Sea battle at Abukir

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Sea battle at Abukir
Part of: Napoléon's Egyptian Expedition
Abukir, painting by Thomas Luny
Abukir, painting by Thomas Luny
date 1st / 2nd August 1798
place Off the coast of Abukir , Egypt
output English victory
Parties to the conflict

FranceFrance (national flag of the sea) France

Great BritainKingdom of Great Britain (Sea War Flag) Great Britain

Commander

FranceFrance (national flag of the sea) François d'Aigalliers

Great BritainKingdom of Great Britain (Sea War Flag) Horatio Nelson

Troop strength
13 ships of the line
4 frigates
14 ships of the line and one brig
losses

over 5000 dead,
2 ships of the line and
2 frigates sunk,
9 ships of the line captured

208 dead
677 wounded

The sea ​​battle at Abukir ( English Battle of the Nile ) was one of the decisive battles during the coalition wars . It took place on August 1 and 2, 1798 off the coast of Abukir , an Egyptian port city about 15 kilometers northeast of Alexandria . A British navy under the command of Admiral Nelson defeated the French Mediterranean fleet that had previously brought Napoleon's expeditionary army to Egypt .

With this victory, the British secured their naval supremacy in the Mediterranean , which had apparently been lost in the course of the 1790s.

prehistory

Strategic situation in Great Britain since the beginning of the coalition war

After the execution of King Louis XVI. In 1793 numerous monarchies in Europe , including Great Britain , Spain , Portugal and most of the German and Italian states, had declared war on France. The high morale of the revolutionary troops and the strategic skill of the young general Napoleon ensured lasting military success for the French.

In 1795 the Netherlands was occupied by the French army. Prussia and Spain signed a peace treaty with France in the same year . Under French pressure, Spain even declared war on Great Britain in August 1796. This meant that the Spanish ports on the Atlantic coast and in the Mediterranean were no longer accessible to the Royal Navy . In 1797, after several defeats, Austria had to conclude the Campo Formio peace with France. In 1798 Great Britain was the only influential European country still at war with the French Republic. His allies included Portugal, the largely insignificant Kingdom of Naples-Sicily and the island of Malta .

Great Britain had withdrawn its warships from the Mediterranean as early as October 1796 , as the British government increasingly feared a direct attack on France. To protect against a possible French invasion of the British Isles, part of the Royal Navy patrolled the English Channel . Another part crossed in front of the French naval bases Brest and Rochefort and in front of the Spanish Cádiz in order to be able to intercept a departing French fleet in time. The remaining ships in the Royal Navy protected either the colony ports overseas or the merchant fleets. After British warships had been present in the Mediterranean area without interruption from the middle of the 17th century, Great Britain had no naval bases in the Mediterranean area except for Gibraltar from 1796 .

The decision for the Egyptian expedition

The French Directory - as feared by the British government - had actually considered an invasion of Britain and Ireland. In February 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte inspected the French ports on the Atlantic coast in preparation for this invasion. However, after just a fortnight, he came to the conclusion that there were too many factors against such an invasion and refused to carry it out. Instead, Napoleon proposed to the Board, Egypt to occupy and the Ottoman rule in Egypt to end. After initial hesitation, the board of directors agreed to this plan, as there was much to be said for it: Although Egypt was ruled by an Ottoman governor, Egypt had no Turkish garrisons. Military resistance was only expected from around 10,000 Mamelukes . Their military strength lay in the cavalry , which had hardly any military significance compared to an army equipped with artillery. France would therefore be able to raise sufficient troops for this expedition without permanently weakening its military presence in Europe. A success in Egypt also offered wide-ranging opportunities. From Egypt, further campaigns both within Africa and to Asia were conceivable. Campaigns to India would interrupt the trade with the Mughal Empire , which is important for Great Britain , and thus possibly endanger Great Britain's continued existence as a great power.

The French preparations

Napoleon Bonaparte was aware that the success of the Egyptian expedition depended in part on the British government remaining in the dark about these invasion plans for as long as possible. The ongoing preparations for an invasion of the British Isles ensured that the vast majority of British warships cruised far from the Mediterranean.

The preparations for the Egyptian expedition, which were organized by Napoleon's chief of staff , Louis Berthier , were spread over Toulon , Marseille , Genoa , Corsica and Civitavecchia in order to keep them secret for as long as possible. Toulon acted as the home port for the French Mediterranean fleet, which was supposed to protect the transport of the French expeditionary army. Merchant ships were no longer allowed to leave Toulon and the surrounding ports and were confiscated. After a short time enough transport ships were ready to move the expedition army, which consisted of 28,200 infantry , engineers and gunners as well as 2,800 cavalry, 1,230 horses with 60 field guns and 40 siege guns . This transport was accompanied by 13 ships of the line , four frigates and some gunboats under the command of François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers .

On May 20th, the first part of the expeditionary army left the port of Toulon. On May 21st, a fleet of 72 ships from Genoa joined them. On May 28, another 22 ships that had left Corsica joined them. The last sub-fleet of another 56 ships that set sail from Civitavecchia met the remaining ships on May 30th. The convoy from Civitavecchia did not join the association, however, but sailed on a parallel course towards Sicily and reached Malta on June 6, 1798, three days before the rest of the convoy.

Admiral Nelson's search for the French fleet

The information desk from Admiral Nelson and the British Government

The British government now knew that French troops were gathering near Toulon, Marseille and Genoa and that a large fleet was being made available for their transport. The goal of these renewed French war efforts was not clear to her until mid-April: A planned attack on the Kingdom of Naples , Sicily or Portugal was suspected , but an attack on Ireland was not ruled out. The order Admiral Nelson received from the British Admiralty listed these four possible targets and read:

You and your squadron have to determine in every possible way what the strong forces […] in Toulon, Marseille and Genoa are intended for. "

Nelson was expressly allowed to pursue the French fleet throughout the Mediterranean and into the Black Sea , should this prove to be their goal.

Since April, British government circles have increasingly considered Egypt as a target for the French expeditionary army. Messages delivered by ship and by messenger took several weeks from London before they reached Gibraltar. Before these considerations could reach Admiral Nelson, he had already left his home port of Gibraltar on May 9th .

British fleet reunification

On May 20, Admiral Nelson and the fleet he commanded were 70 nautical miles south of Toulon and thus in an ideal position to intercept the French convoy, which was leaving for an unknown destination. However, on May 21, the British squadron was caught in a severe storm that drove the ships far from their position towards the rocky coasts of Corsica and Sardinia. In particular, the flagship HMS Vanguard was badly damaged during this storm and the rest of the squadron was dispersed as a result of the storm.

Horatio Nelson, painting by
Lemuel Francis Abbott in 1799

After repairing his flagship, Admiral Nelson decided to return to his starting position off Toulon. In an order given in advance, he had stipulated that ships that had lost connection with the rest of the fleet should cross south of Toulon at about the 42nd parallel. If they do not meet the HMS Vanguard within ten days during this maneuver , the ships should return to Gibraltar. In fact, Admiral Nelson succeeded in reuniting most of his squadron off the coast of Toulon by June 7th, including meeting the ships that his superior, Earl St. Vincent , had sent him to reinforce. Only the three frigates that had accompanied him up to the storm did not meet with the rest of the squadron.

Stop in Naples

Admiral Nelson had known since the beginning of June that the French convoy had left Toulon on May 20th. He suspected that the French convoy had entered Genoa next to join the other parts of the fleet. According to this assumption, he let the British fleet set course for the north Italian coast. On June 13, he learned from an intercepted Tunisian warship that the French fleet had been seen south of the tip of Sicily. She sailed east. Nelson thought Portugal and Ireland as possible targets for the French expeditionary army were unlikely and decided to sail to Naples with his fleet. There were several reasons for this decision. William Hamilton served as British ambassador to the Neapolitan court for 34 years and had extensive contacts. He may already have known of further sightings of the French fleet. The Kingdom of Naples-Sicily was one of the few European countries that continued to oppose France. Sir John Acton , the Prime Minister of this kingdom, had a British father and was pro-British. Nelson therefore hoped that he would get new provisions for his ships in the port of Naples.

British diplomat William Hamilton

The British fleet reached Naples on June 17th and anchored far outside the port. Nelson expected to meet parts of the French fleet and therefore did not leave his flagship. Thomas Troubridge, one of his officers, sailed into port in his place on board the little Mutine, where William Hamilton had already been waiting for him. From him he learned that the French fleet was on its way to Malta . It is uncertain to what extent William Hamilton informed Thomas Troubridge about a conversation between the French ambassador and John Acton. In this conversation the French ambassador had mentioned that the French fleet would sail on from there to Egypt. William Hamilton heard about it from John Acton and reported about it in his letters to the British Government. Based on the letters and logbooks, it is certain that Nelson did not know about this conversation until around July 12th. The naval historian Brian Lavery suspects in his detailed analysis of the naval battle of Abukir that William Hamilton was convinced that the conversation was a deliberate French disinformation and mentioned this information to Thomas Troubridge so casually and as so unreliable that he Nelson did not inform Nelson of this until July 12th.

In London, on the other hand, they were now certain that the French fleet was on its way to Egypt. The scientists who took part in the Egyptian expedition at the invitation of Napoleon had turned out to be the leak that revealed the destination of the French fleet. For example, the mineralogist Déodat Gratet de Dolomieu wrote to the Göttingen scientist Jean-André Deluc that books on Egypt, Persia and India were being collected for the expedition. He also informed him that the aim of the expedition was to interrupt trade between India and Britain. Deluc was not only a professor at the University of Göttingen , but also a member of the court of the British Queen Charlotte . However, the communications capabilities of the 18th century did not allow the British Admiralty to inform Nelson of this.

Opting for Alexandria

On June 18, Admiral Nelson's fleet left Naples to follow the French troops to Malta. Nelson did not know at the time that the first part of the French convoy had already arrived there on June 6th and that Malta had surrendered to the French troops on June 9th without a fight. 3,000 French soldiers remained in Malta as an occupying force when the French convoy left there on June 19.

The Mediterranean - Nelson's challenge was to find out what course the French convoy was taking

Admiral Nelson learned of the defeat of Malta on June 22nd, when the British fleet intercepted a brig that was coming from Ragusa, now Dubrovnik , and was already informed of the fall of Malta. However, the brig's captain stated that Napoleon left Malta on June 16. This misinformation led Nelson to underestimate for the next few weeks how close he was to the French convoy.

From Admiral Nelson’s point of view, it was now completely impossible for the French convoy to head for Portugal or Ireland; Napoleon's fleet was too far east in the Mediterranean for that. Conceivable destinations for a fleet departing from Malta could, however, be Sicily or the Black Sea; Egypt also offered itself as a destination from here. Admiral Nelson was certain that news of an attack by the French on Sicily would have already reached him, had this been the target of the French squadron. After consulting with his commanders, Admiral Nelson decided to search the French fleet off Alexandria.

The wind conditions were favorable for the British fleet. During the next six days, Admiral Nelson sometimes covered up to 150 nautical miles in 24 hours with his fleet. Military historians suspect that the British fleet was only 30 nautical miles from the French fleet on June 22nd and sailed past it the following night. In the log books of the British fleet it is recorded that the masts of four ships were sighted on the horizon, which the observation post of the HMS Leander identified a little later as four frigates. From the HMS Orion , this was little confirmed later. Although some of the British commanders interpreted the discovered four frigates as a clear sign of a large armada sailing nearby, Nelson gave the instruction not to pursue them any further, but to continue sailing towards Alexandria at the greatest possible speed. Nelson's decision, which met with incomprehension among his commanders and is difficult to understand from today's perspective, is probably due to the lack of frigates in Nelson's fleet. Without these fast ships, Nelson was not able to carry out a sufficient reconnaissance.

On June 28, the British fleet reached the port of Alexandria without finding the French fleet there. Thomas Hardy docked the HMS Mutine in port to contact the British consul. However, this had left Alexandria. However, Thomas Hardy met the commander of the Ottoman fortress, who explained to him that he had not yet seen a French fleet and that France was not at war with the Ottoman Empire. In accordance with customary law at the time, the commander of the British fleet allowed itself to be supplied with drinking water. However, he also asked them to leave the port within 24 hours. Admiral Nelson became convinced that he had made a wrong decision. He let his fleet sail on towards Antalya .

Just 25 hours later, the French fleet docked east of Alexandria. A little later, the first French troops entered Egyptian soil.

Search in the Eastern Mediterranean

On July 4th, Admiral Nelson's fleet reached the coast of Antalya and sailed from there towards the southern tip of Crete . On July 20th he had reached Sicily again. From Syracuse , Admiral Nelson sent three letters to his wife, to William Hamilton and to his superior Admiral Lord St. Vincent. The frustration of the unsuccessful search for the French fleet can be heard in all three letters. He wrote to his wife:

I haven't been able to find the French fleet so far, but no one will be able to say that it was due to the lack of attempt. "

He complained to both Hamilton and his superior, Earl St. Vincent, that his fleet lacked frigates that could have served as scout ships because of their speed.

The British fleet left Syracuse on July 24th and intercepted several merchant ships over the next few days. Surveys of the ship's crews gave a more precise picture of the French fleet movements over the past four weeks, and Admiral Nelson was more certain that the French fleet must be somewhere off the coast of Syria - an area that, according to the understanding of the time, also comprised today 's Israel , Palestine and Lebanon , which at that time belonged to the Ottoman Empire. On July 29th, Nelson had his fleet sail again towards Alexandria. Even if the French convoy hadn't landed there, it was very likely that news would have been received in Alexandria as to where the French convoy had headed.

On August 1st the port of Alexandria was reached a second time. As on June 30, there were again no French ships in the harbor, but one guard could see mast tips in an easterly direction from his lookout on the HMS Goliath . A little later his sighting was confirmed by the post on the HMS Zealous .

Starting point of the sea battle

The Abukir Bay

Napoléon Bonaparte, who was now in the interior of Egypt with his army, had given François-Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers the instruction to anchor the French warships near the Egyptian coast. The Marabout Bay, where the French troops landed, had proven to be an unsuitable anchorage for the larger and deeper warships. The port of Alexandria, where most of the transport ships in the French convoy entered, could easily have been blocked by an enemy fleet. Brueys d'Aigalliers therefore decided to anchor his warships in Abukir Bay. He was convinced that an attack by the British fleet - which Brueys d'Aigalliers considered probable - was almost impossible.

Abukir Bay extends in a semicircle over a width of 16 miles, from Cape Abukir to the Rosetta estuary of the Nile . The former village of Abukir was located where the ancient city of Canopus was . The coast here slowly descends into the Mediterranean . Therefore the French fleet had to be anchored three miles to sea. The only natural protection consisted of the small Abukir Island and some rocks and sandbars.

The French fleet was anchored in a line to the coast. Such a setup turned the fleet into an elongated, floating coastal battery that ran from Abukir Island. Brueys considered the strait between Abukir Island and the mainland to be impassable due to insufficient sea maps. He also believed that he would have anchored his ships so close to the coast that warships would not find adequate maneuvering space behind his line.

Ships involved

French people Cannons captain
Le Guerrier 74 Jean-François Trullet
Le Spartiate 74 Maxime-Julien Émeriau de Beauverger
L'Aquilon 74 Antoine René Thévenard †
Le Peuple Souverain 74 Pierre Paul Raccord
Le Franklin 80 Armand Blanquet du Chayla ; Maurice Gillet
L'Orient (flagship) 120 Comte Brueys †; Louis de Casabianca
Le Tonnant 84 Aristide Aubert Dupetit-Thouars
L'Heureux 74 Jean-Pierre Etienne
Le Timoléon 74 Louis-Léonce Trullet
Le Mercure 74 Cambon
Le Guillaume Tell 80 Pierre de Villeneuve ; Captain Saulnier
Le Généreux 74 Louis-Jean-Nicolas Lejoille
La Sérieuse 36 Claude-Jean Martin
L'Artermise 36 Pierre-Jean Standelet
La Justice 40 Villeneuve
Le Conquérant 74 Etienne Dalbarade
La Diane 48 Denis Decrès ; Éléonore-Jean-Nicolas Soleil
British Cannons captain
HMS Goliath 74 Thomas Foley
HMS Zealous 74 Samuel Hood
HMS Orion 74 James Saumarez
HMS Theseus 74 Ralph Willett Miller
HMS Audacious 74 Davidge Gould
HMS Vanguard (flagship) 74 Horatio Nelson ; Edward Berry
HMS Minotaur 74 Thomas Louis
HMS Defense 74 John Strutt Peyton
HMS Majestic 74 George Blagdon Westcott
HMS Leander 50 Charles Thompson
HMS Culloden 74 Thomas Troubridge
HMS Swiftsure 74 Benjamin Hallowell Carew
HMS Mutine 18th Thomas Hardy
HMS Alexander 74 Alexander Ball
HMS Bellerophon 74 Henry Darby

The battle

Foley's decision

Course of battle; the British ships are marked in red, the French in blue

When the L'Heureux sighted the Zealous in the early afternoon of August 1, 1798 , Admiral Brueys d'Aigalliers was not worried - it seemed unlikely that the British fleet would attack that day. However, he had callback signals set for the work details, because half of his crews went ashore every day either to dig wells or to get provisions. Over 4,000 men could no longer reach their ships and had to watch the battle from land.

The British squadron , however, had standing orders that an enemy lying at anchor should not be given any time to prepare. Despite the time of day, the attack began immediately. At 3 p.m. the signal “Ready for battle” was raised. At 5:30 p.m. the British ships coming from the north-west were standing in the keel line abeam of the Abukir Island. The battle began shortly after 6 p.m. when daylight was already fading.

Unlike the French Admiral Brueys d'Aigalliers, Thomas Foley, who commanded HMS Goliath , believed the strait between Abukir Island and the mainland coast to be maneuverable. Among other things, he owned a French atlas from 1764, which gave the depths in the bay. Thomas Foley also concluded that the French fleet was able to anchor the ships in a long line off the coast that behind the French line the water was still deep enough to maneuver his ship there. Thomas Foley's quick decision to break the French line inward determined the whole course of the battle. The French fleet was completely unprepared for an attack from this side, and the HMS Goliath was followed by the British ships HMS Zealous , HMS Audacious , HMS Orion and HMS Theseus , while the rest of the fleet in the keel line attacked from sea, which the force of the attack doubled.

Admiral Nelson later explained his tactics to Lord Howe :

By attacking the advance guard and the center of the enemy, and because the wind was blowing exactly in the direction of his line, I was able to bring any strength to bear against a few ships. "

For example, the Guerrier , which was at the head of the French line, was hit one after the other by the HMS Goliath , the HMS Zealous , the HMS Audacious , the HMS Orion and the HMS Theseus and was soon unfit for action.

Explosion of the L'Orient

The French flagship L'Orient explodes on August 1, 1798 at 10 p.m., contemporary painting by George Arnald

Thanks to Thomas Foley's decision to steer his ship between the coast and the French line, the French ships in front received fire from two sides. Similar to the French Guerrier , the Aquilon , the Peuple Souverain and the Spartiate were badly damaged very quickly. However, the most armed French ships - including the French flagship L'Orient  - were in the middle of the French line. The British HMS Bellerophon suffered severe damage when it positioned itself opposite this ship, lost two of its three masts and drifted seaward in the course of the battle. At around 10 p.m., however, the British ships HMS Swiftsure and HMS Alexander took the L'Orient under fire, and fire soon broke out on the deck. The captain of HMS Swiftsure ordered targeted shots into the flames to prevent the French crew from fighting the fire. The French Admiral Brueys d'Aigalliers, who was on this ship, was already seriously wounded at this point, but insisted on staying on deck. A little later he was hit by a shot that killed him.

The spreading fire on the L'Orient gave rise to fear of an explosion of the ammunition dump. Most of the British and French commanders whose ships were in close proximity therefore decided to move their ships to a greater distance from the L'Orient . The French ships Heureux and Mercure were stranded on the mainland coast as a result. A little later the L'Orient exploded ; Parts of the ship and corpse were scattered a nautical mile across the bay by the force of the explosion, and the sound of the explosion could be heard as far as Alexandria, nine nautical miles away. It was the crucial turning point in the battle. Five French ships were in British hands; the Heureux and the Mercure were still firing their cannons, but were unable to maneuver.

Admiral Villeneuve on board the Guillaume Tell decided to flee in view of the hopeless situation of the French fleet and was able to escape to Corfu together with the Généreux and the frigates Justice and Diane . All four ships were largely undamaged, and Admiral Nelson decided not to let any of his ships chase them as they were all badly damaged. The now mastless Tonnant and Timoléon continued their hopeless fight until the afternoon of August 2nd; after that the tonnant gave up; the crew of the Timoléon on the other hand set their ship on fire and rowed ashore in the dinghies to escape capture.

consequences

The victims

Of Admiral Brueys d'Aigallier's thirteen ships of the line and four frigates, eleven ships of the line and two frigates had been lost. Admiral Brueys d'Aigalliers and seven other French commanders had fallen, over 5200 French sailors were either dead or missing - more than 1,000 sailors were killed in the explosion of the L'Orient alone . 3305 sailors had been captured by the British. So complete was the annihilation of the French Mediterranean fleet that it is occasionally compared to the devastating defeat the Japanese navy inflicted on the Russian at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.

The injured Admiral Nelson comes on deck to the burning L'Orient to see

Immediately after the battle the English mourned 218 dead and 677 wounded. In the days after the battle, however, a number of the wounded died. There were also women among the dead and wounded: the British Navy regulations actually forbade the presence of women on board warships. It was not uncommon for women to follow their husbands on board. During the battle they helped to bring powder and ammunition on deck or provided the crew with water. John Nicol, a seaman on the HMS Goliath , noted in his diary that several were wounded and a woman from Leith died from her injuries. Captain Thomas Foley added four women to his draft list who had tended to the wounded during the battle and whose men had either died in the battle or died of their injuries in the coming weeks.

Every ship in the British squadron had suffered serious damage: HMS Culloden had run aground in the course of the battle, and HMS Bellerophon and HMS Majestic had lost their masts. But all British ships could be repaired.

The high number of casualties this battle claimed is mainly due to the fact that the English ships were able to maneuver freely, whereas the French ships were anchored unprepared, and the explosion of the L'Orient contributed more than 1,000 deaths to the number of victims.

Effects

Egypt and Syria during the Egyptian expedition

The French plan to advance into India was called into question with the defeat in the sea battle at Abukir; at the same time, the victory of the British was seen as the first major setback of Napoléon Bonaparte. British supremacy at sea was not yet ensured for the rest of the coalition wars. It was not until the Battle of Trafalgar seven years later, in which Admiral Nelson defeated a Franco-Spanish fleet, that it was finally secured for more than a century.

Horatio Nelson was raised to the British nobility for his victory in the Battle of Abukir. The East India Company , which Nelson informed of the outcome of the battle by sending one of his officers to India from Alexandria, expressed its gratitude to him with a gift of £ 10,000. The Kingdom of Naples and Sicily , whose Queen Maria Karolina  - a sister of the executed French Queen Marie Antoinette  - was a staunch opponent of the French Republic, also paid him numerous honors . The French defeat at Abukir was also the reason for the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily to take Rome. However, that turned out to be a hasty decision. The counterattack by the French troops was successful, and a revolt broke out in Naples, forcing Ferdinand I and Queen Maria Carolina to flee to Sicily in December 1798.

memories

Art, literature, monuments

The naval battle at Abukir has been depicted several times by British marine painters. Paintings by Arnald George and Luny Thomas depict the battle in the dramatic moments when the French ships were on fire.

The naval battle also found a literary memorial in Felicia Heman's poem Casabianca , which is known to many Britons primarily because of its first, often parodied line, “The boy stood on the burning deck”. It depicts the death of Louis de Casabianca's only twelve-year-old son , who was on duty on the French flagship L'Orient , commanded by his father , and who died during the ship's explosion .

A memorial to commemorate the Battle of Abukir is located near Stonehenge . It consists of a large number of small birch groves known as "Nile Clumps". According to local legend, each of the birch groves represents a ship from the French and British fleets. The planting is said to be due to Emma Hamilton , the mistress of Admiral Nelson. After Nelson's death, she made friends with the Marquess of Queensbury, a local landowner, and convinced her, together with Thomas Hardy , to plant this unusual monument. Most of the remaining 17 birch groves are now on the area of ​​the Stonehenge Historic Monument, which is owned by the British National Trust . In the meantime, some of these birch groves have also been replanted, as birches rarely get older than 200 years.

archeology

In 1998 and 1999, wrecks of the French fleet were discovered by the underwater archaeologist Franck Goddio . In 2000, Paolo Gallo , an Italian archaeologist , found a burial site on what is now called " Nelson's Island " in Abukir Bay. The tomb contains the remains of sailors and officers; there are also the remains of three female skeletons and two small children in the tomb. The British archaeologist Nick Slope was able to prove that some of those buried in the tomb were dead from the sea battle at Abukir; other deaths can be traced back to an expedition from 1801. It is certain that two of the female dead and the deceased small children died in 1801. For the third female skeleton, this is not certain. It could therefore be one of the dead in the Battle of Abukir.

On April 18, 2005, the dead found in the grave were given an honorary military burial by the crew of the British ship HMS Chatham , which was in Egyptian waters at the time.

literature

  • Roy Adkins, Lesley Adkins: The War for All the Oceans - From Nelson at the Nile to Napoleon at Waterloo. Abacus Kibdib 2007, ISBN 978-0-349-11916-8 .
  • John Keegan : Intelligence was in. Knowledge of the enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda. Pimlico, London 2004, ISBN 0-7126-6650-8 .
  • Brian Lavery: Nelson and the Nile - The Naval War against Bonaparte 1798. Caxton Publishing Group, London 2003, ISBN 1-84067-522-5 .
  • Oliver Warner: Great naval battles. Ariel Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1963.
  • John Brinckman : Peter Lurenz bi Abukir (seaman's yarn) 1868. Hinstorff 1976.

Movie

  • Napoleon's sunken fleet (original title: Napoleon's Lost Fleet ). Documentary , 52 min, episode 1 of the series Diving into the Past (original title: Undersea Treasures ), book: Siobhan Flanagan , director: Christopher Rowley , USA 1999.

Web links

Commons : Battle of the Nile  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 6
  2. Lavery, p. 10 and Keegan, p. 36
  3. Keegan, p. 34
  4. Adkins and Adkins, p. 7 and Lavery, pp. 7-9
  5. Lavery, pp. 12-13, p. 15 and Keegan, p. 38
  6. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 8
  7. Keegan, p. 40
  8. Lavery, p. 77; Adkins and Adkins, p. 11
  9. ^ Warner, p. 148
  10. Lavery, p. 65
  11. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 9
  12. Keegan, p. 45 f.
  13. Laverty, p. 122 and Adkins and Adkins, p. 13 - Keegan gives the date June 14, p. 48.
  14. Laverty, p. 122
  15. Laverty, p. 124 and p. 134
  16. ^ Keegan, pp. 51 and 52
  17. Laverty, p. 126 and Keegan, p. 55
  18. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 14
  19. Laverty, pp. 127-129 and Keegan, pp. 56-57
  20. Laverty, p. 129
  21. Laverty, p. 130
  22. ^ Keegan, p. 58 and Adkins and Adkins, p. 15
  23. cit. n. Keegan, p. 59
  24. Adkins and Adkins, pp. 18 and 19
  25. ^ Keegan, p. 60
  26. Laverty, pp. 142 and 148-153
  27. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 21
  28. Adkins and Adkins, pp. 21 and 22
  29. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 26
  30. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 24
  31. Adkins and Adkins, pp. 26-28; Keegan, p. 63; Laverty, pp. 178-181
  32. cit. n. Warner, p. 152
  33. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 29
  34. Adkins and Adkins, p. 34; Keegan, p. 64; Laverty p. 195
  35. Adkins and Adkins, pp. 35-37; Keegan, p. 64; Laverty pp. 195-199
  36. Laverty, p. 201
  37. Laverty, pp. 202 and 209
  38. a b c Keegan, p. 65
  39. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 37
  40. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 38
  41. ^ Keegan, p. 64
  42. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 37
  43. Laverty, pp. 216 and 217
  44. Laverty, pp. 189 and 218
  45. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 41
  46. ^ Adkins and Adkins, p. 43
  47. ^ Website about the archaeological discovery
  48. Tannalee Smith: 30 Members of British Fleet reburied , Associated Press, April 18, 2005
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on October 9, 2006 .