Adolph Bermpohl hurricane

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Adolph Bermpohl hurricane
Origin: February 21, 1967
resolution February 24, 1967
Top gust: > 200 km / h (North Sea)
Lowest air pressure: 955 hPa
Affected regions: Northern Germany, southern North Sea, Netherlands
Damage amount: -

The Adolph Bermpohl hurricane was a hurricane on February 23, 1967. The hurricane, originally named after the deep Xanthia , was later named by the Maritime Weather Office Hamburg after the rescue cruiser Adolph Bermpohl , who had an accident in this hurricane and lost his entire four-man crew. The hurricane reached the highest wind speeds measured over the North Sea until then . These were an hourly average over several hours of 149.4 km / h, a peak value that has not yet been reached on Heligoland. Due to its southern railway, which led across the southern North Sea to Jutland, the hurricane low that triggered the hurricane was one of the so-called high - speed runners .

Preliminary remark

In 1967 the information technology and the supply infrastructure were not yet up to date. Telephone, radio and teleprinter were available to the authorities as means of communication; the population itself could only be reached via radio and television, with television programs only being broadcast in the afternoon and evening. Since the power supply in the countryside, but also in parts of the cities, was provided by overhead lines, heavy storms caused by storms, but also by lightning strikes, regularly led to power outages that lasted for a long time. Under such conditions it was extremely difficult to warn the population and only possible with loudspeaker vans from the police.

The weather forecast was also still in its infancy in the 1960s. Weather observations were made at sea in the form of hourly meteorological observations based on precisely defined phenomenological parameters. Weather reports were forwarded by radio and then entered manually in the weather maps. As a result, dangerous weather changes occurring at short notice could only be recognized very late and severe weather warnings could only be issued by the responsible weather authorities at a time when the storm had already reached the affected region. During the Adolph Bermpohl hurricane as well as the Hollandorkan in 1953 and the hurricane Quimburga in 1972, this led to ships at sea and people on land as well as the authorities responsible for disaster prevention being surprised, and buildings were secured or moving to a safe harbor was too late.

Weather conditions during the Adolph Bermpohl hurricane

Development of the weather situation

The hurricane of February 23, 1967 represented the climax of a previously stormy westerly wind situation and, in its history, showed extensive parallels with the hurricane that triggered the Dutch storm tide of 1953 and the Capella hurricane of January 3, 1976. Two days earlier, a heavy storm with gale-force gusts had hit the German Bight. After a one-day high impact, the foothills of the hurricane low, which moved rapidly from the British Isles to Jutland, spread to Central and Western Europe. This hurricane low was created on February 21, 1967 in the sea area of ​​the Azores as the edge of another hurricane low near Newfoundland. It reached Ireland in the early morning hours of February 22nd, and 24 hours later, after crossing Central England, it hit the German Bight. Triggered by a highly tropospheric wave, there was a very strong deepening when the depth entered the North Sea area. In the sea area west of Jutland, the depression reached a core pressure of less than 960  hectopascals . At the same time, an extremely sharp air pressure gradient built up on the back of the hurricane low, which was moving further to southern Sweden, as a wedge of the high pressure area off the Bay of Biscay immediately north of Cape Finisterre was quickly built up under reinforcement over the British Isles and the western North Sea. At midnight, the low pressure area reached the Stockholm area with a significant weakening before it dissolved over the Gulf of Finland .

After initially moderate winds from the south-east prevailed , characteristic of a North Atlantic low of the Jutland type, with the passage of the warm front in the midday hours, the wind turned in a westerly direction and a very strong wind increase. With the passage of the cold front, the wind turned in a north-westerly direction, resulting in an influx of highly unstable cold air. Due to a high pressure wedge rapidly advancing from the west, the air pressure gradient over the southern North Sea increased considerably, so that in the afternoon and evening hours in the German Bight for several hours, wind speeds of 149.4 km / h were measured on an hourly average. The peak gusts not recorded by the anemometers in use at the time are likely to have reached higher values ​​than those recorded later with better quality anemometers. According to current estimates, the peak gusts in the main storm field were well over 200 km / h.

Problems with comparability with other hurricanes

The Adolph Bermpohl hurricane is still the worst hurricane in the German North Sea since the beginning of the record. However, due to the different methods used for wind measurement, a direct comparison is extremely difficult. This is mainly due to the fact that in 1967 the wind strength at sea was qualitatively recorded on the Beaufort scale using precisely defined phenomenological characteristics. A measurement of the wind speed with the help of anemometers only took place at weather stations on land. The models that were still common at the time, however, quickly reached their technical limits in extreme wind speeds and only recorded wind speeds of 40 to 44 meters per second (144 to 158 km / h). At that time, they could only be used to determine the hourly averages necessary for predicting the sea weather and the expected swell, but not the speed of individual extreme gusts.

Storm surge

The hurricane, unprecedented in its strength, caused the low tidal water to fail along the entire German North Sea coast. Instead of falling, the water levels rose even further after the midday flood. This development of the gauges caused great consternation among the population as well as the responsible authorities. Although the storm surge was nowhere near as high as the February flood in 1962, the dykes that had not been reinforced or had just been completed since then suffered severe damage. The sea dikes in front of the Finkhaushalligkoog, the Christianskoog and the Elbdeich near Brunsbüttel were particularly affected. On Sylt there were large dune demolitions.

The Oste river basin was particularly hard hit. Since the completion of the eastern barrier was expected here in 1968, the storm surge hit dykes that were not raised. In the river basin between Hechthausen and Bremervörde , the dikes at Kranenburg and Niederochenhausen broke in a total of five places; in addition, dyke sections near Brobergen were flooded. Several 100 hectares of green and arable land were flooded. Also in the area of Oberndorf (Oste) , where the storm surge in 1962 caused severe dike breaches, as well as in Großenwörden , dangerous situations developed again. The ring dike around the construction site of the eastern barrier could also be held. In order to prevent the construction site from being flooded, which would have jeopardized the commissioning of the barrage, which was planned for 1968, 100 Bundeswehr soldiers were sent to secure the site.

Floods also occurred in the Pinnau , Krückau and Stör river areas, which are also not yet protected by barriers . Due to the exposed position of the river mouths, the water levels here were similar to those of the storm surge in 1962. In Elmshorn , the city center was flooded. There were also floods in Uetersen , Stade and Itzehoe .

Serious damage also occurred in the port and industrial areas on the Weser and Elbe rivers that were in front of the main dikes and were not yet secured by flood protection walls. In Hamburg, a large contingent of forces from the police, fire brigade, technical relief organization and the Federal Armed Forces succeeded in preventing the Elbe dike from breaking at Kirchwerder . Critical situations also arose on the dike sections on the Süderelbe and in the river section between Hamburg and Geesthacht, but dike breaches could be prevented by the emergency services arriving in good time.

On the Lower Weser, particularly dangerous situations arose at Hamme and Ochtum. In Ritterhude the Hammeschleuse was flooded and the road connections to the Teufelsmoor and Worpswede were interrupted. On the Ochtum, the storm surge partially reached the top of the dike in the area of ​​the dyke sections that were not yet raised.

Crisis management

In contrast to the storm surge of 1962 , the responsible authorities in the Hanseatic City of Hamburg were prepared for a potentially dangerous situation; here as well as in the districts of Aurich , Stade , Flensburg and Husum , a disaster alarm was triggered. The endangered residential areas on the Veddel and in Waltershof as well as in Finkenwerder were evacuated in good time, in other places an evacuation was prepared. Dike breaches could be prevented by the timely deployment of the Federal Armed Forces, the fire brigade, technical relief organizations and the police in Hamburg.

Damage

Damage inland

There was severe devastation inland. In Hamburg alone, where the storm left one dead and around 60 injured, the fire brigade drove six hundred missions in eight hours as a result of the storm. In the inner cities, countless shop windows were destroyed by the enormous wind pressure. In Schleswig-Holstein, due to the severe storm damage, a disaster alarm had to be triggered; The main focus of the damage was the northern parts of the country, especially Flensburg. In what was then the Husum district, 75 percent of the buildings were badly damaged, and several farmhouses were completely destroyed by the storm. In the Puttgarden ferry port, freight wagons loaded with motor vehicles were set in motion by the storm and crashed into the port. Due to the severe storm damage, traffic in Schleswig-Holstein almost completely came to a standstill.

Severe storm damage with deaths and injuries occurred not only in the FRG and the GDR , but also in Belgium , the Netherlands , Denmark , Austria and Switzerland . Numerous buildings were badly damaged or destroyed in the Dutch province of Friesland .

Two trams overturned in the canton of Basel, and a construction crane in Sissach . In Bedburg , the spire of the St. Lambertus Church fell on the square in front of the church, killing a person.

Effects on Shipping

Due to the inadequate weather forecasting techniques in 1967, the danger of the storm was only recognized very late by the weather services. Immediately after a hurricane warning was issued by Norddeich Radio at 11:55 a.m. on February 23, the storm field reached the sea area of ​​the German Bight. As a result, numerous ships at sea were surprised by the sudden hurricane and there was no way of protecting themselves from the wind or heading for the open sea, so that the first distress at sea occurred at 12:36. A total of at least 44, according to other sources, 80 sailors died in the hurricane.

Among other things, the crew of the rescue cruiser Adolph Bermpohl and three Dutch fishermen who had previously been rescued by their cutter TM1 Burgemeester van Kampen drowned after the rescue cruiser was hit by a heavy bottom sea ​​on the Sellebrunn Reef east of Heligoland while trying to pick up the rescued from the daughter boat . The Urker fishing cutter UK223 Maartje sank in the sea ​​channel between Den Helder and Texel without the ship's command being able to make an emergency call. All five crew members were killed in the sinking.

During the storm, the Duisburg coast motor ship Ruhr sank in the sea area between Langeoog and Spiekeroog after the cargo had slipped in very heavy seas, as well as the Danish motor ship Else Priess (299 GRT) and the German coaster Ikone (344 GRT) off the Schleswig-Holstein one West Coast. The icon , who was traveling from Esbjerg to Hamburg with a load of gravel, reported for the last time in the vicinity of Fanö ; only a hatch cover floating at the level of the mouth of the Eider was recovered from it. As in the case of the UK233 Maartje , the ship must have sunk so quickly that it was no longer possible to make an emergency call.

The motor ship Else Priess , which was traveling from Hamburg to London with a load of magnesite and was in distress about 20 nautical miles north of Norderney, sank while attempting to call at the Borkum protective port after the salvage tug Danzig due to the extreme swell and the hurricane could not reach the damaged vessel. All eight people on board were killed in the accident.

In all three cases, the entire crew was killed, although in the case of the sinking of the Ruhr, the German fishing steamer Kap Wallo , located in the immediate vicinity , tried to hand over a line before it had to withdraw due to the dangerous situation. Particularly tragic in the case of the sinking of the Ruhr is the fact that the Helgoland rescue cruiser Adolph Bermpohl was supposed to leave for the wrecked Ruhr after the rescued crew members of the fishing cutter TM 1 Burgemeester van Kampen were set down , because the local motor rescue boats Weser (at that time station Wilhelmshaven) and Langeoog ( at that time station Langeoog) could not reach the open sea and had to return to their harbors when the tide was strong and the sea was extreme.

There were the following losses:

Ship name description dead
Adolph Bermpohl and daughter boat Vegesack Rescue ship and daughter boat found without crew. 4th
TM 1 Burgemeester van Kampen The crew had been rescued, but died in the Adolph Bermpohl accident. 3
Dysentery Sent an emergency call north of Spiekeroog, capsized 6th
Else Priess decreased 6th
icon sunk without an emergency call ?
UK233 Maartje Fishing cutter, sunk without an emergency call 8th
Oste stranded 0

See also

Individual evidence

  1. a b Orkaner, stærke storme og stormfloder ( Memento from April 13, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) ( Danish )
  2. Hansa: Central organ for shipping, shipbuilding, port, volume 105, 1968, p. 231 online
  3. In the breakers of hell off Heligoland. Die Zeit , February 23, 1968, accessed on July 23, 2019 .
  4. The misfortune of "Adolph Bermpohl". NDR, February 23, 2017, accessed on July 20, 2019 .
  5. Simone Viere, Thomas Morell: Helgoland recalls the sinking of the "Adolph Bermpohl". Evangelical Lutheran Church in Northern Germany , February 21, 2017, accessed on July 20, 2019 .
  6. Annalen der Meteorologie, p. 38 online
  7. See:
  8. ^ Kruhl, Heinrich (1977): Storm surge weather conditions of the last decades. In: Yearbook of the Hafenbautechnischen Gesellschaft vol. 1975/67. Hamburg: 337-349
  9. Hamburger Abendblatt No. 54 from 3/4. March 1967
  10. ↑ The district of Stade got off lightly in the stormy night: Only Easter room was hit hard . In; Stader Tageblatt. No. 48 of February 25, 1967. Stade.
  11. a b c d Hamburger Abendblatt No. 47 of February 24, 1967
  12. After midnight: the danger is over. In: Bremer Nachrichten. No. 48 of February 25, 1967
  13. Storm and flood damage is great . In: Bremervörder Nachrichten.Nr. 48 from 25./26. February 1967. Bremervörde.
  14. 33 sailors died in the raging sea . In: Bremer Nachrichten. No. 48 of February 25, 1967. Bremen.
  15. ^ Chronicle for the month of February 1967. Canton Basel-Landschaft, accessed on January 23, 2014 .
  16. St. Lambertus Church in Bedburg. Parish Association of the City of Bedburg, archived from the original on January 6, 2014 ; accessed on July 23, 2019 .
  17. The cross is seated again. Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, January 26, 2007, accessed on January 23, 2014 .
  18. Heino Comien: SOS. Hurricane over northern Germany. In: The island bell Baltrum 1-2001. Archived from the original on February 1, 2014 ; accessed on July 23, 2019 .
  19. Hamburger Abendblatt No. 48 25./26. February 1967
  20. German Society for the Rescue of Shipwrecked People: Yearbook 1968. P. 6 ff. Bremen 1968.
  21. SCHIFFAHRT / ADOLPH BERMPOHL - Der Kaventsmann , Der Spiegel 11/1967
  22. Urker kotter spoorlos met 5 mensen aan boord (Dutch)
  23. a b Prager, Hans-Georg (2012): Savior Without Glory: The Adventure of the Sea Emergency Aid Erfurt: 106
  24. Huge hurricane over the North Sea: four sea rescuers had to die. In: Bremer Nachrichten. No. 48 of February 25, 1967. Bremen.
  25. Betænkning vedrørende minre skibes sikkerhed - Afgivet af det af trade ministery on December 21, 1967 nedsatte udvalg. ( Memento from March 1, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Betænkning No. 497, June 1968 ( Danish )
  26. https://books.google.de/books?id=0NAt0g6FDigC&pg=PA106