Battle at Saint-Dizier

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Battle at Saint-Dizier
Castle of Saint-Dizier
Castle of Saint-Dizier
date March 26 , 1814
place Saint-Dizier on the Marne , Champagne , France
output Withdrawal of the Russian cavalry to Bar-le-Duc
Parties to the conflict

France 1804First empire France

Russian Empire 1721Russian Empire Russia

Commander

France 1804First empire Napoleon Bonaparte

Russian Empire 1721Russian Empire Ferdinand von Wintzingerode

Troop strength
about 30,000 men about 10,000 riders
losses

less than 600

500 dead and wounded,
2000 prisoners,
18 guns

The battle at Saint-Dizier took place on March 26, 1814 during the winter campaign of the Wars of Liberation between French troops under Napoleon's personal leadership and the Russian cavalry of the Silesian Army under Ferdinand von Wintzingerode .

Almost exclusively horsemen came into the battle, about 18,000 in number. Marshal MacDonald raved about what he saw in his memoir:

"... on the plain of Saint-Dizier ... a cavalry battle developed like I had never seen it greater since the beginning of the war."

- Marshal Jacques MacDonald

prehistory

The movements of the French troops

On March 23, 1814, Napoleon was in Saint-Dizier with the Old Guard and the Guard Cavalry and ordered the French corps further north under Marshal Ney and Marshal MacDonald to follow him south the next day. At 4:00 a.m. the next day, March 24, 1814, the Old Guard and the accompanying cavalry marched on the road to Wassy under Lefebvre-Desnouettes and Letort . On the evening of that day they reached Doulevant , the cavalry still roaming ahead as far as Daillancourt , Nully and Colombey-les-Deux-Églises . Marshal Ney's corps stood between Saint-Dizier and Wassy, ​​while MacDonald's troops were bivouacking north-west of Saint-Dizier on the Marne .

On the following March 25, 1814, the French cavalry reached Bar-sur-Aube and Brienne-la-Vieille and stood before Chaumont . Napoleon stayed in Doulevant that day, because he was in the dark about the whereabouts of the coalition troops. He had been told that Bar-sur-Aube and Troyes had been evacuated, but he had no certainty about the whereabouts of the enemy troops, as he wrote frankly to his marshals. In the afternoon the message came in that about 10,000 enemy riders coming from Vitry-le-Francois were approaching Saint-Dizier. When the report arrived that evening that these troops had reached Saint-Dizier and requisitioned quarters for the tsar and the Prussian king, Napoleon informed his marshals at 9 p.m. that he would turn back to defend this enemy he had to consider an essential part of the Bohemian Army - to attack the next day. In fact, the French faced only a single cavalry corps under Wintzingerode , which had been sent to follow the French and watch them. The rumor of the presence of the monarchs had been spread as a ruse to mislead Napoleon. Both were far away with the bulk of their troops on the train to Paris.

At 2:30 on the morning of March 26, 1814, Napoleon and his troops left Doulevant and reached Wassy at dawn. There he was told that only the Tettenborn Cossacks had so far crossed the Marne and had advanced to Eclaron . Napoleon immediately ordered to advance with all available troops and attack the enemy.

Decisions on the part of the coalition

On the afternoon of March 23, 1814, Tsar Alexander , the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III. and the commander-in-chief of the coalition troops, Prince Schwarzenberg, jointly decided in a council of war in Pougy not to follow Napoleon any further, but first to wait for the union with the Silesian army of Blucher . In the next few hours it became known that the closest corps of the Silesian Army under Wintzingerode had already taken Chalons and that his vanguard would soon reach Vitry-le-Francois , which the French army had just passed.

On the evening of March 23, 1813 at 8:00 p.m. the monarchs and Prince Schwarzenberg left Pougy and traveled on to Sompuis , which they reached early the next day, March 24, 1814. On the way there they crossed the Aube on a makeshift bridge at Nogent-sur-Aube . At 10:00 o'clock they continued on the road to Vitry. Around noon, Tsar Alexander called everyone together for a new council of war in the open air and, in consultation with his personal staff, suggested that both armies of the coalition troops, the Bohemian Army and the Silesian Army , should move together to Paris , in order to be in the French capital for good bring about the fall of Napoleon. Only a small cavalry corps was supposed to cover this train against the French army on the Marne. This proposal was quickly agreed and the necessary orders were soon sent out. The aforementioned equestrian corps was to provide the Russian Wintzingerode corps of the Silesian Army . The necessary order was given by Tsar Alexander personally, who also ordered that Wintzingerode himself should take command. The infantry of the corps, under Vorontsov's command, had to take part in the parade on Paris.

Wintzingerode commanded 7 regiments of light cavalry, 16 Cossack groups, a hunter regiment and 5 mounted batteries, a total of around 10,000 horsemen and 800 infantrymen. This cavalry corps also included the Tettenborn and Tschernyschows Cossacks , who formed the vanguard, and the Benckendorff Cossacks .

The battle

Advance Tettenborn

When the Tettenborn Cossacks approached on March 25, 1814 from Vitry on the right bank of the Marne Saint-Dizier, they saw on the other bank the columns of the rearguard of the French corps Gérard , which Saint-Dizier had left on the march to Wassy. Then as now, the road from Saint-Dizier to Wassy (or Montier-en-Der) initially leads back west on the left bank of the Marne before turning south at Valcourt . This circumstance led the enemy troops to approach within sight. At the level of the village of Hoéricourt, Tettenborn had his eight guns positioned and effectively fired at the retreating French on the opposite bank.

The French defended themselves with fire from 16 guns and also sent a few hundred men who waded through the Marne and attacked the Russian guns. However, these were successfully defended by the Russian hussars. In the opposite direction, a group of Cossacks crossed the Marne to stir up unrest among the French.

Gérard only withdrew his guns at dusk, whereupon Tettenborn's Cossacks immediately crossed the Marne, followed the French and were able to occupy the village of Humbecourt . But there they had to stop because of the overwhelming mass of the enemy. During the night the Cossacks could see innumerable bivouac fires around them. From their large number, they rightly concluded that several French corps were encamped around them.

Tettenborn spent the night in Eclaron , Wintzingerode and the majority of the Russian horsemen had reached Saint-Dizier, where the general spent the night.

The next morning of March 26, 1814, the Cossacks were immediately expelled from Humbecourt. An attempt to recapture the place failed, as large numbers of French troops now showed up. Wintzingerode went to Tettenborn when he estimated the number of French to be 15 to 20 thousand. Wintzigerode returned to the right bank of the Marne. But Tettenborn led his riders to another attack on the French along the road to Humbecourt, before the Cossacks withdrew under constant defensive battles over the ford near Valcourt to the other bank of the Marne.

At that time, the number of French on the left bank of the Marne was already estimated at 30,000.

French attack

Shortly before noon Napoleon arrived at Valcourt. He immediately ordered all available guns to be positioned and fired at the Russian cavalry across the river. Then the French cavalry crossed the Marne: first the 4 divisions of the Guard Cavalry under Sébastiani , then the Dragoons Milhauds, followed by the Dragoons Kellermanns , then the Cuirassiers Germains and the riders Lefebvre-Desnouettes . 10,000 French cavalrymen had already gathered to the right of the Marne when Tettenborn saw the last chance to attack. But it was no longer possible for him to coordinate with the other Wintzingerode divisions. Tettenborn's 4,000 Cossacks alone attacked the bulk of the French cavalry and achieved some success before they withdrew on the road to Vitry in order not to be encircled. Energetically pursued by the French and obstructed by their own luggage cart, they were only able to gather again at Perthes and later retreat to Vitry under cover of darkness.

Wintzingerode had made the decision to keep the road to Bar-le-Duc clear as a line of retreat for his troops . This was particularly true of the infantrymen, 600 of whom held Saint-Dizier. However, this road left Saint-Dizier on the remote side from the Marne, so that Wintzingerode's reserves, which he set up there, were so far removed from the battle that they could not be used.

When the French cavalry had crossed the Marne, the infantry advanced wading across the river. An unusual measure in the winter cold and an area in which there was a lack of firewood everywhere to offer the soaked soldiers a warming and drying fire. Only the Oudinot infantry advanced on the road to Saint-Dizier to retake the place.

When the French infantry came into action on the right bank of the Marne, the position of Wintzingerode's last 3,000 dragoons became hopeless. They withdrew and tried to gain the road to Bar-le-Duc and to unite with the reserves of Wintzingerode.

Escape of the Russians

The French cavalry pursued the Russian immediately and initially drove the right wing of their reserves apart and to flee in front of the forest of Trois Fontaines . The Russian riders tried to find paths through the forest with their horses and to reach the road to Bar-le-Duc.

The Cossacks of Benckendorff were the last Russian horsemen who could still offer resistance on the road to Bar-le-Duc, as their position was initially protected by swampy terrain. Then they had to withdraw with the remaining Russian hussars in constant combat with the advancing French horsemen. To the north of the village of Brillon they were able to take up a firm position again because the falling darkness protected them from further pursuit.

The Russian hunters in Saint-Dizier resisted until the afternoon, when they had to give way to Oudinot's troops and tried to escape to Bar-le-Duc. Outside the city, however, the French cavalry attacked them, hunted them down and pursued them. Only a few were able to flee through the woods and make their way to Bar-le-Duc.

The next days

From 10 a.m. on the following day, March 27, 1814, the bulk of the French army marched under Napoleon's personal leadership to Vitry. Only the Oudinots division went to Bar-le-Duc.

Before Vitry, which was still occupied by Prussians, who were eagerly bombarding the French, Napoleon held a council of war with his marshals who were present. Since all captured opponents unanimously stated that the majority of the coalition army was on the direct route to Paris, Napoleon, after some hesitation, decided to go there as well. In order to bypass the opponents, the detour via Troyes was chosen . On the evening of March 27, 1814, all the French marched back to Saint-Dizier and at 3:00 a.m. the next morning, March 28, 1814, they continued in four columns via Wassy, Doulevant and Vendeuvre to Troyes.

Wintzingerode only met the Tettenborns Cossacks again on March 28, 1814 in Chalons . Together they marched south and occupied Saint-Dizier again late in the evening. There the Cossacks Chernyshev found their way back to their corps. The combined Reiterkorps Wintzingerodes advanced to Montier-en-Der on March 29, 1814 and occupied Troyes the next day, March 30, 1814, without catching up with the French who were hurrying away.

literature

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Notes and additions

  1. cf. Bogdanovich
  2. cf. Houssaye
  3. The area on which the battle took place largely corresponds to that of today's Saint-Dizier-Robinson military airfield near Saint-Dizier
  4. There are references (cf. Damitz) which say that Napoleon was Bar-sur-Aube on that day. The French and more recent literature do not confirm this
  5. previously also Sommepuis
  6. Chernyshev's Cossacks did not enter the battle because they were moving too far west and did not meet the French
  7. this village was completely destroyed in September 1944 when the military airfield was captured by American troops. The place has not existed since 1952
  8. cf. Damitz
  9. 200 were at Perthes
  10. Bar-le-Duc was Oudinot's birthplace