Conti affair
Affair Conti describes the criminalized division of the Deutsche Continental-Gas-Gesellschaft AG (Contigas, also DCGG) with its headquarters in Dessau into an east and a west company and the shifting of assets allegedly worth 98 million in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Reichsmark from the Soviet occupation zone to West Germany since 1945.
The Conti affair culminated in the Dessau show trial of April 1950 and the imposition of high prison sentences for the accused managers and politicians. This show trial , chaired by Hilde Benjamin, served not only as a diversion from economic policy grievances but also as an instrument of the SED to discipline the bloc parties and SED members with more liberal views.
prehistory
Post-war situation of the Deutsche Continental-Gasgesellschaft in the Soviet occupation zone
The Deutsche Continental-Gasgesellschaft (Contigas), headquartered in Dessau , had an extensive network of holdings with 21 own operations and 33 subsidiaries . Dessau was in the Soviet occupation zone according to the Yalta agreements and was occupied by the Red Army on July 3, 1945 . By dividing Germany into four occupation zones in 1945 , Contigas was separated from its holdings in other occupation zones. Some board members , such as the chairman of the board, Eduard Schalfejew , Johannes Darge and the authorized signatory Wolfgang Glatzel, left for West Germany after the city was handed over to the Red Army and managed the West German parts of the company from the Frankfurt headquarters of the subsidiary Voigt & Haeffner AG. Other managers such as the commercial director Friedrich Methfessel , the technical director Hermann Müller (both CDU ) and company legal adviser Paul Heil stayed at the corporate headquarters in Dessau and now managed the parent company in trust.
The policy of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) consisted in the dismantling of the industrial plants in the Soviet occupation zone for the purpose of reparations , but also in the construction of a communist social structure for which a basic infrastructure should be preserved. As an energy and water supplier, the Contigas did not see themselves in any immediate danger, but they did endeavor to preserve the company's assets, 75% of which were in the Soviet occupation zone. On July 9, 1945, Methfessel wrote to the absent chairman of the board, Shalfeyev. The private copy of this letter would later be used as an important piece of evidence in the trial.
On October 30, 1945, the Soviet military administration issued Order No. 124 for the expropriation ("sequestration") of assets of the Third Reich, the so-called sequester order . Extensive expropriation campaigns were initiated, associated with the confiscation of the entire company assets of the companies concerned. The respective provincial and state governments were responsible for converting the assets into the "national assets". When DCGG only initially were immediately establishments affected, or "mixed work" were considered "military operation".
Dissolution and expropriation resolution
On December 11, 1945, the President of the Province of Saxony (renamed Province of Saxony-Anhalt on October 20, 1946 , and from January 10, 1947 to the State of Saxony-Anhalt ) declared the previous Board of Contigas dissolved and resumed on January 14 In 1946 the Minister for Labor and Social Affairs Leo Herwegen ( CDU ) was appointed as the new chairman of the supervisory board . Leopold Kaatz (President of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce and at the same time trustee of the Dessau sugar refinery ) and Heinrich Scharf (Director of the Landeskreditbank Sachsen-Anhalt) were appointed to other supervisory boards . Since the Saxony-Anhalt Minister of Economic Affairs, Willi Dieker, did not want to forego the professional competence of the previous executives, the provincial government confirmed Methfessel on February 14, 1946 as trustee chairman of the board . Hermann Müller also took on a board position in trust. Both boards of directors objected to the resolution to dissolve, arguing that Contigas would not fall under the category of companies referred to by SMAD Orders Nos. 124/126, 97 and 154/181. The economic commission of the city of Dessau, which was composed of representatives of the parties and the FDGB , supported this position. The head of the economic commission, Ernst Pauli, confirmed on behalf of the mayor that the Contigas would not be placed under sequestration. Minister Herwegen also issued a report in which the Contigas was declared a specialist society that did not have the character of a monopoly society .
On September 30, 1946, the expropriation decision of the President of the Province of Saxony was issued. The decision was not officially served or enforced at this point in time. According to instructions, the owner of the Contigas should be the newly founded Energie-Verwaltungs-Gesellschaft mbH (EVG) of the Province of Saxony-Anhalt, which was intended as the umbrella company for all supply companies in the province. A limbo began that would last for over two years.
In December of the same year, for tactical reasons, Contigas took a stake in Provinziale Energieversorgungs-Aktiengesellschaft (PREVAG), a merger of the main energy supply companies in the province of Saxony-Anhalt ordered by the provincial government on March 6, 1946 . The aim of the Contigas was to evade the breakup and subordination to the EVG and initially to remain as an independent legal entity with quasi-private management. Contigas increased its stake in PREVAG to 62% by bringing in additional companies and thus acquired the majority of shares in PREVAG. This majority stake, carried out on the basis of stock corporation law, took place - despite the expropriation resolution - with the express consent of the Minister of Economics, Willi Dieker. The deputy minister of economics Willi Brundert (SED, formerly SPD ) became chairman of the PREVAG supervisory board . Methfessel and Müller also took seats on the PREVAG supervisory board and began centralizing the provincial energy supply. With this maneuver, the danger of the contigas being placed under the EVG was averted, as PREVAG was now fulfilling the purpose for which the EVG was founded.
Diversification of the East and West operations of Contigas
On the fringes of the Contigas supervisory board meeting on February 14, 1946, in which Friedrich Methfessel was also appointed as trustee chairman of the board, the new board of directors met with the former board members Johannes Darge and Wolfgang Glatzel, who had moved to the west. Together with Eduard Schalfejew at the headquarters of the subsidiary Voigt & Haeffner AG in Frankfurt am Main, they had set up a West German representation for Contigas and now wanted the relationship between the West German companies (including the gas works in Hagen - Eckesey , the gas works in Lemgo and the stake in Voigt & Haeffner AG) to the parent company and its limited by the situation capacity clarify. With the SMAD order No. 154 of May 21, 1946, the Soviet military administration ordered the early transfer of those operations in sequestration to the provincial governments that were not claimed by the occupying power itself. However, Herwegen assured that a decision on the Contigas would still drag on. Since the unification of the occupation zones was becoming more and more distant and the fate of the Contigas was still unclear, the board decided - with the consent of the provincial government - to found a German Continental Gas Company (DCGG mbH) based in Hagen which these West German companies should continue to run under a common roof in the future. Ultimately, the aim of this West German foundation was to be able to succeed Contiga and to secure as many assets as possible. The later actions of the East German board members Methfessel and Müller suggest that they actively supported this endeavor.
Furthermore, Darge and Glatzel asked for payments of 700,000 Reichsmarks from the assets of the parent company to satisfy the pension claims of the Contigas employees who had emigrated to the west, which the western companies alone no longer raised due to the destroyed production facility of Askania Werke AG in Berlin could become. Methfessel saw the claims as justified and decided to set up a pension fund from the total assets of Contigas.
The gas works in Lemgo belonged to AGAG, a subsidiary of Contigas. However, this company was blocked in the commercial register , as the state government of Saxony-Anhalt itself claimed the company as a result of the sequestration. On March 7, 1947, Methfessel asked Deputy Minister Brundert to temporarily lift the blocking notice so that Contigas could acquire the gas works from AGAG for 700,000 Reichsmarks. The plant was then to be transferred from Contigas to the West German Deutsche Continental-Gas-Gesellschaft mbH (DCGG mbH), which in return would now take over all pension claims. Minister Dieker and his deputy Brundert agreed on the condition that the book value was transferred in full to the pension fund. Brundert took a moderate line in the expropriation policy and was convinced that the all-German Contigas group would not suffer any financial loss as a result of this transaction. He assumed that only the internal structure of the group would change.
Transaction of the Contigas holdings
Also on March 7, 1947, the notice of the expropriation, which had already been resolved on September 30, 1946, was delivered, which was dated February 25, 1947. With the help of the West Berlin attorney Wilhelm Könemann, legal advisor Paul Heil lodged an objection. On the advice of Könemann, they brought in the former district judge Ernst Simon, a judge with Nazi charges, as legal advisor. As a first measure to rescue assets, the Management Board declared the Voigt & Haeffner AG shares deposited in the Landesbank in Dessau and managed for third parties to be invalid, commissioned the West German DCGG mbH with the reprint of the securities and thus formally transferred these share assets to West Germany.
On April 27, 1947, as discussed, Brundert lifted AGAG's blocking notice in the commercial register and the Contigas supervisory board, chaired by Leopold Kaatz, was able to transfer the Lemgo gasworks to the West German DCGG mbH on June 17, 1947 as planned. Methfessel and Müller joined the management of DCGG mbH as "delegated" members.
In October 1947 Methfessel took part in the general meeting of Charlottenburger Wasserwerke AG , in which Contigas held shares worth one million Reichsmarks. The Berlin magistrate wanted to municipalize the waterworks in the British sector . Methfessel decided to sell the shares, with the proceeds being transferred to a West Berlin account of DCGG mbh. This happened in February 1948.
On February 11, 1948, a meeting took place in West Berlin between Methfessel, Scharf and Hermann Müller on the one hand and Könemann, Darge, Glatzel and another manager of the DCGG mbH, Joachim Kessler, on the other hand to discuss the further holdings of Contigas in West Germans Companies to be located. In addition to the Voigt & Haeffner AG shares that had been declared invalid within the group, there were also shares in Hamburger Elektro-Großhandels GmbH (ELG) worth 12.9 million Reichsmarks and 9956 Kuxe from the Westphalia union with a balance sheet value of 13 in a locker at the Landesbank in Dessau . 1 million Reichsmarks. It was decided to transfer these shares to DCGG mbH.
As chairman of the supervisory board, Leo Herwegen also agreed to these measures. He later said, “ I have always believed that only DCGG property on East Zonal soil has been expropriated. Therefore I could not see anything criminal in the fact that shares in former West German branches were returned after the liquidation of the group. "He justified himself with the words:" I actually had the impression and the conviction that one now wants to create clear paths; what is in our country should be ours, what is in factories there should be theirs. I had this opinion ”.
Expropriation and sequestration of the contigas
On April 29, 1948, the provincial government rejected the contigas' objection to the expropriation. The company formally ceased to exist. A serious failure by Willi Brundert ensured that the Contigas was not deleted from the commercial register, as provided for in the expropriation notice.
Methfessel, Müller, Heil and Ernst Simon and took advantage of the delay. Thanks to Simon's old relationships with the court in May 1948, they got hold of the Contigas' commercial register extracts, legitimized them to fetch the shares, share certificates and kuxe from the locker in the Landesbank and deposited them in Heil's private safe . The extracts and notarized depository receipts for the securities were brought to the West by courier. With these documents, the legal succession of DCGG mbH as a subsidiary of Contigas was proven at the Hagen registry court . Thereafter, Heil destroyed the share certificates and Kuxe on May 26, 1948, as instructed, and transmitted the notarized transaction to Könemann. A West German legal opinion, obtained by Schafeljew, secured the transactions as legal according to the legal opinion of the western occupation zones.
On May 31, 1948, the German Economic Commission (DWK) demanded the predecessor of the GDR government, Methfessel and Müller, to draw up a balance sheet in order to be able to carry out the transition of the contigas into the "national assets". They refused, pointing out that the company had expired and that the Ministry of Economics had forbidden them to represent the Contigas. This rejection was perceived by the commission as a slap in the face that had to provoke a sharp reaction. Initially, however, the situation with the Berlin blockade worsened politically, so that measures were a long time coming. In November 1948 Willi Brundert made up for the deletion of the Contigas from the commercial register, which had been neglected up to then, after an employee had drawn his attention to it.
Action by SMAD and DWK against the bourgeois parties
In 1947 there was a change in the politics of SMAD and DWK. It was believed that the time had come “ to fundamentally change our tactics towards the bourgeois parties [...]. This also requires a new relationship with the bloc (bloc parties) - yes, the bloc itself must be viewed as “invalid”. “This included, above all, the discrediting of high officials and politicians of the CDU, the LDP or former SPD members, the due to the forced union with the KPD , they belonged to the SED, but took a moderate line.
As early as December 1948 there were differences between the German Economic Commission (DWK) and Ministerial Director Willi Brundert regarding the amount of material requirements for reparations and the needs of the state- owned companies . The DWK accused Brundert of "economic offenses" and caused him to be expelled from the SED. He defended himself with clear remarks in his lectures and also received a lot of public support in the form of protest letters from the workforce from the nationally-owned companies concerned. The allegations against Brundert and also against his head of department Dieker were only part of a whole chain of defamations directed against the leadership of the ministries not led by the SED. The dismissals and arrests of CDU functionaries followed, mostly for flimsy reasons.
The Central Control Commission (ZKK) , founded on May 29, 1948, served as the executive body of the DWK . The SED functionary Fritz Lange was in charge of the ZKK, and Anton (Toni) Ruh was his deputy . The ZKK was initially only intended as a control body for planning discipline, but quickly developed into an executive body of the DWK. She was allowed to conduct her own investigations and was authorized to give instructions to the police and the judiciary. Fritz Lange summarized the ZKK's self-image with a Stalin quote: " A well-organized control of the implementation is the spotlight that helps us to illuminate the state of the apparatus at any given time and to draw the bureaucrats and class people to light ".
The ZKK was renamed the Central Commission for State Control on October 26, 1948 . The old abbreviation ZKK and the tasks were retained. It served as an independent organ of the DWK (after the GDR was founded as an independent organ of the Council of Ministers of the GDR ) outside of parliamentary control. Even if the name falsely suggested it, the ZKK was in fact not a state but a party organ. It was made up of SED members who were close to the party leadership. Their power to intervene and control was derived from the coordination with the party headquarters, not from orders from state organs.
At the end of 1948 the ZKK received the order to investigate the transactions of the Contigas. After the Glauchau-Meeraner Textilschieberei, the investigation of the Contigas transactions was the second case in which the ZKK took action.
Exposure, arrests, interrogations and indictments
The DWK wanted to assert ownership claims over those 25% of the assets of the Contigas that were in the western occupation zones. It quickly became apparent that through various transactions - such as the sale of the shares in Charlottenburger Wasserwerke AG to the West Berlin magistrate, which did not go unnoticed - some of these claims had been lost and therefore the safeguarding of the remaining property was forced. At the end of January 1949, a DWK auditing group therefore searched the Landesbank Dessau. Methfessel, who happened to be a witness of the search, received the information from a bank employee that the Contigas safe deposit box was of particular interest, as they were looking for securities from their property. Methfessel was able to leave the building undetected and immediately set off with his family to West Germany. On February 2, 1949, Müller and Simon were arrested at the DCGG headquarters due to the lack of securities for " economic sabotage ".
At first, the ZKK only suspected the trustees Methfessel and Müller of having moved Contigas assets to the West and accused Brundert, Dieker and Contigas supervisory board member Leo Herwegen of negligence. A trial against Müller and Methfessel was initially rejected because the ZKK, with Ulbricht's backing, decided in spring to turn the incident into a “political action”.
On March 29, 1949, the registry court of Hagen informed the East German authorities of the entry of DCGG GmbH at the request of the Dessau District Court, which exacerbated the allegations against Müller and Simon. Among other things, the ZKK accused Müller of having reduced the value of Askania Werke AG from 12 million to 2 million to the detriment of DWK . The understandable objection that due to the enormous war damage to the production facilities - two thirds of the factory were bombed - such a value adjustment was necessary in the balance sheet , was not accepted and he was accused of embezzling this amount.
As an accomplice, Contigas board member Leopold Kaatz was arrested while on the run in Leipzig. In the search for further allegations, his trusteeship and previous work as a director at the Dessau sugar refinery , in which the pesticide Zyklon B was produced during the Nazi era , was his undoing . He was also accused of running a forced labor camp and killing prisoners there. Kaatz denied having knowledge of the criminal use of the poison gas in the murder of people in the National Socialist extermination camps before the end of the war and shifted responsibility for the forced labor camp and the crimes there to the SS on watch . The main accusation, however, was the approval of the Contigas transactions. Months later, improper storage of chemicals was added to the list as a further allegation.
Heinrich Scharf, also a provisional board member of the DCGG, was arrested as a further accomplice. The bank director claimed that he had only acted on the instructions of the chairman of the supervisory board and minister Leo Herwegen and, according to his testimony, was briefly released. With Heinrich Scharf's testimony, Leo Herwegen was not undesirably targeted by the investigators. As CDU minister he was in the focus of the ZKK anyway and the Conti affair was only too gladly used as an opportunity to take action against the minister, who was considered too liberal-democratic. Fritz Lange, head of the ZKK, instructed his emissaries: “ Our task has a political character. By proving the corporate crimes Herwegen, publicly convicting him of treason against the interests of the people, we simultaneously eliminate the state chairman of the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt. And then it should not be difficult for us to bring the troublemakers in the other parties to reason ”.
From Walter Ulbricht is handed down: " Herwegen is the typical representative of the reactionary group within the CDU, which tries to turn back the wheel of history on behalf of the western corporate owners ".
The circle to Willi Brundert came full circle via Herwegen and his supervisory board position in the now dissolved PREVAG. Like Herwegen, he remained in office until October 28, 1949, but felt that something was brewing about him. When he decided to openly confront him and called the prosecutor general Werner Fischl , who was officially in charge of the investigation , he was arrested the next morning. His indictment was expanded to include a grave point. He was interned as a prisoner of war in the British camp Camp 18 near Haltwhistle ( Northumberland ) and in Wilton Park and thus came into contact with British military personnel and German emigrants who worked for the British secret service . He was then accused of continuing espionage for the British.
What was striking about Brundert's arrest was that neither his superior, Minister Dieker, nor the finance minister responsible for controlling the sequestration and later Prime Minister Werner Bruschke were prosecuted. The former locksmith Bruschke was not considered particularly talented, but as a loyal SED member from the working class. Despite his position of responsibility, he remained completely unmolested during the investigation.
Ulbricht also knew something to say about Brundert: “ We know that the enemies have sent agents into our area who work for the long term. Brundert, who comes from Wilton Park School in England, is one of those people. There he was trained in the direction of saving capitalist rule in Germany. I studied Brundert's work. Brundert wanted to put capitalist theories into practice here ”.
At the same time as Brundert, Herwegen, who was packing for his escape, and Heinrich Scharf again were arrested. A cyanide capsule was found at Scharf , which was presented to the public as an admission of his guilt. Six valuable old Bibles were found in Herwegen's escape luggage. The rulers extensively exploited this find as evidence of a “reactionary sentiment” for propaganda purposes.
The last to arrive on November 3, 1949, were Paul Heil and Ernst Pauli. All of the accused were individually transferred to the Gommern police prison and placed in heavily guarded solitary confinement . The following interrogations, mostly carried out by Fritz Lange personally, met with more or less resistance depending on the person concerned. While Brundert and Simon were hardly intimidated as experienced lawyers, Scharf attempted suicide in his cell and Herwegen was persuaded to admit misconduct.
By order of the DWK, the ZKK preceded any legal investigation and sent the Public Prosecutor General under Public Prosecutor Werner Fischl a prepared indictment . Since Fischl saw no legal reason to take action against Herwegen, Dieker and Brundert and did not want to open the proceedings, the ZKK replaced him with Ernst Melsheimer . After the interrogations were over, the new GDR attorney general brought the charges. She based the charge on SMAD Order No. 160 of December 3, 1945 on responsibility for acts of sabotage and diversion. She accused the defendants Leo Herwegen, Willi Brundert, Friedrich Methfessel, Herrmann Müller, Leopold Katz, Ernst Simon, Paul Heil, Ernst Pauli and Heinrich Scharf of the indictment “ in the period since December 1945, continuing to act as perpetrators, with intent to sabotage the economic To have thwarted measures of the German self-government organs, whereby the economic reconstruction of Germany and the fortunes of the German people suffered severe damage ”.
Propagandist press coverage
On November 23, 1949, the press dutifully reported in big headlines the arrest of the "economic criminals" alleged to have caused damage of 100 million Reichsmarks. Almost all daily newspapers in the GDR put the report in several columns as a lead story on their front page. The reporters were given the opportunity to photograph the detainees in their cells. The press, especially the SED party newspaper Neues Deutschland , left no doubt as to their guilt. The New Germany printed the complete official report of the ZKK.
The Neue Berliner Illustrierte published a propaganda-tinged report entitled “ The rats in a trap ” with selected photo material. The respective allegation was touched under each portrait photo of an accused:
- Leo Herwegen : " Inspirer: The former Minister Dr. L. Herwegen, who was paid for his help, arrested the People's Police at the last moment while he was fleeing to the West. "
- Paul Heil : " Legal forger: Notary Dr. Heil, whose declarations of innocence u. a. refuted the document below, gave most transactions a semblance of 'legality' "
- Willi Brundert : " Espionage agent: Dr. Brundert, once a lecturer at a British agent school, a man "with connections", sabotaged the financial situation by deliberate confusion. "
- Heinrich Scharf : “ Asset slider: Bank director Heinrich Scharf, whose hand injury suggests a suicide attempt, took part in the illegal board meeting of the DCGG. "
- Leopold Kaatz : " Main culprit: 'Trustee' of the DCGG, formerly General Director and manor owner Dr. Leopold Kaatz, organized the 100 million theft, but plays the clueless. "
- Ernst Simon : “ Helpers: The lawyer Ernst Simon, who defended himself slyly before the examining magistrate, directed business documents to a West Berlin group shop steward. "
- Ernst Pauli : “ Handyman: The Economic Commissioner Pauli supported the misappropriation of assets by issuing a false certificate. "
- Hermann Müller : “ Organizer: Dipl.-Ing. Müller, trustee of the DCGG assets, broke the trust placed in him and made the fraud possible. "
In addition, the NBI presented internal correspondence of the Contigas, a picture of Herwegen's escape luggage with the six Bibles and a picture of a leg with a hidden cyanide capsule in the sock. Photos also showed the defendants in a degrading way in their cells or in the prison yard.
Legal opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany
The charges and the preparations for the trial did not go unnoticed in West Germany. At the request of Johannes Darge, the Nuremberg Higher Regional Court dealt with the legal situation in a decision of September 19, 1949. It ruled: “ An expropriation without compensation in the eastern zone cannot be recognized in the western zone because it attacks the basis of state and economic life in the western zones. The expropriated owner can therefore claim as his own property that is transferred to the western zones after the expropriation. According to international law, it is recognized that sovereign acts of a state only have an effect within the sphere of influence of this state. Due to a longer international practice, it is generally assumed that expropriation cannot cover any property that is located outside the expropriation state. "
The show trial
Preparations
Unimpressed by the West German legal opinion, the SED decided at the highest level to allow the trial to take place in the Dessau Theater in front of a select audience. An organizational office " Herwegen-Brundert-Prozess ", consisting of employees of the Central Commission for State Control, high officials of the Ministry for State Security , the Justice, the Police Authority and the Office for Information of the Council of Ministers , organized the process, printed entry cards that were only for were valid for one day of the trial and distributed them to deserving political figures. There was room for 1200 spectators in the theater on each day of the negotiation. The administrative districts were instructed to "evaluate" the progress of the negotiations with the workforce of the state-owned companies.
The former Contigas CEO Methfessel, who had resigned to Kassel , was advertised in all the major East German newspapers to appear for the trial and to face the trial as a defendant. This public summons was unsuccessful. However, it put the insecure Methfessel under great psychological pressure, as he feared he would be forcibly dragged off to the east or extradited.
The process
On April 22, 1950, the defendants were transferred to the Dessau police prison. 48 hours later, on April 24, 1950, the trial began before the 1st Criminal Senate of the Supreme Court of the German Democratic Republic, chaired by the Vice-President of the Supreme Court of the GDR, Hilde Benjamin , who was subordinated to " Freisler methods " by the West German press . Attorney General Ernst Melsheimer and his assistant Public Prosecutor Cohn represented the indictment . The assessors were Rothschild and Richter Trapp. All defendants, including the absent Friedrich Methfessel, were represented by lawyers. Listening devices were installed in the lawyers' common rooms.
The Politburo had determined the political message that the process was supposed to convey: " The process must be conducted in such a way that the role of monopoly capital, its work of disintegration with the help of agents for sale and their criminal activities in the German Democratic Republic are clearly revealed ".
Fritz Lange took over the “ choreography ” of the show trial as head of the ZKK and the organization office “ Herwegen-Brundert-Prozess ”. He gave his “stage directions” to the public prosecutor and the judges by mail from the director's box . At the gates of the Dessau Theater, delegations from the FDGB and the Free German Youth (FDJ) chanted rehearsed slogans.
The process was filmed by DEFA newsreel cameras. Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler reported every evening on Berlin radio in special broadcasts about the course of the process.
The prosecution used the letter from Methfessel to Schalfejew, written in 1945, who was meanwhile State Secretary in the Bonn Ministry of Economics , as evidence of a long-planned conspiracy, although the trusteeship of Brundert, Herweg, Kaatz and Scharf only started the contigas the following year.
Ernst Melsheimer's three-hour indictment speech ended with the words:
“ The accused have committed tremendous crimes against our democracy, against our economic development and thus against the peace of the German people and the world, and they are extremely guilty. [...] While for years the masses of our working people have been working hard and successfully every day to rebuild our fatherland and to rebuild our state on a peaceful and democratic basis, these accused have stabbed them in the back in a treacherous and insidious way . […] The accused […], who are paid by a small but influential clique of German imperialist warmongers and their Anglo-American backers, must feel the rigors of our democratic legality for their shameful crimes. They must be severely punished. "
On every day of the trial, the defendants were brought before in handcuffs , although all but Brundert were over fifty years old . The interrogation began with Leo Herwegen. The main allegation was the support of corporate interests contrary to his ministerial duties. Because of that, broken by the interrogations, also admitted omissions before the court.
Willi Brundert's indictment was based mainly on allegations of a British agent activity and the failure to delete the contigas from the commercial register, which the public prosecutor held against him as active action in favor of embezzlement.
Hermann Müller was charged with the main culprit in the securities transactions. His defense looked awkward.
Leopold Kaatz was questioned on the third day of the trial. The main allegations were based on the events in the Dessau sugar refinery during the Nazi era. On the side, there was the accusation that DCGG mbH had not been prevented from being split off.
Ernst Simon was accused of having illegally appropriated the Contigas commercial register excerpts based on old contacts in order to enable DCGG mbH to be founded.
According to the indictment, Ernst Pauli delayed the sequestration of the contigas in August 1946. Even the objection that the formal expropriation decision was only issued six months later on February 25, 1947, did not convince the court. The court interpreted the sequester's refusal due to a lack of a legal decision as malicious. In order to prove his perfidy, the court charged him with private purchases as an aviation officer during the Second World War . He is said to have made these advantageous purchases in occupied France and Spain under Francisco Franco - among other things, it was a fur coat, a radio and food. Hilde Benjamin theatrically apologized to the French people for the "injustice" suffered.
On the fourth day of the trial, the defendants Paul Heil and Heinrich Scharf were tried. As in the interrogations, Scharf confessed and had to be ridiculed by Hilde Benjamin, who also addressed his suicide attempt . With his excessively submissive behavior, Scharf played a role that was also often envisaged in the Stalinist show trials of the Soviet Union in the 1930s. The full admission of the guilt of a marginal figure among the defendants should burden the main defendants even more. In return, this " key witness " experienced an advantage in the sentencing. This is also the case here with Heinrich Scharf, who was least able to cope with the extreme pressure. In his closing remarks, he thanked the authorities for their good treatment.
Most recently, the Minister of Industry Fritz Selbmann was heard as an expert . He certified all those involved in a criminal way of having violated orders No. 124 and 154 of the SMAD and estimated the resulting financial loss at 98 million Reichsmarks. He calculated this sum from the difference between the book value of the Contigas on July 1, 1945 and the value after the transition to "public property". This calculation did not take into account war damage, losses through reparations, or the depreciation rate of the currency reform, which was also charged to the defendants. Also included was the value of the West German corporate property, the expropriation of which was not even possible. The press inflated the already excessive damage as a propagandistic eye-catcher to the sum of around 100 million Reichsmarks.
The fifth and sixth day of the trial were dominated by the pleadings , before all that of the excited Attorney General Melsheimer. He used verbal juries like “ (Herwegen) is the typical criminal ”, “ (Brundert) is an arrogant careerist, a typical agent ”, “ Pauli is the worst subject that I have ever come across. “To all the defendants.
In the opinion of the trial observers, the pleadings by the defense lawyers did not attract attention and were partly over after a few minutes.
The judgment
The verdict was passed on Saturday, April 29, 1950. “In the name of the people” the defendants were convicted of crimes against Order No. 160 of the SMAD of December 3, 1945. The death penalty has not spoken to the surprise of observers of the trial, since they opinion of the court the alleged "backers" from the western zones, including USA -Sonderbotschafter Averell Harriman , who led the Marshall Plan , and under Ludwig Erhard appointed as Secretary of State Eduard Schalfejew reserved should be.
Leo Herwegen, Willi Brundert and Friedrich Methfessel were to fifteen years ' imprisonment sentenced Hermann Müller and Leopold Kaatz to twelve years, Paul Heil to eight years, Ernst Pauli to seven years and Ernst Simon to four years. Heinrich Scharf, who had taken on the role of the repentant sinner in the process, got away with two years in prison. He was the only one who had suffered pre- trial detention since October 28th to be fully counted towards the sentence.
Follow the process
Media follow-up
While the convicts were being brought to their prisons, the East German press hailed the conviction of the "economic criminals". The non-communist western press felt the trial was a Stalinist staging.
The body responsible for steering the press and the broadcast of the GDR Office of Information to the Prime Minister of the GDR, was shortly after the trial for the "political education" a brochure entitled " Debunked - the story of an uncovered huge fraud " out that as Groschenheft to was sold to the kiosks .
Political Consequences
The Dessau show trial consolidated the central power of the ZKK. The ZKK used the freedom to improvise granted by the SED to develop extensive competencies. This included arrests, torture interrogations, coercion of judges, falsification of indictments and the appointment of judges loyal to the line during trials. As the “rapid reaction force” of the SED and - after the founding of the GDR - the Politburo, it developed into an important instrument of political discipline and securing power.
The SED used the process to divert attention from its own mistakes in economic policy. Difficulties could thus be explained to the public as a result of external attacks. In addition, it served to discipline and educate the bloc parties and critical views within the SED. With the Dessau show trial, the SED took action on a broad front against politicians and officials of the CDU , the LDP and above all against the former SPD members in their own ranks and brought them on the desired political line. However, the hoped-for recognition by the “working masses”, who did not get involved in the propaganda staging to the extent desired, failed to materialize.
The Dessau show trial was therefore not the last of its kind; many similar proceedings were carried out in the 1950 “show trial year”. Ernst Melsheimer took it up front in his plea in the Dessau show trial: “ It won't be the last trial of this kind. "
Fate of those involved
Willi Brundert was the last to be released from prison on March 19, 1959 after nine years and moved to West Germany, where he began a new political career. After his work as State Secretary of Hesse , he was elected Lord Mayor of Frankfurt am Main in 1964 . He died on May 7, 1970, not without first having written a book about his experiences. It was entitled: " It began in the theater: People's justice behind the iron curtain " and described his view of the events.
Leo Herwegen was released in 1958. He too moved to West Germany and died in 1972. Friedrich Methfessel, who followed the process in Kassel with concern that he would be extradited, only managed to gain a foothold in the West with great difficulty. He worked as a sales manager in Kassel and died on November 1st, 1967 in Holzminden. In 1950 he wrote a detailed résumé in which he described his view of the events. Ernst Pauli died on March 2, 1965 in Dessau. Little is known about the fate of the other defendants.
The judge Hilde Benjamin was a member of the People's Chamber from 1949 to 1967 , a member of the Central Committee of the SED from 1954 to 1989 and rose to the position of Justice Minister of the GDR. She died on April 18, 1989 in Berlin. Ernst Melsheimer remained attorney general and chief prosecutor of the GDR until his death in 1960.
The ZKK leader Fritz Lange rose to the central committee of the SED and took part in the fall of the so-called " Berija gang " (including Rudolf Herrnstadt and Wilhelm Zaisser ) in 1953 . From 1954 to 1958 he was Minister for Popular Education in the GDR. His deputy Toni Ruh became head of the Office for Customs and Control of Goods Movement of the GDR (AZKW) and exercised this function from 1950 to 1962.
The judgment was lifted after the end of the GDR
At the instigation of the descendants of Friedrich Methfessel and Ernst Pauli, the Berlin Regional Court was called on in a cassation case . On September 9, 1992, the court overturned the judgment of April 29, 1950 and acquitted all of the accused at the time.
The reasoning for the judgment states:
“ […] In addition, the overall content of the judgment shows that the court was only concerned with ideologically justifying and justifying the expropriation of commercial enterprises in the GDR territory in general and in particular. It was not judged about criminal behavior, but about a certain worldview. This is particularly indicated on page 42 f. of the challenged judgment: 'What the defendants have done is: shaking the cornerstone of the construction of the former Soviet zone of occupation, our present German Democratic Republic, and at the same time the cornerstones of a unified democratic Germany in general. It is also a threat to peace in Europe and the world: the defendants have helped to rescue and rebuild corporate interests, that is, forces that endanger the peace of the world anew because they, the German monopolists, are the most meaningful helpers for all the forces that drive a new war. All of these considerations are also relevant to the sentencing. ' […] Here a judicial-style procedure was misused to justify economic-political decisions in a show trial (extended public -1200 spectators per day; main hearing in the State Theater Dessau). [...] "
The court refused any further rehabilitation .
literature
- Franz-Josef Kos: “ Political Justice in the GDR. The Dessau Show Trial of April 1950 ”in: VfZG 7/1996
- André Gursky: “ The Prehistory of the Dessau Show Trials ”, part 13 of the series of contributions in kind , publisher: The state commissioner for the records of the State Security Service of the former GDR in Saxony-Anhalt.
- Wolfgang Mittmann: " Time of the offense - great cases of the People's Police ", Verlag Das Neue Berlin, 2000, ISBN 3-360-00895-2
- Jutta Braun, Nils Klawitter, Falco Werkentin: “ The backstage of political criminal justice in the early years of the Soviet Zone / GDR ”; Volume 4 of the series of publications by the Berlin State Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR , 4th edition Berlin 2006. PDF document
swell
- City Archives Dessau, OB 1251–1253 (Conti process)
- Judgment in the criminal case Herwegen, Brundert u. a. In. Neue Justiz, Volume 4, No. 8/50
- Berlin radio archive. DOK 139, Herwegen-Brundert trial
- Willi Brundert : " It all started in the theater: People's justice behind the iron curtain ". Berlin and Hanover 1958
- Hilde Benjamin : “ About the Dessau Trial. “In: Neue Justiz, Volume 4, No. 5/50
- And now this shame . In: Der Spiegel . No. 53 , 1949, pp. 29 ( online ).
- Harriman is supposed to die . In: Der Spiegel . No. 18 , 1950, p. 5 ( online ).
Individual evidence
- ↑ Wolfgang Mittmann: " Time of Tatz - Great Cases of the People's Police ", Verlag Das Neue Berlin, 2000, ISBN 3-360-00895-2 , page 56
- ^ W. Mittmann, page 54
- ↑ a b André Gursky: “The Prehistory of the Dessau Show Trials”, part 13 of the series of contributions in kind, Ed .: The State Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR in Saxony-Anhalt, page 16f
- ↑ a b c d Nils Klawitter: " The role of the ZKK in the staging of show trials in the SBZ / GDR: The proceedings against the" textile slide "from Glauchau-Meerane and the" economic saboteurs "of the German Continental Gas AG1 ", In : " The backstage of political criminal justice in the early years of the Soviet Zone / GDR ". Volume 4 of the series of publications by the Berlin State Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR , page 36
- ^ Certificate from Ernst Pauli from the Economic Commission of the City of Dessau, issued on August 12, 1946
- ^ The incriminating letter from Friedrich Methfessel to Eduard Schalfeljew gives this number
- ^ W. Mittmann, page 58
- ↑ a b " Inventory of the Orders of the Supreme Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) 1945–1949. “Compiled and edited by Jan Foitzik on behalf of the Institute for Contemporary History. - Munich; New Providence; London; Paris: Saur, 1994. ISBN 3-598-11261-0
- ↑ Appendix of the President of the Province of Saxony-Anhalt on power of disposal 49 (sequestration of the DCGG)
- ^ Four-page protest and objection by Friedrich Methfessel, dated September 24, 1946
- ^ A. Gursky, page 20
- ^ Certificate of exemption dated August 12, 1945
- ↑ a b c d W. Mittmann, page 62ff
- ^ A. Gursky, page 19
- ^ A b c d e Franz-Josef Kos: " Political Justice in the GDR. The Dessau Show Trial of April 1950 ”in: VfZG 7/1996, pp. 395–429
- ^ A. Gursky, page 18
- ↑ . The West was founded with the approval of the provincial government. According to a later report from the Attorney General's Office, Brundert and Dieker had given approval to BAP DC-1-266, unpag.
- ↑ a b c W. Mittmann, page 65ff
- ↑ a b W. Mittmann, page 67f
- ↑ W. Mittmann, page 70f
- ↑ a b W. Mittmann, page 72ff
- ↑ a b c d Article in Der Spiegel magazine , issue 18/1950
- ↑ a b c d e f g h W. Mittmann, page 75ff
- ↑ Soviet policy in the Soviet occupation zone 1945–1949. Documents on the activities of the propaganda administration of the SMAD under Sergei Tjul'panow, ed. by Bernd Bonwetsch, Gennadij Borjugov and Norman Naimark, Bonn 1998, p. 191f
- ↑ a b W. Mittmann, page 81f
- ↑ The basis for the formation of the ZKK was the SMAD order No. 32 of February 12, 1948 on the powers of the DWK; See also Wolfgang Zank: Economic Central Administrations and German Economic Commission (DWK) , in: SBZ-Handbuch , ed. by Martin Broszat and Hermann Weber, Munich 1990, pp. 253-290, p. 269
- ↑ a b N. Klawitter, p. 25.
- ↑ BArch DY 30, IV 2/13/110, p. 193
- ↑ N. Klawitter, page 37
- ↑ Lange's letter to Ulbricht dated December 12, 1952, from which it emerges that the ZKK was still operating according to the guidelines of September 1948, cf. BArch DY 30, IV 2/13/259, unpag.
- ↑ a b W. Mittmann, page 85f
- ↑ a b W. Mittmann, page 83f
- ^ Letter from Lange to Ulbricht of March 17, 1949, BAP DC-1-2540, unpag.
- ^ Lange in a conversation with Ulbricht on October 27, 1949, BAP DC-1-2539, unpag.
- ^ W. Mittmann, page 87
- ↑ W. Mittmann, page 88f
- ↑ W. Mittmann, page 89f
- ↑ a b W. Mittmann, page 90f
- ^ W. Mittmann, page 92f
- ↑ Walter Ulbricht's speech at the state delegates' conference of the SED Saxony-Anhalt
- ↑ N. Klawitter, page 39
- ↑ see facsimile of the indictment
- ^ W. Mittmann, page 97
- ↑ a b The "Donath" Report, Neue Berliner Illustrierte of December 2, 1950
- ↑ N. Klawitter, page 44
- ^ West Berlin Telegraph of April 26, 1946
- ↑ . Benjamin's nickname " Rote Freislerin " was also used within the GDR leadership
- ↑ Fischl's 16-page report from May 17, 1955, files of the PV of the SPD, vol. 0048C (02287), unpag.
- ↑ Verbatim proposal by Fritz Lange, which was accepted by the Politburo on February 28, 1950 with six additional points
- ^ Report of the NWDR, transmitted by a listening point in the SBZ on May 3, 1950, BAP DC-1-2538, unpag.
- ↑ W. Mittmann, page 114f
- ^ W. Mittmann, page 116
- ↑ a b N. Klawitter, page 38
- ↑ a b W. Mittmann, page 126f
- ↑ a b Minutes of the DCGG trial, BAP DC-1-1925, p. 347
- ^ W. Mittmann, page 129
- ↑ a b N. Klawitter, page 55f
- ↑ a b file number 552/506 Kass 458/91, business number 3 Js 1507/91, Berlin Regional Court