Hans Hedtoft (ship)

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Hans Hedtoft p1
Ship data
flag Denmark
Ship type Combined ship
Callsign OXKA
home port Copenhagen
Shipping company The Kongelige Grønlandske Handel
Shipyard Frederikshavn Værft , Frederikshavn
Build number 226
Keel laying December 28, 1957
Launch August 13, 1958
takeover 17th December 1958
Commissioning January 7, 1959
Whereabouts Sunk on January 30, 1959
Ship dimensions and crew
length
83 m ( Lüa )
width 14 m
Draft Max. 6.4 m
measurement 2875 BRT
1368 NRT
 
crew 40 men
Machine system
machine 1 six-cylinder two-stroke diesel engine ( B&W )
indicated
performance
Template: Infobox ship / maintenance / service format
2,900 hp (2,133 kW)
Top
speed
14 kn (26 km / h)
propeller 1 propeller
Transport capacities
Load capacity 1791 dw
Permitted number of passengers 60
Berths for passengers 60

The Hans Hedtoft was a combined ship built in 1958 by Den Kongelige Grønlandske Handel (KGH). Denmark's most modern ship, declared unsinkable at the time, sank on January 30, 1959 on its return voyage from its maiden voyage in a collision with an iceberg , killing all 95 people on board. The shipwreck was never found. Due to its causes and consequences, the sinking of the Hans Hedtoft plays an important role in Danish and Greenlandic maritime and political history.

prehistory

The development of Greenland shipping

Greenland has belonged to what was then Denmark-Norway since 1721 . With the founding of the KGH in 1774, regular trade between Greenland and Denmark by ship became more important. Since 1797 the KGH operated continuously shipping between Denmark and the arctic colony. The weather in the North Atlantic is inconsistent and sudden storms and ice can make sea travel difficult, especially in winter. The KGH's initially used sailing ships could not operate between Denmark and Greenland in winter. In 1887 a steamship was first used for the KGH with the Hvidbjørnen , which sank in 1895 after it was trapped in the ice and the hull destroyed. Everyone on board survived. The Castor was bought as a replacement and disappeared without a trace on its second voyage in 1896 with the crew. In 1927 the KGH received the first motor ship with the disco . It was not until 1940 that a ship sailed between Denmark and Greenland for the first time in winter. In 1942, during the Second World War , the KGH lost two more merchant ships, the Gertrud Rask and the Hans Egede . Since 1952, the Umanak, built in 1949, was the first time a ship operated regularly between Denmark and Greenland, even in winter.

Discussion about winter traffic

On December 15, 1956, the KGH commissioned a new ship from the shipyard in Frederikshavn to cope with the increasing transport volume. After the KGH's Umanak ran into distress twice in January and February 1957 , killing a sailor, strong doubts arose as to whether shipping would be responsible in winter. However, the KGH under Director Hans C. Christiansen and the Greenland Ministry under the leadership of Minister Johannes Kjærbøl considered it harmless. Opposed to this were the opinions of the captains, above all Otto Andreas Møller, who led the Umanak in the winter of 1957, and the Greenlandic Folketing member Augo Lynge . He asked Kjærbøl in parliament whether, in view of the events surrounding the Umanak, he still considered it responsible to allow ships to sail between Greenland and Denmark in winter because the chances of survival in the event of a sinking were very slim. Kjærbøl replied that the KGH was only continuing what the Americans had started during the Second World War, when the Third Reich occupied Denmark, but that year-round freight and passenger transport by ship had meanwhile become indispensable. With specially equipped and modern ships, this can be carried out relatively safely even in winter. Augo Lynge was not satisfied with the minister's answer and asked why air traffic could not be carried out even if it were more costly, since it was about the safety of human life. Civil aviation in Greenland was just beginning to develop at that time. Johannes Kjærbøl then got personal and said that Augo Lynge's stay on the Umanak must have made quite an impression on him, but that he himself had been on the route many times in strong hurricanes and the most adverse weather conditions. However, it never came to a catastrophe; the whole thing is only done for the benefit of the Greenlanders. Ultimately, Kjærbøl prevailed and the KGH commissioned a ship whose safety precautions should make the ship unsinkable even in winter at Cape Farvel . In May 1957 Johannes Kjærbøl was replaced as Greenland Minister in the course of the Folketing election by Kai Lindberg .

ship

The 1956 commissioned Hans Hedtoft was in Frederikshavn on 28 December 1957 under the hull number 226 to set keel . The ship measured 2875 GRT , was almost 83 m long, 14 m wide and had a draft of 6.4 m. The engine was manufactured by the Danish company Burmeister & Wain and could bring the ship to a speed of up to 14 knots. It could accommodate 60 passengers along with goods and around 40 crew members.

The Hans Hedtoft was specially built for winter use, as Kjærbøl had requested. For this purpose, the hull of the ship had a reinforced stern , a double bottom and seven compartments, which were separated by six bulkheads . The construction work should reduce water ingress in the event of an ice collision and prevent sinking. Due to the measures, the ship was declared unsinkable, which is why it was the pride of the Greenlandic fleet.

The ship also had three light metal lifeboats for 35 people each, which alone would have been enough for everyone on board. There was also a launch and four inflatable boats for 12 people each. In the event of an emergency, theoretically all passengers and crew members could have been evacuated from the ship without any problems.

On August 13, 1958, the ship was completed after around seven and a half months of construction. Several test drives were then undertaken before the Hans Hedtoft was handed over to the KGH on December 17th. She received her license five days later. The ship was named after the Danish politician Hans Hedtoft , who was Danish Minister of State from 1947 to 1950 and from 1953 until his death in 1955 .

The Hans Hedtoft as a warship

Unknown to the public and parliament at the time was the fact that the ship was also built as a warship . The Danish Ministry of Defense had insisted that, in the event of war, an appropriately equipped ship could keep supplies to the Danish military in Greenland . Denmark lost control of Greenland during World War II, which was supplied by the United States during this period (see Greenland in World War II ). For this purpose, three 40 mm anti-aircraft guns could be mounted on the ship . There was also an ammunition room on board. The cannons had been tested in advance and then dismantled for camouflage and stowed in the hold.

The KGH's vice director, Magnus Jensen, strongly opposed the ministry's plans, mainly because he saw that Denmark wanted to secure a warship for active use in arctic waters, but could not get it. Eske Brun , who at the time was Head of the Greenland Administration in the Greenland Ministry, supported the Ministry of Defense's plans. However, because Kai Lindberg did not want to submit an application for funding to parliament for the secret plans, KGH director Hans C. Christiansen finally decided to pay the additional costs of 24,000 Danish kroner from the KGH, while the Ministry of Defense financed the cannons.

Maiden voyage

On January 7, 1959, the Hans Hedtoft made her maiden voyage from Copenhagen to Qaqortoq . The ship should be led by the 57-year-old captain Poul Ludvig Rasmussen. The officers on board were Helge Bantz (first officer), Hans Richard Jacobsen (second officer) and Ulf Kaulbach (third officer). Carl Dejligbjerg was the radio operator. Bantz in particular was valued for his navigational skills. Captain Rasmussen was one of the few captains who fully supported the winter traffic.

It was planned that the ship would reach Qaqortoq on January 13th, which would have set a speed record. The ship should then continue to Nuuk , which it should call on January 18th. The next stop was planned to be Sisimiut , which was to be reached another five days later on January 23rd. From there, the Hans Hedtoft should turn around, head south again and reach Maniitsoq as the last stop on January 25th . The arrival in Copenhagen was scheduled for January 29, the fourth anniversary of Hans Hedtoft's death.

On January 7th, the Hans Hedtoft left Copenhagen punctually at 10 a.m. with 55 passengers on board. The ship entered Qaqortoq on the morning of January 14th. Even if the ship had taken a day longer than planned, the Hans Hedtoft had nevertheless set a speed record on the route and the crew was welcomed as heroes in Qaqortoq. The ship then continued to Nuuk, where it arrived one day early, on January 17th. Sisimiut was also reached one day early on January 22nd. Two days later, the ship ran into Maniitsoq - a day earlier than planned - and the maiden voyage was over.

At this point in time it had already been determined that the ship was rolling excessively , but this was attributed to the construction method and no safety risks were seen in this observation.

Return trip

Start of the journey

Although the Hans Hedtoft was not due to return to Copenhagen from Maniitsoq until January 29, it left the place on January 26 to make a stopover in Qaqortoq. Qaqortoq was reached on January 28th and the ship was loaded there. On January 29th at 9:15 p.m., the Hans Hedtoft again left Qaqortoq with 55 passengers and 40 crew members under the same command and drove towards Copenhagen. The weather was good at this point. It was slightly cloudy, the wind was blowing with a force of about four to five Beaufort and the temperature was about −3 ° C.

The following night at 3 a.m. local time, the ship was about 45 km southwest of Nanortalik at position 59 ° 54 'N, 45 ° 54' W (→ map) with a course to the southeast at a speed of 10 to 12 knots at low speeds Wind and good visibility of about 10 nautical miles. The next report was made at 9 a.m. when the ship was about 36 km south-southwest of Narsarmijit at position 59 ° 42 ′ N, 44 ° 54 ′ W (→ map) . It was reported that snow had set in, a fresh breeze was blowing and visibility had dropped to less than a nautical mile. Because of this, the crew slowed the ship down to 7 to 9 knots. However, afterwards the speed may have increased again to 13 knots. At 11 o'clock the Hans Hedtoft reported open water with some ice floes in the sea. At 1:32 p.m., the Ikerasassuaq weather station at the entrance of the Prins Christian Sund received the message that everything was okay.

Downfall

At 1:50 p.m. the radio station in Qaqortoq received an emergency report from Hans Hedtoft , and at 1:56 p.m. the crew radioed SOS . The report that the ship had collided with an iceberg about 60 km southeast of Cape Farvel at position 59 ° 30 ′ N, 43 ° 00 ′ W (→ map) was received in Ikerasassuaq. Radio operator Carl Dejligbjerg announced that the antenna system had been damaged in the collision, but he was able to repair it quickly. Another SOS report was issued at 14:10 and at 14:41 when it was reported that the engine room was filling with water due to a leak. At 14:44, the Hans Hedtoft radioed the German fishing protection boat Poseidon and asked for help. Three minutes later the answer came that the German trawler Johannes Krüss was closer and would come to help. His position was given as 59 ° 25 'N, 42 ° 30' W (→ map) , which was about 30 km east-southeast of the point where Hans Hedtoft had sent the first SOS report. After a few minutes of communication with Johannes Krüss , Hans Hedtoft again asked Poseidon for help. At 4:10 p.m. the Hans Hedtoft reported a large amount of ice floes on request and at 4:14 p.m. the Johannes Krüss also radioed the Hans Hedtoft and to Ikerasassuaq that snow drifts, ice and heavy seas could reach the Hans Hedtoft at a speed of 10 Would only make knots possible in an hour or two. 16:41 who asked Johannes Krüss the Hans Hedtoft to the firing of flares . Shortly after 5 p.m., several signal rockets were fired, which, however , were reported as not seen by Johannes Krüss . At this point the power on board the Hans Hedtoft had already failed. At 5:21 p.m. Johannes Krüss turned its headlights into the sky, but Hans Hedtoft noted that they could not see them either. At 17:41 it was reported that the ship was now slowly sinking. At 5:45 p.m., there was another report from Johannes Krüss that the sea was full of ice and that the journey was difficult. At the same time, Canadian planes flew over the area, which were seen by Hans Hedtoft . At 6:06 p.m. a last, indistinct signal was received, which was interpreted as "We are sinking now." The Johannes Krüss then asked about the Hans Hedtoft , but received no answer.

Assumptions about the course of the accident

The crew of the Hans Hedtoft had hardly reported more detailed information about the accident and the damage. There is no doubt, however, that at least both engine rooms were flooded, if not more of the rooms, because the iceberg tore several holes in the hull or destroyed the bulkheads. The flooding of a single room - including the main engine room - would have enabled the ship to continue its journey because of the spare engine room.

L. Coulet-Svendsen, who worked as a ship inspector for the KGH, assumed that visibility was so poor that the crew did not see the iceberg for a long time and only then tried to avoid it. As with the Titanic, the ship touched the iceberg sideways and suffered significantly more fatal damage than if it had simply hit the iceberg. Willy Nielsen, who worked as a radio operator in Qaqortoq, claimed that the radar system on board the Hans Hedtoft was damaged and only worked within a radius of two nautical miles. This could also be the reason why the crew did not see the iceberg. It was also assumed that because of the swell, the temperatures and the associated icing, no lifeboats could be launched and the people on board had sunk along with the ship.

During the spark, Carl Dejligbjerg was certain that the Johannes Krüss would reach the point quickly and that all persons on board could have left the sinking ship directly. This may also be the reason why no lifeboats had been launched. The people on board were calm, as they too expected an imminent rescue. Hans Boisen, who radioed the Hans Hedtoft from Qaqortoq , said later that the ship ended up filling up with water very quickly over the upper decks and capsizing, which is why Dejligbjerg could hardly send the last message that was no longer clearly understandable.

Victim

Memorial plaque to the victims of the sinking in Copenhagen

95 people died on board the Hans Hedtoft . Of these, 40 were crew members and 55 were passengers. Among the passengers were the Greenland Folketing member Augo Lynge, who was a staunch opponent of winter shipping and had barely escaped death on the Umanak , and Carl Egede , who had been in Grønlands Landsråd since 1955 . Both were on their way to the KGH board meeting. Anders Thybo Berthelsen, the manager of the Ikerasassuaq station, with which the Hans Hedtoft communicated, was also on board the ship with his four-year-old son Peter. While the crew came from Denmark, the passengers were Danish and Greenlanders in roughly equal proportions. 19 people on board were women and six were children.

losses

In addition to the passengers and crew members, there were also goods on board the Hans Hedtoft . A large part of the total of around 958 t of transported goods consisted of salt fish (444 t), frozen goods (205 t) and shrimp and fish meal (88 t). However, there were also 249 boxes with irreplaceable historical documents on board. A third of the entire then Greenland National Archives were to be moved to the Rigsarkivet in Copenhagen. When the ship went down, the entire South Greenland inspectorate archive until 1933 and numerous church registers from 1780 were lost forever.

search

The first hours

Immediately after receiving the emergency call in Ikerasassuaq, the rescue operation was coordinated in the former US naval station Grønnedal (Kangilinnguit) under the direction of the chief of Grønland's command , Johannes Jegstrup , and the former Greenland governor, police superintendent Carl Frederik Bistrup Simony .

The Johannes Krüss reached the crash site around 19.30 and cruised the area to about 22 am, found there but nothing more. The radio operator later assumed that the hurricane had driven the ship up to 25 nautical miles before it sank, and that Hans Hedtoft's position information no longer corresponded to the real position on which the Johannes Krüss was looking. Another possibility was that the captain had inadvertently given incorrect coordinates on his emergency call. The specified position 59 ° 30 ′ N, 43 ° 00 ′ W corresponds to a decimal 59.50 ° N, 43.00 ° W. It is possible that Captain Rasmussen is actually 59.05 ° N, 43.00 ° W (→ map ) meant and had installed a number rotator . This is supported by the fact that the KGH announced that the route of their ships would not run so close to the coast. Numerous bearings during the sinking led to contradicting results, so that it is not entirely clear where the Hans Hedtoft really sank.

No other ship reached the scene of the accident in the next few hours. The ships in the area later reported that at the time of the accident, large amounts of ice, 7 to 11 m high waves and wind force 10 to 12 had made it impossible to reach the Hans Hedtoft .

The next days

Numerous other ships and aircraft from the USA, Canada, Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands took part in the search for the remains of Hans Hedtoft or survivors in lifeboats in the following days . Several hours after the disappearance of the Hans Hedtoft, the German trawler Justus Haslinger reported an object around 1,600 m away on the radar screen.

On January 31, the Johannes Krüss reported that she had seen a piece of wood floating in the water, which she could not bring on board because of the rough sea. In the afternoon the Johannes Krüss had to leave the area because the fuel was running out. After consultation with the Campell , she set a course for Labrador , but followed the drift route of Hans Hedtoft to look for wreckage and lifeboats. The Faroese trawler Teisten reached the area around 8 p.m. The Poseidon , the American Campbell and the Umanak of the KGH were in the vicinity, but could still not reach the scene of the accident.

The next day the wind turned and pushed the ice north again. The three ships finally reached the area on February 1st. On the same day, an airplane discovered a larger object in the water that could have been a lifeboat. The Teisten and the Umanak landed in Narsarmijit and Grønnedal on the same day. At 5:05 p.m., several places in Greenland received incomprehensible Morse Code, which led to the assumption that a shipwrecked person who did not know Morse code could have sent them from a lifeboat.

On February 2, the site of the accident was finally free of ice again. At the same time, there were waves up to 9 m high in the disaster area, which made the search more difficult, which is why no ship continued to search the area for the time being. At 17:20, signals were picked up again, but they were later assigned to Campbell .

On February 3, an airplane discovered several barrels floating about 100 km west-northwest of the accident site.

On February 4, an American plane flew over an eight-meter-long wooden mast that had apparently not been in the water for long. The Umanak , the Teisten and the HJ Rink of the Greenland Ministry continued to search the site of the accident that day while the Poseidon left the area.

On February 5th, the KGH disco began looking.

After an area of ​​7,000 square nautical miles (24,000 km²) south of Cape Farvel had been searched by February 6, the search was stopped and the Hans Hedtoft was declared missing and the people on board were declared dead.

consequences

Political Consequences

The sinking of Hans Hedtoft sparked national mourning in Denmark and Greenland. After the sinking, the focus of criticism was on former Greenland Minister Johannes Kjærbøl. He had enforced the construction of the Hans Hedtoft and the winter use, mainly with the help of a declaration by the KGH captains on March 11th that they would now support the use. The suspicion quickly arose that Kjærbøl had forced the captains to sign the declaration in support of his own position. A committee was convened to clarify the background to Kjærbøl. He came to the conclusion that, contrary to his testimony, Johannes Kjærbøl had known about the masters' first declaration on 8 March and had therefore deliberately requested their consent. The opposition from Det Conservative Folkeparti , the Venstre and Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti demanded an indictment against Kjærbøl, but there were warnings. The matter had no major impact on him, as he had ended his political career with his resignation as Greenland minister anyway.

The Copenhagen Maritime and Commercial Court also did not attach any great importance to the incident and only dealt with the matter superficially. The KGH was only questioned for two hours, the captain of the Johannes Krüss and the radio operators in Qaqortoq and Ikerasassuaq not at all. A court hearing was also held in Bremerhaven . It was more precise, and when the judge in Copenhagen heard about it, he asked for the results examined there, but this did not lead to the case being reopened.

In 1964, as a direct consequence of the events surrounding Hans Hedtoft, the Ministeransvarlighedsloven (Ministerial Responsibility Act ) was passed, through which ministers could be held liable under civil law for willful or negligent incorrect exercise of office.

Continue

After the accident, the captain of the Johannes Krüss , Albert Sierck, received from King Frederik IX for his courageous commitment at risk of death. awarded the Knight's Cross of the Dannebrog Order.

There was also a new debate about the responsibility of winter shipping. Greenland Minister Kai Lindberg, who was in office at the time of the disaster, set up a committee to examine the risk for the future and to determine whether winter shipping should continue and how emergency and rescue measures in Greenland could be improved. On September 2, 1959, the committee concluded that year-round freight traffic between Denmark and Greenland was necessary, but could only be carried out on condition that security measures were taken. Passenger traffic was banned between December and February. Finally, the radio stations on the Greenland coast and the weather services were expanded for security purposes and a sea rescue base and an ice reporting station with patrol flights over the sea were set up in Narsarsuaq in order to be able to prevent such accidents in the future.

Later development

The Hans Hedtoft was lost. Only after nine months did one of their lifebuoys wash up in Iceland . It is the only object that remains from the ship. Today it hangs together with a plaque in the church of Qaqortoq. Further memorial plaques can be found in Copenhagen and Nanortalik since 2005. Fifty years after the accident, commemorative ceremonies took place in Greenland and Denmark. Remembrance services were also held in Nuuk and Copenhagen in 2019 on the 60th anniversary of the disaster.

In 2003 the marine historian Thomas de Richelieu initiated a project to search for the wreck of the Hans Hedtoft , mainly because it was hard to imagine that the experienced captain Rasmussen had caused the collision with the iceberg by a navigation error. The project received support from the Greenland government in 2004 . In 2005 an attempt was made to spend two weeks on the Galathea 3 expedition looking for the wreck. The proposal was turned down, but when the Vædderen carrying the expedition passed the site on their planned route, two hours were spent on a search for the wreck, which, as expected from a superficial search, yielded no results were. To date, no expedition has been carried out exclusively to locate the wreck of the Hans Hedtoft .

meaning

The sinking of the Hans Hedtoft is still one of the largest Danish shipwrecks and one of the most lossy ship sinkings caused by an iceberg. Because of the many parallels to the RMS Titanic (iceberg, sinking shortly after construction, supposed unsinkability), Hans Hedtoft also speaks of the "Danish Titanic". The loss of important state documents, the political framework before and after the disaster and, last but not least, the effects on the Greenland-Danish traffic and transport conditions make Hans Hedtoft one of the most important chapters in Greenland and Danish shipping history.

literature

  • Lars Halskov, Morten Halskov: Skibet der forsvandt: Historien om Hans Hedtofts gådefulde forlis . Politics Forlag, 2009, ISBN 978-87-400-2089-2 .
  • Jan Schmidt: Hans Hedtoft . Refueling, 1996, ISBN 87-985929-0-4 .
  • Thomas Rockwell: I de bedste hænder: Historien om M / S Hans Hedtofts forlis . Aschehoug, 2002, ISBN 87-11-16284-8 .
  • Rasmus Dahlberg: Danske katastrofer: atomic bombs in Valby and other dramatiske hændelser . Gyldendal, 2014, ISBN 978-87-02-16156-4 , chapter 15. Forlist med mand og mus: Hans Hedtofts forlis January 30, 1959.
  • Ove Baks article collection . Archival collection in the Groenlandica

Web links

  • Website of the Hans Hedtoft project

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d The sinking of the "Hans Hedtoft" / OXKA (2) at seefunknetz.de
  2. Søskælv årsag til Hvidbjørnens forlis at pleasure.borsen.dk
  3. Uforsvarligt at sejle til Grønland i vintertiden in Vestkysten from January 31, 1959
  4. a b c d e f g h René Lynge, Henrik Groes-Petersen: Katastrofen ved Cape Farvel in the Politiken of January 24, 1999 (PDF; 17.75 MB)
  5. Hans Hedtoft at vaerfthistorisk-selskab.dk
  6. Hans Hedtoft at faergelejet.dk
  7. Hans Hedtoft at jmarcussen.dk
  8. a b Project Hans Hedtoft at hanshedtoft.dk
  9. Byggenr. 226 at hanshedtoft.dk
  10. The ship - lost on its maiden voyage at qaqortoq.gl (archived)
  11. Rejse no. 1 at hanshedtoft.dk
  12. Forliset at hanshedtoft.dk
  13. a b c radio communication at hanshedtoft.dk
  14. a b c Intet Spor af Hans Hedtoft - Intet Spor af 95 Danskere in Jyllands-Posten from February 1, 1959 ( title page , page 2 , page 8 , page 9 )
  15. a b c Helge Schultz-Lorentzen: M / S Hans Hedtoft. Skibskatastrofen ved Cape Farvel in memoriam 40 år efter in the Tidsskriftet Grønland . Issue 1/1999.
  16. 19 kvinder og seks børn blandt de ombordværende in Vestkysten from January 31, 1959
  17. M / S Hans Hedtoft at katak.gl
  18. a b c d The sinking of the "Hans Hedtoft" / OXKA (I) at seefunknetz.de
  19. ^ Ingen contact med Hans Hedtoft in Politiken of January 31, 1959
  20. ^ "No hope for passengers of the 'Hans Hedtoft'" in Pforzheimer Zeitung of February 2, 1959, p. 1
  21. a b c d e f "Hans Hedtoft" s forlis in the special edition of the Atuagagdliutit from February 7, 1959
  22. Knækket skibsmast på katastrofestedet ud for Cape Farvel in Vestkysten from February 5, 1959
  23. Skibskatastrofen of the rystede Grindsted at jv.dk
  24. Til minde om "Hans Hedtoft" at kristeligt-dagblad.dk
  25. ^ Minimum for "Hans Hedtoft" -forliset at nordjyske.dk
  26. ^ Hans Hedtoft in Den Store Danske
  27. Mindedag med tårer at fagbladet3f.dk
  28. Kirker markerer 60-året for Hans Hedtoft-forlis at knr.gl
  29. Hvorfor? at hanshedtoft.dk
  30. bagged at hanshedtoft.dk
  31. Galathea3 forsøget at hanshedtoft.dk