Richard Hönigswald

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Richard Hönigswald (born July 18, 1875 in Magyaróvár ; † June 11, 1947 in New Haven (Connecticut) ) was an Austrian- German- American philosopher of Jewish origin who, as a representative of realistic criticism, belongs to the wider neo-Kantian circle .

Based on Kant , Hönigswald combined philosophical epistemology with questions about the validity , the philosophically relevant basic conditions of psychology and pedagogy, and developed independent concepts for the theory of the organism and in the philosophy of language .

Life

Hönigswald grew up in a Jewish family in Hungarian Altenburg. His father, Heinrich Hönigswald (1842–1909), was a practical country doctor “of cosmopolitan liberality” with interests in psychology, who was friends with the local abbot. His mother was Marie Hönigswald (1844–1910), née Goldberg. He gained his first school experience in his hometown of Wieselburg-Ungarisch Altenburg at the Piarist high school, after which he moved to the upper class of the Benedictine high school in Raab , where he passed his Matura with distinction on June 11, 1892 .

He began studying medicine at the University of Vienna in the winter semester of 1892/1893 to the winter semester of 1900/1901, after which there was a break until he finished his studies in the summer of 1901; in 1902 his doctorate followed. In Vienna he was strongly influenced by the neopositivist teachings of the physiologist Sigmund Exner .

This was followed by studying philosophy with Alexius Meinong in Graz and with Alois Riehl in Halle . His doctorate at the University of Halle under Alois Riehl in 1904 had the topic: "About Hume's teaching of the reality of external things". Hönigswald was baptized to the Protestant faith on November 7, 1904 . In 1906 he moved to Breslau , where, after completing his habilitation on “Contributions to epistemology and methodology ”, he initially worked as a private lecturer. In the winter semester of 1910/11 he was appointed adjunct professor at the University of Breslau . On May 25, 1914, he married his first wife Gertrud Grunwald. In January 1915, as an Austrian, he applied for naturalization in Prussia. In April he was conscripted into hospital work as a doctor. In the same year the son Heinrich was born (the later linguist Henry M. Hoenigswald ). On June 10, 1916, Hönigswald was appointed successor to William Stern at the Extraordinariat for Philosophy, Psychology and Education, and on December 9, 1919, he was appointed full professor for the same subjects. His first wife died on October 3, 1921.

Among other things, Hönigswald supervised the doctorate of Norbert Elias, completed in 1924 . In a dispute about Immanuel Kant's assumptions about a priori, the doctoral student came into conflict with his doctoral supervisor, so that the doctoral thesis could only be successfully completed by changing the relevant passages. From 1924 he was editor of the series “Wissenschaftliche Grundfragen. Philosophical Treatises ”. In June 1929 Hönigswald accepted the position of Erich Becher's successor at the University of Munich from the 1930 summer semester. On October 15, 1930 he married Hilde Bohn.

As a native Jew, he had to leave the university on April 16, 1933. Colleagues and friends, including Karl Vossler and Giovanni Gentile , stood up for him. Nevertheless, on September 1, 1933, he was forced to retire and retired. A defamatory report by Martin Heidegger had also contributed to this; he wrote to Dr. Einhauser, a senior councilor in the Bavarian Ministry of Culture, on June 25, 1933:

“Dear Mr. Einhauser! I am happy to comply with your wishes and give you my opinion below. (1) Hönigswald comes from the school of Neo-Kantianism, which represented a philosophy that is tailored to liberalism. The essence of man was then dissolved into a free-floating consciousness in general, and this ultimately diluted into a generally logical world reason. In this way, under apparently strictly scientific philosophical justification, the gaze was diverted from the human being in his historical roots and in his popular tradition of his origins in soil and blood. This went hand in hand with a conscious suppression of all metaphysical questions, and humans were now only considered servants of an indifferent, general world culture. The writings of Hönigwald grew out of this basic attitude. (2) But there is also the fact that Hönigswald now defends the ideas of Neo-Kantianism with a particularly dangerous acumen and an idle dialectic. The main danger is that this hustle and bustle gives the impression of the utmost objectivity and strict scientificity and has already deceived and misled many young people. (3) Even today I still have to describe this man's appointment to the University of Munich as a scandal, which can only be explained by the fact that the Catholic system prefers people who are apparently indifferent to their ideology because they prefer them to their own Efforts are harmless and, in the known way, are 'objective-liberal'. I am always available to answer further questions. With excellent appreciation! Hail Hitler! Your very devoted Heidegger "

Reinhold Aschenberg speaks of a “Germano-fascist discourse context openly evoked in the text of the work.” Heidegger's text is particularly problematic because it was in a critical discussion with the representatives of Neo-Kantianism.

Hönigswald then lived in seclusion as a private scholar in Munich. He still had contacts with Theodor Litt and the Romanist Karl Vossler , while the originally friendly relationship with Bruno Bauch was completely broken off after his full devotion to National Socialism. He has published various articles in foreign magazines in Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands and two books in Switzerland. In 1938 he was stripped of his doctorate in philosophy. As a result of the November pogroms , he was sent to Dachau concentration camp for three weeks in 1938 and was only released after international protests. In March 1939 he was able to emigrate with his wife, son and daughter with the help of friends and the Swiss industrialist Guido Jenny via Switzerland to the United States, where he reached New York in June 1939. In 1941 his German citizenship was revoked. He received American citizenship in 1944. Hönigswald was unable to get a job at a university in the USA or to find a publisher, so that he was able to continue his work in very modest circumstances. The material livelihood of the family during these years was ensured by a doll manufacture that his wife built up during these years. After the end of the war, Hönigswald made contacts in Germany again, especially with his friend Ernst Lohmeyer , and became co-editor of the “Archive for Philosophy”.

From the extensive estate, which is administered under the direction of Hans Wagner initially in Würzburg , from 1962 in the Hönigswald archive in Bonn and in Aachen , Gerd Wolandt a. a. Work published posthumously in 10 volumes. In addition to smaller works, these include, in particular, the two-volume writings “The Basics of General Methodology” and “The Systematics of Philosophy Developed from Individual Problem Design”, in which Hönigwald's systematic interest is expressed. At Hönigwald's work, u. a. the philosophers Wolfgang Cramer and Hans Wagner , the psychologists Moritz Löwi and Hermann Johannsen as well as Alfred Petzelt and Marian Heitger in education .

Teaching

Richard Hönigwald's philosophical thinking has gradually developed towards a systematic approach, which is about the theoretical grasp of reality and the demonstration of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge and the validity of statements. At the beginning he developed a fundamental Kantian position based on his teacher Riehl, which at the same time included a critical dissolution of positivism and the philosophy of consciousness (Brentano, Meinong, Husserl). His writings up to around 1915 show a thematic parallelism to the neo-Kantians Ernst Cassirer ( The Knowledge Problem in Philosophy and Science , 1906) and Bruno Bauch ( Philosophy of Exact Sciences , 1911). Hönigswald reflected the position he had gained in this way in the history of philosophy both in overview presentations and in several individual case studies, before he turned to questions of thought psychology and then to pedagogy and the philosophy of language . Thematically throughout the entire work, the tension between the reality-grasping concept of "objectivity" and the concrete subject, referred to by Hönigswald as "Monas". He achieved a mature representation of his position around 1930, which he presented in the basic questions of epistemology and even more concentrated in a philosophical self-portrait ( self-portrayal ). In the large papers published from the estate ( The Basics of General Methodology and The Systematics of Philosophy Developed from Individual Problem Design ), the various components are finally brought together to form a methodical and content-related system. Striking opposing positions that Hönigswald rubbed against were, on the one hand, Heidegger's existential ontology, which was limited to the finite, and, on the other hand, Hegel's idealism, which transcended the limits of the ability to cognize as an absolute mind.

Objectivity as the relationship between object and monas

Hönigswald's epistemological topic is not the definition of boundaries in the abstract "I think" (Kant), but the connection between knowledge and concrete subjectivity. According to this, the basic provisions of psychology are to be included in the investigation of the cognitive process. The object of consideration is therefore not only scientific, but all real-life knowledge and experiences including those that relate to ethics, aesthetics or religion. With Hönigswald, the question of the ultimate justification becomes the question of the constitution of the subject. It is not enough, as in positivism, to concentrate on facts that can be empirically experienced, or, as in the philosophy of intentionality (Husserl, Meinong), to deal with the structures of consciousness in general. It is about the relationship between subject and object , which is experienced in objectivity. The philosophical question is thus that of the determination of objectivity.

Concealed in the question of the determinateness of the objective is the problem of universals , the question of the relationship between unity and multiplicity, between the general and the particular, or, in Hönigswald's terms, between fact (the given) and principle (concept and method). Thinking is a fundamental psychological phenomenon that cannot be deduced and that cannot be traced back to. The tension exists between concrete reality as what appears and the unlimited space of possibility of thinking. In thought psychology, this relationship is examined logically without going into special psychological elements (emotions, reactions, etc.). It is about the connection between experience and knowledge and the mental faculties of the physical subject. In modern parlance, Hönigswald deals with the theory of cognitive science . Following Leibniz, he called the subject experiencing in thought “ Monas ” because, as a concrete subject, it reflects the entire world that he can experience in his thoughts. There is an indissoluble correlation between the Monas and the world. The “self-presence”, as Hönigswald calls self-reference, works in the Monas, which means that the Monas is an object to itself.

“The 'I' and that something that I 'encounter' that is 'given' to me in this sense fulfill one and the same condition in their mutual relationship. [...] I 'am' not, if not in the correlation to a 'something'; and this something in turn 'is' only 'given' as a possible 'I'. But this his 'given' coincides with his independence from me. That is why this independence from me is at the same time his reference 'to me'. "(GE 62)

In this context, Hönigswald also dealt critically with the question of whether “nothing” can also become the content of experience. He denied this because nothing (in contrast to the infinite) cannot have any objectivity and polemicized (1931) against Heidegger (lecture: Was ist Metaphysik?, 1929), to whom he reproached for having lost sight of the question of object knowledge and instead of the given only examine the finite:

“Incomparable as it is, the“ nothing ”breeds comforting fear by, as the obvious and precisely therefore surprising expression“ does not ”,“ It is therefore more original than the not and the negation. ”- Meanwhile, Such insights, as one can see on closer inspection, defy any concern. They are, as it were, beyond his conditions and competencies. Because concerns always mean questions; How far questions now reach into the uncanny depths of “nothing” at all cannot be determined in principle. So here too the rest is silence. Then, however, the problem of negation as the object of an epistemological investigation unfortunately does not appear to be met by the insight into “nothing”. For what relationship connects that - certainly improper, only revealed in “niece” - “being” of “nothing” with the function of negation? Isn't the "niece" at least affirmed? - one hardly dares to ask the question in the understandable fear of the gloomy darkness of its metaphysical bearer. After all, it leads back to the subject of our consideration, whether legitimized in relation to “nothing” or not. ”(GE 62-63)

For Hönigswald, humans cannot understand themselves as finite existence due to their nature. Rather, it is “the carrier of all the representational and yet dialectically agitated timelessness of culture. And this is also based on the fact that 'man' does not persist in his 'finitude'. He participates in the 'infinity' of a system of tasks that have never been fulfilled and yet can be overlooked as a totality. "

In Hegel , Hönigswald criticizes the idea of ​​an absolute spirit that unfolds as something superordinate to all reality. In this system the Monas, the experiencing concrete subject, would only be an intermediate station. “The problem of psychology can therefore never become fully systematic with him. The interrelated separation of experience and object, which is present in the critical concept of “givenness”, can only appear to Hegel as a temporary phase to be “canceled” in the completion of his system. [...] Because only the whole is 'the true' for him. ”He reproached the concept of phenomenology for neglecting the relationship between“ validity and execution ”and for psychologism the one-sided focus on“ psychological factuality ”. For Hönigswald, on the other hand, the Monas is the fixed point in which objectivity is anchored. Man lives and thinks in objectivity. In the Monas the synthesis of reality and self-knowledge takes place. The Monas is the concrete self-given and reflective subject. Correspondingly, understanding knowing can only relate to what is given.

Validity

Validity is the recognition of a theory or an analysis, in the simplest case a statement . There has to be an approach , albeit a contingent one. This is a prerequisite if one talks about validity. Validity also implies that a statement can be justified in a comprehensible manner.

“Validity, however, always appears only as a predicate of something valid. A validity, the conditions of which are absolutely unsatisfactory, would amount to a judgment without structure, a thought without content. It would contradict its own concept. So the analysis cannot be empty; it must reveal itself in beginnings and shape itself through beginnings. The approach, however, has to justify and prove itself as an approach within the framework of the analysis; through the analysis he must find out a justification according to function and content. "(Päd 30)

Validity is not subjective, i.e. This means that it is not a question of the individual consent of someone else or the conviction of the person making the statement, but rather an agreement with a truth value that serves as a yardstick. “The 'true' requires consent; it 'should' be approved. Precisely for that reason 'truth' means something other than the factual state of that consent itself. Truth, one can also say, is the object and principle of consent, consent is not the basis of truth. A plethora of examples can be used to show that the truth “is” not because one agrees with it; but one should agree to it because it 'is'. Their being is always valid. ”(Päd 33) The background of this thesis is not a correspondence theory of truth . Rather, Hönigswald refers to the connection with the need to communicate verbally. The object of a statement is not independent of the statement; it is constituted by him. A statement or a judgment is valid because another subject can recognize its validity and come to an understanding by constituting the fact in the same way. Hönigswald therefore speaks of different types of truth, such as cognitive truth, scientific truth, religious or artistic truth. The claim to validity is an intersubjective process that arises from consensus .

As Hönigswald also includes statements of the normative (morality, law, art and religion) in the realm of the objective, not only questions of the truth, but also questions of the right and the beautiful are subject to the claim to validity. In addition to the logic of the sciences, the historicity as well as the education or the language come into view. The systematic framework of validity is the totality of human culture, are all manifestations of life. Reflecting on the justification of a thought is Hönigswald's primary task for the philosopher. “So the motive of justification becomes more and more the immovable starting point and pivot of all philosophical-scientific considerations. Now this concept includes the motif of objectivity in two ways: on the one hand, because what is justified or justified has become independent of 'me' in its validity; but then because justification as the principle of the validity of statements always requires an 'object' for these statements. "(GE 208)

“That is precisely why it is only partially true that science and law, morality, art and belief form a 'system' in the common sense of this word. Because no higher class concept takes precedence over them. They 'belong' together, but only because, each of them completely, embodies the idea of ​​objectivity, because each of them spans the 'world' in its own way. "

The various spheres of validity claims are not in a system of dialectical linear logic, as in Hegel's case, but are equal, plural levels of life that are connected in a network of relationships, but constitute an independent component of human culture. Hönigswald's concept is reminiscent of Cassirer's symbolic forms on the one hand, and Luhmann's systems on the other .

Validity is limited to the area of ​​the objective. This also means that it is no longer possible to go back to the objectivity. A final justification that tries to fall back on the idea of ​​a transcendence makes no sense for Hönigswald.

"Because behind the concept of the object with objective justification, i. H. Wishing to go back to evidence and arguing is no longer a possible task. A relationship is then “last” in the defined sense of the word when its concept coincides with that of the justification. Relations of this kind are called invariants. They represent the reference points by virtue of which knowledge is possible at all; they are conditions on the fulfillment of which the validity of scientific insights depends in a particular case. "

Organism and nature

The self-presence of the experiencing Monas is tied to the corporeality and through the experiencing corporeality in its concrete subjectivity organically connected with nature as a whole. The purely scientific approach to nature makes the organism a pure object, which is considered on the basis of the law of causation. In doing so, “the 'being' of the atom becomes the creature of physics”. (GE 68) On the other hand, the Monas experiences itself integrated in the natural context; the organism is tied back to the experiencing subject and thereby becomes the “physical correlate of the psychic”. (GE 60) Nature and Monas are thus in a twofold relationship and form a psychosomatic unit.

“With the concept of experience, we also determine the conditions for the independence of nature from the facts of experience. Objectivity is, as we know, always the possibility of execution; the sense in which I call myself 'I' is just the other side of the object-determination. "(GE 98)

For Hönigswald, an organism is a natural system that works and functions at the same time, e.g. B. by metabolism, its existence. “In it, 'function' and 'continuance' coincide.” The organism as part of nature is the means and objectivity of experience in which all stimulus-receiving processes are coordinated and processed. With him Monas has access to the world and with him she stands in time. The Monas stands in the presence, the pure here and now. Only the body of the organism has access to the spatiotemporal dimension and mediates the past that is no longer present and the future that is not yet present. “The organism itself 'is' only with regard to the simultaneity of past and future. He is the epitome of dispositions; it is, if you want to put it that way, its history. ”(GE 103) Because the organism maintains its existence, it is a self-regulating system. This means that in relation to himself he has a natural "immanent expediency" (Päd 151), because he reacts to stimuli from individual causes lying in him. Causes in biology are basically mechanical and chemical, i.e. H. causally, due to the property of self-regulation, organisms have an inner purpose. Life is only a name for the way it works, for the principle that the organism exhibits as a given, as a fact.

Language and communication

The world consists of a multitude of monads, each of which is unique. In their being as an organism they are connected to nature and in this way also to each other, so that no monas can exist without other monads. The way of communication between the monads is language. Because language arises from the perspective of the individual monad, it is pluralistic. At the same time, it is intersubjective as a connecting link. In language, too, there is a tension between fact, the physical sound or the written character, and the principle, the meaning generated in language .

The core of Hönigswald's philosophical considerations is again the concept of certainty. “Determination does not mean an object, but rather 'objectivity'; for it means precisely this that there are “characteristics” of “objects”; furthermore the possibility of the objective reciprocal reference of objects. Objectivity therefore includes the conditions according to which things are 'independent' of me, it thus includes the conditions of a peculiar relationship of all possible objects 'to me'. ”The object determines the meaning and thus the linguistic content of an utterance. At the same time, however, the object is also determined by language. “Of course, language is also a 'fact'; it is 'given', it is 'found'. But at the same time it proves to be a function, better as an equivalent of objectivity, as an instance to which the concept, i.e. H. the problem of the given, that is, the 'fact' itself decides. Language identifies itself as a 'fact' and a 'principle' at the same time and thus reveals a characteristic of experience in general. ”Meaning arises from the meaning of a statement. It is the "epitome of circumstances by virtue of which a structure can be described as meaningful and valid, the condition for everything that is or can become an element of a set of meaning or a validity context."

Language is ultimately the system of symbols that cannot be circumvented. All symbols can be traced back to language. “Language, however, symbolizes itself”. Language is “the place of relationships in which general, special and individual things can only be shaped and functionally separated.” Language basically has two functions. On the one hand it is used for presentation and on the other hand for communication. With Cassirer, language as a symbolic form is a figure of the spirit; with Hönigswald it is a direct access to the world. Language becomes tangible only in the community, in the 'we'. "This 'we' now appears as a new, namely, language-related function of the 'I' and the sentence that language represents a 'community phenomenon' only then receives its exhaustive analytical meaning."

Pedagogy and culture

When it came to the question of pedagogy, Hönigswald was not concerned with drafting concrete instructions for action, not even with the theory of pedagogy and its methods, but with the epistemological analysis of the basic conditions and the meaning of pedagogy.

“At this point it should be remembered that all pedagogical insight means 'doing' well characterized by principles, that all pedagogical theory mean the theory of this 'doing'. So we cannot speak of a pedagogical theory that perhaps in an appropriate way, but always only as a factor alien to pedagogical 'practice', whose needs 'take into account' as much as possible, but rather the pedagogical theory itself only is insofar as it encompasses the specific conditions and the peculiar meaning of the full complexity of educational activity. "(Päd 16-16)

Hönigswald wanted to show "how from the concept of the object in general, that is, the concept of objectivity, a range of special, precisely educational tasks grows." (Päd 127) In his fundamental thoughts on education, Hönigswald linked both his concept of objectivity and that of the organism with the question of culture and validity. “This is how the cultural asset proves to be the ideal center of the educational community. In this respect it is teaching and educational material. "(Päd 63)

The community of Monas is realized in the concept of human culture. Humanity is the concept of a value through which the community receives a meaning that is fulfilled in moral action. The individual Monas can only strive for morality. "In other words, humanity only exists as the meaning of its own development according to the idea of ​​ideal perfection." (Päd 121) The task of pedagogy lies in a cultural "higher education of the community" (Päd 99) and this takes place through the mediation of values taking into account the historical situation. “Understand the system of values ​​in their current particularization, i. H. To grasp the value that appears to be realized in the respective culture-related acts of evaluation, that will mark the natural starting point of any pedagogical theory. The 'present' itself then becomes the bearer and representative of values. ”(Päd 131) The pedagogue“ must strive to make the idea of ​​a harmonious system of 'truths' of all possible areas of validity the conscious motive of his actions and thus the meaning of his pupil's attitude to life to make. "(Päd 76)

“Only that which fulfills the condition of being an organism is educable.” Learning processes take place through experience, so that the body is a condition for the possibility of learning processes. “Experiencing oneself also means the possibility of H. to 'map' the meaning of the community of all objective ties to oneself. But nothing else demands 'personality', the concept of which, like that of education, thus proves to be necessary because, in certain modifications, it expresses the thought of necessity itself, precisely the thought of objectivity. "

Pedagogy is above all conveying meaning and this can only happen with recourse to philosophy. On the other hand, pedagogy with its historically conditioned cultural task is the touchstone of philosophy: “The concept of philosophy determines the problem of pedagogy; and the problem of pedagogy ultimately proves the right and content of the concept of philosophy. "(Päd 31)

History of philosophy

An essential part of Hönigswald's work are historical works. In addition to the overview representations, which extend in three parts over the entire spectrum from antiquity through the Renaissance and modern times to Kant and individual case studies, there were also problem-related questions, in particular about the meaning of the creation myth and the universals. The title "Abstraction and Analysis" , which the work on the universal dispute in the Middle Ages bears, indicates Hönigwald's interest in the history of philosophy . On the one hand, it offers him the historical material on the topic, on the other hand, it is the origin of the topic itself and thus a source of ideas for systematic thinking.

“A problem in the history of philosophy does not find its solution by referring to thinkers who 'already' thought and formulated a thought in front of others, to questions and decisions that they would have 'anticipated', to 'influences'. To which they have been exposed - however consequential such discoveries may be on the background of systematic insights, but only because it is possible to map the factual connection of the problems to certain questions that are historically authenticated as formulated in a certain way. Tasks in the history of philosophy require both systematic and historical treatment: the conceptual structure of the questions must be recorded over all coincidences of a linguistic and psychological nature and made methodical, i.e. H. critical development. "

The purpose of the history of philosophy, like that of systematic philosophy, is to analyze statements that claim validity and to work out what is valid from the historical background, "the timeless epistemological determination of the content". Against this background, dealing with the myth appears problematic, because epistemological statements of value hardly appear to be achievable from the myths, which are largely based on fictions. In myth, however, principles are reflected that are hidden in modern science. These are the generality, the holistic nature of the explanation of the world, which is in contrast to the concrete tangible reality, the feeling of dependence on a superordinate cosmological power that takes shape in myth, the thinking of the origin of the tangible world. From this perspective, philosophy is nothing more than a continuation of the intention to explain the world with rational reasons. The Logos is nothing more than a continuation of the myth with the intention of explaining and opening up the world. The main difference lies in religious belief, which eludes philosophical explanation. Because of its religious function, myth must not be misunderstood in a rationalizing way. “Faith 'is' really only right because of its special relationship to something ultimate and unconditional. Whether this particular relationship is characterized in detail as reverence, trust, humility, devotion, feeling of dependence or in some other way - the decisive factor in it remains the peculiar kind of certainty value which it gives to the object of faith. This certainty value differs and distinguishes faith from any other kind of 'validity'. "(Päd 170-171)

The concern with the myth also served Hönigswald to show that there are different forms of validity for the human spirit, not only in philosophy and religion, but also in other areas of culture such as art. "Caused by the question of the epistemological content of the cosmogonies, the basic constitution of the mind itself becomes a problem for H."

religion

For Hönigswald, people experience the identity of meaning and existence by believing in the existence of God. The possibility of faith is based on the very existence of God.

“God is not because I believe in him, but I believe in him because he is. But the meaning of his belief is reflected in this "being" of his. [...] The divine being appears unconditionally as the fulfillment of these requirements. God's immediacy reveals the faithful meaning of all that is conditioned and that of all that conditions. I think God in the sense of faith, in that I know myself 'set' by God. "(GE 147)

And this is how God differs from everything else in the world. “Its 'absoluteness' means that every Monas in its necessary cultural reference as a value appears at all times capable of knowing its dependence on God. And 'dependency' in this context again means the possibility of an understanding with a unique 'you', that is, a form of understanding that is unique in this regard. "(GE 148)

Fonts

Selected bibliography

  • Contributions to epistemology and methodology. Leipzig 1906.
  • On the theory and system of science. With special consideration for Heinrich Rickert's 'Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft'. In: Kant studies. 17/1912, pp. 28-84.
  • To the argument about the basics of mathematics. Heidelberg 1912.
  • Questions of principle in thought psychology. In: Kant studies. 18/1913.
  • Studies on the theory of basic pedagogical concepts. A critical investigation. Munich 1913 (ND: Darmstadt 1966).
  • The skepticism in philosophy and science. Goettingen 1914.
  • The philosophy of antiquity. 2nd Edition. Leipzig 1924.
  • About the basics of pedagogy. 2. reworked. Edition. 1927.
  • The basics of thought psychology. 2. reworked. Edition. Leipzig / Berlin 1925 (ND: Darmstadt 1965).
  • The philosophy of the Renaissance to Kant. Berlin / Leipzig 1923.
  • Hobbes and the philosophy of the state. Munich 1924 (ND: Darmstadt 1971).
  • From the problem of the idea. In: Logos. XV / 1926.
  • GW Leibniz. Tübingen 1928.
  • Spinoza. A contribution to the question of its problem-historical position. In: German quarterly for literary studies and intellectual history. 6, pp. 447-491 (1928).
  • Causality and physics. 1931. (Report of the meeting of the Prussian Academy of Sciences published by Max von Laue )
  • Basic questions of epistemology. Tübingen 1931, Hamburg 1997.
  • Self-presentation. In: H. Schwarz (ed.): German systematic philosophy according to their designers. Volume 1, Berlin 1931. (purely philosophical, without autobiographical elements)
  • History of epistemology. Berlin 1933. (ND: Darmstadt 1966)
  • Philosophy and language. Problem criticism and system. Basel 1937. (ND: Darmstadt 1970)
  • Thinker of the Italian Renaissance. Shape and problems. Basel 1938.

New editions

  • Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (Ed.): Basic questions of epistemology. Meiner, Hamburg 1997, ISBN 3-7873-1349-4 . (contains the self-presentation on pp. 205–243)
  • Christian Benne, Thomas Schirren (ed.): The skepticism in philosophy and science. Edition Ruprecht, Göttingen 2008, ISBN 978-3-7675-3056-0 .

From the estate

(Publications of the Hönigswald Archive)
  • G. Wolandt (Hrsg.): On the epistemological content of old creation stories. Stuttgart 1957.
  • G. Wolandt (Ed.): Analyzes and Problems. Treatises on philosophy and its history. Stuttgart 1959.
  • K. Bärthlein (Ed.): Abstraction and Analysis. A contribution to the problem history of the universal dispute in the philosophy of the Middle Ages. Stuttgart 1961.
  • G. Wolandt (Ed.): Science and Art. A chapter from their theories. Stuttgart 1961.
  • G. Wolandt, H. Schmitt (ed.): Basic problems of science. Bonn 1965.
  • G. Schaper, G. Wolandt (ed.): Philosophy and culture. Bonn 1967.
  • H. Oberer (Ed.): The basics of general methodology. I / II, Bonn 1969/70.
  • E. Winterhager (Ed.): The systematic of philosophy developed from individual problem design. I / II, Bonn 1976/77.

literature

  • Reinhold Breil: Hönigswald and Kant. Transcendental philosophical studies on the ultimate justification and constitution of the subject . Bouvier, Bonn 1991, ISBN 3-416-02292-0 .
  • Roswitha Grassl: The young Richard Hönigswald: A biographically founded contextualization with historical intent . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1998, ISBN 3-8260-1489-8 .
  • Roswitha Grassl, Peter Richart-Wiles: Thinkers in his time. A glossary of people on Richard Hönigwald's environment . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1997, ISBN 3-8260-1275-5 .
  • Henry M. Hoenigswald: On the life and work of Richard Hönigswald. In: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (Ed.): Recognize - Monas - Language. International Richard Hönigswald Symposium Kassel 1995. Würzburg 1997, ISBN 3-8260-1311-5 , pp. 425-436.
  • Utz Maas : Persecution and emigration of German-speaking linguists 1933-1945. Entry on Richard Hönigswald (accessed: April 13, 2018)
  • Ernst Wolfgang Orth , Dariusz Aleksandrowicz (Ed.): Studies on Richard Hönigwald's philosophy . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1996, ISBN 3-8260-1155-4 . (1st Hönigswaldsymposium, Wrocław 1992)
  • Wolfgang Otto (Ed.): From the loneliness: Letters of a friendship; Richard Honigswald to Ernst Lohmeyer . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1999, ISBN 3-8260-1640-8 .
  • Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik : Richard Hönigswalds Philosophy of Education , Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1995, ISBN 3-8260-1141-4 .
  • Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (Ed.): Recognize - Monas - Language. International Richard Hönigswald Symposium Kassel 1995. Würzburg 1997, ISBN 3-8260-1311-5 . ( Content ; PDF; 324 kB)
  • Bernhard Josef Stalla:  Hönigwald, Richard. In: Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon (BBKL). Volume 27, Bautz, Nordhausen 2007, ISBN 978-3-88309-393-2 , Sp. 668-674.  ( Article / beginning of article in Internet archive )
  • Gerd Wolandt:  Hönigswald, Richard. In: New German Biography (NDB). Volume 9, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1972, ISBN 3-428-00190-7 , p. 345 f. ( Digitized version ).
  • Gerd Wolandt: Objectivity and structure. Investigations on the principle theory of Richard Hönigswald with special consideration for the problem of monadology. Cologne University Publishing House, Cologne 1964.
  • Gerd Wolandt: R. Hönigswald: Philosophy as the theory of determinacy. In: Josef Speck (ed.): Basic problems of the great philosophers. (Philosophy of the Present II). 3. Edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (UTB), Göttingen 1991, ISBN 3-525-03304-4 , pp. 43-101.
  • Nicolaj Zarewskij: Consciousness and Time: A transcendental psychological attempt in connection with Richard Hönigswald's "Thinking Psychology". Jena book printing workshop 1931. Univ. Jena, Philos. Fak., Diss., 1931.
  • Kurt Walter Zeidler: Critical Dialectics and Transcendentalontology. The outcome of Neo-Kantianism and the post-Neo-Kantian systematics by R. Hönigswald, W. Cramers, B. Bauchs, H. Wagners, R. Reinigers and E. Heintels. Bouvier, Bonn 1995, ISBN 3-416-02518-0 , pp. 75-138.
  • Christian Swertz, Norbert Meder, Stephan Nachtsheim, Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, Kurt Walter Zeidler (eds.): Homecoming of the logo. Contributions on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the death of Richard Hönigswald on June 11, 1947 . Janus, Cologne 2019, ISBN 978-3-938076-42-2 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ The biographical information is contained in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik: Richard Hönigswalds Philosophie der Pädagogik. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1995, pp. 203-205, and Roswitha Grassl: Introduction. In: Roswitha Grassl, Peter Richart-Wiles: Thinker in his time. A glossary of people on Richard Hönigwald's environment. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1997, pp. 1-3.
  2. ↑ Archive for Systematic Philosophy. Richard Hönigswald
  3. ↑ Gerd Wolandt: Hönigswald, Richard. German biography.
  4. ^ Roswitha Grassl: The young Richard Hönigswald: A biographically founded contextualization with historical intent. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1998, ISBN 3-8260-1489-8 , p. 37.
  5. ↑ Hönigswald received his doctorate on March 22, 1902 in Vienna with the evaluation valde laudabile, awarding the diploma of a doctor of all medicine
  6. ^ Andreas Köhn: The New Testament scholar Ernst Lohmeyer: Studies on biography and theology. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2004, ISBN 3-16-148376-6 , pp. 25-29.
  7. ↑ How the philosopher Hoenigswald had to leave Germany in 1939. schrimpf.com
  8. ↑ quoted from Reinhold Aschenberg: Ent-Subjectivierung des Menschen: Lager and Shoah in philosophical reflection. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, p. 121 f., Who inserted the structural numbers and refers to the quote from Claudia Schorcht: Philosophy at the Bavarian Universities 1933–1945 , Harald Fischer, Erlangen 1990, p. 161, where the text refers is shown without outline numbers and a final greeting. Schorcht names the source: HStA, MK, 43772, Heidegger on June 25, 1933; Aschenberg's underlining has been omitted here.
  9. ↑ See Martin Heidegger. Complete edition , Volume 16. Speeches and other testimonies to a life path. Edited by Hermann Heidegger. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2000, p. 132.
  10. ↑ Reinhold Aschenberg: Ent-Subjectivierung des Menschen: Camp and Shoah in philosophical reflection. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, p. 122.
  11. ↑ The argument with Ernst Cassirer during the Davos Disputation is famous , see z. B. Matthias Flatscher: The modern age as the root of the present. Different evaluations of the epoch by Cassirer and Heidegger. ( Memento of the original from March 7, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 166 kB), for a direct discussion of the content between Hönigswald and Heidegger see also: Tom Rockmore: Philosophy or Weltanschauung. About Heidegger's statement on Hönigswald, in: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (Ed.): Recognize - Monas - Language. International Richard Hönigswald Symposium Kassel 1995. Würzburg 1997, pp. 171-182. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / sammelpunkt.philo.at
  12. ↑ Five weeks are sometimes mentioned. Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik ( introduction to: Basic questions of epistemology. Meiner, Hamburg 1997) mentions the specific date of discharge on December 1, 1938
  13. ↑ Heidelberg Manuscripts 3717, 56 (Hönigswald to A. Grisebach, January 31, 1947)
  14. ↑ Overview representations can be found in Hans-Ludwig Ollig: Der Neukantianismus. Metzler, Stuttgart 1979, pp. 88-94, Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik: Introduction. In: Richard Hönigswald: Basic questions of epistemology. Meiner, Hamburg 1997, VII-LVI and Gerd Wolandt: R. Hönigswald: Philosophy as Theory of Determination. In: Josef Speck (ed.): Basic problems of the great philosophers. (Philosophy of the Present II). 3. Edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (UTB), Göttingen 1991, pp. 43-101.
  15. ↑ GE = basic questions of epistemology.
  16. ^ Martin Heidegger: Waymarks. Klostermann, Frankfurt 2004, Volume 9 of the Heidegger Complete Edition
  17. ↑ Hönigswald refers to Heidegger's sentence: "Das nothing nichtet", Heidegger-GA 9, p. 114; see. on this also the criticism of Rudolf Carnap in: Overcoming Metaphysics by Logical Analysis of Language. in knowledge 2, 1932, pp. 219–241, printed in: Rudolf Carnap: Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie and other writings critical of metaphysics. Meiner, Hamburg 2004, pp. 81-109.
  18. ↑ Richard Hönigswald: History of the theory of knowledge. 1933, p. 167f, quoted from: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik: Introduction. In: Richard Hönigswald: Basic questions of epistemology. Meiner, Hamburg 1997, pp. VII – LVI, here XXVIII – XXIX.
  19. ↑ Richard Hönigswald: Self-Presentation. In: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (ed.): Basic questions of the theory of knowledge. Meiner, Hamburg 1997, pp. 205-243, here 212-221.
  20. ↑ Norbert Meder: The validity problem with Hönigswald. In: Andreas Dörpinghaus, Karl Helmer (Ed.): Rhetoric, argumentation, validity. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, pp. 85-102, 88.
  21. ^ Päd = Richard Hönigswald: About the basics of pedagogy. A contribution to the pedagogy of university teaching. 2nd Edition. Munich 1927.
  22. ↑ Richard Hönigswald: Introduction to Scientific Philosophy, lecture postscript by Hans-Georg Gadamer 3, quoted in Jean Grondin : The young Gadamer and Hönigswald. In: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (Ed.): Recognize - Monas - Language. International Richard Hönigswald Symposium Kassel 1995. Würzburg 1997, pp. 159-170, 165.
  23. ↑ Gerd Wolandt: R. Hönigswald: Philosophy as theory of determinacy. In: Josef Speck (ed.): Basic problems of the great philosophers. (Philosophy of the Present II). 3. Edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (UTB), Göttingen 1991, pp. 43-101, 92.
  24. ↑ Richard Hönigswald: From the philosophical problem of religious belief. In: Journal for Religious Psychology. 5 (1932), pp. 49-63, 56.
  25. ^ Richard Hönigswald: On the problem of rhythm. Leipzig / Berlin 1926, p. 83.
  26. ^ Richard Hönigswald: Philosophy and Language. Problem criticism and system. Basel 1937, p. 59, quoted from: Reinhold Breil: Hönigswalds Organism Concept. In: Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik (Ed.): Recognize - Monas - Language. International Richard Hönigswald Symposium Kassel 1995. Würzburg 1997, pp. 211-224, 217.
  27. ↑ Christian Bermes: Philosophy of meaning: meaning as determination and determinability: a study on Frege, Husserl, Cassirer and Hönigswald. Königshausen & Neumann, 1997, p. 182.
  28. ^ Richard Hönigswald: Philosophy and Language. Problem criticism and system. Basel 1937 (ND: Darmstadt 1970), p. 30.
  29. ^ Richard Hönigswald: Philosophy and Language. Problem criticism and system. Basel 1937 (ND: Darmstadt 1970), p. 81.
  30. ↑ Richard Hönigswald: The basics of thought psychology. 2nd Edition. Leipzig / Berlin 1925 (ND: Darmstadt 1965), p. 37.
  31. ^ Richard Hönigswald: Philosophy and Language. Problem criticism and system. Basel 1937 (ND: Darmstadt 1970), p. 83.
  32. ^ Richard Hönigswald: Philosophy and Language. Problem criticism and system. Basel 1937 (ND: Darmstadt 1970), p. 414.
  33. ^ Richard Hönigswald: Philosophy and Language. Problem criticism and system. Basel 1937 (ND: Darmstadt 1970), p. 127.
  34. ↑ Richard Hönigswald: From the problem of education. In: Pedagogical Control. Journal for Education, Teacher Training and School Policy. 38 (1931), pp. 727-733, 729.
  35. ↑ Richard Hönigswald: From the problem of education. In: Pedagogical Control. Journal for Education, Teacher Training and School Policy. 38 (1931), pp. 727-733, 730.
  36. ^ Richard Hönigswald: Abstraction and Analysis. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1961 [Manuscript: New York 1946, posthumously ed. by Karl Bärtlein and Gerd Wolandt], p. 13.
  37. ↑ Gerd Woland: Problem history, myth of the creation of the world and belief in Richard Hönigswald's philosophy. In: Journal for Philosophical Research. 12, (2/1958), pp. 188-217, 193.
  38. ↑ Gerd Woland: Problem history, myth of the creation of the world and belief in RichardbHönigswald's philosophy. In: Journal for Philosophical Research. 12, (2/1958), pp. 188-217, 215.
  39. ↑ Gerd Woland: Problem history, myth of the creation of the world and belief in RichardbHönigswald's philosophy. In: Journal for Philosophical Research. 12, (2/1958), pp. 188-217, final sentence of the article
  40. ↑ The author was not least interested in "putting Italy's outstanding contribution to the unique work of the philosophical renaissance in the right light". With his writing, which is the result of decades of historical and systematic preoccupation with the problems of the philosophical renaissance, the then 1938 much controversial concepts of humanism and renaissance. "a fixed content" can be given. See the foreword and footnote 1 there with the most important works by RH in this context.
personal data
SURNAME Hönigswald, Richard
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German-American philosopher
DATE OF BIRTH July 18, 1875
PLACE OF BIRTH Magyaróvár
DATE OF DEATH June 11, 1947
Place of death New Haven (Connecticut)