Greifswald nuclear power plant

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Greifswald nuclear power plant
The Greifswald nuclear power plant 2005
The Greifswald nuclear power plant 2005
location
Greifswald nuclear power plant (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania)
Greifswald nuclear power plant
Coordinates 54 ° 8 '26 "  N , 13 ° 39' 52"  E Coordinates: 54 ° 8 '26 "  N , 13 ° 39' 52"  E
Country: GermanyGermany Germany
Data
Owner: Disposal works for nuclear plants
Operator: Disposal works for nuclear plants
Project start: 1967
Commercial operation: July 12, 1974
Shutdown: July 22, 1990

Decommissioned reactors (gross):

5 (2200 MW)

Construction discontinued (gross):

3 (1320 MW)
Energy fed in in 1989: 10,678 GWh
Energy fed in since commissioning: 134,212 GWh
The data source of the respective entries can be found in the documentation .
f1

The decommissioned Greifswald nuclear power plant (more precisely: Lubmin nuclear power plant , also: North nuclear power plant ) was located in the municipality of the Lubmin seaside resort near Greifswald and was the larger of the two operated nuclear power plants in the GDR . The nuclear power plant was officially called VE Kombinat Kernkraftwerke ' Bruno Leuschner ' Greifswald . It was gradually put into operation from 1974, shut down in 1990, finally shut down in 1995 and has been being demolished ever since. Today's owners are the disposal works for nuclear facilities , which also operate the neighboring intermediate storage facility in the north .

history

The inside of the reactor block 6 (holding device for the control rods and fuel rods)
A control room in June 2007

Construction of the NPP (units 1 to 4)

Even before the GDR's first commercial 70 MW test reactor Rheinsberg was completed and commissioned in 1966, an intergovernmental agreement was signed between the GDR and the USSR on July 14, 1965 for the construction and delivery of a second nuclear power plant with around 2000 MW of electrical output in the GDR the core components for it closed from the USSR.

As part of a location selection process, Lubmin near Greifswald was favored. The reasons for this were the year-round sufficient supply of cooling water from the Baltic Sea, the low agricultural utility value of the areas and the low settlement density, which were intended to minimize the effects of an accident. On the other hand, the great distance between the north of the GDR and the power consumption centers in the south and the resulting transmission losses spoke.

Development of the site began in 1967 and, from 1969, the actual construction of four reactor blocks of the type WWER -440/230, the main contractor was VEB BMK Coal and Energy . The construction of the first four blocks took place in the internationally usual time frame, whereby at the 14th meeting of the Central Committee of the SED from December 9th to 11th, 1970, it was criticized that the costs of the project were twice as much as the accounting. Commercial power operation began in Block 1 in 1974, Block 2 in 1975, Block 3 in 1978 and Block 4 in 1979. From then on, the first four blocks covered around 10% of the GDR's electricity needs.

Extension by four more blocks (blocks 5 to 8)

In the mid-1970s, the decision was made to expand the nuclear power plant by a further four units with a net output of 408 MW, which should go into operation after 1980. In units 5 to 8, the reactor type WWER-440/ 213 , which has been significantly improved, particularly in terms of safety, was used. B. has several redundant main cooling lines, a revised emergency cooling system with at least theoretical control of large coolant losses as well as wet condensation and is still operated today in several countries of the former Council for Mutual Economic Aid.

The completion of the new blocks was significantly delayed due to delays in delivery by Soviet heavy industry and quality defects in the components supplied and those manufactured in the GDR. After urgent complaints in Moscow about the non-compliance with the supply contracts, the GDR leadership was informed by the Ministry of Atomic Energy that “under the new conditions of the economic management in the USSR, it has no compelling options that are compatible with the bilateral government agreements on the construction of nuclear power plants in to enforce the obligations entered into by the GDR vis-à-vis Soviet associations and companies. "

Unit 5 did not begin trial operation until 1989, unit 6 was completed in 1990, but no longer loaded with fuel elements.

Roll in the winter of 1978/79

During the snow catastrophe in northern Germany in 1978 , the Greifswald nuclear power plant was the only large power plant in the GDR that delivered electricity at full capacity. During these days, due to impassable roads, some of the personnel were brought to work by army helicopters or picked up from there. Many lignite-fired power plants ran with reduced output or failed because they often had only small supplies and the high-water content coal froze on the way.

Construction of the district heating line

In 1982 the construction of a district heating extraction system began. From 1983 and 1984, 75 MW district heating could be extracted from units 1, 2, 3 and 4, thus supplying around 14,000 apartments and some industrial companies.

Delayed maintenance measures in the late 1980s

The VVER 440/230 reactors in units 1 to 4, with their design from the late 1960s, did not meet the standards customary in the 1980s in a number of safety aspects. In addition to fundamental conceptual weaknesses, the State Office for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection of the GDR observed the increasing embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessels in units 1 to 4 (see section below) with great concern. As part of a large-scale reconstruction of units 1 to 4, an approximation of the standard international safety level and reliable operation for the remaining life of the reactors should be achieved and ensured. However, the project did not advance because of the lack of cooperation between the Soviet authorities. In the course of the 1980s, the condition of the plant deteriorated so much that the supervisory authority demanded an immediate reconstruction for Unit 1 in May 1987, as otherwise the operation would not be justifiable in terms of safety:

"[...] [the increasing embrittlement of the weld seams], which can lead to the breakage of the reactor pressure vessel and thus to a catastrophic, uncontrollable incident in which large amounts of radionuclides are released into the environment. [...] The SKG emphatically points out that the restarting of Unit 1 of the "Bruno Leuschner" Greifswald NPP after the end of the 1986/87 campaign without the implementation of the planned reconstruction measures is not justifiable in terms of safety. "

Against the background of the worsening energy crisis in the GDR, the Politburo postponed the modernization measures for the Greifswald nuclear power plant on June 30, 1987. The reactor block 1 was started up again contrary to the demands of the safety authority. At least the thermal treatment of the reactor pressure vessel to heal the embrittlement of the weld seams was carried out a year later.

The future of Units 1 to 4 of the Greifswald nuclear power plant was controversial within the GDR leadership. While the Central Committee of the SED decided on the large-scale reconstruction of reactor units 1 to 4 on May 30, 1989, the State Office for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection was of the opinion to Soviet authorities that “a reconstruction in the 1990s, in which a considerable difference to the international status remains, cannot be approved, but the blocks should be shut down ”. On this issue, too, the formally independent supervisory authority ultimately had to bow to the party line and support the planned reconstruction.

Shutdown in the turning point

With the report “Zeitbombe Greifswald” published on February 1, 1990 in the magazine “Der Spiegel”, safety deficiencies in the Greifswald nuclear power plant (“Chernobyl North”) became public for the first time. In addition to a list of previously unpublished incidents and a reference to the embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessels, the article also contained claims about uncontrolled corrosion problems in the reactor pressure vessel and problematic fluid mechanics in the reactor core due to oversized main circulation pumps. The latter two problems were contradicted in a safety report published later by the Society for Reactor Safety (GRS).

With the help of Soviet and French experts, GRS began inspecting the nuclear power plant in early 1990 in the course of reunification . In addition to general safety-related deficiencies in all four blocks such as the lack of redundancy for the emergency cooling of the reactors, the failure to control a break in the main coolant line and the lack of containment or wet condensation, the serious safety concerns resulting from the embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessels (see section below) for units 2 and 3 to a temporary closure recommendation in February 1990. This was promptly followed by the GDR agencies.

Block 4 was shut down in the early summer of 1990 for the upcoming revision and no longer put into operation. The GDR government decided on June 1, 1990 on the basis of an expert opinion by GRS that blocks 1 to 4 could be brought to a level that could be approved under German law and should therefore be switched off at unreasonable costs. To supply the facilities connected by district heating, Unit 1 remained in operation until December 17, 1990 and was the last to be switched off immediately after a temporary oil boiler was put into operation. Since 1995, district heating has been largely supplied by gas-powered combined heat and power plants .

On November 17, 1990, the trial operation of Unit 5 was also prohibited. This VVER-440/213 reactor could have been upgraded to a security level corresponding to the West German Atomic Energy Act with retrofitting of the safety systems, but no West German energy company was willing to take on the cost and approval risk for Unit 5 (and 6). The retrofitting costs would have amounted to approx. 50 million marks each for units 5 and 6 and, according to a former employee, would have been earned again after 6 months of operation.

The plant came into the focus of the public again when in 1996, amid protests by Greenpeace, 235 unused fuel elements were delivered to the Hungarian Paks nuclear power plant with reactors of the same design.

Dismantling

In the following years, a dismantling concept was developed to dismantle the power plant with the help of part of its core workforce. On June 30, 1995, the concept was approved and the nuclear power plant was officially shut down. At that time, the cost of the demolition was estimated at three to five billion euros. The disposal of radioactive waste was made until 1998 in the Morsleben repository . By 2007, 2.5 billion euros had already been invested. In 2012, the dismantling should be completed and the status "green field" achieved.

In April 2012 it was reported that the operator was planning a combination of immediate dismantling and safe containment in order to save costs : Most of the facilities should be demolished immediately, but the buildings should remain standing for another 50 years and will only be dismantled when the radionuclides have subsided are. Environmentalists criticize that this unnecessarily delayed the dismantling.

In February 2013 it was announced that the main dismantling activities should be completed in 2015. In 2015 there was a change in strategy: While the buildings were originally supposed to remain standing for 50 years, it has now been decided to Template: future / in 5 yearsdemolish all buildings by 2028 .

Of the approximately 10,000 people who worked at the power plant during operating hours, approximately 1,000 are still employed today. You are responsible for the dismantling and disposal of the nuclear plant components at the disposal works for nuclear plants . Since the power plant was closed, a large number of the prefabricated housing estates built for the workers of the power plant in the east of Greifswald have been dismantled.

Safety aspects of the system

The nuclear reactors in Greifswald come from Soviet production and have some special features compared to western pressurized water reactors:

Embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessels (blocks 1 to 4)

Cross-section through the reactor pressure vessel of a WWER-440 - the red marking indicates the weld seam affected by embrittlement

In all types of VVER-440 reactors, the fuel elements are positioned very close to the wall of the reactor pressure vessel. As a result, neutrons produced during nuclear fission only travel a short distance in the water, are accordingly slowed down slightly and hit the wall of the reactor pressure vessel with high energy. As a result of the neutron entry, the steel changes its material properties and tends to break brittle with increasing irradiation.

The weld 0.1.4 has proven to be a critical weak point. (see figure on the right) in the middle of the reactor pressure vessel. From experiments with hanging samples u. a. It is known from the Loviisa nuclear power plant in Finland that the embrittlement of the seam is three times as fast as was predicted when the systems were planned. An excessively high copper and phosphorus concentration in the material of the weld seam is suspected to be the cause. Technically, one describes the embrittlement through the 'brittle fracture transition temperature' - above this temperature a material tends to elastic deformation, below this a brittle fracture can suddenly occur in cracks in the material .

In the case of a reactor running at full load, which requires a rapid shutdown with borated water due to a technical defect, the thermal shock when the emergency borehole water is introduced can cool the reactor pressure vessel below the brittle fracture transition temperature and thus cause it to burst.

As a preventive countermeasure, the reactor core can be provided with shielding cassettes to reduce the entry of neutrons into the weld seam. Furthermore, the reactor developer OKB Gidropress recommended as early as 1984 to preheat the disaster borne water in order to reduce the thermal shock in the event of an emergency shutdown. This retrofitting was omitted in the Greifswald nuclear power plant. If the weld seam has already become brittle, the pressure vessel can be healed by tempering at almost 500 ° C and the original material properties can be largely restored.

Passive safety reserves

The VVER-440/230 reactors of units 1 to 4 and the further developed second generation VVER-440/213 (units 5 to 8) have a clear advantage over West German pressurized water reactors such as the convoy in terms of emergency cooling or the dissipation of decay heat greater passive safety reserves. The primary circuit of a VVER-440 reactor contains approx. 160% of the amount of water in relation to the thermal output compared to a convoy reactor and in the secondary circuit three times the amount of water. In the event of a total failure of the power supply, these large coolant reserves enable the decay heat to be dissipated over a period of approx. 7 hours and thus considerably extend the time window for responding to incidents. In this respect, the short-term failure of all cooling pumps in a VVER-440 reactor is far less critical than it would be in a western-style reactor.

Accident

Demonstration in February 1990 in Berlin against the Greifswald nuclear power plant

On December 7, 1975, an electrician wanted to show his apprentice how to bypass electrical circuits . This resulted in a short circuit on the low-voltage side of reserve transformer 1 of block 1. The short-circuit current caused a cable fire. The fire in the main cable duct destroyed the power supply and the control lines of five of the six main coolant pumps. The sixth happened to be connected to the power circuit of the neighboring reactor and ensured that the reactor core was kept cool. The fire was quickly brought under control by the plant fire brigade and the power supply to the pumps was provisionally restored, as countermeasures were taken immediately after the fire occurred and the operating team made the right decisions at all times of the accident. After this near-disaster, measures to improve fire protection within the power plant were proposed and "spatial separation" was introduced for safety-relevant facilities, which took several weeks; each main coolant pump received its own separate power supply. The fire protection measures were only implemented eleven years after the 1975 incident, and in the meantime there has been at least one other fire (1977 in a water treatment plant). The incident of 1975 was only made public after the fall of the Wall in 1989 on television and in Der Spiegel (including the February 1, 1990 issue). The IAEA was informed by Soviet authorities just a few hours after the incident . The accident was first classified in INES  4, later corrected in INES 3 (precursor to an accident, here a “station blackout” melting scenario). The 10 percent limit for the permitted activity output has not been exceeded. Subsequent evaluations of the processes by a government commission and the IAEA's confirmation of the conclusions drawn by the commission show that an experienced operating team can compensate for system-related weak points. This incident was therefore also included as the standard accident scenario for VVER-440 in the simulator training in Greifswald after 1990.

The cost of the incident is estimated at $ 519 million. In this context, the costs of nuclear accidents worldwide are estimated at well over 400 billion dollars.

Quote

“In the late morning hours of December 7, 1975, shortly after 11 a.m., a cable fire broke out in the machine house. Almost two and a half hours later, the fire brigade rushed to extinguish the fire. Nonetheless, there was immediate property damage of almost 3 million marks. The nuclear power plant, which had been ceremoniously put into operation only two years earlier, failed completely, associated with a loss of energy production in the order of more than a million marks per day. The badly damaged reactor 1 could only go back on line at the end of January 1976, the reactor 2 just a few weeks after the incident. The trigger was the negligence of a 27-year-old electrician. (...)

The electrician had wanted to demonstrate switching operations in the machine house to a colleague, but did not use the prescribed special tool, only simple flat-nose pliers. His lax handling caused a short circuit which resulted in a huge cable fire in the basement of the machine house. No less than 130 kilometers of cables caught fire. In reactor 1, practically the entire control room as well as the cooling water pumps and other accident protection systems (boric acid feed) failed. An accident automatic shut down the reactor automatically. Meanwhile, there was great excitement and confusion among the staff, because if the residual heat from the shutdown reactor was not dissipated, there was a threat of a nuclear disaster. The power plant staff could not prevent the pressure in reactor 1 from overheating until the afternoon hours from rising so much that safety valves released water vapor with radioactive particles from the first circuit. A safety valve jammed and the pressure in or the cooling water level in the opened first circuit now fell threateningly. The jammed valve could only be closed again by hitting a hammer.

According to various Stasi reports, the Soviet manufacturer had already informed the power plant about the faulty safety valves several years before the incident and recommended their replacement with West German valves. Finally, restarting the cooling water pumps via an improvised emergency power supply prevented the reactor from overheating until the evening. According to the East German secret police, the nuclear power plant on the Greifswalder Bodden narrowly escaped a nuclear disaster, similar to the one that was to occur in the spring of 1979 at the US nuclear power plant Three Mile Island near Harrisburg. "

- Sebastian Stude : Electricity for the Republic - The Stasi and the Greifswald nuclear power plant , Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2018, pages 100-101

Information center

There is an information center on the site of the nuclear power plant. a. informs about the history of nuclear energy, the WWER used in Greifswald, the decommissioning, dismantling and disposal. After prior registration, there is the opportunity to visit the completed reactor block 6, which has never been loaded with fuel elements, on the “visitor route - primary circuit”. For this reason, radiation protection measures are not necessary. Original components are on display in the exhibition center and in the open spaces.

Turbine hall

All turbines and generators of the power plant were housed in a 1000 meter long hall, which was one of the longest industrial buildings in Germany.

This spatial proximity and connection was only partially canceled by the fire protection measures after the accident in 1975. However, it was still the case: The reactor blocks were, as a report from Greifswald found, "quasi in mutual local and circuit-related interference proximity". Thus, due to an accident in one of the reactors, a second would have been involved at the same time.

technology

cables

Two double-circuit 380 kV lines led to the Wolmirstedt substation and the Ahrensfelde substation near Berlin. At 287.8 kilometers, the former was the longest power line in Germany.

cooling

The power plant obtained its cooling water via an open inlet channel from the Spandowerhagener Wiek, which in turn is fed by the Peene stream. After the reactor blocks had been cooled through flow, around 20,000–40,000 m³ (1 m³ = 1 t) of cooling water per hour with a high waste heat load were fed into the Greifswalder Bodden via an open outlet channel. This made it possible to dispense with cooling towers. A small part of the heat also went to the Greifswald district heating network.

Efficiency

As is usual with nuclear power plants of this type, the degree of efficiency was around 34% in relation to pure electricity generation. However, since heat was also used as district heating for the city and process heat for industry in the cogeneration process, the degree of utilization related to the utilization of the energy stored in the uranium fuel was above this value.

Immediately before the fall of the Wall in the GDR, there were concrete plans to expand the district heating network to cities and towns such as Wolgast, the island of Riems, Wusterhusen and Stralsund.

Data of the reactor blocks

The Greifswald nuclear power plant had a total of eight units :

Reactor block Reactor type net
power 		gross
power 		start of building Network
synchronization 		Commercialization
of essential operation 		switching off
processing
Greifswald-1 (KGR 1) WWER-440/230 408 MW 440 MW 03/01/1970 December 17, 1973 07/12/1974 December 18, 1990
Greifswald-2 (KGR 2) WWER-440/230 408 MW 440 MW 03/01/1970 December 23, 1974 04/16/1975 02/14/1990
Greifswald-3 (KGR 3) WWER-440/230 408 MW 440 MW 04/01/1972 October 24, 1977 05/01/1978 02/28/1990
Greifswald-4 (KGR 4) WWER-440/230 408 MW 440 MW 04/01/1972 09/03/1979 11/01/1979 07/22/1990
Greifswald-5 (KGR 5) WWER-440/213 408 MW 440 MW December 01, 1976 04/24/1989 11/01/1989 11/24/1989
Greifswald-6 (KGR 6) WWER-440/213 408 MW 440 MW December 01, 1976 - - completed but not put into operation
Greifswald-7 (KGR 7) WWER-440/213 408 MW 440 MW December 01, 1978 Construction canceled - Abandoned 10/1/1990
Greifswald-8 (KGR 8) WWER-440/213 408 MW 440 MW December 01, 1978 Construction canceled - Abandoned 10/1/1990

See also

Web links

Commons : Greifswald nuclear power plant  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Joachim Kahlert: The nuclear energy policy in the GDR - On the history of unfulfilled hopes for progress . Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne 1988, ISBN 3-8046-8713-X , p. 151 ( uni-muenchen.de ).
  2. ↑ a b c d e Per Högselius: The German-German history of the Greifswald nuclear power plant. Atomic energy between east and west . Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag , 2005, ISBN 978-3-8305-1019-2 , pp. 127 .
  3. ↑ Stefan Wolle : The ideal world of dictatorship: everyday life and rule in the GDR 1971–1989 . Ch. Links Verlag , Berlin 2013, ISBN 978-3-86153-554-6 , p.  33 ( google.de ).
  4. ^ Joachim Kahlert: The energy policy of the GDR. Defects management between nuclear power and lignite . Vol. 92. Bonn, 1988, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft Download LMU Munich
  5. ^ A b Felix Christian Matthes: Electricity Industry and German Unity: A Case Study on the Transformation of the Electricity Industry in East Germany . ISBN 3-89811-806-1 .
  6. ↑ a b c d e Michael Hänel: The end before the end: On the role of the GDR energy industry in the system change, 1980–1990 . Download (PDF; 496 kB)
  7. ↑ Manfred Haferburg: Blackout in Germany - 40 years ago everything was too late (Part 1) , Axis of the Good , December 27, 2018.
  8. ↑ Manfred Haferburg: Blackout in Germany (Part 2) - the day on which I illuminated the Wall , Axis of the Good, December 28, 2018.
  9. ^ Power failure in the snowy winter of 1978/79 , Nordmagazin, NDR, December 22, 2018.
  10. ↑ Six days of the ice age - the catastrophic winter 1978/79 | Video | ARD media library. Accessed January 1, 2020.
  11. ↑ a b c d e f Society for Reactor Safety - Second interim report on the safety assessment of the Greifswald nuclear power plant blocks 1-4 (WWER-440 / W-230) Download
  12. ↑ Greifswald time bomb. In: Spiegel Spezial , edition 2/1990. February 1, 1990, accessed January 15, 2017 .
  13. ^ GDR nuclear power - brittle over the years. In: Der Spiegel , edition 8/1990. February 19, 1990. Retrieved January 15, 2017 .
  14. ↑ a b Nothing good is coming. In: Der Spiegel , edition 23/1990. June 4, 1990. Retrieved January 15, 2017 .
  15. ↑ a b c Journalist Academy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung eV - Time Lapse - History of the North Link NPP
  16. ↑ Matthias Brendel: Radiant scrap. In: The time . August 19, 1999, accessed January 15, 2017 .
  17. ↑ Small question about the Greifswald nuclear power plant 1994
  18. ↑ ERA Morsleben nuclear waste report , as of July 23, 2016, accessed on August 31, 2016
  19. ↑ disposal costs . In: energieverbrauch.de .
  20. ^ Deutsches Atomforum eV: Annual Report 2008 - Time for Energy Responsibility . Berlin 2009, ISSN  1868-3630 . Page 32.
  21. ↑ Stefan Schultz: AKW Lubmin - energy company plans cheap disposal for nuclear power plant. In: Spiegel Online . April 24, 2012. Retrieved January 15, 2017 .
  22. ↑ dpa / mv: Dismantling of the last major part in the Lubmin NPP started. In: The world . February 26, 2014, accessed January 15, 2017 .
  23. ↑ Dismantling of the GDR nuclear power plants - radiant coming to terms with the past . In: Deutschlandfunk . ( deutschlandfunk.de [accessed April 14, 2017]).
  24. ^ Society for Reactor Safety - Safety Assessment of the Greifswald Nuclear Power Plant, Block 5 (WWER-440 / W-213) - Download
  25. ↑ A shutdown is possible - GDR nuclear expert Helmut Rabold on the risks in the Greifswald nuclear power plant . In: Der Spiegel . No.  6 , 1990 ( online - Feb. 5, 1990 ).
  26. ↑ BMU - 2005-664, “Evaluation of personnel actions in the event of a fire, fire detection and fire fighting in German nuclear power plants”, M. Röwekamp, ​​M. Türschmann, year of publication: 2005, page 29 , ISSN  1612-6386
  27. ↑ Ruined nuclear power plants devoured billions worldwide. Billions in investments without earnings. In: Tagesschau. ARD, October 22, 2015, accessed on October 1, 2018 .
  28. ↑ https://www.ewn-gmbh.de/information/besichtigung-kernkraftwerk-egoswald/ EWN - information center
  29. ↑ Dr. G. Father: Greifswalder Bodden and anthropogenic influences ( memento from October 9, 2010 in the Internet Archive ). In: kein-kohlekraftwerk-lubmin.de . (PDF)
  30. ↑ Sabrina Wittkopf-Schade, Greifswald KOMPAKT, issues 1 and 2/2007
  31. ↑ Power Reactor Information System of the IAEA : "Germany, Federal Republic of: Nuclear Power Reactors" (English)
  32. ↑ The Radiation Protection Commission - Consultation Results - Greifswald Nuclear Power Plant (KGR), Units 1 to 6, decommissioning of the plant with dismantling of parts of the plant. Retrieved October 1, 2018 .
  33. ↑ Greifswald 6 nuclear power plant in the IAEA's PRIS ( Memento from June 4, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) (English)
  34. ↑ The reactor block was fully equipped, but not yet loaded with fuel rods.
  35. ↑ Greifswald 7 nuclear power plant in the IAEA's PRIS ( Memento from June 4, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) (English)
  36. ↑ Greifswald 8 nuclear power plant in the IAEA's PRIS ( Memento from June 4, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) (English)