Battle of Kharkov (1942)

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Map of the Battle of Kharkov
Major military operations during the German-Soviet War

1941: Białystok-Minsk  - Dubno-Lutsk-Rivne  - Smolensk  - Uman  - Kiev  - Odessa  - Leningrad blockade  - Vyazma-Bryansk  - Kharkov  - Rostov  - Moscow  - Tula
1942: Rzhev  - Kharkiv  - Company Blue  - companies Braunschweig  - company Edelweiss  - Stalingrad  - Operation Mars
1943: Voronezh-Kharkov  - Operation Iskra  - North Caucasus  - Kharkov  - Citadel Company  - Oryol  - Donets-Mius  - Donbass  - Belgorod-Kharkov  - Smolensk  - Dnepr
1944: Dnepr-Carpathians  - Leningrad-Novgorod  - Crimea  - Vyborg-Petrozavodsk  - Operation Bagration  - Lviv-Sandomierz  - Jassy-Kishinew  - Belgrade  - Petsamo-Kirkenes  - Baltic States  - Carpathians  - Hungary
1945: Courland  - Vistula-Oder  - East Prussia  - West Carpathians  - Lower Silesia  - East Pomerania  - Lake Balaton  - Upper Silesia  - Vienna  - Oder  -  Berlin  - Prague

The Battle of Kharkov , also known as the Second Battle of Kharkov , was a major battle in the German-Soviet War during World War II . It took place from May 12 to 28, 1942 near Kharkov (today Kharkiv in Ukrainian ) and, after the initial success of the Red Army, led to the encirclement of a large part of the attack formations by a counterattack by the Wehrmacht .

Due to its central location, Kharkov was fought over several times during the advance and retreat of the German Wehrmacht. A total of four battles took place in the region during the war . The first occurred during the German advance in October 1941. In February and March 1943, fierce fighting broke out again for the city, which became known as the Third Battle of Kharkov ; after it had been retaken by the Red Army in the meantime, the Germans took it again. In August 1943, the city was finally retaken by Soviet troops as part of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation .

prehistory

In December 1941, Operation Barbarossa came to a standstill on the Leningrad , Moscow and Rostov line . The Soviet High Command (Stawka) raised new reserves and launched various counter-offensives along the entire front from December, which became known as the Soviet 1st Winter Offensive . In the north, the Leningrad Front and the Northwest Front tried to open the siege ring around Leningrad in the Battle of the Volkhov . The Northwest Front and the Kalininer Front also tried to use a pincer movement in the direction of Ostrow . This movement led to the Battle of Demyansk . The battle for Moscow was fought in front of Moscow with parts of the Kalinin Front and the Western Front . In the Black Sea region , the Caucasus Front made an attempt to retake Crimea . In the south, the 1st Panzer Army under Ewald von Kleist had to give up Rostov at the end of November due to strong Soviet counter-attacks. The front on the southern eastern front stabilized on the Mius .

Isjum front arch

On January 5, 1942, General Friedrich Paulus was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the German 6th Army with simultaneous promotion to General of the Panzer Troops . After the death of General von Reichenau , General Field Marshal von Bock took over the command of the superior Army Group South . From January 18, 1942, the Soviet southern and southwestern fronts south of Kharkov attempted an attack between Balakleija and Slavyansk across the Donets in order to break through in the direction of the Sea of ​​Azov and thus cut off and destroy the 1st Panzer Army. The front between the inner wings of the German 6th and 17th Armies collapsed within a few days. The advance northwards towards Krasnograd by the Soviet 6th Army (General Gorodnjanski) could only be stopped by the alarm units at the Oriel section. The middle advance on Dnepropetrovsk by the 57th Army (General Podlas) pushed the XI. Army Corps returned to Losovaya . The southern advance on Stalino (today Donetsk), carried by the 9th Army (General Charitonov) and the 5th Cavalry Corps , pushed the German XXXXIV. Army Corps headed south-east towards Kramatorsk , liberated Barvenkowo on January 24 and threatened the hinterland of the 1st Panzer Army. The railway lines from Kharkov to the south and from Poltava to Slavyansk were cut off by the Soviet breakthrough. The German 6th Army, with the involvement of strong Romanian forces, carried out tactical counter-attacks with difficulty, which could only contain further successes of the Soviets at the end of February, but did not completely ease the situation. The Soviet plan of attack did not lead to complete success, but the won front arc of Isjum created the necessary conditions for an early resumption of the offensive.

Strategy and planning

Soviet strategy and planning

Marshal SK Tymoshenko

After the end of the winter offensive, Stalin and Stavka did not want to give up the initiative. The Stawka was aware that the German Wehrmacht was planning a new offensive for the summer. However, the direction of attack was unknown. After the strong efforts of the German Wehrmacht in autumn 1941, the Stawka suspected that the offensive would continue in the direction of Moscow. In accordance with the strategic thinking of the Red Army that was customary in 1941/42 , Stalin wanted to disrupt the German preparation with several offensives along the entire Eastern Front, instead of concentrating the forces for a large offensive.

In the northern sector, on April 9, Stalin ordered the Leningrad Front and the Volkhov Front to launch a relief attack to liberate the enclosed Soviet 2nd Shock Army . On April 22, 1942, he ordered the northwest front to launch another attack on the German II Army Corps, which had been trapped in the Demjansk pocket since January . On the western front, the trapped Below group was reinforced near Vyazma so that they could fight their way free. In the Crimea , the Crimean front received orders to widen the bridgehead on the Kerch peninsula in order to break the ring of siege at Sevastopol . At the beginning of May an offensive against the Finnish troops was ordered in the north of the Leningrad Front.

The offensive in the Kharkov area was the largest. It was planned and carried out by the Southwest Front with the help of the Brjansk Front and the South Front.

Marshal Tymoshenko , commander of the Southwest Front, planned two offensives, which were supposed to unite in a pincer movement west of Kharkov: a southern offensive from the front arc of Isjum in a north-west direction to the west of Kharkov, and a northern offensive from the small bridgehead at Stary Saltow , west of the northern Don towards Kharkov. The two parts of the group were to join west of Kharkov, take the city and destroy the German troops that were then surrounded. Marshal Tymoshenko's further plan was to take the important junction of Dnepropetrovsk with the united troops in a further joint offensive . Had it been successful, Army Group South's supply lines would have been seriously endangered.

German strategy and planning

After the fighting in the winter of 1941/1942, Hitler wanted to bring the Russian campaign to an end in 1942. In contrast to the Barbarossa company , which was attacked in three strategic directions, the OKH now concentrated on a single strategic direction due to the high losses it had already suffered: The offensive was to be continued in the south, around the economically important regions in the Donets Basin and the Caucasus to take. Because of the expected economic weakening of the Soviet Union through these operations, the German generals hope that it should subsequently be possible to take Moscow by changing the direction of Army Group South to the north. This resulted in the Blue Case plan .

In the run-up to the blue case, two further operations were planned in preparation. The operation Kremlin was a red herring that a major offensive of the middle army group should pretend to Moscow and helped in fact to the Soviet miscalculation of the strategic location. The operation Fridericus other hand, aimed to destroy the front bow of Isjum, because the Army Group South was concerned, the Soviet bridgehead that adversely affect the planned summer offensive in southern impact could. The plan was to attack the 6th Army from the north and the 1st Panzer Army from the south towards Isjum. Strong units in Kharkov and Slavyansk were brought together for this attack . These preparations, which remained unknown to the Stawka, had a strong influence on the outcome of the Soviet Kharkov offensive, as the German forces around Kharkov were much stronger than the Red Army had expected.

Lineup

Soviet line-up

The attack was to be conducted through the southwestern front and the northern wing of the southern front. Marshal Tymoshenko and his chief of staff, Bagramjan, dispatched four armies directly to attack. At the beginning of the offensive, the Stawka concentrated a group of 925 tanks. The group consisted of three tank corps (21st, 22nd and 23rd) and 9 separate tank brigades. The 22nd Panzer Corps (Colonel Alexander Shamschin) was subordinated to the 38th Army and divided among the rifle divisions. The 21st (Major General Grigori Kuzmin) and 23rd Panzer Corps (Major General Jefim Pushkin ), however, were concentrated for a breakthrough and together with the 6th Cavalry Corps (General AA Noskow) formed the Bobkin mobile army group.

Northern sector

The Northern Sector was east of Kharkov.

Southern sector

The main attack was to come from the southern sector. This was located in the north of the Isjum front arc and was therefore heavily exposed.

  • 6th Army (Lieutenant General AM Gorodnyansky ): south of Kharkov. Mission: Securing the left southern attack flank. Attack in a northwesterly direction.
  • Army Group Bobkin (Lieutenant General LW Bobkin ): During the planning phase, the Bobkin Group was formed from two tank corps and parts of the 6th Army. This was set up on the left flank of the 6th Army for the main attack. Mission: Attack in a north-westerly direction and secure the left wing of the south-western front.

In the middle of the front arch, the southern front took over the security of the southern front lines. The commander, Colonel General RI Malinowski , placed two armies in this section.

  • 57th Army (Lieutenant General KP Podlas ): southwest section of the Isjum front arch to Barvenkowo . Mission: Securing the left flank of the southwest front
  • 9th Army (Major General FM Kharitonov ): southeastern section of the Izjum front arc from Barvenkowo to Slavyansk . Mission: Securing the left flank of the southwest front

The 9th and 57th Armies had only 11 rifle divisions and one rifle brigade at their disposal to secure the 176 km long southern border of the Isjum front arc. Further forces on the southern front were tied up in front of Rostov and Voroshilovgrad to secure the rest of the southern front. However, these troops should be brought to the left flank of the southern front if necessary.

German line-up

Kharkov area

The German 6th Army was on the left flank of Army Group South and occupied the area from Kursk to the southwestern tip of the Isjum front arc. In the Kharkov area at the time of the attack there were:

Southern front arch

The southern section of Army Group South was defended by the German 17th Army and the 1st Panzer Army . The following units were attached to the right wing of the 6th Army:

Other units of the 17th Army occupied the front as far as the Sea of ​​Azov .

The battle

Soviet prisoners near Kharkov (1942)

Tymoshenko's offensive

The Soviet attack, in which around 380,000 soldiers took part, began on May 12, 1942. Tymoshenko's major offensive now aimed the main force directly at Kharkov. The troops of the south-western front (6th, 9th, parts 38th and 57th armies, supported by five tank corps and 13 separate tank brigades) faced the German 6th Army from the Isjum front arc to the northwest and west. The Soviet 28th Army carried out a separate attack northwards against the front of the German XVII. Army corps (General Hollidt) near Wolchansk , which, after a successful breakthrough, was to reach the northern apron of Kharkov. The front defense positions of the 8th Army Corps (General Heitz ) fell rapidly, and the Red Army quickly gained space. The front of the 62nd Infantry Division quickly collapsed near Likhachevo under the onslaught of several rifle divisions and more than 300 tanks. Likewise, the 294th Infantry Division at Ternovaya could not withstand the onslaught of the 28th Army (General Ryabyschew) and had to retreat. The Soviet 38th Army connected to the south of it and maintained the connection between the two attack groups, and this army also covered the Donets section between Stary Saltow and Balakeja opposite the German LI. Army Corps. Moskalenko's troops advanced 6 km and fought on the Novo Alexandrowka and Tscherwona Rogana line when a counterattack by the German 3rd Panzer Division on Stary Saltow forced the Soviet troops standing there to retreat to the east bank of the Bolshaya Babka. To the south, the Soviet 9th and 57th Armies recorded no gain in space, because these large formations were given priority to cover the southern flank. On May 14th, troops of the Soviet 6th Army broke the German resistance at Bishkin and Bereka and penetrated the front of the 8th Army Corps. Only through the intervention of the German VIII. Air Corps could the heads of the Soviet 21st (General Kuzmin) and 23rd Panzer Corps (General Pushkin ), about 20-25 km from Kharkov, be stopped along the southern apron of the city. The Soviet 6th Cavalry Corps, which had broken through furthest to the west, already encompassed Krasnograd from the north, east and south. A German counter-attack by the newly introduced 305th Infantry Division into the flank of the Bobkin Army Group was able to remove the immediate threat to Poltava . The encirclement of the German VIII., XVII. Planned by Tymoshenko. and LI. Army corps did not succeed. The Soviet thrust slackened faster than expected, while the German resistance hardened at the same time.

German counterattack

On May 17th, the German counter-offensive began by the Kleist Army Group: The III. Panzer Corps (General von Mackensen ) acted as the head of the attack wedge from the south with stronger armored forces ( 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions , 60th Motorized Division ) against the rear of the Soviet offensive armies. The XI standing in the Losowaja area. Army corps, which was covered on both sides by numerous allied troops (Romanian VI Army Corps), tried to join the attack on the western and southwestern section of the front projection. Kleist's troops advanced northward together from Slavyansk (LII. Army Corps), Barvenkowo (III. Panzer Corps) and Losovaya (XI. Army Corps). As a precautionary measure, the high command of the German 6th Army had not given up its own Donets lead from Andrejewka in January, now it offered General Paulus the possibility of a flank thrust against the Soviet armies that had broken through to Kharkov. Parts of the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions protecting the Kharkov area tried to push against Kleist's tanks from the north. On May 19, Kleist's units reached the southern edge of the Isjum - Kamyshevaya line, and the armored troops crossed the Bereka at Petrovskoye. On the evening of that day, the VIII. Army Corps had the impression that the Soviet attack force in the direction of Kharkov had peaked and the impending breakthrough had come to a standstill.

On May 20, the northern wedge of the von Mackensen group was violently attacked by the Soviet II Cavalry Corps on the western flank near Gawrilowka. Infantry of the 1st Mountain Division , the 389th and 384th Infantry Division that had moved in took over the protection of the western flank. The 14th Panzer Division succeeded in taking Gussarowka on May 22nd, thus more than halving the width of the western Soviet bridgehead on the Donets. The four Soviet armies attacking south of the city of Kharkov were completely surprised by the impending encirclement. In the VIII Army Corps, the 305th Infantry Division began its transition on the Berestovenka, the 113th Infantry Division advanced south near Taranowka. On the northern section at Ternowaja the XVII. Army Corps lost connection with the south wing of the XXIX. Restore Army Corps on Murom, from May 22nd the Soviet 28th Army had to move into defensive position.

On May 23, the attack group from Mackensen (III. Panzer Corps) acting from the south was able to unite with the Corps group Breith (parts of the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions and 44th Infantry Division ) coming via Andrejewka and the encirclement of the Soviet troops complete with it. On May 25, the Commander-in-Chief of the 57th Army, General Podlas, and his chief of staff committed suicide; on May 26, General Bobkin was fatally wounded near the village of Krutoyarka, and Lieutenant General FJ Kostenko was also killed. On May 27, General Gorodnyansky, the commander in chief of the Soviet 6th Army, fell while his troops attempted to break out. Major General AA Noskov, commander of the enclosed 6th Cavalry Corps, was captured. The enclosed Soviet troops tried in vain to break out to the southeast until May 27th. Around 240,000 Soviet soldiers became prisoners of war, and around 1,250 Soviet tanks were destroyed or captured in the fighting. The forces planned for the Soviet spring and summer offensive were no longer available.

Importance of the battle

The victory at Kharkov was also one of the last victorious kettle battles of the Wehrmacht. With this victory, the Germans achieved the strategic prerequisites for the 1942 summer offensive .

literature

Web links

Commons : Battle of Kharkov (1942)  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files