Methodical culturalism

The Methodical culturalism is one of Peter Janich developed and his students philosophical mindset .

The core message is that the objects of science are not based on purely theoretical considerations, but come about through human action . Science is understood as the continuation of practical processes in everyday life and must then be systematically and methodically questioned as to whether it promotes them.

The methodical culturalism is a further development of the methodical constructivism of the Erlangen school by Paul Lorenzen and Wilhelm Kamlah . In 1996, Peter Janich and Dirk Hartmann formulated the basic ideas behind this approach. The sum of the results of human activity is understood as culture . The human being is always a member of a community of action and communication in a lifeworld (everyday) practice.

The focus is on a newly formulated theory of action , which, in addition to practical actions in the strict sense, also includes language actions and is differentiated from so-called “experiences” and “instinctive behavior”. The starting point of the theory of action is life-world action, so that science is understood as a further development and specialization of pre-scientific practice. A reconstruction of this fact takes place in the prototheories (the program of a specialist science) of physics, chemistry, biology or psychology. This results in a concept of knowledge that has the success of actions as a yardstick. Knowledge is determined pragmatically as having means for the pursued ends. The scientific theory of methodological culturalism, which, contrary to common practice, deliberately also includes technical engineering with the criterion of “cultural level” and “orderly sequence of actions”, is also justified in a pragmatic manner.

The aim of methodical culturalism is to offer a rational world orientation without pursuing the implicit metaphysical ultimate justification of naturalism , and on the other hand, against the relativism of postmodernism, to offer a guideline for a well-founded practice of the lifeworld and the sciences , including ethics . Methodical culturalism sees itself as a philosophy that is shaped by a critical and anti- universalistic (i.e. not absolutizing) way of thinking.

Critique of modern currents in philosophy

The authors see the philosophy of methodical culturalism as an alternative to naturalistic and relativistic approaches and also set themselves apart from methodical constructivism. Peter Janich originally belonged to this school.

naturalism

The founders of methodical culturalism assign a number of related positions to naturalism , the spectrum of which ranges from “everything is nature” to “naturalistic epistemology ” to the view that all explanation of the world is only possible through natural sciences. According to this, nature is realistically understood by the naturalists as a legislative (ie “the laws giving”) reality, the laws and structures of which can be uncovered and which scientists only need to read through observation.

For methodical culturalism, however, the relationship between humans and nature is determined by their actions . The results of human practice are "cultural". This term, which originated from Paul Lorenzen , is deliberately used to distinguish it from “natural” (see section culture ). Recognized nature thus becomes a culture-dependent object. Naturalistic theories of knowledge and truth have a blind spot in their perspective insofar as the criteria to be found are not a result of nature but of reflection. This applies in particular to positions such as evolutionary epistemology or the autopoiesis of radical constructivism , in which the scientist assumes the position of an external observer that is no longer questioned. For the methodical culturalist, nature is not a book that can only be read ( Augustine ), and certainly not just written in the language of mathematics ( Galileo ), as it is represented by reductionist and materialist positions. The mathematical values ​​and results of the natural sciences are determined and realized by measuring technology according to the methodical culturalism. They are also dependent on the functioning of the devices used. The data obtained in this way have neither semantics nor validity; accordingly, they do not provide any justification. For the advocates of methodical culturalism, natural laws are simply sentences that “humans” put up in order to obtain “guidelines for successful action”.

The setting of purposes, that is, the normative aspect of the natural sciences , does not come from - according to the thesis of the methodical culturalists - from these sciences themselves, but from human activity. In order to be able to consider the results of the apparatus and methods used in the natural sciences as valid, the respective underlying purposes must be methodically reconstructed. The evaluations “good” and “bad”, “right” and “wrong”, “true” and “false” are therefore standards that humans apply to nature, which they therefore do not find in nature. So natural sciences are products of human work and culture, they are not "given by nature", are not a natural consequence of "objective" observation of nature. The natural scientist is always a member of a human communication and action community who has to justify his standards. Thinking about one's own work as a scientist, dealing with one's own purposes is philosophy and not science.

relativism

Even if neither reality and knowledge nor ethical norms can be absolutely justified, this must not lead to arbitrariness from the point of view of methodical culturalism.

Methodical culturalism agrees with Thomas S. Kuhn's view that the sciences should consistently be seen as human practice and as a cultural product. The purely descriptive presentation of the history of science as paradigms and the thesis of its incompatibility ( incommensurability ) is rejected because this leads to skepticism about rationality . In particular, it justifies the thesis formulated by Paul Feyerabend with the slogan anything goes that there can be no general methodology with a specific content that rationalism can recommend to scientific practice. The position of Richard Rorty , who advocates a cultural relativism that justifies what is factually accepted in the respective cultural milieu, is viewed particularly critically . The advocates of methodological culturalism assume that epistemology must not be replaced by hermeneutics , as Rorty calls for. An “objective, scientific” standard cannot be achieved in this way.

Methodical culturalism opposes relativism with a fundamental rationality in action that demands a consistent relationship between means and ends based on the success or failure of actions . Action and (included) speaking take place in a given environment, in which the individual does not act alone (singularly), but always intersubjectively in collective work and action systems. This precludes the assumption of arbitrariness outlined above. Action is tied to pragmatic rationality and thus to a methodical order. Developments from the wheel to the pulley system to the modern transmission do not show any conflicting, incompatible paradigms, but an increase in the knowledge associated with work up to the "cultural height" of the present. Errors in the history of science or incompatibilities of theories according to Kuhn are also resolved in that they are assessed with regard to their success through comparisons with the respective alternatives. Then the theory more suitable for action is preferred. This largely continuous progress in knowledge can be seen among other things. a. in a steady increase in the number of measurands and the accuracy of measurements in the field of science. New measurement techniques are often the basis for new, improved theories.

Methodical constructivism

The questions raised by postmodernism have changed the demands on philosophy from the point of view of methodical culturalism. The theory of science and philosophy of language should no longer be in the foreground as in the 20th century. Was the Erlangen (methodical) constructivism as the philosophical source of methodical culturalism still concerned with the linguistic-philosophical consequences of the linguistic turn and a pragmatic-instrumentalist philosophy of science, i. H. For Janich and his students, cultural criticism is the focus of interest. The focus is on everyday culture , the analysis of which is based on a newly formulated theory of action.

Methodical constructivism and methodical culturalism also differ in "internal philosophy" principles. The so-called dialogical logic is replaced by a pragmatic-operative logic , which is based on the company's own theory of action and the principle of methodical order (see below). The consensualist concept of truth is being replaced by the action-oriented concept of truth. The restriction of proto-theory to mathematical protophysics is also lifted. Instead, Janich et al. Prototheories for physics, chemistry, biology, computer science and (scientific) psychology on the basis of “handcrafted” proven practices.

Critical reflection on culture

Lifeworld

Methodical culturalism uses a very broad concept of the lifeworld . The starting point is a generally recognized pre-scientific linguistic and action practice. Janich speaks of a prediscursive and pre-active consensus with linguistic and non-linguistic components such as things , events , purposes and actions , each of which relates to a part of a found world. Any communication requires ways of speaking and acting that have already been practiced. The world found is the totality of all things, events and facts that people deal with in their presence. In this respect, the lifeworld is a part of it that is relevant for a specific practical context. The world of the miner, for example, has different connections than that of a watchmaker, a farmer or that of a doctor.

If one tries to grasp the lifeworld of a science, the reconstruction of its practice leads to the various pre-scientific activities from which it emerged, in physics, for example, to the measuring techniques in handicrafts, in chemistry, to the handicraft of dyeing, among other things. However, the lifeworld of a scientific area in its current form no longer has to have any direct reference to its origin, as is also the case in large-scale industrial chemistry. The term “Lebenswelt” in methodical culturalism is thus similar to that of Ludwig Wittgenstein's “way of life” .

Culture

Peter Janich and his students represent an expanded concept of culture . This is not limited to the intellectual and artistic achievements of a society, but includes all results of human activity as “cultural”. It is used in direct contrast to "natural". Planting a tree in the park is “cultural”, “natural” is the growth of branches and leaves.

Everything that is influenced by human activity is cultural. This also includes the consequences of human actions on nature. So there is little in the found world that is not cultural, including changes in the tropical rainforest due to deforestation and greenhouse gases ("from the Lüneburg Heath to 'nature-identical aromas' to Aunt Erna's Pug").

Humans do not have "purely natural" experiences because they are constantly confronted with cultural circumstances from birth. He opens up the world through encounters with the cultural, be it clothing, toys or the language of his parents. The toddler learns "kinetic action" (grasping, sitting, walking), " poietic action" (playing with building blocks) and finally also "linguistic action" - always with reference to and interplay with the cultural world of his communication community.

Human practice is geared towards establishing oneself in the lifeworld. Lifeworld includes both subjective and intersubjective aspects. In doing so, people shape the world they live in according to their purposes. Culture is that which is rule-based in practice and is conveyed through tradition of customs and institutions . The process of making steel, the course of a football tournament and the political rules for legislation can be seen as cultural practice. Cultural practice also includes intersubjective decision-making processes, which in “modern society” are generally non-violent and instead are based on discourses .

The aim of methodical culturalism is the "reflection" and "reconstruction" of culture. Cultural criticism is always inherent in culture. The cultural framework cannot be left in reflection either. “The pursuit of a worldview based on the principles of reason is itself shaped by culture.” Methodical culturalism claims to use methodically rational procedures to evaluate changes in practice and, if necessary, to demand changes in the discourse.

Action theory

In order to create a clear, coherent terminology , Dirk Hartmann and Peter Janich in particular formulated the action theory of methodical culturalism. This also includes the theory of so-called language behavior. This theory of action serves as the basis for the corresponding theory of knowledge and science.

The concept of action

The reconstruction of theories begins with a phenomenological study of the terms used in the theory. These terms are sorted according to their complexity. So-called action types such as B. Running, playing or writing are each referred to as a "plot pattern". These are general names of activities with common characteristics that recur and do not refer to individual persons. In contrast, the actual execution of the action is described as "updating a plan of action".

Distinctions to the concept of action

Actions are to be distinguished from "behavior" and "incidents". One of the basic characteristics of action is the attribution of responsibility . Even as a toddler, people learn for what actions their environment praises or rebukes them. So-called “pure behavior” must be distinguished from this responsibility. These are behaviors that can neither succeed nor fail, but simply happen, such as sneezing. Experiences, on the other hand, are based on the actions or behavior of third parties or on other events that you cannot influence yourself.

An important characteristic of actions is that they can succeed or fail. This view presupposes that actions are based on an end for which the actions are a means . If an action succeeds, the purpose does not have to be achieved. Pressing a light switch is the means to illuminate a room. Only when the lamp is on has the purpose been achieved and one can speak of a successful action. Talking about “ purposes of action” assumes that actions are not caused causally in the sense of a deterministic stimulus-response scheme . From the freedom of action , an important characteristic of actions emerges that one can also omit them. Actions, whether making music, cycling or writing, must first of all be learned. If you need several successive actions to achieve a purpose, Janich and his students speak of “chains of action”.

It is fundamental to include language in action theory and the resulting distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic actions (for language see below ). Non-verbal actions can be ephemeral, such as B. Walking or eating. Of particular interest are poietic acts. In this way, non-perishable objects or states are recreated. In the pre-scientific area, these are in particular manual activities. The methodical culturalists call the created objects "artefacts". The purpose of poietic actions is to create such artifacts that are in turn suitable to function as a means to achieve other purposes.

“Purpose” is meant here in a value-neutral way, ie in the sense of something that is set or striven for as the goal of an action. Action in this sense is end-means-rational. The usefulness counts as an evaluation and is not considered in this context. Artifacts are often retrospectively linked to purposes other than those originally intended. From the cutting tool knife z. B. be a hunting weapon. Therefore, artifacts have general properties. The benefits and harm from the use of an artifact are not (fully) certain at the time of its production. This is an important moment in technology assessment of modern industrial products.

Artifacts play an essential role in the science process when measuring tools and devices are used for experiments . The "Principle of methodological order" (PmO) , which Hugo Dingler already emphasized, is of decisive importance for both the craftsman and the scientist . With actions, especially the production of objects, it is often necessary to adhere to fixed sequences if one wants to achieve the purpose of the action. So you have to peel an egg before you salt it. Accordingly, recipes and instructions for use are often fundamental to success. Scientific experiments are not only based on measuring devices and devices for their implementation, but also always on a process idea. It is also necessary to describe the steps in which an experiment is to be carried out as precisely as possible (see algorithm ).

The action theory of methodological culturalism is based on three basic principles, which are assumed as premises for an unrestricted ability to act :

• "Purpose Autonomy"
• "Means choice rationality"
• "Consequence responsibility"

The initial problem

The answer of Methodical Culturalism to the question of the beginning does not lie in a final justification . Reality is not questioned according to whether and in what way a reality independent of the subject or a superordinate world principle exists. Such a question is rejected. It is metaphysical because it can only be answered by an observer outside of ourselves on a higher level that is not accessible to humans.

The perspective of methodical culturalism is rather the reality of action. If one considers not only talking about action, but also taking action as the reality of action, the distinction between the observer's and participant's view emerges.

Recognizing that every theory is guided by interests, the question of its validity arises. Statements from the observer's perspective , like statements from the participant's perspective, are descriptions of actions from an action-theoretical perspective. In the participant's perspective, the “self-referential nature” of the action is also taken into account. Access to intentions and purposes is only possible through this. The distinction between observer and participant corresponds to the juxtaposition of self-psychic and external psychic, of mentalism and empiricism, known in philosophy .

In contrast to realistic world views, in methodical culturalism theories are justified “operationally” (specifically). In a chain of questioning, theories are traced back (“reconstructed”) to their origin in life-world action and the purposes of action associated with it. It is crucial that the starting point of the investigation is not the abstract description of a type of action (walking, eating, speaking), but a specific spatial and temporal specific action execution. By starting, for example, with the concrete drawing of a line or a circle in geometry and using the terminology for the formulation of a theory from these actions , one avoids the justification tremma (i.e. the existence of three logically equal paths): the justification arises from the point of view of methodical culturalism in a non-linguistic act, for example the transfer of technical knowledge through demonstration and imitation.

Janich and Schüler postulate: From the beginnings of Greek natural philosophy until well into the 19th century, but also in the present day, people have predominantly been viewed from the perspective of the observer. Since Descartes in particular , thinkers have distinguished between subject and object . The aim was to describe people using scientific means and to explain them causally. The role of the human being as an agent who produces this scientific explanation shaped by his experiences and interests was disregarded. In modern times, the focus was on the role of humans as a subject that gains knowledge. However, it is impossible to adopt the perspective of an outside observer. In fact, experiences arise only in the execution of actions. Theories are based on descriptions of possible, non-linguistic actions. The subject of the theories is always determined by whoever proposes the theory. Each theory is formulated in a self-referential way from the participant's perspective. When using technical systems or theoretical models, it must always be noted that nature as an “ explanandum ” precedes theory (as explanans ). The researcher chooses his theory accordingly.

Language acting

Language is not a representation of the world as it is. Rather, it is the task of language to enable communication between at least two actors. Language is the performance of actions such as “distinguishing”, “asserting”, “asking”, “asking”, “evaluating”. In the practice of mutual understanding, it is primarily about clarifying the conditions for the success of practical and poietic actions. In so far as language acts are a means of achieving a purpose within a communication community, they are rational.

Language is basically dialogic , that is, it belongs to a common ground. In every speech act there is a speaker / writer (sender), a language content (information) and a listener / reader (receiver). In order for the speech act to be successful, the speaker and listener must each meet two criteria. The listener must understand the speech act and express this through an action. After the speech, the speaker must make sure that the person speaking to him has understood him. Only when both have fulfilled their part and the information has arrived, the speech act is successful.

Man acquires language in a learning story . He is influenced by culture. In his living environment he is made familiar with an existing practice. The methodological culturalists refer to Ludwig Wittgenstein , who describes learning as follows:

“ The children are raised to do these activities, to use these words in the process, and thus to react to these words of the other. An important part of the training will be for the teacher to point out the objects, draw the child's attention to them, and say a word at the same time; z. B. the word "plate" when showing this shape ".

For language, the same basic distinctions apply between “behavior” (the exclamation “ouch”), “actions” (speech associated with the intention to communicate) and “incidents” (the speech of the other) as for speech-free action. The two aspects of the success of a speech act are acoustic perception and the understanding of the meaning of the speech content. This is to be distinguished from the “success” of a language act. The recipient of a question can understand it acoustically as well as semantically. But it may be that he cannot or does not want to answer the question. In this case, the speech act has succeeded, but there is no action success. Wittgenstein sums up:

“In this way, the functioning of the language or the meaning of the linguistic expressions can be understood against the background of practical purposes and actions. "

Epistemology

The basic idea for the epistemology of methodical culturalism was already developed by Hugo Dingler . He distinguished between knowledge as a stock of knowledge and knowledge as a process of acquiring knowledge. The philosophy of consciousness from Descartes to Hume had focused on the first part of the definition. The problem arose that the validity of the knowledge could not be justified without circular reasoning or without creating an infinite recourse (back reference) or breaking off the justification procedure before the proof of truth could be provided ( Fries' trilemma ).

Dingler rejected the question of the truth of knowledge. It is true that Kant had modified it by not asking about knowledge itself, but about the “conditions of the possibility of knowledge” . According to Dingler, like his predecessors, he had failed in the justification process because he, too, did not deal with the creation of knowledge. According to Dingler, if one does not ask for “knowing that”, but for “knowing how”, one escapes the reasoning trilemma and receives statements whose validity can be demonstrated through the practice of action without any metaphysical assumption.

In methodical culturalism, knowledge is defined as “true, well-founded opinion”. On this basis, one does not first ask about the object of knowledge, but rather, starting from the theory of action, about its function. Knowledge serves the agent as a means of orientation in the living environment. The purpose is to "cope with life".

Knowledge is therefore a “tool” that enables the realization of repeatable, teachable and learnable chains of action. Findings are based on a cultural learning process that teaches how to design actions successfully. Like action and language skills, they are acquired within the framework of existing action and communication communities.

Knowledge differs from knowledge in that it is tied to a subject (i.e., an individual). Knowledge also includes traditional knowledge of the community. Knowledge is also understood as an action. If someone knows that Paris is the capital of France or is learning a foreign language at school, then they have acquired “practical knowledge in stock”.

The “progress in knowledge” is based on the “principle of methodical order”. In the way from the simple wheel to the pulley system, the cogwheel to the worm gear in modern machines, an orderly development logic is ascertained, right up to the "cultural height" reached in each case. The principle of methodical order is from the point of view of Janich u. a. a "rationality standard for non-linguistic and technical action". This standard must also be adhered to in the grammar , the description of a recipe or an instruction manual. Otherwise the “penalty of failure” threatens.

The statement that an opinion is true or untrue is itself a linguistic act and must therefore be judged on the basis of “success”, like other acts. Wittgenstein described this as follows:

“ Right and wrong is what people 'say'; and in 'language' people agree. This is not a consensus of opinion, but a way of life. "

The methodical culturalists argue that truth 'arises' through successful actions in the lifeworld. The justification of truth is therefore a “convention in the communication process”. It must conform to the accepted rules of the communication community. Depending on the practice, this can range from the conviction that the speaker is credible to logical or empirical evidence through the execution of the alleged possibility of action.

Applied to the science of history, this means the proof with an adequate source, in the natural science the reproduction of an experiment. The validity of a statement is "granted or denied". The control of the correct use of terms and sentences takes place in the learning and teaching situation of common practice. Theories are referred to as sentence systems or systems of sentence systems. They are a means of pursuing a knowledge goal and are therefore not “categorical” but “conditional”. Accordingly, a final justification is not required. Rather, their validity depends on which premises ( definitions , postulates , axioms ) are based on them and recognized in the respective practice. The search for absolute truth is rejected as a secularized form of religiosity.

“ True opinions are based on justifications, the beginnings of which prompt the addressee of the justification to decide whether to participate in certain practices. They are cultural, but not arbitrary, since one's own historical situation, need-dependency, availability of means and dependence on other people cannot be arbitrarily disposed of. "

On the basis of this theory, in the opinion of Janich and his students, it is possible to substantiate not only scientific findings, but also findings of everyday life and to define a concept of truth that allows an adequate assessment of the terms "true" and "in the given cultural framework. wrong ”allowed. With these arguments, they reject theories of cognitive science and scientism on the naturalistic justification of knowledge.

science

For constructivists and thus also for Janich and others, theories are not structurally isomorphic or adequate images of a natural world, but tried and tested knowledge of effects and prognoses . The question of existence is viewed epistemologically as irrelevant. According to methodical culturalism, the assumption of a real world independent of the subject cannot improve the empirical content of a theory or the quality of prognoses. The conclusions of any realism , however critical, are necessarily circular , because they always presuppose the knowledge of what is to be known. The idea that there is a reality outside of human consciousness is rejected as metaphysics . In this regard, methodical culturalism expressly refers to the argumentation of the late Wittgenstein.

As a cultural achievement, science is based on the human ability to set ends, to realize them through actions and to rationally justify the choice of means. It includes not only the object of investigation, but also acting scientists who make methodological and practical preliminary decisions for carrying out their experiments. Since natural science textbooks often ignore the manufacturing reference, basic terms are often circularly defined by terms introduced later in the process. The founders of methodical culturalism see this as one of the reasons for the widespread naturalistic worldview in the natural sciences. They criticize the attempt at a methodological reconstruction and thus the logical-conceptual clarification by reducing the respective science to its actions. From their point of view, these are usually to be found in pre- and non-academic practice. From this, they are "stylized" by the traditional natural sciences.

Science as a form of knowledge is linked to methodological claims that meet the usual criteria of personal independence ( trans-subjectivity ) for the purpose of verification and general validity ( universality ). For the validity of scientific theories, reproducibility is therefore expected. In addition, there are demands for a meaningful internal context ( coherence ) and for logical non- contradiction (consistency).

The approach describes the practice of philosophy of science as an act in which theories in the applied sciences are pragmatically set up by making validity claims.

Construction and reconstruction

That of Janich u. a. The so-called "reconstruction" of the epistemological instrument designed should serve to assess scientific theories with regard to compliance with general philosophical standards of rationality. If a scientific theory can be traced back to an existing skill in the lifeworld through a methodically ordered derivation context, then it is viewed as systematically “justified”. Means of reconstruction are in particular the theory of action and the principle of methodical order (see above). Reconstruction requires good specialist knowledge of the theories and sciences to be reconstructed.

In the course of this reconstruction, the linguistic requirements must also be clarified. A valid linguistic representation of experience and observation knowledge is not possible without a clear definition of terms. The conceptual basis of the respective scientific language can be found - so the considerations - usually not in the latest theories, but in the origins. Therefore, scientific reflection concepts such as “ space ”, “ time ” and “ mass ” in physics, “ substance ” in chemistry and “ life ” and “ organism ” in biology must be questioned. Wittgenstein describes the problem of such terms:

“ The question 'What is length?', 'What is meaning?', 'What is the number one?' etc. cause a mental spasm in us. […] (We are dealing here with one of the great sources of philosophical confusion: a noun makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it) ”.

Through the "reification" of general terms - in philosophy these are e.g. B. " Being ", " Spirit ", " Thinking ", " Meaning " and " Truth " - from the point of view of methodical culturalism, category errors arise . The supposed description of the world is then talking about language.

The method of reconstruction includes “ constitution ”, “ construction ” and “ reflection ”. First, science is examined with regard to its connection with its original, mostly pre-scientific task of coping with life (“constitution”). This is intended to make the original objectives and means clear. In the handicraft, it is usually about tried and tested means and methods. Methodological demands must be made on scientific theories with regard to the trans-subjectivity and universality of the results. The orderly structure of the terminology (the respective system of terms ) must also be checked. The theory (the sentence systems) must not have any logical contradictions, the doctrinal sentences no redundancies and no structural gaps. This is followed by an analysis of the coherence and consistency of experiments and other methods. This is how one “constructs” the “scientific procedure”. Finally, “reflection” is understood to mean dealing with the “meaning” and “validity” of scientific theories. The epistemological methods such as definitions , postulates or hypotheses are examined . The preoccupation with the effects of science on the environment in other areas such as environmental protection, private life or the world of work and on the worldview it creates are essential components of the reflection process.

Prototheories

The founders of methodical culturalism refer to their elaborations as “prototheories”, which are intended to “reconstruct” the program of a specialist science in the way described. In connection with Hugo Dingler's philosophy , according to Janich, Friedrich R. Lipsius spoke of protophysics as early as 1927 with regard to physics . The representatives of Erlangen's constructivism took up this term and applied it to the field of mathematical physics.

The variant represented by Janich expressly refers to procedures in which a pre-scientific action can be reconstructed. For example, one can derive the basic principles of Euclidean geometry by idealizing manual or industrial processes. This results in an approximated plane (»surface«) if you grind three bodies alternately against each other, so that you can move the grinding surfaces against each other as you like without losing the accuracy of fit. A geometric plane is now defined as that which would result if this process were to be continued into infinity. The example given by Dingler was still practically used in the manufacture of mirrors and played an important role in the construction of machine tools until the 20th century. If you grind one of the surfaces produced using this "three-plate process" on another, you get an edge and thus an approximate straight line. Further grinding down an edge results in the intersection of three levels, i.e. a corner and thus an approximate point.

Also circle and sphere are derived action theory. According to Euclid, the circle is defined by the fact that all lines from a point within the figure to the circular line are the same length. This is equivalent to drawing a circle with a compass. A sphere could not be generated analogously, only imaginable. However, Euclid defined the sphere as a body around which a semicircle can be drawn until it comes back to its starting point. This corresponds to the manufacturing process of a sphere by a stone mason with the help of a template .

As a further example of reconstruction, Janich and Weingarten name the system term in the biosciences , such as the nervous system , ecosystem or system of the organism. Linguistically, the term system means something “put together”. It was first introduced in the natural sciences in connection with electrical networks and the calculation of circuits , in which various components with independent functions (resistors, capacitors, coils, transistors, filters, amplifiers, motors, etc.) are made up of lines, nodes and meshes Schematic are linked, introduced. The circuit diagram of a bell is simple, that of a video recorder is highly complex. The interaction of subsystems that are functionally coordinated is typical of complex systems. Before such a system is created, the purpose is first determined and, if necessary, a breakdown is made according to components and the functions to be fulfilled by them. This is followed by the small-scale detailed planning. The manufacturing process corresponds to an action with an end-means relationship, taking into account the principle of methodical order.

The theorists of methodological culturalism basically differentiate between the production and the function of a system. The function does not allow any conclusions to be drawn about the structure. Only when a system no longer works does the person who repairs it need to understand its structure, but not in detail. The electronics technician can subject a defective measuring device to a functional test by component. Applied to medicine, a doctor only has to understand the “human system” to a limited extent in order to treat a broken bone or a visual defect. In the biosciences, the "natural systems" are analyzed in terms of their functions for humans from this point of view. The idea of ​​purposeless research is called a fallacy. Rather, the notion of systems related to objects of the life sciences is viewed as a “model transfer” from a poietic practice. Therefore, the role of the scientist as a purposeful acting person must not be overlooked. The system-theoretical description is referred to as a means for scientific purposes, which must be checked for meaning and validity.

Corresponding methodological preparations by representatives of methodological culturalism have so far existed in the areas of "protophysics" (geometry, time, space, mass), "protochemistry", "protobiology", psychology or computer science.

information

Janich also dealt with questions of communication and information sciences . He dealt critically with the naturalistic use of the term information in the natural sciences and presented approaches for the reconstruction of this term. He emphasized that this term - similar to the terms force and mass in physics - is being used more and more frequently and in expanded contexts as a property of objects, substances or organic elements such as cells or genes. He posed the question of the value of an explanation through this multiple use of the term "information" and dealt with the implications hidden therein .

Janich critically referred to the work of Claude Shannon / Warren Weaver (The Mathematical Theory of Communication) and Norbert Wiener (Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine) from 1948. Janich criticizes Wiener, reducing people "Physically" in Cartesian manner on the animal and the animal on the machine. Information is given the same status as matter and energy . He points out that energy can be measured, i.e. a physical term technicus , while matter as a concept of metalanguage is a reflection concept like space and time . Shannon / Weaver, based on Charles W. Morris, differentiated between syntactic (quantity and structure), semantic (meaning) and pragmatic (application benefit / effect) aspects of information and developed a telecommunications language theory from this. With the advent of modern biosciences , it became common practice to speak of biological information as of genetic information and even to attribute the “ability” of molecular “memory” to plastics.

Janich further argues that "sender" and "recipient" in telecommunications are technical artifacts, aids for communication that should not be equated with the sender and recipient of a letter. Speaking, writing letters or telephoning, on the other hand, are actions. The characters (e.g. Braille ) or tape recordings (e.g. in Frisian ) only become information when they are decoded by a person and thus understood. According to Janich, the material structures themselves have no meaning. You can not from a syntax , a semantic and out of a semantics pragmatics derived. Linguistic expressions always contain syntax, semantics and pragmatics, albeit separately from one another.

You can only judge the nonsense of the statement “It is 5:00 p.m.” if you know that someone has asked for directions to the train station, that is, if you know the context of communication. You can only grasp the meaning of the sailor's language when you know the practice of sailing. There is therefore no causal relationship between syntax and pragmatics.

In Janich's conclusion, the concept of information is merely a metaphor or a model . The use of this expression must also not imply any intention to obtain knowledge on natural data carriers in brain research or genetics . Otherwise, one runs the risk of assuming "purposes" to nature and thus "naturalizing" the concept of information. This position, advocated by Janich in the journal Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften , has led to a high profile controversy in the field of information theory.

Mind and brain

When dealing with the question of the relationship between mind and brain , Janich refers to the different approaches of the natural sciences and the humanities to this problem area.

While access via the physiological organism is sought in the natural sciences with the aim of finding ways to explain, predict and influence human behavior via causal models of neural conditions, the humanities scholar regards humans as a cultural being that on the one hand fits into the historical framework its lifeworld is integrated, and on the other hand is determined by the experience of the individual history in which it acts purposefully.

The different perspectives only lead to a “mind-brain problem” when one of the positions claims to be the only valid one. The causal view becomes a materialistic position in which there are no reasons, but only causes (mostly evolutionary ). In contrast, the mentalistic paradigm asserts a (conditional) independence of the consciousness from causes with the ability to make rational decisions based on reasons and in discourse.

Metaphorically , this conflict can be illustrated with the possible ways of describing an oil painting. The scientific description includes weight, materials, the chemical composition of the colors and the like. The lifeworld-artistic description, on the other hand, focuses on what is represented, the historical context, painting techniques used, style and artistic quality, etc. Applied to the mind-body problem, there is the question of the causal relationship between the two levels of description.

As in other areas, methodical culturalism rejects the purely naturalistic position, as represented, for example, by neuroscientists Gerhard Roth or Wolf Singer with the determination of brain processes. Here we have the previously mentioned circle that a theory of the empirical refutability of free will itself is already determined. Rather, the object of an explanation (the explanandum) is already determined by setting purposes before an explanatory theory (the explanans) is determined.

Singer's assertion that this distinction does not apply in the neurosciences, since the brain examines itself, is a category error for the methodical culturalist because, according to this assertion, the requirements for a scientific explanation are not met. The natural sciences, too, are based on the general validity (universality) and independence of persons (trans-subjectivity) of their theories (see above).

On the other hand, it is also undisputed for the methodological culturalist that there are deficits and defects, for example due to injuries or illnesses in the brain, for which a causal relationship to disorders in physical and mental functions can be proven. Even if one rejects a purely causal explanation of mental processes, one will be able to pragmatically recognize causal relationships for medical therapeutic purposes. Likewise, one can pragmatically dispense with the claim to a complete explanation possibility without denying the meaning of neuroscientific and medical research.

In the context of a reconstruction of the mind-body problem, Dirk Hartmann takes the view that this can only arise in the transition from a pre-scientific and lifeworld to a scientific approach. The lifeworld is conceptually so broad that scientific practice and modern technical apparatus are also included. In contrast, the specific scientific language with its special theoretical constructs is not part of the lifeworld defined in this way .

According to Hartmann, abstract concepts such as the body emerged historically from the practice of building, that of weight from the activity of weighing, and that of movement as a description of projectile trajectories. Physical mechanics developed from such basic concepts. The increasing ability to explain the interrelationships of the world theoretically with the causal principle led to the "ontological hypostatization" (to the unjustified conclusion about the general state of the world) that all facts in the world can be explained by natural laws. Hartmann assesses this logically unfounded conclusion as a “second naturalistic fallacy ”. Only the materialistic way of thinking leads as a reaction to questions as to how sensations, intentions, intuitions, rationality or the feeling of freedom of action can be explained. Questions of this kind would not arise if one is not confronted with a causal, physically closed worldview.

From a theoretical point of view, the mind-brain problem for Hartmann is a pseudo problem that has arisen from misunderstandings of language. But this derivation does not yet provide an explanation of the psychic. To this end, Hartmann is developing a reconstruction of the concept of experience from the lifeworld. The lifeworld reality arises from the comparison of the experiences of those involved in the lifeworld. The experiences are primarily not based on a subjective perspective, but arise from the perspective of the common, intersubjective constitution of the lifeworld. Action and language precede the first-person perspective. From Hartmann's point of view, Descartes was wrong with his doubt insofar as he could only formulate this doubt in a language learned in community. A private language has no function because there are no agreed rules for it that enable another to understand the person you are speaking to. In the methodical reconstruction, the constitution of reality first takes place in the intersubjectively accessible world of things, facts and events, i.e. in the realm of the physical. If, however, an understanding cannot be achieved at this level, terms such as sensory data, perception, impressions, sensations, thinking, intention, experience, ideas, conceptions, memories, etc. are introduced for explanation. These are terms used to describe internal issues that have been considered private since Locke. The area of ​​the psyche is introduced. The function of this speech is to provide explanations for the disturbances in understanding and thus to bring about a stabilization of communication.

According to Hartmann, communication about internal conditions also includes the psychological in the living environment. Objectivity arises from intersubjectivity. The repetition of experiences and recognition lead to experiences that are tied to the subject. Recognition includes the ability to make distinctions and grasp regularities. Experiences have a temporal dimension. They are at the same time intentional , that is, they are someone's individual experiences that are directed towards something. In the communication community, the subject learns that other people also have experience and thus learns to conceptually differentiate between intersubjectively comprehensible experiences and self-awareness. Through the common practice of the community, a reality is constituted in which the idea of ​​one's own person is included as a distinction. In this sense, the concept of consciousness is for Hartmann a reflection concept for the distinction and reflection of experiences, similar to life, organism, space and time. Concepts of reflection become problematic when linguistic practice is reified by properties. Talking about concepts like consciousness are speculative sentences in which one speaks not about objects, but about the meaning of expressions, sentences, practices and institutions.

From this point of view, mental states cannot be described as phenomena for methodical culturalism , and neither are they functional states. It also follows from this that these purely semantic phenomena cannot be explained scientifically, be it neuroscientific or physiological, without being based on the everyday practice of the constitution of reality. In this practice, however, the mind-body problem does not exist any more than the problem of the alien psychic.

ethics

Because of the theory of action, methodical culturalism cannot assume that there is a general normative justification for actions. Ethical norms are therefore general maxims for action that have been introduced in a lifeworld community in order to achieve a jointly determined purpose, for example that of conflict resolution.

Rationality as a goal-oriented principle of action is a method for assessing proposals for conflict resolution. Methodical culturalism advocates - as a result of a rational discourse, as it were - for non-violent management of conflicts. However, it must be assumed that the majority of those involved in the conflict accept this decision. The representatives of methodical culturalism also consider it a rational decision to further align their ethical principles with eudaemonistic principles, as in the doctrine of the good life. This follows on from Wilhelm Kamlah's “ Philosophical Anthropology ” , who formulated his ethics from the perspective of the participants and also took a position on questions that are unavailable to humans. The justification of the material norms is not a prerogative of the philosophers, but is the responsibility of everyone involved in the discourse.

reception

Since Methodical Culturalism has only been published as a separate school for a few years, the reception is still low. Early feedback can be found in the Festschrift for Peter Janich from 2002. Since methodical constructivism was used in many ways despite the deliberate delimitation, a number of criticisms apply to the methodical as well, unless they were taken up by conscious changes Culturalism.

One of the fundamental criticisms was made by Critical Rationalism . Since Methodical Culturalism, like Erlangen Constructivism, starts with action as the fundamental category, it is subject to the breaking off of justification, like any philosophy that starts with something obvious. This criticism is concretized by pointing out that in methodical culturalism the end-means relationship of action is no longer questioned, i.e. the origin of the ends is not examined further. Also linked to this problem is the statement that although ontological as well as epistemological realism are excluded from an argumentative point of view, a realistic world is de facto implicitly assumed. This applies, for example, to the concept of the world found as well as to that of experiences. Laws of nature are to be understood as man-made instructions for action, but they are pointless if man cannot apply them to something independent of them. This is based on the difference between the knower and the object of knowledge. The knower creates (constructs), even if he bases the measure of the success of the action, a reality, his life reality, which is opposed to a reality of the known. Only an assumed realism makes a theory binding. Without such a yardstick, a philosophical position remains relativistic, even if, as in methodical culturalism, one refers to basic principles of action such as end-means rationality, cultural level and the principle of methodical order.

A second fundamental question concerns the relationship between theory and practice. Methodical Culturalism fully follows Dingler's catchphrase : “In the beginning was the deed.” With this dictum, Methodical Culturalism criticizes Quine's empiricism , but also Popper's critical rationalism : Both only move on the linguistic level, but overlook the fact of Action execution. The persistence on the linguistic level is the reason for the circular nature of the concept of truth in traditional philosophy. The critical rationalist counters this by saying that action is problem-solving. Before the action is the problem and the consideration of how to solve this problem. The theory precedes the practice here. To put it simply, you are thirsty first, then you think about where to drink something and only then go to the source. The theory works as long as the action is successful. In the sciences too, the starting point is a problem, an inexplicable observation. This also applies to craftsmanship or practical science, be it in the field of technology or social sciences. First a purpose must be formulated, then a solution to the problem is thought about and then action is taken. In law, too, there is the problem, the conflict, for the (best) solution of which a theory is developed in court proceedings. In particular, methodical culturalism lacks an explanation for the cause of the progress of knowledge. He can only state this. Theories are not just a tradition and a representation of actions. They are based on creative thinking about existing issues. Otherwise there would be no inventions and technical developments: The idea of ​​power transmission precedes the pulley.

One of the basic problems, but also the still open possibilities of methodical culturalism, is that it has not yet been fully developed. Hartmann / Janich themselves use the metaphor of the still unfinished painting. The program brief comprises only 60 printed pages and cannot even provide a comprehensive system of the topics to be dealt with on this scale. The remaining presentations on methodical culturalism concentrate on individual questions or on dealing with individual specialist fields. Because of the large number of authors, focuses and statements are inhomogeneous, so that an independent merging of the ideas is necessary for the reception. There are also large subject areas that have not yet been covered. On the one hand, this is the entire area of ​​the social sciences. There are no prototheories on the subjects of history, politics and economics. The Protosociology to be found in the literature is a project based at the University of Frankfurt, which has its sources in critical theory. On the other hand, the aim was formulated to want to conduct a critical examination of questions of culture, but a fundamental reconstruction of the topic of culture is still pending.

Aesthetics is one of the open points . Can this be captured using the end-means relationship scheme? The question is not about the creation of music or the painting technique of the painter, but about the engagement with art. Can a visit to a picture gallery or an opera be measured by the success of the action? Here the “why” criterion is just as questionable as it is when determining eudaemonistic principles in ethics. Here the standards remain subjective and that is why methodical culturalism, like other philosophical positions of modernity, has no systematic answer to these questions. In this respect, the concept of action, like the concept of knowledge, appears to be technically too narrow.

It is a hallmark of methodical culturalism that its representatives maintain intensive contact and discourse with the practice of applied sciences. Nevertheless, it can still be stated that the previous reconstructions and the epistemological elaborations based on them have remained selective so far. According to the concept of the reconstruction of the sciences in the prototheories, an extensive research program remains.

literature

Introductory literature

• Dirk Hartmann and Peter Janich (eds.): Methodical culturalism. Between naturalism and postmodernism. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1996 ( stw 1272 ) ISBN 3518288725
• Dirk Hartmann and Peter Janich (eds.): The culturalist turn. For orientation of the philosophical self-image. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1998 ( stw 1391 ) ISBN 3518289918
• Peter Janich : What is truth? A philosophical introduction. Beck, Munich 1996, ISBN 3406410529
• Peter Janich: Constructivism and knowledge of nature. On the way to culturalism. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1996 ( stw 1244 ) ISBN 351828844X
• Peter Janich: The measure of all things. Protophysics of space, time and matter. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1997 ( stw 1334 ) ISBN 3518289349
• Peter Janich: What is knowledge? A philosophical introduction. Beck, Munich 2000, ISBN 3406459161
• Peter Janich: Logical-pragmatic propaedeutics. A basic course in philosophical reflection. Velbrück, Weilerswist 2001, ISBN 393473037X

In-depth literature

• Armin Grunwald : Acting and planning. (Habil.-Schr. Marburg 1998) Fink, Munich 2000, ISBN 3770534875 ( description )
• Mathias Gutmann , Dirk Hartmann , Michael Weingarten and Walter Zitterbarth (eds.): Culture - Action - Science. For Peter Janich . (Festschrift for the 60th birthday) Velbrück, Weilerswist 2002, ISBN 3934730531
• Gerd Hanekamp: Protochemistry. From matter to valence. (Diss. Phil. Marburg 1996) Königshausen and Neumann, Würzburg 1997, ISBN 3826013220
• Dirk Hartmann : Scientific theories. Scientific theoretical foundations using the example of psychology. (Diss. Phil. Marburg 1992) BI Wissenschaftsverlag, Mannheim 1993, ISBN 3411160918
• Dirk Hartmann: Philosophical Foundations of Psychology (PDF; 17.1 MB). (Revised and abbreviated Habil.-Schr. Marburg 1997) Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1998, ISBN 3534138872
• Peter Janich (Ed.): Developments in methodological philosophy. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992 ( stw 979 ) ISBN 3518285793
• Peter Janich and Michael Weingarten : Theory of Science of Biology. Methodical philosophy of science and the foundation of the sciences. (UTB) Fink, Munich 1999, ISBN 3825220338
• Nikolaos Psarros , Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer and Georg Vobruba (eds.): The development of social reality. Controversy with the historical-genetic theory of society. Velbrück, Weilerswist 2003, ISBN 3934730647
• Su-Hyeon Kwon: Between Universalism and Particularism. Transculturality as a goal of moral-philosophical justifications. (Diss. Marburg 2003) ( )

Web links

• Peter Janich: Culture of Knowledge - Naturally Limited? (PDF file; 163 kB)
• Rafael Capurro on Peter Janich's concept of information
• Dirk Hartmann: Free will and the autonomy of cultural studies ( ; PDF file; 174 kB)
• Matthias Wille: Deficits in justification in culturalist epistemology (PDF file; 185 kB)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ This includes in particular Dirk Hartmann , Mathias Gutmann , Armin Grunwald ( homepage ) and Nikolaos Psarros ( homepage ).
2. ↑ Dirk Hartmann and Peter Janich (eds.): Methodical culturalism. Between naturalism and postmodernism . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1996.
3. ↑ Not to be confused with protosciences .
4. ^ Gerd Hanekamp: Cultural Criticism and Postmodernism. In: Hartmann / Janich Methodical Culturalism . Pp. 390-420, here p. 394.
5. ↑ See Hartmann / Janich: Methodischer Kulturalismus . P. 27.
6. ↑ Cf. Hanekamp: Kulturkritik und Postmoderne. In: Hartmann / Janich: Methodical culturalism . With the distinctive subtitle Between Naturalism and Postmodernism .
7. ↑ Nikolaos Psarros: The concept of the lifeworld. In: Dirk Hartmann and Peter Janich (eds.): The cultural turn. Pp. 333-352.
8. ↑ "Cultural" as a term was already used by Paul Lorenzen in Erlangen's Constructivism, but can also be found in Franz Martin Wimmer for intercultural philosophy.
9. ↑ Hartmann / Janich: Methodical culturalism . P. 39.
10. ↑ Cf. especially Dirk Hartmann in his ed. With Janich. Anthology of methodical culturalism . Pp. 70–114, as well as Peter Janich: Logisch-pragmatische Propädeutik. Velbrück, Weilerswist 2001.
11. ↑ In detail on this Dirk Hartmann: Freedom of will and the autonomy of cultural studies . From: Handlung, Kultur, Interpretation 2000, 1, pp. 66–103 ( PDF ; 2.1 MB); Reprint in: e-Journal Philosophy of Psychology . Issue 1 from March 2005 (PDF; 178 kB).
12. ↑ Ludwig Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigations § 6.
13. ^ Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations § 206.
14. ↑ See e.g. B. Hugo Dingler: Methodology and epistemology instead of science. In: Hugo Dingler: Essays on methodology. Edited by Ulrich Weiss. Meiner, Hamburg 1987, ISBN 3787307184 .
15. ↑ Dingler points out that Kant had no reliable criterion for his assertion of a pure intuition (In essays on methodology, p. 4).
16. ^ Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, § 241.
17. ↑ See Janich and Weingarten Theory of Science of Biology, p. 85.
18. ↑ Janich in "Culturalistic Epistemology Instead of Informationism." In: Hartmann u. Janich Methodical Culturalism p. 155.
19. ↑ See Peter Janich: Scientism and Naturalism. Wrong paths of the natural sciences as a philosophical program? In: Geert Keil and HerbertSchnädelbach (eds.): Naturalism. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000 ( stw 1450 ), pp. 289-309.
20. ↑ Schonefeld in: Hartmann / Janich: Methodischer Kulturalismus . P. 197.
21. ↑ Ludwig Wittgenstein : Blue Book. Collected Works Volume 5, 1984 p. 15; quoted from Janich and Weingarten: Theory of Science of Biology , p. 121f.
22. ↑ In: The measure of things. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1997.
23. ↑ Cf. Karl-Heinrich Katthage: For the production of flat surfaces using the three-plate process. In: History of Technology. No. 49, 1982, pp. 208-222.
24. ↑ See Janich / Weingarten: Theory of Science of Biology . Pp. 89-99.
25. ↑ Cf. Peter Janich: What is information? Critique of a legend . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2006.
26. ^ CE Shannon and W. Weaver: Mathematical foundations of information theory. Munich 1976 (English: 2nd edition 1949) and Norbert Wiener : Cybernetik. Regulation and message transmission in living beings and in machines . Düsseldorf / Vienna 1963 (MIT 1948).
27. ↑ See Janich: Culture and Method . P. 216.
28. ^ Foundation of the Theory of Signs. 1938; German: Basics of the theory of signs. Munich 1972 / Frankfurt 1988.
29. ↑ 1998, No. 2; see. also Rafael Capurro on Peter Janich's concept of information .
30. ↑ The dispute between images of the world and people in brain research. In: Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Philosophy and Neurosciences. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2006, pp. 75-96.
31. ↑ See Janich: Constructivism and knowledge of nature. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1996 p. 267.
32. ↑ E.g. in From the point of view of the brain. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2003.
33. ↑ E.g. in The Observer in the Brain. Essays on Brain Research. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2002.
34. ↑ In: The Observer in the Brain . P. 61.
35. ↑ See the deductive-nomological explanatory model , according to which the explanans must contain (at least) one singular sentence as a premise that describes the initial conditions, as well as a legal statement that relates to the explanandum.
36. ↑ Dirk Hartmann: The body-soul problem as a result of the hypostatization of theoretical constructs. In: Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Philosophy and Neurosciences. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2006 pp. 97–123.
37. ↑ So Hartmann in: The body-soul problem ... p. 109.
38. ↑ Cf. Dirk Hartmann: The body-soul problem ... S. 112/113; Hartmann refers to Wittgenstein's private language argument in his Philosophical Investigations , especially § 258.
39. ↑ Christoph Demmerling: Language and Reification. Frankfurt 1994 p. 18.
40. ^ Mathias Gutmann et al. (Ed.): Culture, Action, Science. Velbrück, Weilerswist 2002.
41. ↑ See Hans Albert : Treatise on Critical Reason. 5th edition Mohr, Tübingen 1991, where the discussion with the Erlangen constructivists is presented in the appendix from Albert's point of view.
42. ↑ Geert-Lueke Lueken in: Culture, Action, Science, pp. 65–90.
43. ↑ Marco Buzzoni in: Culture, Action, Science pp. 241-259.
44. ^ Wallner / Jandl in: Culture, Action, Science . Pp. 260-284.
45. ^ Hugo Dingler: The experiment. Its essence and its reality . Munich 1928 p. 73.
46. ↑ See Hans Albert: Treatise on Critical Reason.
47. ↑ In: Methodical Culturalism . 1996, p. 69.
48. ^ Hans Julius Schneider in: Culture, Action, Science . Pp. 302-321.