Stauffenberg service

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The Stauffenberg Service (also called Confidential Information Service or CDU Service ) was a private political intelligence service in Germany from 1969 to 1982.

assignment

The service was supposed to provide the CDU and CSU with confidential information after they switched to the opposition . In addition, his task was to mediate the liaison with “stable connections with politically important persons of a Christian-Democratic-conservative direction abroad” and to give advice to selected German and foreign journalists. The service worked decidedly against Willy Brandt's foreign policy concept of change through rapprochement and against the conclusion of the Eastern Treaties , for example through the targeted dissemination of information collected to the press. After the conclusion of the Eastern Treaty, the main focus in the period 1972–1982 was on collecting information on hidden Eastern strategies, e.g. B. the infiltration, but also the support of terrorism.

history

Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg , Wolfgang Langkau and Hans Christoph von Stauffenberg (alias: Scheffer ) played a key role in the development in autumn 1969 . The latter two contributed their intelligence experience as former employees of the Federal Intelligence Service . Also inaugurated were the former Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger , the former Head of the Chancellery Hans Globke , who died in February 1973 , and the then CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss . In June 1972, shortly before Guttenberg's death on October 4th, Werner Marx took over his role in the organization.

The East German spy rings Goliath , an employee of Marx revealed the existence of the Stauffenberg-service to the Main Intelligence of the Stasi . On November 6, 1973, the Ministry received a seven-page note from Goliath with the title "About people who work for a CSU-internal information service, their business and financial practices, and their connections to the BND".

Stauffenberg, who was formally employed by the Bavarian State Chancellery , retired in 1976 when he reached the age of 65. The Free State of Bavaria did not want to extend it beyond this limit, despite its interventions with the then State Minister Ludwig Huber and the head of the State Chancellery, Reiner Kessler .

One of the service's greatest successes since October 1980 were reports from the GDR's Politburo. Who was the source is still unknown today. However, their reports were confirmed to be correct after the fall of the Wall . Further successes were reports in connection with the Solidarność protests, the imposition of martial law in Poland and the attitude and reactions of the GDR leadership.

The service lasted until the spring of 1982, when press releases ensured that most of the sources terminated their collaboration. In addition, the Union parties under Chancellor Helmut Kohl took over government again a short time later. This secured the Union politicians access to the findings of the BND, so that the Stauffenberg service lost its right to exist. It is not known whether the BND took over sources from the Stauffenberg service.

In November 2012, the service was treated for the first time by the political scientist and journalist Stefanie Waske in a monograph, which was based on archive material that has now been released, including from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation .

activity

Reports from informants from abroad reached the service by courier or telex. The courier service and the telex connections of a western embassy could be used for reports from Moscow . In the case of so-called “express information”, the findings were also transmitted by telephone. Radio links may also have been used.

Initially, the service processed the information that its informants could get abroad. The informants were later given specific intelligence assignments. The sources were mainly active on a fee basis; few were volunteers.

Employee

The employees included the eponymous Hans Christoph von Stauffenberg , Wolfgang Langkau , a retired confidante of the former BND President Reinhard Gehlen , and Hans Langemann . This is employed as a camouflage as a foreign intelligence advisor for the Olympic Games. The position belongs to the Bavarian State Ministry for Education and Culture . However, Langemann does not move there, but - allegedly due to a lack of space - into a rented office in Bruckmannstrasse in the Nymphenburg district of Munich . He was subordinate to two employees who, like him, also come from the BND. After the end of the Olympic Games, Langemann moved to the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior at Odeonsplatz and vacated his Nymphenburg office in May 1973. From 1973 he was head of the state security department of the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior.

Stauffenberg has two typists available.

financing

Financing a private intelligence service is much more difficult because it cannot easily fall back on state budget funds.

Casimir Prince zu Sayn-Wittgenstein , who later became the state treasurer of the Hessian CDU and became a key figure in the CDU party donation affair , tried to get donations from representatives of the economy. In mid-February 1971, he talked to Hermann Josef Abs , the former spokesman of the board of Deutsche Bank . In May 1971 Sayn-Wittgenstein had commitments of 60,000 to 80,000 DM. The Bavarian Minister of State Franz Heubl tried to get grants from the southern German economy. He was hoping for money from the Rolf Rodenstock company .

The working group for the study of international issues played an important role in financing the Stauffenberg service . The association was registered on January 13, 1971. Otto B. Roegele was chairman throughout its existence and Heinrich Krone was deputy . Treasurer was Alfred Seidl until July 23, 1980 , then Florian Harlander . The association is liquidated in 1986. The liquidators were Florian Harlander and Hans Christoph von Stauffenberg. At the end of June 1971 the association had amassed 50,000 DM in debt. From 1976 to 1981 the working group received DM 95,500 from the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior . In the same period, Stauffenberg transferred at least DM 300,000 to Langemann as "reimbursement of expenses for informants."

Langemann received 91,254 DM from the state of Bavaria in 1971 and 108,491 DM in 1972 for operational purposes, which also paid for sources of the service. The member of parliament Gustav Stein helped the ministry in a financial emergency in 1971 with 25,000 DM from his own funds. The service may also have received money from Axel Springer , for which Guttenberg had campaigned.

Messages

One of the first objectives of the service was the negotiations with Willy Brandt in Moscow in 1970. Among other things, reports were made on the Communist Party of Italy , the relationship of the Vatican to the Soviet Union , situation reports on the situation in Egypt and Sudan, and the US position on the Middle East question. Topics continued to be the change of government in Poland and the associated uprisings. The service also received reports on the political stance of western countries in relation to Germany. A source appeared to have access to the CIA .

The service reported in a study on the continued "infiltration, subversion and propaganda" of the GDR against West Germany, despite the Eastern Treaties. One of the driving forces behind this approach is said to have been the Politburo member Hermann Axen . In July 1972, the service reported a connection between the MfS and the Red Army faction , which was confirmed after 1989. An analysis of "Palestinian terrorism" was based essentially on a CIA report, as was an analysis of Frelimo , which interested the Stauffenberg service because a delegation visited Bonn in August 1973. In 1972 the Stauffenberg service warned of a terrorist threat at the Olympic Games in Munich (an attack actually took place on September 5, 1972 ) and, in 1973, a possible control of the SPD sub-district of Munich by communist cadres . Information about the Hungarian Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja was obtained for Karl Carstens , who was won as a supporter for the service and who had intelligence expertise during his time in the Federal Chancellery . Reports on the private life of politicians made up about two percent of total reporting. These included analyzes of Willy Brandt's alcohol consumption (“I ordered several large cognacs for the discussion at breakfast ”) or a character study about Helmut Schmidt (“His great self-confidence cannot be overlooked”).

Report formats

One reporting format of the service was the 14-day "Foreign Policy Accents", which was supposed to summarize the reports of the past two weeks without citing the source. Readers were allowed to use these in the same way without quoting verbatim.

The reports sometimes bore a “personal” stamp for “exclusive and sensitive information” or the notes “For reasons of source protection we ask for particularly confidential treatment”, “Endangering the information path or the informant” or “Endangering the informant”. In very sensitive cases the request is: “Destroy after reading”. Interlocutors are described as "experienced experts" or "very well informed politicians". If knowledge arises by chance, the term “information on the occasion” is used.

In the first year of service alone, 250 reports were produced after only a few a month in the first half of 1970. In 1970-71, most reports reached the service from (but not via) the United States, followed by Italy and France.

swell

Those in charge of the service often found their interlocutors in diplomatic missions. Embassy staff from the Soviet Union , the GDR and the People's Republic of China were frequent conversation partners. In reports from Paris , representatives from China, Japan , Yugoslavia , Poland and the Soviet Union, according to Ambassador Awerki Borissowitsch Aristow , were quoted. There are also contacts with the ambassadors of the USA and France in Germany. The service also uses the connections of the former German diplomat Karl Werkmeister to gather information. Source reports reach the service from Rome , Ankara , Beirut , Istanbul , Belgrade , New York and Algeria, among others . In 1976 informers from Bangladesh , South Africa and Zimbabwe were obtained.

A major source of information for the service was George Meany , who heads the conservative American trade union confederation AFL-CIO , and its foreign policy advisor and anti-communist Jay Lovestone . Other contacts and connections were the publicist Klaus Dohrn and the American Christopher Emmet . Stauffenberg was also in contact with the German ambassador in Moscow, Helmut Allardt . The journalist Simon Malley , who is also said to have worked for the BND, was led under the code name " Peter ". For his work and his office with secretary he received 6,000 DM per month plus 5,000 DM travel expenses. Among the high-ranking Israeli interlocutors of the service Langkau included the then chairman of the Zionist Executive Committee Ehud Avriel , the later President Shimon Peres and the ambassador in Paris Asher Ben-Natan . Another informant was Brian Crozier , who wrote in his memoir that Stauffenberg had built up a "substantial network of agents".

The main sources are Simon Malley ( Petrus ) and Spiritus . Fritz reports on the GDR leadership, Alex on Poland, Savoy on Soviet-Portuguese relations, Heinez on Cuba, Jonathan on the journalist Carlos , Paul on the foundations of the NATO strategy, Consul on Ostpolitik, Anton on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and mosaic on the European Economic Community . Other sources have the code names Norbert ., Jonathan , Burg and Romulus . The latter reports from Italy, among other things, on the Red Brigades and bases his reports on information from the Italian civilian intelligence service Sicurezza . A KPÖ functionary and an emigrated Czech communist have their say as further sources . Aristide Brunello was one of the informants .

The service had no contact with German authorities such as the Federal Criminal Police Office or the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution , as its investigative activities were directed abroad. However, the service was only able to compile reports on German left-wing terrorism in the 1970s on the basis of sources from abroad.

receiver

The recipients of the service's messages have been grouped into different distribution lists. At the beginning of 1971 there was an exclusive, normal and extended mailing list as well as one on church topics.

The recipients of the exclusive mailing list were Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg ( Member of the Bundestag ), Hans Globke ( former State Secretary), Franz Heubl (Bavarian State Minister) and Otto B. Roegele (publisher Rheinischer Merkur ). Content that was distributed via this mailing list was special information, mostly at risk for informants. Therefore, in order to minimize the risk, the recipient group should be kept small. From 1973 the following people belonged to the exclusive distribution list: Karl Carstens , Alfred Dregger , Franz Heubl, Heinrich Krone , Alphons Horten , Werner Marx , Alois Mertes , Heinrich Seewald , Franz Ludwig Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg , Casimir Prince zu Sayn-Wittgenstein , a Kirchert and Spiritus .

In addition to the recipients of the exclusive distribution list, the normal distribution list included Hans Neusel (former personal advisor Kurt Georg Kiesinger ), Friedrich Voß (office manager for Franz Josef Strauss in Bonn ), Rainer Barzel (CDU / CSU parliamentary group leader), Heinrich Krone ( former Federal Minister). ), Karl Forster (Secretary of the German Bishops' Conference ), Karl Gumbel ( Former State Secretary), Werner Marx (Member of the Bundestag), Franz Josef Bach (Member of the Bundestag), Bruno Heck (CDU Secretary General), Reiner Keßler (Head of the Bavarian State Chancellery ), Casimir Prince zu Sayn-Wittgenstein (CDU Hessen) and a Kirchert.

Journalists who wrote in line with the political orientation of the service and were sufficiently discreet could also receive reports. These included, in particular, the then editor-in-chief of the Bild newspaper , Peter Boenisch , the ZDF television presenter Gerhard Löwenthal and the head of the foreign policy department of the newspaper Die Welt , Dieter Cycon . In some cases, similarities between world articles and reports from the Stauffenberg service could be made out.

Later (possibly 1973/74) the members of parliament Walter Wallmann , Gerhard Reddemann and Kurt Birrenbach , who is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and praises the "excellent secret reports", are recipients of the reports , Hans Graf Huyn , the CSU's foreign affairs officer, the former ambassador Gustav Böx , the financier Gustav Stein and the entrepreneur Heinrich Gattineau . The identity of the recipient of the report with the code name Marianne is unclear.

literature

  • Stefanie Waske: Destroy after reading! The secret intelligence service of the CDU and CSU in the Cold War . Hanser, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-446-24144-2 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Stefanie Waske: Destroy after reading! The secret intelligence service of the CDU and CSU in the Cold War . Hanser, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-446-24144-2 , pp. 206 .
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  9. a b Stefanie Waske: The conspiracy against Brandt (ZEITmagazin 49/2012). In: http://www.zeit.de/ . November 29, 2012, accessed January 16, 2019 .
  10. The greatest scandal in the history of the Federal Republic. Egon Bahr on conspiratorial actions against Willy Brandt. In: http://www.dradio.de/ . Deutschlandradio Kultur , November 29, 2012, accessed on December 31, 2018 .
  11. Dietmar Seher: Blüm believes in a robber pistol. In: http://www.derwesten.de/ . The West, November 29, 2012, accessed December 31, 2018 .
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  14. Snoopers without a nose . In: Der Spiegel . No. 17 , 1995 ( online ).
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