• “The Soviet Union has never exerted such pressure” ( Memento from February 16, 2009 in the Internet Archive ), Netzeitung , January 2, 2006, interview with Russia expert Eberhard Schneider
• “Kiev does not play a glorious role” , Tagesschau , January 6, 2009, interview with ARD correspondent Stefan Stuchlik

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Lyudmyla Synelnyk: Energy resources and political blackmail: The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine , Diplomica Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-8428-9075-6 , page 57
2. ↑ Russia-Ukraine gas dispute remains unsettled ( Memento from March 9, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
3. ↑ Archived copy ( Memento of the original dated December 30, 2005 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
4. ↑ http://www.gazprom.com/eng/news/2005/12/18443.shtml
5. ↑ - ( Memento of the original from September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
6. ↑ - ( Memento of the original from December 12, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
7. ↑ http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=633921
8. ↑ The fairy tale of fast liquid gas , FAZ v. April 8, 2014, p. T1
9. ↑ The Energy Question in Russian-Ukrainian Relations , Russanalysen 116/06
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12. ↑ Russia-Ukraine gas dispute remains unsettled ( Memento from March 9, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
13. ↑ http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2005/12/27/afx2415146.html
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15. ↑ http://www.forbes.com/work/feeds/afx/2006/01/01/afx2422361.html
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26. ↑ http://www.finanzen.net/nachricht/UPDATE_Gazprom_droht_Ukraine_mit_weiterer_Lieferkuerzung_686960
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36. ↑ Ukraine: Russia drastically cuts gas supplies to Europe . In: The press . January 6, 2009.
37. ↑ Energy conflict: Russian gas deliveries via Ukraine completely stopped . In: Spiegel Online . January 7, 2009
38. ↑ Permanent conflict: EU pushes for a quick solution to the gas dispute . In: Handelsblatt . January 6, 2009.
39. ↑ The gas dispute is also damaging Russia . In: The world . January 7, 2009.
40. ↑ Michael Ludwig: A small victory against Ukraine would help the Kremlin. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . January 7, 2009.
41. ↑ Gerhard Mangott : The gas crisis and the failure of the EU . In: The Standard . January 6, 2009.
42. ↑ Observer: EU expects the gas dispute to end soon . In: Spiegel Online . January 9, 2009.
43. ↑ Energy dispute: Russia promises gas delivery from Tuesday morning . In: Spiegel Online . January 12, 2009.
44. ↑ The dispute goes to the next round . In: ORF . 11th January
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47. ↑ ^{a b} Der Spiegel : Ukraine blocks itself offside from January 14, 2009.
48. ↑ - ( Memento of the original from February 15, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
49. ↑ http://de.rian.ru/business/20090121/119742280.html
50. ↑ Der Spiegel : Domestic political chaos complicates the situation of January 14, 2009.
51. ↑ Tagesschau: Gazprom: Kiev should pay outstanding gas bills ( Memento from March 4, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
52. ↑ Gas price increase is not a catastrophe for Ukraine , Welt v. April 4, 2014
53. ↑ Bloomberg: Ukraine Seeks Renewable Energy Investors to Loosen Russia's Grip. dated April 18, 2014
54. ↑ FAZ.net October 30, 2014: Russia promises gas supply for the winter
55. ↑ Russia turns the gas tap on again - can Ukraine pay for it too?
56. ↑ Ukraine triumphs in the gas dispute against Russia , NZZ, May 31, 2017
57. ↑ Ukraine has finally won the natural gas dispute with Russia , NZZ, March 1, 2018
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60. ↑ http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=109935813
61. ↑ Almost everything speaks for Julia Tymoshenko ( Memento from February 16, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
62. ↑ http://en.rian.ru/world/20051221/42606000.html
63. ↑ - ( Memento of the original from February 2, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
64. ↑ Reuters of May 1, 2010: Putin wants to merge Ukrainian Naftohas with Gazprom
65. ↑ Ukraine does not want to give up control of pipelines. ( Memento of the original from May 10, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. rp-online.de, May 7, 2010 
66. ↑ aktuell.ru of March 26, 2010
67. ↑ http://de.ria.ru/politics/20111104/261275680.html
68. ↑ http://de.ria.ru/politics/20120121/262511056.html
69. ↑ http://www.wirtschaftsblatt.at/home/international/osteuropa/neuer-gasvertrag-fuer-kiew-die-naechste-runde-ist-eroeffnet-504260/index.do ( Memento from January 21, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
70. ↑ Ukraine buys five billion cubic meters of gas from German RWE Voice of Russia , February 23, 2013