Disengagement plan
Israel's unilateral disengagement plan, also known as the "Sharon Plan," was a proposal by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2004 that included the withdrawal from some of the areas occupied by Israel since the Six Day War and the dismantling of some Israeli settlements while maintaining others on a permanent basis should be. The plan was implemented in 2005. The idea was further developed by his successor in office Ehud Olmert in the so-called convergence plan .
Outlines of the plan
In the Gaza Strip , all 21 settlements were evacuated according to Ariel Sharon’s plan:
- The sixteen settlements of Gush Katif in the south-western Gaza Strip: Bedolach , Bnei Atzmon, Gadid, Gan Or, Ganei Tal , Katif , Kerem Atzmona, Kfar Jam, Morag, Netzer Hazani, Newe Dekalim , Pe'at Sade, Rafiach Jam, Schirat HaJam, Selaw and Tel Katifa.
- The settlements of Kfar Darom and Netzarim in the central Gaza Strip
- In the northern Gaza Strip on the border with the Israeli heartland the settlements: Dugit , Elei Sinai and Nisanit . In the first draft of the plan, these settlements should initially remain.
In the northern West Bank , the settlements of Chomesh, Ganim, Kadim, and Sa Nur have been dismantled.
To this end, the six largest settlements in the West Bank, Ariel , Givʿat Seev , Gush Etzion with Efrat , Kirjat Arba , Ma'ale Adummim and the settlements in Hebron, were to be permanently retained and the barrier to the West Bank expanded. The vast majority of the approximately 220,000 Israelis in the West Bank live in these six settlements.
Ariel Sharon presented the plan on February 3, 2004, while Yasser Arafat was still alive . In his view, political negotiations or a peaceful solution with the Palestinian side were no longer possible. Ariel Sharon wanted to evacuate settlements that would be unsustainable with a final solution. The plan should improve Israel's security, enable a unilateral solution to the Middle East conflict and prepare a separation between Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinians, on the other hand, believe that the plan must be legitimized by international agreements and are demanding a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories.
reaction
During a visit by Ariel Sharon to Washington on April 14, 2004, US President George W. Bush endorsed the plan as historic and courageous. "In light of the new realities, including the already existing large Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect a return to the 1949 borders ( Green Line ) from the negotiations on final status ." The demand for secure borders for Israel, the required under the provisions of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 will be taken into account in the plan.
Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen announced on April 15, 2004 that the EU would not recognize unilateral borders. Ireland held the presidency of the Council of the European Union .
On the same day, the German federal government welcomed the plan as an opportunity for peace, since the process has moved again, and as an important step on the way to a two-state solution.
Javier Solana , High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (EU) said on June 10, 2004:
“I welcome the Israeli Prime Minister's proposals for a withdrawal from Gaza. This opens up new opportunities for the implementation of the road map as decided by the UN Security Council. "
The Palestinian leadership rejected the plan on the grounds that Ariel Sharon was also planning to permanently annex the largest Jewish settlements in the West Bank to Israel.
In a fatwa, the Mufti of Ramallah, Sheikh Jamal al-Bawatna, declared that it was against religious law to attack Israeli settlers and soldiers and thus prevent their withdrawal.
The head of the largest Israeli opposition party, the Avoda , Shimon Peres , supported the plan, but on February 6, 2004 pointed out the risk that the Islamist Hamas could take over the Gaza Strip.
Political preparation in Israel
After Ariel Sharon failed to get public support from all of his key ministers, he had to agree to a referendum within his party (the Likud ). The referendum, which was held on May 2, 2004, ended with 56% no votes - i.e. a rejection of his plan. This came as a surprise as most pre-referendum polls suggested around 55% approval.
Most commentators saw the rejection of the “Sharon Plan” as a hard blow to Ariel Sharon. He said he would accept the vote and reconsider his steps. He instructed Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz to draft an amended plan that could be accepted by Likud voters. According to polls, almost 60% of the Israeli population voted for the plan.
150,000 people came to a demonstration in Tel Aviv for a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. According to polls, 71 percent of Israelis are in favor of the withdrawal.
On June 6, 2004, the cabinet approved the amended decoupling plan, albeit with the restriction that each withdrawal from the various settlements should be voted on individually. The plan was approved by a 14-7 majority after National Union ministers Avigdor Lieberman and Benjamin Elon were sacked and a compromise was reached by Likud cabinet member Tzipi Livni . The compromise provided for another, then final, vote in March. The preparations for the implementation of the plan should start now.
As a result of the adoption in principle of the plan, two Mafdal ministers (Effie Eitam and Jitzhak Levy) resigned, causing the government to lose its majority in the Knesset . Despite these conditions, the Mafdal was initially divided on the question of whether to leave the government completely, or to remain in it, in opposition to the plans and to prevent a secular government made up of Likud, Labor and Shinui .
After the plan was approved, there were massive terrorist attacks on the Erez crossing and the Erez industrial zone. As a result, it was decided to close the Erez industrial zone and relocate the factories that still existed there to other locations such as Ashkalon , Dimona , Jerocham or Sderot . Many factories had been closed in advance.
On July 25, 2004, a human chain of around 130,000 people protested at a rally against the unilateral disengagement plan and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The demonstrators formed a human chain from Nisanit (later moved to the Erez crossing due to security concerns) to the Western Wall in Jerusalem (approx. 90 km).
On September 14, 2004, the Israeli cabinet approved by nine to one ( Zvulon Orlev of the Mafdal) plans to regulate the compensation of those settlers who have to leave the Gaza Strip.
A poll of September 15, 2004 in the Maariw newspaper showed the following opinions:
- 69% support a general referendum to decide on the plan. Only 26% think the Knesset's approval is sufficient.
- If there were to be a referendum, polls show that 58% would vote for and 29% against the unilateral disengagement plan.
On the evening of October 26, 2004, the Israeli parliament adopted the disengagement plan with a majority of 67 in favor, 45 against and seven abstentions. The plan was supported by the Avoda under Shimon Peres ; most of the Arab MPs abstained. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon sacked the Minister without Portfolio Uzi Landau and Deputy Minister for Security Michael Ratzon , who had voted against the plan , on the same evening . Sharon could count on the votes of the opposition on this issue, whereas he had to contend with resistance from his own Likud party.
Benjamin Netanyahu and three other ministers ( Limor Livnat , Danni Naveh and Israel Katz ) gave Sharon a 14-day ultimatum for a referendum after the plan was approved . Otherwise, they would no longer belong to the cabinet. On November 9, 2004, Finance Minister Netanyahu withdrew his threat to resign because the death of Yasser Arafat created a situation in which he had decided to remain in government. The other Likud ministers also followed Netanyahu's decision. Meanwhile, at the turn of the year 2004/2005, the Shinui left and the Labor Party entered the government. The Labor Party wanted to support the Sharon Plan.
Even after the death of Yasser Arafat on November 11, 2004, the Palestinian leadership was not prepared to cooperate with the Israelis in implementing the plan. She welcomed the plan as a step in the right direction, but at the same time called for a list of additional areas from which Israel will withdraw.
On February 17, 2005, the Knesset voted in the third reading with 59 votes (40 against, 5 abstentions) for a law that regulates, among other things, financial compensation for the settlers. These are made dependent on the age and the years they have lived in the current location. In addition, the law is intended to regulate the dismantling of the settlements - it makes staying in the houses after the deadline a punishable offense; in addition, entering the areas after the evacuation has ended is prohibited. From Sharon's own party, only 18 out of 35 MPs voted for the law. An annex to the law to hold a referendum on it was rejected with a majority of 72 votes. This was seen as a success of Sharon.
On March 28, 2005, the Knesset rejected a bill by Ministers Benjamin Netanyahu, Limor Liwnat and Silvan Schalom (all Likud) for a constitution on a referendum on the decoupling plan with 72 to 39 votes.
In March 2005, the UN human rights commissioner for the Palestinian territories explicitly praised Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s disengagement plan: "This is an encouraging step on the part of the Israeli government, a decision that divides Israel."
Political Consequences
The fact that Sharon implemented this plan cost him a lot of support from his right-wing mainstream voters, but on the other hand brought him approval from the left-wing electorate. Ultimately, many Israelis from both political directions are skeptical of his plans to withdraw beyond Gaza and northern Samaria. It was believed that he had a majority in the government but not in his own party, so a government of national unity became more and more urgent.
Discussion in Israel
Sharon tried to present the plan in the internal Israeli debate as an antithesis of the Oslo process , which he had always viewed as a fundamental flaw. In the direction of his Likud party friends, he said that it was always better to withdraw unilaterally than to compromise with people who had never kept to agreements anyway. He also referred to the external political effect, namely that, thanks to the disengagement plan, the US had recognized that the return of Palestinian refugees was impossible and allowed Israel to keep settlements outside the Green Line , at least generally . Shimon Peres, however, wanted the disengagement plan to be understood as a continuation of the Oslo process. He claimed the truth was that it was not carried out unilaterally. Peres went on to say that as Prime Minister he had tackled things differently, but recognized the fact that he would never have enjoyed the popular support that Sharon had. Both the left-wing Meretz around Jossi Beilin and the right-wing National Union around Benny Elon criticized the unilateral nature of the disengagement plan. Beilin said that cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) would have strengthened Mahmoud Abbas and thus the moderate forces of the Palestinians, which would ultimately also have benefited Israel. Elon says the disengagement plan is worse than Oslo because it does not oblige the PA to do anything. The Oslo process was at least over when the PA showed its true colors.
implementation
On Monday, August 15, 2005, the Israeli army began to distribute eviction orders. Many Israeli residents had moved before. The remaining residents had until August 17th to clear their houses. Some families moved to the Nitzan settlement near Ashkelon, which was designed for 320 families, or to other temporary accommodations. The houses of the settlements were demolished.
Keshev on reporting by Israeli media
In a report published in 2006, the Israeli NGO Keshev concluded that the Israeli media had systematically overemphasized the danger of civil war between Israeli forces and settlers in the areas affected by the withdrawal:
“[...] throughout the weeks before the disengagement, and during the evacuation itself, the Israeli media repeatedly warned of potential violent confrontation between settlers and security forces. These scenarios, which never materialized, took over the headlines. "
“[…] During the weeks before the withdrawal and during the evacuation itself, the Israeli media repeatedly warned of possible violent clashes between settlers and security forces. These scenarios, which never materialized, made the headlines. "
According to Keshev's research, articles that put potential dangers into perspective were referenced in print media to the back of the page and often presented under ambiguous headings. On the other hand, alarming headlines like “The Police Declares High Alert Starting Tomorrow, Almost Like a State of War” dominated ( Channel 1 - General News August 14, 2005). The report goes on to say:
“In all areas of the withdrawal there is a discrepancy between the image reflected by the media and the relatively calm reality [...] Information about the voluntary disarmament of settlers in the Gaza Strip was withheld; Numbers of protesters invading Gaza ahead of the evacuation have been exaggerated; Protests by the settlers were placed under false pretenses [...] and the coordinated cooperation between Israeli security forces and settlers was played down. "
In the opinion of the organization, all of this created an unjustifiably radicalized image of the settlers in public, which was not confirmed by their non-violent withdrawal.
Shefar'am terrorist attack
On August 4, 2005, the Jewish Israeli Eden Natan-Zada carried out an assassination attempt on four Arab Israelis in Shefar'am . 24 other people were also injured. In a letter, Natan-Zada had disclosed his motives and stated that he wanted to protest against the expulsion of the Jews.
Web links
- The decoupling plan on the website of the Israeli embassy in Germany. Retrieved August 23, 2016.
- Shlomo Avineri: Ariel Sharon follows De Gaulle's footsteps In: Die Welt . October 28, 2004. Retrieved June 17, 2011.
- Daphna Baram: Disengagement and Ethnic Cleansing . In: The Guardian . August 16, 2005. Retrieved June 17, 2011.
- Jonathan Steele: The Settlers' Retreat Was the Theater of the Cynical . In: The Guardian. August 19, 2005. Retrieved June 17, 2011.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. April 14, 2004, p. 5.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. February 3, 2004, p. 6.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. February 3, 2004, p. 6.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. April 15, 2004, p. 10.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. April 16, 2004, p. 1.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. April 16, 2004, p. 1.
- ^ Knesset for the Gaza Withdrawal Plan. Sharon's plan accepted. ( Memento from December 4, 2011 in the web archive archive.today ) at: politik.de , October 27, 2004.
- ↑ Palestinian religious leader bans attacks that might delay pullout . In: Ha'aretz . August 9, 2005.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. 7th / 8th February 2004, p. 6.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. May 17, 2004, p. 7.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. June 7, 2004, p. 7 and June 8, 2004, p. 4.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. July 26, 2004, p. 7.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. October 28, 2004, p. 1.
- ↑ Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. October 27, 2004, p. 5.
- ↑ a b Keshev Report: Disconnected - The Israeli Media's Coverage of the Gaza Disengagement. ( Memento of November 4, 2011 in the web archive archive.today ) at: keshev.org.il , January 2006.
- ^ Disconnected - The Israeli Media's Coverage of the Gaza Disengagement ( Memento of July 21, 2011 in the Internet Archive ), p. 8.
- ↑ 'I will not expel Jews' Ynet News , August 5th of 2005.