Corpus Christi flood

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The Corpus Christi flood on June 21, 1984 (Corpus Christi Day) triggered a disaster alarm in the Main-Tauber district. In the four mainly affected communities (Königheim, Tauberbischofsheim, Boxberg and Lauda-Königshofen), technical operations management teams were established.

The Corpus Christi flood is a severe weather catastrophe that led to torrential floods on June 21, 1984 ( Corpus Christi Day ) in the Main-Tauber district in Baden-Württemberg, mainly in the area of ​​the communities of Königheim , Tauberbischofsheim , Boxberg and Lauda-Königshofen . The town of Königheim was particularly heavily flooded. Also Dittwar , Kupprichhausen and Lengenfelder vineyards were hit hard.

The total damage amounted to around 90 million German marks .

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June 21, 1984 - Corpus Christi flood

f1Georeferencing Map with all coordinates of the mainly affected rivers, locations and retention basins of the Corpus Christi flood: OSM | WikiMap

The flood was triggered by heavy rain of up to 150 mm on June 21, 1984, which fell over the catchment areas of Brehm- ( ⊙ , ⊙ ) and Schüpfbach ( ⊙ , ⊙ ). The rain started in the afternoon and flooded the partly narrow stream valleys completely and with tidal waves up to three meters high down the valley.

There were severe storms in the area of ​​Kupprichhausen ( ⊙ ), Lengenrieden ( ⊙ ), Oberlauda ( ⊙ ), Heckfeld ( ⊙ ), Dittwar ( ⊙ ), Brehmen ( ⊙ ), Gissigheim ( ⊙ ), Königheim ( ⊙ ) and Tauberbischofsheim ( ⊙ ) . The center of the heavy rainfall was in the region yard Essel Brunn ( ⊙ ) and Reisberg ( ⊙ ). The water masses flowed through the Eisgrundgraben ( ⊙ , ⊙ ) and Ölbach in the direction of Dittwar (13.5 cubic meters / second) and over the Adelsgraben above Gissigheim and the Brehmbach in the direction of Königheim (10 to 19 cubic meters / second) and flowed in the direction of the underlying villages and towns. At about the same time in the Schüpfbachtal, a two-meter high tidal wave rushed towards Kupprichhausen and Lengenrieden at a width of 100 meters. The flood peaked at around 5 p.m. with a flow of around 100 to 120 m³ / s. As a result, District Administrator Georg Denzer triggered the disaster alarm for the Main-Tauber district at 5:18 pm . As a result, teams from the police and a SAR helicopter from the Federal Air Force were ordered to the disaster area. In addition, emergency services from the DLRG, fire brigades and the technical relief organization were set out on the field.

Today almost nothing can be seen at the blocking point of the former Gissigheim retention basin, which suffered a dam break during the Corpus Christi flood and triggered a second tidal wave

A short time later and only about half an hour after the rain had ended, the situation worsened again: The dam of the Gissigheim retention basin ( ⊙ ) broke at around 5:20 p.m. after it was overflowed with extremely high runoff. The bottom outlet had previously been blocked and the flood relief system could no longer drain the water after floating debris on the grate cover of the relief system had severely impaired its performance. As a result, the dam was flooded up to 65 cm high before the break, with a maximum estimated flow of 54 m³ / s.

The second tidal wave triggered by the dam breach damaged a large part of the houses in Königheim up to the second floor. Like most of the dams of the time, the dam was not built so that it could be flooded without damage, and its air side was therefore not erosion-proof . The actual reason for the dam breach, however, was not the backward erosion, but the integration of the relief system into the dam body, where the overflow structure was not interlocked and cavities were present due to the receding components. The maximum water level in the reservoir was 10.7 m, the storage volume 0.144 million m³. At the beginning of the dam breach, 0.165 million m³ were dammed.

Due to the retention effect (retention effect) of the widening Brehmbach valley, the second tidal wave in Königheim could no longer be recognized as a single wave. The maximum water level in Königheim lasted until around 6 p.m. due to the retention effect. Despite the dam breach, the retention basin prevented even greater damage in Koenigheim, as it delayed the flood wave of the Brehmbach so that the flood waves from the catchment areas below the basin could run ahead and the waves did not overlap. The flood in Königheim was largely over at around 7 p.m.

Embankment at Dittwar station damaged by the flood of Corpus Christi, 1984

The embankment ( ⊙ ) of the former Tauberbischofsheim – Königheim railway line, which was located at Dittwar station across the discharge direction of the Muckbach from Dittwar, prevented even greater disaster for Tauberbischofsheim. The Umpfertal , Königshofen , Sachsenflur , Schweigern and Boxberg also got off relatively lightly due to the high-lying railway embankments. These caused a backlog, which in part then became doomed for other communities.

As a result, the police, fire brigades, the German armed forces, technical relief organizations, DLRG and DRK were in constant use. Several missing person reports were not confirmed and there were no deaths, but nine injured. However, over 1200 animals died, half of them cattle. 24 buildings were completely destroyed and 184 badly damaged. Large parts of the stream and river meadows were under water and numerous buildings threatened to collapse. The electricity and telecommunications networks as well as the water supply failed in large parts of the disaster area. In addition to the federal road 27 , several state and district roads were no longer passable. Over 100 vehicles were swept away by the masses of water, completely demolished or piled on top of each other.

In the evening, the disaster management asked to boil the drinking water in the entire disaster area. In an initial estimate, the management of the district office assumed around 7,000 victims who were directly affected by the flood disaster, i.e. who caused considerable damage to their belongings.

June 22, 1984

After the heavy rains subsided the previous evening, they did not stop until the night of June 22, 1984. In the morning a large part of the water had already drained and the levels on the Tauber sank again. At 6:45 a.m., technical operations management teams were set up in each of the four communities mainly affected (Königheim, Tauberbischofsheim, Boxberg and Lauda-Königshofen) . Around 1000 emergency services began with the first clean-up work. District Administrator Georg Denzer said in a press conference in the afternoon as follows:

“At the moment it is not my job to assess the damage that has occurred. The priority was and is to contain the disaster and avert danger to humans and animals. Now it's time to clean up and rebuild. And we need help for that. "

- Georg Denzer

The first priority was the evacuation of people from houses in danger of collapsing. In addition, work was carried out to restore the power supply, the telecommunications network and the road connections. In areas with destroyed water supplies, the population was supplied with water by tank vehicles . Since the suction baskets of the fire service pumps were repeatedly clogged, divers sometimes had to be used in Tauberbischofsheim .

The Baden-Württemberg Minister of the Interior Dietmar Schlee got a personal impression of the emergency on June 22nd and promised rapid help from the state.

June 23, 1984

High water mark of the Corpus Christi flood in Dittwar

The Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg, Lothar Späth, visited Dittwar on June 23, 1984 , one of the hardest hit places in the disaster area. The clearing and securing work was progressing in the meantime: With the exception of the L 511 between Heckfeld and Oberlauda , all roads were meanwhile again at least poorly accessible. The supply of electricity and drinking water has now been ensured by emergency power generators (including from Badenwerk ) and water treatment systems. The structural securing of buildings and bridges as well as the removal of about 1200 animal carcasses were the most urgent tasks. The floods had scattered the animal carcasses over the entire, partly still flooded damaged area or buried them under rubble, so that the clean-up work was difficult. In addition, basements were emptied of mud, wood cleared and apartments cleaned. Another focus was on removing oil spills after some oil tanks overturned and leaked in flooded cellars.

The disaster tourism that began on this Saturday had an extremely disruptive effect on everyone involved . According to statements by the emergency services, the onlookers showed no consideration for the people affected by the accident and increasingly obstructed the rescue work, which made barriers necessary in an ever greater area.

June 24, 1984

On June 24, 1984, the clean-up work continued unabated in the entire damaged area. It turned out that far more buildings than initially assumed were in acute danger of collapsing. Around 1150 emergency services therefore mainly supported or demolished buildings. Another focus was the removal of alluvial debris so that the water could drain away even if it rains again. However, some of the emergency services had to be withdrawn from the main damaged area after the collapse of the railway bridge over the Main between Wertheim and Kreuzwertheim was reported at 1 p.m. According to eyewitnesses, the nuisance by onlookers gradually took on blatant forms in the damaged area, and this hindered the use of the vehicles.

June 25, 1984

In Dittwar and Königheim, the public water supply was restored on June 25, 1984. To maintain the power supply, however, emergency power generators still had to be used in Königheim. While the clearing and security work in Königheim continued unabated in the inner-city area, the areas of responsibility in other damaged areas increasingly shifted to areas outside the built-up areas. Around 820 emergency services were still employed. For example, the streams and bridge culverts were mostly cleaned of coarse floating debris by hand, as initially hardly any trucks or excavators could be used on the still soaked and muddy soil.

June 26, 1984

The clean-up work continued, especially in the damage centers with a large number of volunteers. After most of the sludge had been removed from the flooded houses, there was often severe damage that was not apparent at first glance, which made further safety measures necessary. Since the feed supplies for the surviving cattle in the damaged area were running out and many corridors were not yet passable, feed increasingly had to be obtained from other areas.

June 27, 1984

On June 27, 1984, around 720 helpers were still on duty, mainly devoting themselves to the time-consuming clearing of the brook bridges and water passages. Heavy equipment was mostly not yet usable on the sodden ground. Other buildings in danger of collapsing were secured, if possible, and some were also demolished. Areas of application that had already been closed became partially up-to-date again after numerous cellars that had already been pumped empty were filled up again due to the ingress of pressurized water. In the meantime, the farmers' association ensured that the farms were supplied with feed and other necessary goods.

Water tests by the State Chemical Research Institute showed that all water catchments in the damaged area were contaminated with E. coli bacteria. The requirement to boil the drinking water remained in place until it was possible to rule out any risk to the population from daily samples. Heavy clearing equipment was only needed to a small extent and the Bundeswehr units deployed could be removed from the disaster operation. The mission was not finished on June 27th, but the number of helpers was gradually reduced one week after the flood.

The Corpus Christi flood triggered the first and so far only disaster alarm in the Main-Tauber district.

Emergency services

When the disaster alarm was triggered, a so-called disaster management was formed at the Main-Tauber district administrative office. According to a plan already prepared for such cases, employees of the district office took their place in this management staff, which coordinated the deployment of the technical assistants, for the entire duration of the assignment.

In addition, four technical command lines were set up in the main areas of the damage , which led the units deployed there:

  • Technical operations management "Königheim"
  • Technical operations management "Tauberbischofsheim"
  • Technical operations management "Boxberg"
  • Technical operations management "Lauda-Königshofen"

The connection between all these points was ensured by the telecommunications center set up in the district office .

In addition, the following authorities, organizations and units were in action:

literature

  • State Institute for Environmental Protection Baden-Württemberg , Institute for Waste and Water Management (Ed.): The flood on June 21, 1984 in the Main-Tauber district. Hydrological description. (= Handbook Hydrology Baden-Württemberg , 6.2.) Karlsruhe 1985.
  • District Office Main-Tauber-Kreis: Documentation of the storm disaster in the Main-Tauber-Kreis . 13 pages, black and white, spiral binding. Tauberbischofsheim 1984.

Web links

Commons : Corpus Christi Flood  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e District Office of the Main-Tauber-District (1984): Documentation of the severe weather catastrophe in the Main-Tauber-District , p. 2.
  2. ↑ a b c d e f g h Harald Fingerhut: Wave rolls with force through Weinort. The Corpus Christi flood on June 21, 1984 caused enormous damage, especially in Königheim, but also in Kupprichhausen and Dittwar. . In: Franconian news . July 22, 2016. Online at www.fnweb.de. Retrieved November 20, 2016.
  3. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l Rainer Hofrichter: Hochwasser 1984. Chronology of a catastrophe . Online at info.koenigheimer.com. Retrieved August 16, 2019.
  4. ↑ a b c d e Fränkische Nachrichten: Flood catastrophe with devastating effects. The disaster came with lightning and thunder . June 23, 1984. Made available online on the website of the Heimat- und Kulturverein Dittwar at www.hkvdittwar.de. Retrieved August 23, 2019.
  5. ↑ a b Südwest Presse : "Nothing like gone". Destroyed houses, dead cattle in the streets: within minutes on June 21, 1984, entire villages sank in a brown liquid. The flood in the Main-Tauber district sparked a wave of helpfulness . June 21, 2014. Online at www.swp.de. Retrieved August 22, 2019.
  6. ↑ a b c d e f Anton Rupp: Failure of the Gissigheim dam . In: Exchange of experience in the operation of flood retention basins in Baden-Württemberg. 13th annual conference - report volume: Safety of flood retention basins, November 29, 2006 in Dotternhausen, Werkforum Holzim (Baden-Württemberg) mbH. Ministry of the Environment Baden-Württemberg, publisher: WBW Fortbildungsgesellschaft für Gewässerentwicklung mbH, Karlsruhe September 2007, ISSN  1438-3586 , pp. 7–9. (PDF; 2.7 MB)
  7. ↑ Impact Project: Karl Broich: Procedure for the hydraulic calculation of dike and dam breaches , see Table 3.1 on p. 9, (PDF; 665 kB). Online at www.impact-project.net. Retrieved August 16, 2019.
  8. ↑ a b c d e District Office of the Main-Tauber-District (1984): Documentation of the severe weather catastrophe in the Main-Tauber-District , p. 3.
  9. ↑ a b Franconian news: 7,000 victims . June 23, 1984. Made available online on the website of the Heimat- und Kulturverein Dittwar at www.hkvdittwar.de. Retrieved August 23, 2019.
  10. ↑ a b District Office of the Main-Tauber-District (1984): Documentation of the severe weather catastrophe in the Main-Tauber-District , p. 4.
  11. ↑ a b c d e District Office of the Main-Tauber-District (1984): Documentation of the severe weather catastrophe in the Main-Tauber-District , p. 5.
  12. ↑ a b Franconian news: Geile Gaffer . June 25, 1984. Made available online on the website of the Heimat- und Kulturverein Dittwar at www.hkvdittwar.de. Retrieved August 23, 2019.
  13. ↑ a b c District Office of the Main-Tauber-District (1984): Documentation of the severe weather catastrophe in the Main-Tauber-District , p. 6.
  14. ↑ a b District Office of the Main-Tauber-District (1984): Documentation of the severe weather catastrophe in the Main-Tauber-District , p. 7.
  15. ↑ a b c d District Office of the Main-Tauber-District (1984): Documentation of the severe weather catastrophe in the Main-Tauber-District , p. 8.