Battle near Möckern

This article deals with the battle in what is now Saxony-Anhalt. For the later battle in the same year near Leipzig see Völkerschlacht bei Leipzig # First day .

Battle near Möckern

Part of: Wars of Liberation

Scene from the cavalry battle near Zeddenick near Möckern; Historicizing representation by Richard Knötel (after 1880)

date	April 5, 1813
place	Möckern near Magdeburg ( Prussia )
output	Victory of the allies

Parties to the conflict
France	Prussia Russia
Commander
Eugène de Beauharnais	Ludwig zu Wittgenstein
Troop strength
about 37,000 men	about 20,000 men
losses
900 to 2,200 men	500 to 600 men

The battle near Möckern took place between the troops of the French Empire and the Prussian - Russian coalition during the spring campaign of the Wars of Liberation on April 5, 1813. In fact, the historical name battle at Möckern is misleading, as it was about three outpost battles at Dannigkow , Vehlitz and Zeddenick . Here, the Allied troops under General Ludwig Adolf Peter zu Sayn-Wittgenstein won a first major victory over numerically superior French units led by Napoleon's stepson Eugène de Beauharnais . This victory subsequently strengthened the morale of the Allied side.

prehistory

After the disastrous withdrawal of the French Grande Armée from Russia, Napoleon returned to France to raise new troops. Marshal Murat took command of the remaining French units in Central Europe and tried in vain to organize a stable defense against the advancing Russian army . In February 1813, after differences with the emperor, he finally handed over command to Eugène de Beauharnais and left for his possessions in Italy. Nor did it succeed in stabilizing the situation. Eugène moved from the Vistula to the Oder , evacuated Berlin in March and finally took up a position along the Elbe .

The Russian troops had entered Prussia and had previously occupied the Duchy of Warsaw . On March 11th they were in Berlin. In many places the population had risen against the French occupations. However, it was not until March 16, 1813 that the Prussian government formally declared war on France, after the armed forces were already mobilizing . In terms of troop strength, the allied Prussians and Russians were superior, as the French and the allied Rhine Confederation states , west of the Elbe, first had to set up new units. Napoleon therefore urged Eugène in numerous letters to hold the Elbe line by wanting to take an offensive position east of the river with his few troops. So the allies would be forced to take action against this exposed position and only then to cross the strategically important Elbe-Saale line. The inevitable loss of time was intended to enable Napoleon to bring in the newly established or newly formed associations. On March 9, 1813, he wrote to Eugène:

"If there is a beautiful position, it is the one in front of Magdeburg , where you threaten to attack the enemy at any moment, and from where you will really attack him if he does not appear with great power."

Eugène de Beauharnais (1810)

A few days later he repeated these instructions in a letter to General de Lauriston , commander of the V Corps, with the addition that he should take offensive action against the enemy when the opportunity arises. On March 21, 1813, Eugène actually positioned the bulk of his troops east of the Magdeburg fortress . But on March 24th he backed away again. Only after Napoleon had urged him again to take the offensive position, Eugène moved back across the Elbe on April 1st.

At that time, 13,000 Russians were under the Count of Wittgenstein and 10,000 Prussians from General Yorck's corps in Berlin. The von Bülow corps (approx. 12,000 Prussians) and the Borstell brigade (approx. 5,000 Prussians) were approaching from the Oder . Wittgenstein, who was in command, had received orders to turn south, to cross the Elbe at Roßlau and to seek union with Marshal Blucher's army in the Leipzig area . He had already initiated this movement, whereby his flank against the French troop concentration around Magdeburg was only covered by the weak forces of Borstell. The latter were now attacked on April 2, 1813 by the French V Corps (Lauriston) and pushed back. On April 3, the French XI. Corps ( Grenier ) and the Latour-Maubourg cavalry corps across the Elbe and pushed Borstell's troops back behind Möckern . Count von Wittgenstein believed that Eugène's approach was a possible offensive attack against Berlin and thereupon gave up the plans to march to Saxony . Instead, he gave orders to all corps subordinate to him to turn against the heavily developed fortress of Magdeburg. The well advanced Borstell Brigade, on the other hand, received instructions to avoid a direct confrontation for the time being.

On the morning of April 4, 1813, Borstell's troops left for Gloine , Bülow reached Ziesar , the Russian Corps Berg arrived in Lietzo , while Yorck was in Zerbst . Wittgenstein initially planned to wait a day to gather his troops. On April 6th, he wanted to tie up the enemy's front with the Bülow and Borstell corps by means of a mock attack, while the Yorck and Berg corps were supposed to hit Gommern's flank. But when the news arrived on the morning of April 5 that a withdrawal of the Napoleonic forces on Magdeburg was planned, Wittgenstein immediately ordered the general attack. Wittgenstein was able to muster around 20,050 men, which made him numerically far inferior to the French.

Course of battle

Overview plan for the spring campaign of 1813

On the morning of April 5, 1813, the French units had taken the following position: On the right wing near Wahlitz was the Lagrange Division of the V Corps (approx. 9,500 men, 16 artillery pieces), whose advance commandos had advanced to Gommern and Dannigkow . In the center were the three divisions of the XI. Corps (approx. 24,000 men, 46 guns) at Karith , Nedlitz and Büden and the 1st light cavalry division (800 men, 6 guns) at Zeddenick . On the left wing, the Maison division of the V Corps (5000 men, 18 guns) had formed near Woltersdorf . A little further back was the Rochambeau division of the V Corps and at Pechau the Roguet Guard division to cover a swampy narrow road at the approaches to Magdeburg. Even before this position, the 1st Cavalry Corps had advanced as far as the Ehle , a small river that was a natural obstacle for every attacker. In Vehlitz and Dannigkow two companies each stood as outposts. Overall, Eugène had about 37,400 men on the battlefield.

The fighting for Dannigkow

On the left wing of the Allies, the Yorck Corps advanced against the French positions on the morning of April 5, 1813 from 11:00 a.m. The avant-garde under Lieutenant General Friedrich Heinrich Karl von Hünerbein consisted of three battalions of East Prussian infantry, two squadrons of hussars , the Treskow dragoon regiment , a few Cossacks and 12 guns. Hünerbein had instructions to keep the enemy busy and thus prevent them from evading until the main forces of the corps had reached them. The general, for his part, was determined to take Dannigkov with his limited resources. In a report he later stated:

“Only the matter had evidently become a matter of honor, the sacred cause of the fatherland, and I could no longer obey the order to avoid combat; it was the first serious battle in this war, and victory or death obviously had to be the watchword here ... "

- General von Hünerbein

At about 1 p.m. the hussars hit the outposts of the Lagrange division and threw them back as far as Dannigkow. There, however, they received fire from French riflemen and suffered initial losses. Hünerbein sent the riflemen of the first battalion to take the place, but although they advanced as far as the Ehle Bridge, they soon got into a fierce house-to-house fight. The riflemen of the second battalion were called in for reinforcement, but with their help Dannigkow could not be taken.

On the French side, Eugène had recognized due to the cannon thunder, which could be heard from afar, that a serious attack was taking place at Dannigkow and that more had to be expected. He therefore ordered two battalions each for reinforcement to Dannigkow, Vehlitz and Zeddenick. Until then, the French troops in the village (two, later three companies of the 134th Line Infantry Regiment ) had received fire from four Prussian guns that had meanwhile been deployed.

General Yorck; Painting by Ernst Gebauer

Hünerbein now had two East Prussian infantry battalions line up to attack under Major Lobenthal . The French fought off the first storm, but the second eventually threw them out of town after a violent hand-to-hand combat. They tried to gather in the open area beyond Dannigkow, but a bayonet attack threw them back again. Major Lobenthal decided to go back to the village around 4:00 p.m. in order not to expose himself to the attack of the superior French artillery and cavalry in the open area. At this point, both battalions had about 100 dead and wounded.

At the same time the bulk of the Yorck corps with six battalions and the Jurgass Dragoon Regiment , which also included Count von Wittgenstein, had arrived at Leitzkau . At the news of the fierceness of the fighting, two more infantry battalions and a few artillery batteries were sent to Dannigkow. But on that day there was only one reciprocal cannonade of the Prussian and French troops. Against the assembled Lagrange division, any further Prussian action was hopeless.

Another column, consisting of a fusilier battalion and 20 hussars under Major Crammon, was assigned by Hünerbein at the beginning of the battle to bypass the French position via Dornburg on Gommern. In the beginning this division made good progress, threw back the French outposts from a small spruce forest and then penetrated Gommern. But now the French brought up two infantry battalions and two squadrons of cavalry and counterattacked. The Prussians withdrew into the spruce forest and defended themselves there. In the hours that followed it came here to brutal battles were where also French prisoners killed as Major Crammon later stated succinctly because they "wanted to take no quarter, and the time was short to longer dispense with them." The same had already happened in Dannigkow, where no prisoners had been taken.

The fighting for Vehlitz

Overview map of the battles on April 5, 1813

A little further north of Dannigkow, the avant-garde of the Berg Corps under General Roth had advanced and had contact with the enemy near the town of Vehlitz at around 4:00 p.m. In contrast to the battle for Dannigkow, however, the difficult terrain prevented the development of a larger battle. Instead, the artillery of both sides dueled here. The French troops of the Zucchi Brigade of the Gerard Division had four battalions and four guns in position near Vehlitz and Géneral Grenier, the commanding general of the XI. Corps himself had rushed to the battlefield to direct the defense.

At around 6:00 p.m., however, the infantry of the Borstell brigade approached, which had come from Gloine via Wendgräben . General von Borstell let his troops (4 Prussian battalions) immediately go over to the attack, which was sent from the north and south. Two Prussian artillery batteries also drove up and support this approach. Additional support came from two Russian battalions from the Berg division . To the left of Vehlitz, the fusilier battalion of the 4th East Prussian Infantry Regiment under Major von Bülow crossed the Ehle. It swiveled north and entered the place with its scavengers , taking two artillery pieces.

The left flank covered a battalion of the Russian 26th Jäger Regiment and the Russian militia battalion Olonetz-Vologda . The Russian General Roth saw the opportunity and asked the Grenadier Battalion of the 1st Pomeranian Infantry Regiment , who had remained behind to protect the Prussian artillery, to attack also head-on across the Ehle Bridge. This attack was successful and brought the village under Allied control. North of Vehlitz, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Pomeranian Infantry Regiment under the majors von Schon and von Creilsheim crossed the Ehle, but had to gather again on the other bank.

Prussian soldiers 1813; from the uniform work of Richard Knötel (1883)

At that moment the French cavalry (about 800 lancers , chasseurs and hussars) launched a counterattack against the two battalions of the 1st Pomeranian Infantry Regiment north of Vehlitz. In the Prussian ranks it was not sure whether they were French or Russian riders, and when they were recognized as enemies it was too late to form another square . The 2nd Battalion therefore briefly formed a line and let the third section fire a volley at a distance of only 50 paces. The French cavalry became disordered and divided. Some of them swung around Vehlitz and threw back the fusilier battalion. The other part blew through the two Prussian battalions and the Ehle and reached a spruce forest on the other side. There they were attacked and wiped out by two fresh squadrons of the Prussian Queen Dragoon Regiment . 115 French were captured here alone.

After this counterattack had failed, the Prussian Grenadier Battalion captured Vehlitz. Now all available forces went against the Windmühlenberg behind it, which two battalions of the Italian Zucchi Brigade were defending. The Allies under General von Borstell only managed to take the hill with greater losses after the Italians had refused an invitation to surrender. The French forces withdrew to Nedlitz at nightfall. The Prussian-Russian troops set up defense around Vehlitz and finally darkness fell. Géneral Grenier was also badly wounded in the face by a musket ball during the battle.

The fighting at Zeddenick

Major von Platen in action near Zeddenick from a book from 1864

The Bülow corps was up at around 4:00 p.m. with the avant-garde under General von Oppen ( Platen Dragoon Regiment , four squadrons of hussars - 2 squadrons each from the 1st and 2nd Leib-Hussar Regiment , a fusilier battalion, some Cossacks) Möckern came up. The Cossacks threw the opposing advance troops of the French 1st light cavalry division back behind Zeddenick. Behind it, however, the bulk of this division formed, which consisted of the 7 ^e régiment de chevau-légers lanciers , the 8 ^e régiment de hussards , the 9th Polish regiment and smaller parts of the Chasseur regiments 3, 13, 19 and 22. These were supported by a battery of artillery and at some distance were three infantry battalions near Nedlitz. There was a wide trench in front of this position.

On the other hand, the Prussian hussars and the Dragoons regiment under General von Oppen went over to attack together, supported by half a battery. After a short battle, the three French regiments fled the battlefield. It was these regiments which later led an attack on the troops of the Borstell and Berg brigade near Vehlitz and were finally wiped out there. General von Oppen pursued the fleeing enemy troops in the direction of Nedlitz and did not return to Zeddenick until after dark.

consequences

Memorial to the battles of April 5, 1813 in Vehlitz

Memorial stone in Dannigkow

During the fighting the Allies had lost around 500–600 men to death or wounding. The French losses are poorly recorded. Eugène himself spoke in his report of around 900 men, 100 of whom are said to have been captured. According to Allied information, however, the French are said to have lost up to 2200 men and one gun. Of these, 38 officers and 900 soldiers are said to have been captured. Count von Wittgenstein thought of renewing the attack the following morning with assembled forces and more coordination, but Eugène withdrew to Magdeburg that night. The next day he crossed the Elbe and destroyed all bridges behind him. He had probably received news of the river crossing of Blucher’s army near Roßlau, and so he had decided to break off the fight early so as not to be cut off later himself. Eugène's decision later met with criticism: “It gave him the most favorable opportunity to attack the enemy columns advancing separately, but failed to bring only partial forces into the battle and thus the opportunity to raise the sunk courage of his troops through a brilliant success , left unused. ”Eugène himself justified himself by saying that he had not“ wanted to risk everything ”until an opportunity presented itself to him.

But criticism also had to be faced on the Allied side. On April 6th General von Bülow wrote to his wife in Berlin:

“The success would have been completely different if one hadn't rushed too quickly and, instead of attacking yesterday afternoon, had expected this morning, as Count Wittgenstein actually ordered. The guilt of the hasty attack is now placed on Hünerbein. "

Hünerbein responded to the allegations in his report:

“I again confess my guilt for having engaged in a battle with so few troops against the will of the commanding general; I can boldly acquit myself that I am guilty of willful disobedience. The consideration that it was very important to strike the first blow successfully against the new enemy under the eyes of the new allied [...] allowed me to persist in this small battle. "

In fact, the complaints had no serious consequences for Hünerbein. On the contrary, he received the Iron Cross for his services in the battle at Dannigkow.

In the Wehrmacht , an infantry division was named after the location of the battle.

meaning

After the equally successful battle near Lüneburg on April 2, 1813, the battles at Möckern were the first major combat operations in the Wars of Liberation. Eugène had missed the opportunity to exploit his numerical superiority and defeat Wittgenstein's army individually. But the strategic purpose of the offensive position recommended by Napoleon was ultimately fulfilled, because Wittgenstein had initially not been able to unite with Blucher’s army. Instead, he had lost a few days in which he first had to eliminate Eugène's threatening position. Apart from this strategically disadvantageous effect, the victory in these combat operations had a particularly beneficial effect on the morale of the Allied troops:

"So the day of Möckern far beyond its actual meaning became an event that awakened the happiest hope for the future everywhere and gave the brotherhood in arms between Prussia and Russians the first firm hold."

- Rudolf Friederich (historian)

Even a French historian later wrote about the effect of the battle:

“Wittgenstein reported, and in any case believed that Eugen had been on the march to Berlin and had been prevented from doing so by Möckern's victory. Victoria was shot in Berlin while thanksgiving celebrations were being held in the churches; everywhere one celebrated the fame of the defenders of the fatherland and their allies, the Russians, everywhere the enthusiasm of the citizens and soldiers grew. "

- Jean Baptiste Adolphe Charras (historian)

Memorials

A war memorial to this battle was erected in various places.

• Memorial stone near Ladeburg
• War memorial in Dannigkow
• War memorial in Möckern
• War memorial in Vehlitz

literature

• Frank Bauer: Möckern April 5, 1813. The first victory of Prussian-Russian troops. Potsdam 2004. (= Small series history of the wars of liberation 1813–1815 , issue 5).
• Jean Baptiste Adolphe Charras: History of the War of 1813 in Germany. Publisher FA Brockhaus, Leipzig 1867.
• Johann Gustav Droysen: Yorck von Wartenburg. Emil Vollmer Verlag, Essen 1996, ISBN 3-88851-160-7 .
• Friedrich Christoph Förster: History of the Wars of Liberation 1813, 1814, 1815. 3 volumes, Verlag Gustav Hempel, Berlin 1864.
• Rudolf Friederich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. 4 volumes, Verlag Ernst Siegfried Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1911.
• Karl Ludwig Wilhelm Ernst von Prittwitz: Contributions to the history of the year 1813. 2 volumes, Verlag von Ferdinand Riegel, Potsdam 1843.
• Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon as a general. 2 volumes, Verlag Ernst Siegfried Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1901.
• Frank Bauer: The battles near Möckern on April 5, 1813. The allies' victorious start in the liberation year 1813. Potsdam 2012.

Individual evidence

1. ^ ^{A b} Karl Ludwig Wilhelm Ernst von Prittwitz: Contributions to the history of the year 1813 , vol. 1, Potsdam 1843, p. 337.
2. ^ ^{A b} Karl Ludwig Wilhelm Ernst von Prittwitz: Contributions to the history of the year 1813 , vol. 1, Potsdam 1843, p. 338.
3. ^ ^{A b c} Jean Baptiste Adolphe Charras: History of the War of 1813 in Germany , Leipzig 1867, p. 400.
4. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Rudolf Friederich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815 , Vol. 1, Berlin 1911, p. 205.
5. ^ Quoted from: Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon als Feldherr , Vol. 2, Berlin 1901, p. 208.
6. ^ Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon als Feldherr , Vol. 2, Berlin 1901, p. 208.
7. ^ Rudolf Friederich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815 , Vol. 1, Berlin 1911, p. 202.
8. ^ Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon als Feldherr , Vol. 2, Berlin 1901, p. 210.
9. ^ Rudolf Friederich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815 , Vol. 1, Berlin 1911, pp. 202-204.
10. ^ Rudolf Friederich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815 , Vol. 1, Berlin 1911, p. 204.
11. ↑ Jean Baptiste Adolphe Charras: History of the War of 1813 in Germany , Leipzig 1867, p. 393.
12. ^ Johann Gustav Droysen: Yorck von Wartenburg , Essen 1996, p. 232.
13. ^ Friedrich Christoph Förster: History of the Wars of Liberation 1813, 1814, 1815 , Vol. 1, Berlin 1864, p. 202 f.
14. ↑ Quoted from: Johann Gustav Droysen: Yorck von Wartenburg , Essen 1996, p. 233.
15. ^ ^{A b c} Johann Gustav Droysen: Yorck von Wartenburg , Essen 1996, p. 232f.
16. ↑ ^{a b} Jean Baptiste Adolphe Charras: History of the War of 1813 in Germany , Leipzig 1867, p. 396.
17. ^ Friedrich Christoph Förster: History of the Wars of Liberation 1813, 1814, 1815 , Vol. 1, Berlin 1864, p. 204.
18. ^ Johann Gustav Droysen: Yorck von Wartenburg , Essen 1996, p. 233.
19. ^ Karl Ludwig Wilhelm Ernst von Prittwitz: Contributions to the history of the year 1813 , vol. 1, Potsdam 1843, p. 345 f.
20. ^ Karl Ludwig Wilhelm Ernst von Prittwitz: Contributions to the history of the year 1813 , Vol. 1, Potsdam 1843, p. 347.
21. ^ Karl Ludwig Wilhelm Ernst von Prittwitz: Contributions to the history of the year 1813 , Vol. 1, Potsdam 1843, p. 348.
22. ↑ Jean Baptiste Adolphe Charras: History of the War of 1813 in Germany , Leipzig 1867, p. 397.
23. ^ Karl Ludwig Wilhelm Ernst von Prittwitz: Contributions to the history of the year 1813 , vol. 1, Potsdam 1843, p. 349.
24. ^ Johann Gustav Droysen: Yorck von Wartenburg , Essen 1996, p. 233 f.
25. ^ Jean Baptiste Adolphe Charras: History of the War of 1813 in Germany , Leipzig 1867, p. 398.
26. ^ Karl Ludwig Wilhelm Ernst von Prittwitz: Contributions to the history of the year 1813 , vol. 1, Potsdam 1843, p. 342 f.
27. ^ ^{A b} Johann Gustav Droysen: Yorck von Wartenburg , Essen 1996, p. 234.
28. ^ ^{A b} Rudolf Friederich: The Wars of Liberation 1813–1815 , Vol. 1, Berlin 1911, p. 206.
29. ^ Jean Baptiste Adolphe Charras: History of the War of 1813 in Germany , Leipzig 1867, p. 401.
30. ↑ The Prussian General von Bülow to his wife (April 5, 1813), in: Tim Klein (Ed.): The Liberation 1813 - 1814 - 1815 , Ebenhausen 1913, p. 160.
31. ↑ Quoted from: Friedrich Christoph Förster: History of the Wars of Liberation 1813, 1814, 1815 , Vol. 1, Berlin 1864, p. 207.
32. ^ Jean Baptiste Adolphe Charras: History of the War of 1813 in Germany , Leipzig 1867, p. 403.

This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on July 8, 2010 .