LRA conflict

date	1987 – today
place	Uganda , South Sudan , Democratic Republic of the Congo , Central African Republic
output	The conflict has not officially ended, but has since shifted to Uganda's neighboring countries.

Parties to the conflict

Uganda Uganda South Sudan Democratic Republic of the Congo Central African Republic AU-RTF United States (from 2012)
South Sudan
Congo Democratic Republic
Central African Republic

United States

Lord's Resistance Army

Commander

Uganda Yoweri Museveni Joseph Kabila Salva Kiir Mayardit Carter F. Ham
Congo Democratic Republic
South Sudan
United States

Joseph Kony Raska Lukwiya Okhot Odhiambo Dominic Ongwen

Areas affected by the war of the Lord's Resistance Army

The LRA conflict is an uprising that by 1987 in northern Uganda was founded and armed resistance movement the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), dt. Lord's Resistance Army , was kindled. The struggles of the paramilitary LRA against the forces of Uganda were characterized by the violence of their attacks and the atrocities committed against civilians. They also kidnapped children and young people with the aim of turning them into soldiers or slaves. The uprising is not yet officially over, but has increasingly shifted to Uganda's neighboring countries since 2008. The LRA has left the region and has since directed its actions against the civilian population in South Sudan, Eastern Congo and the Central African Republic.

Around two million people were displaced by the conflict; at its height, up to 1.7 million lived in camps where they were dependent on humanitarian aid. According to a report by an NGO published in late March 2006, an average of 146 people died violently every week in northern Uganda. Insurgency activity lasted over 20 years before it ended in Uganda. Nevertheless, it continues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan .

The aim of the LRA is the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni to drop to one of the Ten Commandments of the Bible -founded Christian regime to establish in Uganda. The founder and at the same time the spiritual leader of the LRA is Acholi Joseph Kony , who has taken over both the religious and the military leadership of the resistance group. The LRA is on the list of terrorist organizations in the United States and many of its leaders, including Kony himself, are wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity .

background

The contrast between the ethnic groups of the Luo , other Nilotic ethnic groups in northern Uganda and ethnic groups of Bantu is a central part of the history of this country for centuries. Ethnic hostility, which has its roots in the colonial history of Uganda, has sparked several conflicts since the country's independence, including the LRA uprising.

After the fall of the dictator Idi Amin , the government of Milton Obote , whose military forces (UNLA) consisted mainly of Langi (his ethnic group) and Acholi , and the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Yoweri Museveni (from the south of the country) , whose troops were composed primarily of Baganda and other Bantu-speaking groups, was involved in a war. In this struggle, the NRA tried to overthrow the Obote government through military action and guerrilla warfare . Obote's troops, for their part, could not completely destroy the enemy formations, which were inferior in numbers and weapons.

General Tito Okello , an Acholi who was not satisfied with the limited role his ethnicity played in this war, overthrew Obote in 1985 and continued the war against Museveni's rebel forces, which in turn defeated the internal hostilities of the Obote regime and Okellos' coup to rearmament and Had used recruiting . Okello himself was overthrown in 1986 when the NRA won the war and seized power, with Museveni declared president. For the first time in the modern history of the country, Uganda's socio-economic, military and political power was in the hands of residents of the south.

During this war there were numerous riots by the UNLA, the national army of Obote and Okello, against the civilian population, while Museveni's troops in southern Uganda were recognized as the liberators and legitimate fighting force of the people. In the north there was now deep dissatisfaction among the Acholi with the new President Museveni. Various peaceful movements among the Acholi were crushed by government propaganda against the north, and minor demonstrations and protests by Acholi communities were also put down by the use of armed forces from the NRA, which had now taken on the role of the Ugandan national army. The NRA sometimes shot at unarmed demonstrators. In the course of 1986, NRA troops reported mistreatment of the Acholi, who had settled in the north, sometimes as late retaliation for the UNLA massacre in the Luwero Triangle during the war .

In this climate of tension and distrust among the Acholi, the new Museveni government ordered former UNLA soldiers to appear at NRA military bases. This order, however, reminded most of the Acholi of a massacre carried out against Acholi soldiers by Idi Amin in the 1970s, where he had some troops of this ethnic group appear at the barracks and then executed them. This order from Museveni therefore caused panic among some Acholi: some of the ex-UNLA soldiers hid in the bush, others fled to Sudan , and still others decided to take up arms again and to attack the hated NRA and Museveni fight. Several hundred young people who fled the NRA's aggressive fighting in Acholiland joined these resistance groups. On August 20, 1986, some under the name of Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) attacked NRA troop concentrations in Acholiland. The resistance fighters gathered and were commanded by Brigadier General Odong Latek , who was previously UNLA's military commander in Acholiland. The NRA troops took brutal revenge on the civilian population of the now militarily occupied north for the losses they had suffered in the first fighting against the UPDA; Above all, they committed several massacres of the hated Acholi, which led them to support the UPDA rebellion.

Local uprising (January 1987 to March 1994)

Origins of the LRA (January 1987 to June 1988)

In January 1987 Joseph Kony first appeared in the ranks of the Christian UPDA as a spiritual medium in relative anonymity. The religion of the Acholi and thus also of the UPDA troops at that time consisted of a mixture of Christianity with African-religious elements, such as the existence of people who served as prophets and mediums of a spirit . The most famous of them was the Acholi Alice Auma , also known as Alice Lakwena, who immediately raised the banner of the Holy War in the wake of the first successes of the UPDA troops. She led a smaller splinter group of the UPDA, the "Movement of the Holy Spirit" (English Holy Spirit Movement ). This small force was under Latek's military command, but Auma appointed herself “Spiritual Leader” of the Acholi people. From the beginning of 1987 Kony took more and more control of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), which he had joined as a high-ranking officer, until the movement was declared independent of the UPDA in late 1987. Kony changed the name of the HSM to "Lord's Resistance Army" to emphasize the importance of the religious and military aspects of the Acholi uprising. At the beginning of 1988, a former military commander also joined the LRA, Otunu Lukonyomoi , who was particularly popular with civilians because of the good reputation of his troops and now became the most powerful splinter group of the UPDA.

When it became clear that the UPDA, because of its apparent inferiority, was about to sign a peace agreement with the NRA forces, Kony wrote a letter to the high command of the Museveni National Army in 1988 asking for a separate peace talks. It was clear to him that if the UPDA signed this peace agreement, he would have to do without his most important military ally in the war against the NRA. However, several of his units were attacked by NRA forces before separate peace talks could begin. The unprovoked attacks by the NRA on the LRA units apparently took place because of the poor field communication between the various NRA associations: the attacking troops had not learned that Kony had asked for peace talks. The mystical orientation of the LRA, whose troops were still "inspired" by Alice Auma, also puzzled the top commanders of the NRA. Therefore, the possibility of separate negotiations with the LRA was never examined in detail by the NRA Army Command.

First developments (mid-1988 to early 1991)

The June 1988 peace agreement between the UPDA and the NRA, the defeat of the Holy Spirit Movement the previous year, and Alice Auma's flight to Kenya made the LRA the last major resistance army to operate in Acholiland. Former UPDA and HSM soldiers, and even former UPDA commander Odong Latek , who was dissatisfied with the peace agreement between their units and Museveni's forces, joined the LRA. Thanks to his experience as an officer of the UPDA, Captain Latek quickly gained influence in the LRA and managed to convince Kony and the military leadership , which also included Vincent Otti , to use guerrilla tactics and to replace the previous procedures. The new tactics that Latek proposed consisted primarily of surprise attacks against civilian targets such as villages, churches or schools . These attacks were carried out by highly mobile groups of 15 to 20 LRA fighters who, after the attack, dispersed into smaller groups of 3 to 6 men to shake off the NRA's pursuers. The LRA also occasionally carried out large-scale attacks, sometimes against barracks or military bases, in order to undermine the morale of the enemy NRA troops in Acholiland and at the same time to disrupt coordination among enemy troops. As a result, the LRA fighters often cut telephone and telegraph lines , tore down radio masts and tried to weaken the country's infrastructure by sabotaging the roads and railways in the north. In October 1988, the death of Colonel Otunu Lukonyomoi during an NRA attack resulted in a large number of LRA fighters surrendering to the enemy government troops, thereby severely weakening the LRA's military strength.

In mid-1988, President Museveni established the post of Minister of State for the Pacification of Northern Uganda , based in Gulu , to end the fighting in Acholiland. The post was assigned to Betty Bigombe Oyella , an Acholi. One of their main tasks was to convince the LRA forces to give up their fight and surrender to the NRA forces in order to return to their families in Acholiland. Despite these attempts, the LRA inflicted several severe defeats on government forces in late 1988, killing around 200 NRA soldiers. The LRA troops were then able to carry out smaller guerrilla operations until 1991, attacking various villages in order to rob the local population and to get food for the fighters. After these raids, captured villagers took the loot to the LRA meeting points, where the transport was continued by other LRA soldiers while the locals were released. The brutal behavior of some NRA units and the ethnic hostility of the Acholi towards the government soldiers, who mostly belong to other groups, helped the LRA to gain some, albeit passive, support from the population of some settlements.

Operation North 1991–1992

In March 1991 the government began "Operation North" with the aim of destroying the LRA. In preparation for operations against the insurrection, the entire north was closed and all humanitarian organizations were forcibly evacuated. Operation Nord combined the destruction by the combat forces with the elimination of support for the local population through arbitrary arrests, torture and executions. Although this was partly due to the deleterious effects of the LRA, the World Bank's approval of a loan to rebuild northern infrastructure in May 1992 also played a role, which required a safe environment.

In support of Operation North, Minister Bigombe created the Arrow Groups, a force of local communities, mostly armed with bows and arrows. They were quickly defeated by the LRA forces using modern weapons. However, Kony disrupted the creation of the "Arrow Groups" because he feared that his local support could wane. In return, the LRA began to mutilate the many acholi who saw themselves as supporters of the government by cutting off their hands, noses and ears, sewing their lips together or simply beating them to pieces with machetes . Kony then justified these acts: “If you shoot arrows and we cut off the hand you used, who is responsible? They betray us with their mouths and we cut off their lips. Who is responsible? She! The Bible says that if your hand, eye, or mouth makes a mistake, it must be cut off. "

Even when the government's military attempts failed, many Acholi began to turn away from the insurgents because of the actions of the LRA and despite their deep resentment against the government.

The Bigombe Talks 1993–1994

"Migrants of the Night"

It was then that the “Migrants of the Night” movement began: in order not to be kidnapped by the LRA, up to 40,000 children were fleeing their villages every night to seek refuge in the relative safety of the cities. They slept in hospitals, churches, bus stations, and other shelters, only to return at dawn.

After the failure of Operation North, Minister Bigombe took the initiative in June 1993 and contacted Kony through an LRA supporter. This led to the most promising diplomatic efforts of the first 18 years of the conflict. After Kony replied that he was ready to discuss, Bigombe informed the army and President Museveni, who allowed the negotiations to continue, but at the same time said the military operations would continue. In November 1993, the first meeting between representatives of the LRA and the government took place in Pagik, Gulu district, during a ceasefire. Bigombe represented the government and came with several prominent Acholi and the commander of the 4th Division, Colonel Samuel Wasswa, who was head of military operations in the north, while the LRA sent Kony close members. The LRA called for a general amnesty for its fighters, saying it would not give up but was ready to "go home". Bigombe assured the LRA that they would not be treated as vanquished, and Wasswa accepted an extension of the ceasefire to allow further negotiations.

Still, influential NRA officers suspected that the government was giving in to the rebel demands. The Prime Minister, Bigombes’s superior, refused to publicly support the peace process, possibly also because of tensions over who should benefit from the peace agreement.

At a second meeting on January 10, 1994, Kony himself gave a four-hour speech in which he accused the Acholi of being responsible for a war for which everyone blamed him and which is now turning against them with dire consequences. In a private discussion with Bigombe, Kony took six months to regroup his troops.

Failure of the negotiations in Bigombe (February 1994)

This craving was considered excessive. It was later revealed that the military had learned that Kony was negotiating with the Sudanese government at the same time , and they thought Kony was simply trying to buy time. Still, the sight of LRA fighters traveling freely and in peace had given the Acholi hopes that an agreement was imminent. But in early February the tone of the discussions became more bitter: the LRA negotiators felt despised by the officers of the NRA, who, contrary to the terms of the first meetings, treated them as losers. Insults were exchanged. In addition, Bigombe felt trapped between her role as government representative and chief negotiator, and felt that she no longer had the support of her superiors. At a meeting on February 2, the LRA suspended talks, saying it felt that the NRA was setting a trap for her. Four days later, at a rally in Gulu, President Museveni told the crowd that he would give the LRA a 7-day ultimatum to surrender or the government would resume its military offensive. Whatever the goals of the LRA in the negotiations, the ultimatum put an end to Bigombes' talks.

Intensification and internationalization of the conflict 1994–2002

Involvement of Sudan 1994

Two weeks after Museveni's ultimatum, reports said LRA fighters had crossed the northern border and settled in South Sudan with the consent of the Khartoum government .

The help of the Sudan was a response to the Ugandan support for the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army - which one (Sudan People's Liberation Army SPLA) fighting for independence in the south of the country led. Before this support, the LRA could be seen as a minor nuisance affecting only a peripheral region of the country. After that, the LRA represented the armed wing of the regime in Khartoum in the region. The Sudanese support allowed the LRA to increase the intensity of its activity increase. Sudan not only supplied bases from which the LRA could start operations, but also large quantities of weapons, ammunition, land mines and equipment. In return, the LRA should fight the SPLA and regularly participate in joint operations with the Sudanese army. The extensive use of these proxy attacks brought Uganda and Sudan to the brink of war in 1995.

Attacks on the civilian population 1994–1995

Another notable change has taken place in the LRA's perception of the conflict. Convinced that the Acholi had betrayed him by working with the Kampala government, Kony began to use his military more heavily against civilians. The mutilations already used when the "Arrow Groups" were founded became more frequent; in 1994 the first mass kidnappings of children and young people took place. Other smaller rebel groups, such as the West Nile Bank Front , adopted the raid and kidnapping tactics of the LRA. This strategy of forced recruitment was caused by a lack of volunteers. The moral justification was that the adult Acholi had demonstrated their duplicity in the past, the LRA had to clear the land of their brood and create a new society with the children. This philosophical approach, previously used by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia , has been termed genocide .

The attacks on civilians had at least three strategic goals:

first, to cut off any source of information about the movements of the LRA by forcing rural populations to flee.
second, to encourage looting of abandoned villages.
third, and strangely enough, to show the people that the government could not or would not ensure their safety and to encourage them to support the LRA. Though the lack of security certainly bitter many Acholi, it never translated into support for the LRA that attacked them.

Following Sudan's support, there were many incidents notable by the number of victims, their identities or the circumstances:

On April 22, 1995, the Atiak market in northern Gulu District was attacked and the Local Defense Forces were beaten. In the course of the following day between 170 and 220 civilians were murdered without any resistance from the Ugandan army.
On March 8, 1996, a civilian convoy of more than 20 vehicles and its military escort was ambushed by 14 soldiers traveling on the Karuma- Pakwach route . Between 50 and 110 civilians were killed after the escort was overpowered. Some were shot and others killed after refusing to leave the buses and throwing explosives on them.
The LRA carried out three separate attacks on a UNHCR camp of Sudanese refugees south of Kitgum between July 13-14, 1996 . About 100 refugees were killed.
Up to 412 civilians were killed in the Lokung / Palabek massacres between January 7 and 12 in and around the Lokung and Palabek subdistricts (northeast of Kitgum). There had been no resistance, and the majority of the victims had been killed or cut to pieces.
The most famous attack during this period was the kidnapping from St Mary College in Aboke in the Apac district in the north on October 10, 1996. By 2:00 am, over 200 armed rebels attacked the secondary school, kidnapping 139 schoolgirls between the ages of 13 and 16 left the premises at 5 a.m. At 7:00 am, the assistant director, Sister Rachel Fassera, followed the rebels. She managed to negotiate the liberation of 109 of the girls. Of the 30 remaining girls, 5 died in captivity. In 2006 all but two of the others managed to escape.

During this period, the position of government forces was also subject to controversy:

On August 31, 1995, 13 civilians, some with their hands tied behind their backs, were killed in an army attack on an LRA column near Lokung (northwest of Kitgum). Sixteen LRA fighters were also killed. Critics accused the government of showing a lack of consideration for the abductees. The government replied that the civilian casualties were unintentional.
On August 16, 1996, four people suspected of belonging to the LRA and being held by the government were extradited to the crowd they lynched in the presence of officers from the 4th Division .
The death of Okot Ogony from Cwero (eastern part of Gulu province), the president of the peace commission of the Acholi chiefs council, and of Olanya Lacony, a respected sage from Kac-Goma (south-western part of Gulu province), remains a secret. Although these were members of a local initiative which, with the approval of the Ugandan President and an invitation from the LRA, was to resume peace negotiations, they were murdered on June 8, 1996 under unexplained circumstances near Cwero. Some accused the LRA, while others suspected officers bribed by the LRA.

Creation of “protected villages” in 1996

Camp displaced persons in Kitgum

The creation of “protected villages”, which began in 1996, helped widen the gap between the government and the Acholi people. Although a large part of the population had already been abducted within the country , they resisted being herded into camps. In fact, resettlement or evaporation strategies, a common counterinsurgency technique, have been used primarily by the United States during the Indian Wars to isolate the Indians on the reservations. The aim was to relieve troops that would otherwise have had to protect countless small communities in order to cut off access to resources for the rebels. However, the population continued to be attacked by the LRA in the “protected villages”, which were also overcrowded, miserable and unhealthy.

Culture of peace and gradual decline in fighting 1997–2002

The bloodbath of 1995 and 1996 seems to have convinced people that a negotiated solution was the only acceptable solution. This phenomenon has been described as the emergence of a culture of peace. Indeed, because most of the LRA fighters were kidnapped children, a military solution was viewed by a majority of the Acholi as a massacre of victims. The government's efforts to crush the rebels have become a source of grief for the Acholi. The moral paradox of the situation in which the young kidnapped rebels were victims and perpetrators is essential to understanding the conflict. Meanwhile, in 1997, Sudan's ruling National Islamic Front had begun to give up its hard line over the coming to power of new President Omar al-Bashir , who ensured that oil exports from new oil fields would be wrested from the SPLA's control. The pressure from the American government had increased, especially after the terrorist attacks on the embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi by al-Qaeda agents linked to Sudan. In those years Chartum reduced its support for the LRA considerably.

Labuje camp, Kitgum

In 1999 the Carter Center negotiated the Nairobi Agreement between Uganda and Sudan, which allowed them to resume diplomatic relations in 2001.

In 2000 the Ugandan parliament passed an amnesty law that provided for the pardon of the rebels who surrendered to the amnesty commission and gave up violence. While the law did not put an end to the LRA insurrection, it was effective in other parts of the country where insurrection occurred.

The sudden appearance in June 2001 of LRA units contacting local authorities to discuss the possibility of dialogue sparked a wave of speculation about the exhaustion of LRA forces. The NRA, renamed the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF ), created a demilitarized zone for talks with the implicit consent of President Museveni. The discussions were preliminary and the LRA units eventually returned to Sudan. However, analysts thought they had started at Kony's instigation and represented the best diplomatic progress since the failure of the 1994 talks with Bigombe.

Relations between Sudan and Uganda changed rapidly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 . The Sudanese government sought to avoid allegations of asylum for bin Laden in the 1990s and agreed on December 5, 2001, after the LRA was included on the United States State Department's list of terrorist organizations Stop providing aid to the LRA.

The cross-border tensions subsided along with the cut in aid to the rebels on both sides. The LRA itself established itself in its Sudanese bases and only crossed the border sporadically. Some of the hundreds of thousands of displaced people began to return home, the number of internally displaced people dropped to around half a million, and there was open talk about the closure of the "protected villages".

The uprising ignites (March 2002-September 2005)

Operation Iron Fist (March 2002-2003)

Soldier in the internally displaced person camp Labuje, Kitgum

In March 2002, the UPDF launched a major military offensive, called Operation Iron Fist , against the LRA bases in South Sudan. The government in Khartoum had only allowed Ugandan troops to enter its territory south of a red line consisting of the road from Juba to Torit. This permit was part of Sudan's efforts to showcase its new ambitions as a committed member of the international community. This agreement, which was coupled with the return of Ugandan troops who had been in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the Second Congo War , which indicated to the Ugandan government that the situation was ideal, a conflict that was a national disgrace and had become a political danger of ending.

This attempt to end the conflict failed dramatically. After months of uncertainty, LRA forces began to cross the border again and launch attacks with levels of brutality equivalent to 1995-1996. The LRA began to be active in areas outside of Acholiland, apparently in search of support. However, the LRA expanded its military operations in the face of popular resistance, causing suffering and resettlement of the population in areas previously untouched by the rebellion. One of the first attacks took place in August against the Achol-pi refugee camp in the center of the Pader district. The 24,000 Sudanese refugees were transferred to other locations and the camp was abandoned. The failure of Operation Iron Fist is partly due to large stocks of weapons that the LRA accumulated while receiving support from the Sudanese government. In addition, the Ugandan army also failed to destroy all of the LRA's bases in Sudan, leading to a low-intensity conflict affecting large parts of southern Sudan and northern Uganda. Reports also said that part of the Sudanese government continued to support the LRA. These elements contradicted expectations of the LRA's isolation and immediate destruction.

The then head of the UPDF, Major General James Kazini, estimated the strength of the LRA at 1,500 in May 2002. The UPDF spokesman Major Shaban Bantariza estimated it to be 900 fighters in mid-2003. These numbers are not necessarily contradicting the former Including non-combatants like the kidnapped "wives" and the toddlers. However, a 2003 Human Rights Watch report put a figure of 4,500. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, (IISS), in its 2002–2003 report, mentioned 1,500 fighters and stated that 200 were in Uganda and the remainder in Sudan.

Peace efforts and the creation of militias (early 2003)

In the spring of 2003, several diplomatic initiatives were undertaken with no results. These diplomatic attempts failed because of the LRA's inability to establish a program and negotiate credible time. In addition, the Ugandan government showed a preference for breaking off diplomacy in favor of military solutions. The government, recalling similar negotiations by the LRA with Bigombe and Sudan in 1994, acted as if the LRA's offers were nothing but attempts to buy time and believed the LRA, after being repeatedly attacked in ceasefire zones, did not more to the sincerity of the government. The UPDF claimed that it had learned lessons from the past and that it was confident that it would put down the uprising. Since these statements had been made in the past, many observers expressed doubts.

The Ugandan army had to fight to defend many towns and villages against the LRA. The government promoted and armed the militias in the affected districts against the LRA. Although the militias were often called "Arrow Groups" and "Rhino Groups", the government had learned from the Arrow Groups fiasco in the 1990s and decided to arm the militia with assault rifles. Some observers voiced concerns that the proliferation of more weapons in northern Uganda would create more problems in the future.

Involvement of international organizations (from the end of 2003)

"Night Walker"

During a visit to Uganda in November 2003, the UN Deputy Secretary General Jan Egeland , who was in charge of humanitarian affairs, said : "I don't know of any other place on earth that is as distressed as Uganda and receives so little international attention." In April In 2004, the United Nations Security Council condemned the atrocities committed by the LRA and raised concerns about the fate of the abducted children.

In December 2003, the Ugandan President sent the LRA's files to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to determine whether the LRA was guilty of international war crimes. The ICC's chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, opened the investigation in January 2004. Ugandan local groups criticized this development, as a conviction of Joseph Kony and his deputies would prevent any negotiated solution to the conflict. In November 2004 it was reported that President Museveni was considering the possibility of withdrawing his complaint to the ICC, which was seen as an obstacle to efforts to negotiate peace. Amnesty International condemned this intention.

The talks fail (December 15 to 31, 2004)

Number of people displaced and percentage of the total population (figures from 2004)

On February 21, 2004, the LRA massacred more than 200 civilians in a refugee camp in Barlonyo, near the city of Lira. Demonstrations and riots took place in Lira on February 25, 2004 in protest against the government's failure to protect civilians. The riots caused at least nine deaths. The violence was caused in part by animosities between the Acholi and Langi who blamed them for the conflict with the LRA. From mid-2004 rebel activity slowed due to strong military pressure. A significant number of rebels benefited from the government's amnesty law. On November 15, 2004, the government declared a unilateral ceasefire that was extended. During this ceasefire, a significant number of rebels rallied in the government zones to address the August 2002 government proposals in which President Museveni offered to speak to the LRA and cease military operations under certain conditions in order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict prepare to discuss. This initiative was launched after a number of LRA commanders contacted the government or third parties and expressed their desire to end the conflict. LRA commander Sam Kolo said he had received orders from Joseph Kony to negotiate on behalf of the insurgents.

In mid-December 2004, civilians were killed by LRA groups near the Sudanese city of Juba. These rebels allegedly lost contact with their superiors during the government offensive. The Ugandan government also reported attacking a Kony-led force beyond the ceasefire area. Sam Kolo said further attacks complicated the process of establishing a relationship of trust in which the talks could move forward. On December 31, the 47-day ceasefire expired without an agreement.

Conflict and Negotiations (January 1 to February 3, 2005)

Fire in the Parabongo camp, 2005

On January 1, 2005, the rebels resumed their fighting in Alero, Gulu District. President Museveni stated that military operations "would never cease until the Konys group made an irreversible commitment to leave the bush" and that "only a combination of military options and dialogue could bring peace to northern Uganda". On January 19, Médecins sans Frontières included the conflict in Uganda in the list of the 10 most neglected humanitarian issues of 2004.

The signing of a peace treaty between the Khartoum government and the SPLA that ended Sudan's second civil war gave hope that greater stability in Sudan could help put an end to the LRA uprising. At the end of January, John Garang, head of the SPLA, promised that once he took control of the region, he would not let the LRA operate from southern Sudan. Even if Garang died in a helicopter accident a few months later, this did not affect the cooperation between Uganda and the SPLA.

Throughout January 2005 the discussions in Gulu, mediated by Betty Bigombe, in which LRA commanders Vincent Otti and Sam Kolo participated on behalf of Joseph Kony, continued. However, Kony's exact opinion remained unclear. As an International Crisis Group analyst said, "He compares himself to Moses and, like Moses, does not believe that he will reach the Promised Land, which leaves a very dangerous confusion about his involvement in the peace process."

In January 2005, a series of fires devastated several overcrowded refugee camps, including:

On January 21, 2005, a fire in Agweng camp, which is home to 26,000 people, in northern Lira County, killed six people and left approximately ten thousand homeless.
The following day, 278 houses in Abok camp in Apac district were set on fire.
On January 23, 2005, a fire struck six out of seven areas of Acet Camp in Gulu District, killing three people and setting up 4,000 huts in flames, leaving 20,000 homeless.

Armistice and announcements by the ICC (February to September 2005)

On February 3, 2005, President Museveni announced an 18-day ceasefire, returning to his decision to continue military operations. Interior Minister Ruhakana Rugunda said that "an 18-day truce is a clear indication that the President and the government are determined to end this war peacefully after 18 years". Chief mediator, Betty Bigombe, said on February 7th "the ceasefire is being respected and the peace process is underway." Still, the process was undermined by the surrender of Sam Kolo, the LRA chief negotiator, in mid-February 2005.

A February 3 report by the US State Department said up to 12,000 people had been killed by rebels and 20,000 children were abducted during the war. This first attempt to quantify losses due to the conflict did not include deaths from consequences of the conflict such as malnutrition and disease. The Ugandan military denies these numbers. The government also admitted to having recruited former rebel hostages to return to the battlefield. The army said there were around 800 of these former hostages, including several hundred children under the age of 18.

In February 2005 the International Criminal Court announced that it had issued 12 arrest warrants for LRA members suspected of having committed war crimes, the first arrest of its kind since it was established in 2002. The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, said he would begin the first war crimes trial in Uganda by July 2005. The spokesman for the ICC does not rule out the possibility of prosecuting those responsible for the UPDF, but said: "The crimes of the LRA are much more serious than those of the UPDF."

After meeting with local leaders in northern Uganda, Ocampo said he wanted to delay the issuing of arrest warrants so as not to jeopardize ongoing negotiations. Bigombe said she would stop her mediation if the ICC prosecution continued. In the first half of March 2005, in response to government statements announcing the insurgents' defeat, the LRA launched at least six attacks in which 12 civilians were killed and nearly 50 abducted. Nevertheless, contacts with the rebels, including Joseph Kony, were maintained.

Criticism of the government's conflict management by the international community increased. Humanitarian organizations cast doubt on the government's predilection for military solutions and its commitment to a peaceful solution. Other observers accused the Museveni government of abandoning the north and focusing its attention on the development of the center and south of the country, as taking control of the north proved too difficult.

In May 2005 the World Food Program (WFP) announced that 1.4 million internally displaced people were facing severe food shortages and projected an increase in mortality. The prevailing insecurity prevented people from planting, tending their lands and hampering the distribution of humanitarian aid.

LRA expeditions and establishment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Forty insurgents led by Vincent Otti crossed the White Nile on September 14, 2005 and set fire to houses near Juba on the way to Yei. Since the riots following the death of John Garang, Juba has depended almost entirely on food transported on the Yei streets. The group continued their journey to the west and entered the Orientale province of the DRC at the height of the Garamba National Park . At least two other groups, probably one of which was led by Kony, were reported to have drifted westwards from their historic strongholds of northern Uganda and south-east Sudan. The UPDF claimed that it had control over all of northern Uganda and that its military advances were thwarted by the Sudanese government's refusal to allow them to cross the Juba-Torit red line. Human Rights Watch has now called on the International Criminal Court to investigate war crimes committed by the UPDF in northern Uganda.

On September 25, 2005, representatives of the United Nations and the Congolese national army met in the north-east of the country with a group of the LRA probably led by Vincent Otti. General Paderi of the Congolese Army told the LRA that disarming them was a prerequisite for any discussion. Four days later, Museveni said that if the Congolese authorities refused to disarm the LRA fighters, the UPDF would cross the border to pursue them. This resulted in a diplomatic dispute between the two countries, the armies rallied at the border, while the Congolese ambassador to the UN demanded the implementation of an embargo on Uganda as retaliation.

The Juba Talks 2006–2008

Preparations (June 2006)

On June 8, 2006, a delegation from the LRA arrived in Juba, South Sudan, to prepare discussions with the Ugandan government, mediated by South Sudan and the Community of Sant'Egidio . These discussions were accepted after Kony posted a video denying he committed atrocities and appeared to call for an end to hostilities in response to an announcement made by President Museveni, who had promised to guarantee Kony's safety if necessary before July 2005 a peace treaty would have been found and promised an amnesty if he gave up "terrorism" to be. These statements were accompanied by attempts by the Ugandan government to drop the ICC charges. The ICC, supported by human rights organizations, insisted on the arrest of the LRA leaders in accordance with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court .

Joseph Kony gave his first press interview in late 2006 after 20 years of insurrection, denying the atrocity allegations, and blaming President Museveni for his suppression of the Acholi people. However, at the end of June 2006, the government of South Sudan formally invited Uganda to peace negotiations.

The broader context of these negotiations remained rather vague. The government of South Sudan supported these discussions as a means to get rid of a foreign army that was complicating its already difficult relations with the central government in Khartoum. The Ugandan government's motion to the ICC to end the prosecution of the LRA leadership, despite globally condemned by the international community, was supported by the people and leaders of northern Uganda and was analyzed as a means of gaining local support.

First negotiations and armistice (July - September 2006)

Talks between the delegations of the Ugandan government and the LRA began on July 14, 2006, with Vice-President of South Sudan Riek Machar as chief negotiator. The head of the Ugandan delegation, Interior Minister Ruhakana Rugunda, said his priority was to get a quick ceasefire. The LRA delegation, led by Martin Ojul, specified that their participation in the negotiations should not be interpreted as an inability to continue the struggle, but stressed that a treaty was the best way to end the conflict.

The LRA delegation was initially criticized because the majority of it consisted of Acholi exiles rather than fighters. However, after several delays, Vincent Otti arrived on July 29th, followed the next day by Salim Saleh Kony, son of Joseph Kony (and namesake of Museveni's brother). Joseph Kony himself met local religious and political leaders from northern Uganda and southern Sudan the next day.

On August 4, 2006, Vincent Otti of the LRA announced a unilateral ceasefire and asked the Ugandan government to do the same, but Interior Minister Ruhakan Rugunda said he was awaiting verification of its application on the ground. Despite the death in the fight of Raska Lukwiya, an LRA officer wanted by the ICC on August 12, 2006, the discussions continued. President Museveni set September 12, 2006 as the deadline for the conclusion of a peace treaty. A ceasefire was signed on August 26, which included the rallying of the rebels in two areas the Ugandan army promised not to attack and the security of which the government of South Sudan guaranteed. As soon as these maneuvers had been carried out, discussions continued. Although no agreement was reached by the deadline, the government said it would postpone the deadline, advising the mediator, Machar, that several hundred rebels had gathered in the two areas designated in Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria .

At that time, the Ugandan government had begun to encourage the gradual return of the civilian populations to their soil by creating satellite camps, which allowed the main displaced persons to be relieved, even by direct return to the southernmost and least affected Called Teso and Lango regions.

Nonetheless, discussions continued to be delayed and on September 23, 2006, the LRA delegation threatened to leave the negotiations, arguing that the UPDF had attacked the secured site of Owiny Ki-Bul (Eastern Equatoria) and requested that the security be changed Composition of the Ugandan delegation as well as cancellation of the ICC arrest warrants. Uganda denied the attack allegations. Each delegation met separately with mediator Riek Machar on September 25th.

Postponements (October 2006 - April 2007)

Eastern Equatoria province, in which the Owiny Ki-Bul collection camp is located

Negotiations were interrupted in early October when an end-of-hostilities verification team visited Owiny Ki-Bul. The team found no sign of combat, but the LRA had merely left the designated spot. The team recommended that the LRA rally in Owiny Ki-Bul, stating that the LRA had failed to comply with the terms of the treaty and was using hostile propaganda that l'UPDF was stationed not far from the site and the intermediaries were insurgents would not offer armed protection. On October 11, 2006, the LRA proposed that Uganda adopt a federal structure, thereby sparking criticism from the government.

On October 20, 2006, Ugandan President Museveni went to Juba to meet the LRA face-to-face for the first time in order to revive shaky talks. The President aggressively addressed and reprimanded the rebels. In addition, the massacre of dozens of civilians, including women and children, had spread an icy mood at Juba two days earlier. Although the aggressors had not been identified, some suspected the LRA to be responsible for the bloodbath.

However, after a week's halt, the two parties agreed on a second ceasefire, which ran from November 1 to December 1, after the previous agreement practically expired in September. It was agreed that the UPDF would withdraw from Owiny Ki-Bul and thus leave a buffer zone. The LRA had one week to gather in Owiny Ki-Bul and 4 to gather in Ri-Kwangba, Western Equatoria. Kony and Otti refused to go to the camps and mentioned fears about the criminal mandates of the ICC. The agreement also stipulated that no food should be delivered to the LRA outside of the camps, except in exceptional circumstances.

Hoping to move the negotiations forward, the United Nations Vice Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland met Kony and Otti on November 12, 2006.

The LRA announced on November 30 that it was withdrawing from discussions, claiming that the UPDF had killed three of its fighters, despite the deadline of December 1, which the Ugandan army denied. At the time was the former president of Mozambique , Joaquim Chissano , was appointed UN special envoy for the conflict. The armistice was extended by two months on December 18, 2006.

On January 12, 2007, the LRA stated that the recent comments by Salva Kiir and al-Bashir clearly meant that the LRA was no longer welcome in Sudan and that discussions should continue in Kenya. Nevertheless, on March 14, 2007, the LRA announced that it would return to the negotiating table in Juba.

Resumption (May 2007 to April 2008)

After Kenya, South Africa and Mozambique had accepted to join the discussions, following the demands of the LRA, from 13-14 April 2007 a new series of discussions took place. The armistice was extended to June 30, 2007.

Thanks to the efforts of the UN Special Envoy, Joaquim Chissano, discussions continued in May 2007. The talks were again arbitrated by the government of South Sudan but included support from the United Nations and logistical support from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

On June 29, 2007, the two parties agreed on the modalities of dealing with matters of justice and reconciliation: the legal procedures and the traditional ceremonies of reconciliation should be used together. The government said it would allay the ICC's fears of impunity for those responsible for war crimes and convince them that arrest was unnecessary as part of ICC prosecutions.

In November 2007, an LRA delegation went to Kampala to reaffirm its will to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. She also went to the north of the country to meet victims of the conflict and to ask for forgiveness. Nonetheless, reports in October 2007 began to mention Commander Otti's death in unclear circumstances of an internal battle with Kony. His death, confirmed in January 2008, was a threat to the success of the peace talks.

On December 20, 2007, the Ugandan government threatened to resort to military force if discussions were not concluded before January 31, 2008. Nonetheless, after discussions resumed, the deadline was moved to February 29, 2008. The European Union and the United States joined the negotiations as observers.

On February 3, 2008, progress in negotiations on responsibility and reconciliation allowed a treaty to be signed allowing war crimes to be condemned by a special division of Uganda's Supreme Court on February 19, circumventing the ICC and one of the final obstacles Signing of a peace treaty. The rebels left the negotiating table again on February 22, 2008 after being denied access to senior civil servants. Nonetheless, they signed a new agreement shortly afterwards, which provided that their applications for government or military posts would be considered. It was also envisaged that a permanent ceasefire would come into effect once a peace treaty was signed on February 29, 2008.

Additional problems emerged on February 28, 2008: the rebels demanded an end of the prosecution by the ICC, while the Ugandan government insisted on their prior disarmament. Despite ICC threats, negotiations and clarifications regarding a Ugandan solution to the war crimes problem, it was reported that Kony was ordered to leave the bush to sign the final peace treaty on March 28, 2008. According to several reports of final signing on April 3rd, then April 5th, and again on April 10th. When that date came, it postponed the due date by asking for details of potential convictions and the course of traditional ceremonies, and eventually suspended negotiations, alleging fraud, and changing its negotiating team. The peace treaty was not signed.

Failure (April – June 2008)

The Ugandan government then announced that it was returning to Juba and Kampala, that the LRA had broken the treaty and that the ceasefire would not be extended. Several diplomatic initiatives tried to revive the discussions, but without success. On May 26, 2008, the Ugandan government launched special war tribunals to rule on the LRA in an attempt to convince the ICC to withdraw its prosecution.

Since April 2008, the LRA began rearming and kidnapping recruits. The BBC estimated that in June 2008 1,000 newly abducted were added to the LRA's 600 veteran fighters. In June 2008, the LRA and the South Sudanese Army faced each other in fighting. Most notably, the LRA attacked the SPLA in Nabanga camp on June 5, 2008, killing 7 military personnel, 14 civilians and a local chief in a nearby village before setting it on fire. However, the LRA negotiator, Matsanga, said they contacted Chissano on June 6th to restart discussions. He arrived in Kampala the next day to speak to President Museveni.

On June 8, the government of South Sudan announced that they would no longer act as mediators because of the recent attacks and lack of interest from the Ugandan government.

literature

Ted Dagne: Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda. DIANE Publishing. 1437942601

Individual evidence

^ "Behind the LRA's terror tactics," BBC News

↑ ^a ^b Ogenga Otunnu, "Causes and consequences of the war in Acholiland" , in Okello, 2002.

↑ Lamwaka, Caroline. "The peace process in northern Uganda 1986-1990" in Okello Lucima, [Ed.], Accord magazine: Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda ( Memento of the original from December 10, 2004 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , 2002. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.cr.org

↑ ^a ^b H. Behrend: Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda, 1985-97. , 2001, pp. 179-180, 182 and 184.

↑ "Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda" ( Memento of the original from May 18, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF file; 900 kB) Z. Lomo & L. Hovil, Refugee Law Project of Makerere University , Uganda, February 2004, p. 21. @1@ 2

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d B. O'Kadameri. "LRA and Government negotiations 1993-94" in Okello, 2002.

↑ Gersony, Robert. The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a Field-based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda ( Memento of the original from November 17, 2004 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF), US Embassy Kampala, March 1997, and Amnesty International , Human rights violations by the National Resistance Army ( Memento of the original from November 17, 2004 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , December 1991. @1@ 2 @1@ 2

^ World Bank , Northern Reconstruction , main loan / credit # 23620

↑ Dolan, Chris. What do you remember? A rough guide to the war in Northern Uganda 1986-2000 ( Memento of the original from October 19, 2004 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF), COPE Working Paper No. 33, 2000, p. 15, and Gersony, p. 33. @1@ 2

↑ ^a ^b Balam Nyeko and Okello Lucima. "Profiles of the parties to the conflict" in Okello, 2002.

↑ Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda ( Memento of the original of September 27, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF), Makerere University Refugee Law Process, Uganda, February 2004, p. 18th @1@ 2

^ Ofcansky, T. "Warfare and Instability Along the Sudan-Uganda Border: A Look at the Twentieth Century" in Spaulding, J. and S. Beswick, editors White Nile, Black Blood: War, Leadership, and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala . Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, NJ: 2000, pages 196-200

^ ^A ^b Refugee Law Project, p. 20th

↑ Jackson, P. "The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda?" Small Wars and Insurgencies 13, No. 3 (autumn 2002), p. 43

^ Doom, R. and K. V Lassenroot. "Kony's message: a new koine ? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," African Affairs 98 (390), p. 32

↑ Dolan, Chris. What do you remember? A rough guide to the war in Northern Uganda 1986-2000 ( Memento of the original from October 19, 2004 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF), COPE Working Paper No. 33, 2000, p. 19 @1@ 2

↑ "Pushing the Envelope: Moving Beyond 'Protected Villages' in Northern Uganda" ( Memento of the original from November 12, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 360 kB) W. Weeks for UNOCHA Kampala, March 2002, p. 4 @1@ 2

↑ Weeks, p. 17

↑ Weeks, p. 16

↑ Afako, Barney. Pursuing Peace in Northern Uganda: Lessons from Peace Initiatives ( Memento of the original from November 22, 2005 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF), May 2003, pages 6-7 @1@ 2

↑ Statement on the Designation of 39 Organizations on the USA PATRIOT Act's “Terrorist Exclusion List” ( Memento of the original dated February 2, 2002 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , United States Department of State , December 6, 2001 and Afako, p. 6 @1@ 2

^ Refugee Law Project, February 2004, p. 30

↑ Weeks, p. 36

↑ UGANDA-SUDAN: No rapid solutions in anti-LRA campaign ( page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , IRIN PlusNews, May 27, 2002@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.plusnews.org

↑ Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda ( Memento of the original of September 27, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF), Refugee Law Project of Makerere University, Uganda, February 2004, p. 32 @1@ 2

↑ Uganda (LRA) ( Memento of the original from August 18, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Armed Conflict Database @1@ 2

↑ Army rejects reported rebel offer for talks ( Memento of the original from June 27, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , IRIN, March 30, 2004 @1@ 2

↑ Uganda conflict 'worse than Iraq' , BBC News , November 10, 2003

↑ UN panel condemns Uganda violence , Associated Press , April 15, 2004

↑ Uganda: Government cannot prevent the International Criminal Court from investigating crimes ( Memento of the original dated June 2, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Amnesty International press release , November 16, 2004 @1@ 2

↑ In pictures: Uganda massacre at Barlonyo, BBC News, February 23, 2004

↑ Uganda declares ceasefire with LRA rebels , Reuters , November 14, 2004

↑ Uganda's LRA rebels kill seven Sudanese: report , Agence France-Presse , December 11, 2004

↑ Broken link ( Memento December 14, 2005 in the Internet Archive ), Guardian

↑ Beyond the headlines: Intense grief and fear in Northern Uganda ( Memento of the original of February 21, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Médecins sans frontières , January 19, 2005 @1@ 2

↑ Uganda sees 'dawn of hope' in Sudanese peace deal , AFP, 9 January 2005

^ Sudan-Uganda: SPLM / A leader pledges to help Ugandan peace effort , IRIN, January 31, 2005

↑ broken link , Reuters Alertnet

↑ Ceasefire expires in north Uganda BBC, February 22, 2005

↑ Ugandan army recruiting children , BBC, February 15, 2005

^ UN criminal court to target Uganda rebels, DR Congo militia , AFP, February 8, 2005

↑ Uganda rebels take more children , BBC, March 18, 2005

↑ broken link ( Memento of the original from April 27, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , The Monitor @1@ 2

↑ Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army Cloaked in Myth, Secrecy ( Memento of the original from April 1, 2005 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Voice of America , March 30, 2005 @1@ 2

↑ broken link , Reuters Alertnet

↑ Ugandan rebels fled into eastern DRCongo ( Memento from December 10, 2005 in the Internet Archive ), New Vision , September 19, 2005

↑ UN officials meet Ugandan rebels , BBC, September 25, 2005

↑ DR Congo militia deadline expires , September 30, BBC 2005

↑ LRA rebels arrive for Sudan talks , BBC News, June 8, 2006

^ "Guerra in Northern Uganda: la fine è a portata di mano" , Avvenire , August 20, 2006

↑ ICC urged to drop LRA charges ( Memento of the original from February 29, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , BBC News , July 12, 2006 @1@ 2

↑ Sam Farmar, Uganda rebel leader breaks silence , BBC Newsnight , June 28, 2006

↑ UGANDA: Gov't to send team to Sudan over proposed LRA talks , IRIN, June 28, 2006

↑ UGANDA: Locals want rebel leader forgiven , IRIN, August 1, 2006

^ Ceasefire First On Kony Agenda , AllAfrica (The Monitor), July 15, 2006

↑ Opening speech of LRA delegation at Juba talks ( Memento of the original from April 1, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Sunday Vision, July 15, 2006 @1@ 2

↑ Key Uganda rebel 'attends talks' , BBC News, July 29, 2006

↑ ^a ^b Uganda officials 'meet LRA chief' , BBC News, July 30, 2006

^ LRA leaders declare ceasefire , BBC, Aug. 4, 2006

↑ Uganda hopeful about rebel talks , BBC News, Aug. 14, 2006

↑ Uganda resumes talks with rebels BBC News August 18, 2006

↑ Uganda and LRA rebels sign truce , BBC News, August 26, 2006

↑ Uganda drops peace talks deadline BBC News , September 12, 2006

↑ UGANDA: Most rebels have left northern Uganda for Sudan - army , IRIN , September 26, 2006

↑ UGANDA: Rebels propose federalist solution at Juba talks , IRIN , October 11, 2006

↑ "LRA rebels meet Uganda's Museveni" BBC News , October 21, 2006; "SUDAN: Armed group kills 42 Civilians" , IRIN , October 20, 2006; and "Museveni meets LRA face to face" ( page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , The Sunday Monitor , October 21, 2006@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.monitor.co.ug

↑ "UGANDA: Revised gov't-LRA ceasefire deal signed" , IRIN , November 1, 2006

^ "UN envoy sees Uganda rebel chief" , BBC News , November 12, 2006

↑ "UGANDA: Talks hit fresh snag amid rebel protest" , IRIN , November 30, 2006, "UGANDA: Museveni optimistic peace will prevail" , IRIN , December 5, 2006 et "Ugandan LRA rebel truce extended" BBC News , December 18 2006.

↑ "Rebels snub Ugandan peace talks" BBC News , January 12, 2007 and "Uganda: LRA Quit Juba Talks, Govt Rejects Rebels' Demands" , allAfrica.com, January 21, 2007.

↑ http://allafrica.com/stories/200703140450.html

↑ allAfrica.com: Uganda: S. Africa, Kenya Join Juba Peace Talks (Page 1 of 1)

↑ "Govt, LRA talks underway" ( page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Sunday Monitor, 15.-21. April 2007@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.monitor.co.ug