Battle of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises

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Battle of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises
date January 24, 1814
place near Colombey-les-Deux-Églises , Haute-Marne , France
output French troops withdraw on Troyes
Parties to the conflict

France 1804First empire France

WurttembergKingdom of Württemberg Württemberg Austria
Austrian EmpireEmpire of Austria 

Commander

France 1804First empire Edouard Mortier

WurttembergKingdom of Württemberg Crown Prince Wilhelm Ignácz Gyulay
Austrian EmpireEmpire of Austria

Troop strength
16,000 men, 50 guns 29,000
losses

2,000

2,000

The battle of Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises found on 24 January 1814 during the winter campaign in 1814 the War of Liberation in France instead. On this day the Württemberg corps under Crown Prince Wilhelm and an Austrian corps under General Gyulay attacked the Bohemian Army troops of the French army under Marshal Mortier and forced them to retreat. This cleared the way for the Bohemian Army through the valley of the Aube to the north to unite with the Silesian Army under Field Marshal Blücher .

prehistory

Troop movements on January 17, 1814

On January 17, 1814, the Württemberg corps of the Bohemian Army under the Württemberg Crown Prince Wilhelm had reached Val-de-Meuse . On the same day the Crown Prince sent a large contingent on the road to Langres , as he was not yet aware that the French had already begun to evacuate this city and withdraw to the north. He also sent two squadron hussars with orders to take the city of Chaumont the following night if possible . But the hussars met halfway to Chaumont near Mandres-la-Côte on enemy French cavalry, which initially withdrew. A little further behind the town of Biesles, however, a few squadrons of French cavalry were posted, which made it impossible for the Württemberg hussars to advance any further. The Hussars were the first to learn from two captured French guards on horseback that the French divisions under Marshal Mortier von Langres would withdraw directly to Chaumont, 36 kilometers further north, and would reach this place in the evening. The Wuerttembergians saw their assignment for this night as impossible and settled in Mandres-la-Côte with some observation posts advanced to the north-west.

The battle at Chaumont on January 18, 1814

Knowing the movements of the French troops on the previous day, the Württemberg Crown Prince set his troops on the road to Chaumont on January 18, 1814 at 7 a.m. from Val-de-Meuse. He himself rode with his cavalry in support of his hussars at Mandres-la-Côte ahead of the bulk. This time it was possible to drive the French cavalry behind Biesles, which withdrew to Chaumont, 16 kilometers away. When the Württembergers moved up, they found that the French had prepared well for their arrival in the meantime. Marshal Mortier had positioned strong forces on each other's western bank of the Marne and blocked the bridge in front of Chaumont with obstacles. Strong French artillery dominated the terrain from selected good, elevated positions on the west bank of the Marne south of Choignes. From there the road to Chaumont could also be shelled and the Württemberg people had no choice but to hold back and stand at some distance. Since it had already started to rain heavily in the morning and the rain lasted all day, the Württemberg artillery only managed slowly and with great delay to bring its own artillery over soggy roads and to bring it into position and action in front of Chaumont.

There was and still is a second, narrower bridge ( ) east of the village of Choignes, whose access from the east then and now leads through a cut protected by forests that could not be covered by the French artillery. An attempt by a Wuerttemberg hunter battalion to take this bridge failed, however, due to the energetic and successful resistance of a battalion of the Old Guard , which stood there to protect the bridge.

As darkness fell, the battle subsided and the Württemberg troops tried to find shelter from the cold winter rain in the surrounding villages east of the Marne.

The Württembergers had lost 45 men that day, the losses of the French are unknown.

Marshal Mortier ordered his troops to withdraw to the north-west on the road via Colombey-les-Deux-Églises to Bar-sur-Aube early in the morning, still in the dark of night . There he expected to meet further reinforcements and significantly increase the effectiveness of his troops. When the Württembergians began to advance on January 19, 1814, they no longer met any French troops. They occupied Chaumont and explored the roads to Troyes and Joinville , initially without finding a trace of the French.

With the permission of the headquarters of the Bohemian Army , which was located in Langres from January 20, 1814, the people of Württemberg stayed in Chaumont for five days and tried to recover from the cold and damp weather.

The movements of the Austrian corps Gyulay

The Austrian corps under Gyulay occupied Langres on January 17, 1814, but left the city again on January 18, 1814 to follow the French troops under Marshal Mortier on the road to Chaumont. At Versaignes-sur-Marne the French rearguard could be caught up and followed to the village of Marnay-sur-Marne. Then the night ended the chase. The next day Gyulay learned that the Württemberg troops had already occupied Chaumont and that the French had moved on in a hurry. His corps moved a little closer to Chaumont and stopped between the towns of Richebourg and Foulain .

The battle at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises on January 24, 1814

The region of the upper Marne and Aube (detail)

On January 23, 1814, Prince Schwarzenberg , the Commander-in-Chief of the Bohemian Army , ordered the attack on the French troops under Marshal Mottier an der Aube.

The attack of the Württemberg people from the east

At Colombey-les-Deux-Églises on the morning of January 24, 1814, four battalions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry and six guns of the French troops were under the command of Brigadier General Letort .

The Crown Prince of Württemberg was still standing with his corps in Chaumont and that morning organized his troops into five contingents:

  • The first stayed in Chaumont and secured a possibly necessary retreat.
  • The second occupied the place Baisy on the road to Colombey-les-Deux-Églises.
  • The third occupied the village of Montheries in a side valley of the Aube south of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises.
  • The fourth, under General Jett, was commissioned to advance on the road to Colombey-les-Deux-Églises and to attack the French troops standing there from the east.
  • The fifth, under General Stockmayer, received the most important order: from Juzennecourt it was supposed to bypass the French at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises in the south in an arc via Montheries and then attack them from Lavilleneuve-aux-Fresnes from the west. This plan failed completely. The troops under General Stockmayer could not find a way to Lavilleneuve-aux-Fresnes, lost their bearings in the large wooded area south of the road and reached Colombey-les-Deux-Églises at exactly noon, coming out of the forest from the south.

When the French troops saw the first Württemberg soldiers, they fired a few cannon shots and quickly retreated to Lignol-le-Château . The Crown Prince did not hesitate and immediately pursued the French with the cavalry at his disposal and a mounted battery of artillery, but without infantry support. The French troops under General Letort now withdrew north towards Voigny . When the Crown Prince pursued it again, he realized that a trap had been set for him: the entire ridge from Voigny down to the Aube was occupied by French artillery and 20 guns opened fire on the Württemberg people. In addition, the Friant Division of the Old Guard had taken up position at the same point and made any attack on the French artillery positions hopeless.

The Crown Prince and his troops also had to find out that there were French artillery on the other side of the Aube near Fontaine , which could reach the road leading down from Colombey-les-Deux-Églises with their projectiles, so that further advance on Bar- sur-Aube was unthinkable.

The Württemberger returned fire with the small-caliber guns of their mounted battery and brought in a second mounted battery, but only when the Austrians of Gyulay Corps managed to get 12-pounder guns from the other side of the Aube did the fire show Coalition forces had some effect on the French: Several ammunition wagons caught fire and some guns failed. The early winter darkness put an end to the battle on this side of the Aube.

The attack of the Austrian Gyulay corps from the south

The Aube in the urban area of ​​Bar sur Aube

The days before, the Austrian Gyulay corps had moved from the Marne Valley via Laferté-sur-Aube to the Aube valley and had spent the night of January 24, 1814 in the vicinity of Clairvaux Monastery ( ). On the morning of January 24, 1814, the corps advanced north in two columns on the left bank of the Aube. The first column marched over Bayel towards Fontaine , the other along the heights over Baroville with the same goal.

Fontaine lies to the left and south of the Aube, and north of the village there was a solid stone bridge over the river. Across the river, on the right bank of the Aube, 14 French guns were in an advantageous position, protected by the French Michel division . The French opened fire on the approaching Austrians early on and inflicted considerable losses on them from a distance. In addition, the Austrians now had to take note that the 20 guns in the position between Bar-sur-Aube and Voigny, which had suddenly stopped the advance of the Württembergians, reached as far as the Fontaine bridge and made a permanent conquest of the same impossible.

The Austrians got into disarray by the French artillery fire, which General Michel noticed immediately and used it for an infantry attack, which had to be repulsed with heavy losses.

In the course of the afternoon, French troops repeatedly attacked across the bridge and involved the Austrians in ongoing fighting. The Gyulay corps did not manage to get beyond the village of Fontaine until dark. Even from this village, which lies south of the bridge, the soldiers of the Old Guard of the Michel Division had driven the Austrians twice again by evening.

The withdrawal of the French

Marshal Motier learned in the course of that day at the latest that other coalition troops were on the march against him. In fact, 5,000 Don Cossacks under their ataman Platov tried to reach the site of the battle, which they did not succeed on that day because of the poor, profound paths. This gave the French time to retreat during the night on the road via Magny-Fouchard and Vendeuvre . In the following days they reached Troyes on the Seine , where they stayed for some time.

The days after

The advance of the Württemberger

On January 25, 1814, the Austrian Gyulay corps occupied the town of Bar-sur-Aube, where the French had left several hundred sick and wounded. The Württemberger initially stayed with Colombey-les-Deux-Églises. But then Crown Prince Wilhelm sent his troops north in the valley of the Aube and had Dienville , La Rothière and the surrounding villages occupied. As the Württembergians advanced to Brienne-la-Vieille , they came across Russian troops of the Silesian Army and noticed that Field Marshal Blücher had taken his headquarters in Brienne-la-Château . Crown Prince Wilhelm met Blücher in Trannes in the last days of January and had a major influence on the battle of La Rothière .

The arrival of the monarchs

Tsar Alexander left Basel on January 16, 1814 and came to Montbéliard on January 17 . He traveled on via Vesoul and arrived in Langres on January 23rd.

The Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III. left Basel on January 20th, also traveled via Vesoul and arrived in Langres on January 25th.

Emperor Franz II of Austria traveled from Basel via Vesoul to Langres from January 22nd to 26th. After that, all the monarchs were reassembled at headquarters and the coalition troops were able to act.

Prince Schwarzenberg moved his headquarters to Chaumont on January 27th, where the monarchs followed him on January 29th.

Napoleon travels to the French troops

Napoleon left Paris on January 25, 1814 at 6 a.m. and reached the French troops at Chalons-sur-Marne the next day , but continued to Vitry-le-François the same day . On January 27th he was in Saint-Dizier , which he left the next day at 11 o'clock to go to Montier-en-Der . On Saturday, January 29th, he and his troops reached Brienne to deliver combat to the Silesian army there and to put Blücher in great distress when storming the Château Brienne.

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Supplements and individual evidence

  1. There is still no such thing today.
  2. There is still a bridge at this point.
  3. If it were the case that the Austrians temporarily took possession of the bridge, the French later took it away from them.
  4. ^ Translated from Russian by the author himself.