Battle of Craonne

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Battle of Craonne
Battle plan
Battle plan
date March 7, 1814
place Chemin des Dames , France
output Orderly withdrawal of the Russian infantry
Parties to the conflict

France 1804First empire France

Russian Empire 1721Russian Empire Russia Prussia
Prussia KingdomKingdom of Prussia 

Commander

France 1804First empire Napoleon Bonaparte

Prussia KingdomKingdom of Prussia Gebhard von Blücher Michail Voronzow
Russian Empire 1721Russian Empire

Troop strength
30,000 men 22,000 men
losses

6,000 according to Russian sources
5,400 according to French sources

4,000 according to Russian sources
5,000 according to French sources

Battles of the Wars of Liberation (1813-1815)

The Battle of Craonne was a battle of the winter campaign of 1814 of the Wars of Liberation . It took place on March 7, 1814 on the Chemin des Dames in Picardy in France. On that day, the French army under Napoleon Bonaparte attacked the infantry of the Russian corps Wintzingerode under Prince Voronzow . Due to the unrestrained ruthlessness with which Napoleon let his troops rush against the well-secured positions of the Russians, the battle with the most losses of the entire campaign resulted. The Russian troops involved belonged to the " Silesian Army " of the 6th Coalition , which was under the command of Field Marshal Blücher . On that day, Blücher and his general staff under Gneisenau planned to bypass and enclose the Napoleonic army with the cavalry of the Russian corps Wintzingerode and the Prussian corps Kleist in the east. This plan failed completely due to deficiencies in planning and execution. The Russian infantry under Voronzow had to retreat to the north-west in the late afternoon, the entire "Silesian Army" retired to Laon .

The topography of the battlefield

The "Plateau du Chemin des Dames" or
"Plateau de Craonne"

Between the rivers Aisne in the south and Ailette in the north rises a high plateau, which extends in the east to an imaginary line from the place Berry-au-Bac on the Aisne via Corbeny to Laon, and in the west through a line from Soissons via Chavignon is limited to Laon. In the north the plateau drops steeply to the valley of the Ailette, in the south very steeply into the valley of the Aisne. From the north the ascent is difficult, from the south only possible in the few gorge-like valleys. In the east and west, however, the plateau ends rather gently. The latitude measured in the direction from south to north varies between several and only a few kilometers. The narrowest point is around the present day Braye. Documents from 1814 mention that the plateau was then unforested and that there were very few permanent houses on it.

Many places that are mentioned in the testimonies from 1814 no longer exist today, as the region was completely destroyed in the Battle of the Aisne in 1917 and much was not rebuilt. This also applies to the village of Craonne from 1814, which today only exists as a memorial. The new town of Craonne is further south.

In 1814 there were no passable roads from south to north that led across the plateau. From east to west, just like today, there was exactly one street called “ Chemin des Dames ” that led across the plateau. In the east it began at the old Craonne from 1814, in the west it ended at a hostel called "Ange-Gardien", which has not existed for a long time.

The places on the plateau were enumerated from west to east: The Froidemont estate, Braye-en-Laonnois, Cerny-en-Laonnois and the Hurtebise estate. On the northern edge of the plateau were - again from west to east: Filain, Chevregny, Neuville, Ailette, Bouconville and the Vauclair monastery. In particular, the village of Ailette from 1814 no longer exists. On the eastern southern edge, the places Paissy as well as Vassogne and Oulches in the Vallée Foulon were important for the course of the battle.

In the following, the plateau is referred to as the "Plateau" or "Plateau de Craonne". The term “ Chemin des Dames ” refers to the road across the plateau.

How it came about

The movements of the Napoleonic troops

On March 4, 1814 around noon, Napoléon and his troops reached the place Fismes on the Vesle , on the road from Soissons to Reims about halfway between the two cities. Taking advantage of the mobility along the main road, the French emperor sent a contingent of troops to Reims overnight, which arrived there at 5 a.m. the next day, i.e. on March 5, 1814, and after a brief skirmish in front of the city gates, those who remained in Reims of Russian soldiers expelled or captured. A total of four Russian battalions were still in Reims that day.

At 2:00 in the morning on March 5, 1814, Napoléon sent cavalry in the opposite direction, which met around 1,000 Cossacks under General Chernyshev before Braine . The Cossacks fled from the overwhelming forces north to Vailly-sur-Aisne.

The main action of March 5, 1814, however, was that a large contingent of French guards cavalry, together with other horsemen, especially Polish Uhlans, advanced north-east to Berry-au-Bac on the Aisne. There was the next bridge suitable for the passage of an entire army, but which was guarded by a few hundred Russian troops. The Polish Uhlans attacked the bridge in a par force attack, so that the Russians ran away in a panic. The Russian guns fell into the hands of the French and 300 Russians were captured. If the Russians had taken precautions to destroy the bridge, they could no longer do so.

The French cavalry was followed on the same day by the 1st Division of the Old Guard , crossed the Aisne and secured the area north of the bridge. Napoléon spent the night of March 5 to 6, 1814 in Berry-au-Bac and crossed the river himself around noon on March 6, 1814. The passage of the Napoleonic army across the Aisne continued until March 7, 1814. Napoléon led almost exactly 30,000 men across the river, who then first moved on on the road to Laon.

The roads from Fismes to Berry-au-Bac were bad and difficult to walk in winter. By winning the bridge in Berry-au-Bac, however, it was possible to cross the Aisne quickly and threaten the “Silesian Army” from a direction from which Blücher had not expected.

The attack on Soissons

The corps of the French marshals Marmont and Mortier were on March 4, 1814 in Hartennes-et-Taux 13 kilometers south of Soissons. On the orders of Napoleon, they marched on March 5, 1814 at 6:00 a.m. for Soissons and attacked the city and its now Russian occupation immediately after their arrival there.

After crossing the Aisne on March 3 and 4, 1814, the "Silesian Army" immediately spread north of the city of Soissons along the road to Laon. This was also necessary because no sufficient quantities of food had been found in Soissons. A crew of 5,000 Russian soldiers from the Langeron Corps remained in the city . The rest of the corps stood just north of town in support.

The advancing French were initially bombarded with artillery from the east of Missy-sur-Aisne, but nevertheless brought 30 of their own guns into position south of the city by noon and shot them at the nearest parts of the city. The shelling caused parts of the city to catch fire during the day. At 3:00 p.m., troops from both French corps managed to penetrate the city along the “Route de Paris” and “Avenue de Reims” and establish themselves there. They broke into houses, covered the roofs and shot over the walls at the Russians. Wherever they could, they also pulled guns on ropes to the top floors of such houses and then shot up and over the city walls from a great height. The fight was fought very doggedly, only ebbed at dusk, but lasted into the night, especially in the west. Both sides suffered losses of more than 1,000 men.

The next day, March 6, 1814, the fighting resumed early in the morning, but only for a short time; then the French corps withdrew on the road to Reims. On this they marched first to Fismes and from there in a north-easterly direction to Berry-au-Bac. While the Mortier corps crossed the Aisne there and supported the Napoleonic army in the afternoon of March 7, 1814, the Marmont corps stayed in Berry-au-Bac on March 7, 1814, waiting for 4,000 men to be reinforced under the command of General Arrighi . When they finally arrived, Marshal Marmont knew why he had had to wait so long: Among them were navy sailors who had come from the coast and had never walked so long in their lives.

The movements of the "Silesian Army"

Saturday March 5th, 1814

Map of the Soissons, Laon and Reims region

After crossing over the Aisne near Soissons, the "Silesian Army" camped north of the city of Soissons on the night of March 5, 1814. Blücher himself and his staff did not spend that night in Soissons, but in Chavignon on the road to Laon, 16 km south of Laon and 19 km north of Soissons. For March 5, 1814, Blücher had ordered in his daily dispositions that the Bülow corps had to observe and secure the north bank of the Aisne west of Soissons as far as Fontenoy. On the eastern side, the Sacken Corps was used to secure the north bank of the Aisne as far as Vailly. The Wintzingerode Corps, however, was instructed to go up to the Craonne plateau, secure the southern edge, and use the wide view from the top for reconnaissance. The vanguard should advance as far as Braye, the cavalry beyond.

Blücher learned on March 5, 1814 that Napoleonic troops had been seen along the road from Soissons to Fismes. Couriers that had been sent to the Bohemian Army the day before returned without having achieved anything because they had not found a way through the French troops. They reported that Reims was already occupied by the French.

The Cossacks under Tettenborn, who were still operating south of Reims, attacked a French dragoon regiment that day within sight of Reims, but then had to retreat further south and could not get a courier through to Blücher. There were still no clear reports from other Cossack pulks who also roamed south of the Aisne. In the evening a message arrived from Laon that French horsemen had appeared there in pursuit of fleeing Cossacks.

It can be assumed that Blücher and his general staff did not yet know with certainty that the Napoleonic army was already crossing the bridge in Berry-au-Bac when he issued the dispositions for the next day.

On that day Blücher was in command of an army of such size as he had never commanded before. The strength of the corps was:

Memorial to those who died in the wars of 1814 and 1914 near Hurtebise on the Craonne plateau
The "Silesian Army" on March 5, 1814
Corps commander Corps strength
Yorck 13,500
Kleist 10,600
Bülow 16,900
Langeron 25,900
Sacks 13,700
Wintzingerode 30,000
total 110,600

The total strength was about 110,600 men, including about 20,000 horsemen. About 500 guns were available. The ratio of Russians to Prussians was 7: 4.

The train of the Cossacks under Chernyshev

On Friday, March 4th, 1814, when the “Silesian Army” was still crossing the Aisne near Soissons, Blücher sent General Chernyshov of the Wintzingerode corps to conduct explorations south of the Aisne on the road to Reims along the Vesle. At Braine, the Cossacks picked up a few quartermakers from the Napoleonic army, from whom they learned that Napoléon was personally approaching the south with his army. A little further from Fismes, however, the Cossacks were attacked by strong formations of French cavalry on the morning of the next day (March 5, 1814) and had to hurry to retreat to Vailly on the Aisne. They found the bridge there in a poor condition and had to make makeshift repairs before they could get to safety on the north bank. On March 5, 1814 at 7 p.m. Chernyshev sent a report to Wintzingerode, who forwarded it to Blücher at midnight, supplemented by the suggestion to entrust Chernyshev with the further reconnaissance along the Aisne east to Pontavert. Chernyshev and his Cossacks took over this task and were on the morning of March 6, 1814 between Pontavert and the road from Bery-au-Bac via Corbeny to Laon. There they observed the Napoleonic troops who, after crossing the Aisne in Berry-au-Bac, first moved north on this road. Chernyshev ordered his Cossacks to bombard the French troops with the available artillery, and they suffered significant losses as a result. This was the reason for Napoléon to occupy the area west of the road to Craonne. There, however, his troops met the advance guard of the infantry under Vorontsov, and there was a battle for Craonne between the Russians and the French. This gave Napoléon certainty about the strong presence of enemy troops on the Craonne plateau and decided to attack these troops the next morning.

Blücher's dispositions for Sunday, March 6, 1814

Blucher's order of the day for March 6, 1814 is dated from the previous evening. In it, Blücher ordered the formation of the corps on the Craonne plateau for March 6, 1814: The Wintzingerode corps was to be positioned farthest east between Braye and Cerny, behind the available troops of the Sacken corps, and behind them the remaining parts of the Langeron corps , then the Kleist corps, east of it the Yorck corps. Only the Bülow Corps was to remain on the road from Soissons to Laon. This list should be taken from 7:00 a.m. on March 6, 1814. In this disposition, no troops were provided to occupy the part of the plateau east of Cerny.

This disposition has been criticized in the literature. The tenor of the criticism was as follows: As soon as the corps had taken up position on the Craonne plateau, they became immobile, since there were no roads to the north or south suitable for the movement of large contingents of troops. The question also remains why Blücher sent almost 20,000 horses to the plateau, which was not very suitable for the cavalry because of its narrowness.

It was only after midnight on March 6, 1814 that Blücher received a report from Wintzingerode, which in turn was accompanied by the report by Chernyshev and another by Vorontsov. Vorontsov commanded the infantry of the Wintzingerode corps and had learned from the Cossacks who had fled Berry-au-Bac that the French army was crossing the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac. He correctly stated that enemy troops were already between Berry-au-Bac and Corbeny, and suggested that the infantry of the Wintzingerode Corps be advanced to positions between Craonne and the Hurtebise estate. This movement should no longer occur to the extent suggested.

Sunday March 6th, 1814

That day, Blücher and his staff were in the Froidemont estate on the plateau. There he received a message around noon that strong French units were moving north from Berry-au-Bac to Corbeny. At 2 p.m. he therefore issued the order for all corps to move east on Craonne. Blucher himself hurried east to initiate further measures. He found the infantry of the Wintzingerode Corps under Voronzow furthest to the east, but still standing on the plateau. Blücher learned here that Craonne was already occupied by the French. A further advance to the east was no longer possible, the opportunity for a battle on the favorable terrain east of Craonne and south of Corbeny passed. Vorontsov had lost the initiative without a specific order. In addition, he had fallen from his horse during the day, had received a hoof kick from his mount and could only give his orders lying down from a cot.

The Battle of Craonne on Monday March 7th, 1814

The preliminary battle on March 6, 1814

Battle plan

When the Napoleonic troops came under fire from the west on March 6, 1814 after crossing the Aisne on the road from Berry-au-Bac to Corbeny, Napoléon ordered the attack on the enemy troops in the west. Two divisions then advanced at 4 p.m., the first directly against Craonne, the second further north on the road to Bouconville.

Craonne, which was only occupied by two Russian fighter regiments, could not be held. After repeated violent bayonet attacks, the hunters withdrew to the plateau, losing 400 men.

The second French division reached Bouconville, from where a bad road led past the Vauclair Abbey to the Hurtebiese estate on the plateau. The French tried to penetrate the plateau this way, but were attacked with bayonets by Russian infantrymen the strength of a brigade or more and had to retreat to Bouconville, where they stayed during the night. When dusk fell, the Napoleonic troops had the entire terrain east of the plateau, Corbeny, Craonne and Bouconeville, firmly in their hands. Napoleon spent the night in Corbeny.

Tschernyschows Cossacks had managed to save themselves on the plateau, at the cost of the fact that there were no more troops of the "Silesian Army" southeast of it and the French could occupy the bank of the Aisne south of the Hurtebise estate the next morning without resistance. Chernyshov's Cossacks fought the next day partly on the side of the Vorontsov infantrymen, partly they wandered about together with Wintzingerode's cavalry.

The routes of the cavalry under Wintzingerode

At 6:00 p.m. on March 6, 1814, Blücher ordered his General Wintzingerode with half of the entire cavalry and 60 mounted artillery guns to leave the "Plateau von Craonne" to the north, beyond the Ailette to the east to the Strait of Berry -au-Bac to move to Laon and along this southward advance to circumvent and attack Napoleon's army. General Wintzingerode and all the other generals concerned received this order that same evening and it was clear to each of them that Blücher expected that the night ahead would be used to carry it out.

Blücher himself spent the night in Braye. When he wanted to go to the front in the east the next morning at around 9:00 a.m., he was informed that the cavalry under Wintzingerode was still at Chevregny in the valley of the Ailette, i.e. 24 km from Corbeny and 16 km from Festieux. Since this jeopardized his plan for that day, Blücher called the most senior of the commanders on the plateau, General Sacken, to him, handed over command of all the troops on the plateau, and ordered Kleist's corps to march off immediately via the ailette to Festieux with the further goal Corbeny. At 11:00 a.m. he went personally to Chevregny to take over the management of the cavalry himself. So it happened that in the hours of the bloodiest battle of the campaign, Field Marshal Blücher wandered through Picardy and looked for troops that he seemed to have lost. At 2 p.m., Blücher found General Wintzingerode near Bryères just south of Laon, far from the fighting that was no longer accessible that day. From there, Blücher sent a courier to Sacken with the order to withdraw with all troops to the west from the plateau, to abandon Soissons, since this place could no longer be held, and to march to Laon. Sacken receives this order at 3:00 p.m. he immediately passed it on to Vorontsov.

Wintzingerode was not at a loss for explanations for his long detours and cleverly defended his behavior:

  • First of all, he was able to point out that in their order of March 6, 6:00 p.m., Blücher and his general staff had themselves designated the small village of Filain as the place where all “commanding officers must report to General Wintzingerode”. Wintzingerode was also tied to this. Filain is so far to the west of the plateau that from there only the crossing over the Ailette near Chevregny was possible.
  • It was also reported that at night it was often impossible to lead horses down the narrow, difficult paths to the ailette. Large units had to wait until dawn before they could set off.
  • Then the crossing over the river at Chevregny proved unsuitable for the guns. These could not be brought over rolling, but had to be carried over disassembled. An enormous effort that cost hours.
  • It next found that there was no direct route east from Chevregny to the Bery-au-Bac to Laon road. The cavalry had to go far north to reach this road. However, she made a detour here, so that she covered almost 20 km from Chevregny to Festieux.
  • Most recently, Wintzingerode was able to point out that the feeding times for the horses had not been observed. But a good cavalryman does not let his animal go hungry.

Kleist's corps, which had set out 14 hours after the cavalry, crossed the Ailette at Neuville and continued via Martigny, reached Festieux at 4:00 p.m. when the Russians were already retreating from the plateau. The corps no longer intervened in the fighting, but went back to Laon. Wintzingerrode and the cavalry did not arrive in Festieux until a few hours later.

The first attack by the French (March 7, 1814 10:00 a.m.)

On the night of March 6th to 7th, 1814, there was heavy night frost in Picardy. On the treeless plateau of Craonne, 100,000 men of the "Silesian Army" froze pitifully in the cold of the night. On the morning of March 7, 1814, Napoléon ordered the attack on the Craonne plateau. Napoléon had the following troops at his disposal:

The Napoleonic army on March 7, 1814 during the Battle of Craonne
unit Troop strength Remarks
Spanish Brigade under Boyer 1,900
1st division of the old guard under Friant 3,800
Division Boyer de Reval the Young Guard 3,800
Meunier Division of the Young Guard 900
Division Curial of the Young Guard 1,000
Charpentier Division of the Young Guard 3,600 from 2 p.m.
Christiani division under Mortier 3,800 from 15:00 clock
Division Poret de Morvan under Mortier 4,800 from 15:00 clock
Cavalry - Roussel d'Hurbal division under Grouchy 2,200
Cavalry - Laferrière-Lévèsque division under Grouchy 1,250 from 2 p.m.
Cavalry Division Colbert under Mortier 1,100 from 15:00 clock
Guards Cavalry Division Excelmans under Nansouty 1,350
Guard Cavalry Division Pac under Nansouty 450

The troops under Marshal Victor, who initially only had 7,600 infantry and 3,450 horsemen, were to attack directly from Craonne up to the Hurtebise estate. From the north, the troops were to attack under the command of Marshal Ney, who had about 3,750 men. From the south the guard cavalry under General Nansouty was to ascend to the plateau with 1,800 riders. The latter turned out to be a difficult undertaking, since apart from a poor, hardly navigable path from Vasogne through the Vallée Foulon, only footpaths led up to the plateau. The troop made slow progress; horse behind horse had to be led in a row. They couldn't bring guns up with them. As far as the terrain here was concerned, Napoleon may have been misguided by locals who offered themselves in large numbers.

The ground was slightly frozen in the morning, but softened underneath; the horses broke through the frost, had poor grip, and could only with difficulty pull the guns up from Craonne.

The Hurtebise estate on the Craone plateau

At the Hurtebise estate, the plateau has both a narrowing and an incision. 1000 meters to the west of it, on the sloping terrain about level with the villages of Ailette in the north and Paissy in the south, Vorontsov had massed infantry and artillery in three meetings. In the first meeting there were 14 battalions, in the second, 600 meters behind, 10 battalions, 800 meters further 9 battalions. In the south towards Vassogne there were a cavalry brigade of hussars and 4 Cossack regiments. This was all of the cavalry that Vorontsov still had. 12 guns were directed southwards towards the ravine Vallée Foulon, 18 more northwards on the equally steep ascent from the village of Ailles, 36 guns were in the center, 20 were in reserve between the 2nd and 3rd meeting. The village of Ailles itself had been occupied by the Russians, and the rise from there was ensured by troops of more than two battalions. The guns aimed there were positioned in such a way that they could fire on both the village itself and its immediate surroundings. The Hurtebise estate was occupied by 800 Russians.

Half an hour's walk to the west, the Sacken Corps was ready in three meetings. The formation of these corps reached back to Braye. The Sacken Corps still had 4,000 cavalry men at their disposal, who stood ready in an advanced position to support Vorontsov.

Even further to the west, at the Froidemont estate, the Langeron corps stood ready.

At 10:00 am, Napoleon was overcome by impatience. He opened gunfire on the Russians at a distance of more than 2,000 meters. The Russians returned fire, but both sides did little damage as the distance was still too great. Nevertheless, the cannonade had a significant effect: Marshal Ney in the north near Bouconville heard the thunder of the guns and immediately ordered the attack on the plateau along the path that led up through the village of Ailles: the "Spanish Brigade" advanced directly on the village of Ailles before, the divisions Meunier and Curial circumvented the village and climbed steeply uphill under the protection of the hillside forest. They were soon noticed by the Russians, and although they reached the edge of the plateau under fire from rifles and artillery, they could not hold on there and retreated back into the forest.

The Napoleonic troops had their first success when the Boyer de Rebeval division of the “Young Guard” prepared to bypass the Hurtebise estate in the north. In order not to be cut off from the majority of their own troops, the Russian occupation set fire to the buildings and then withdrew. The thick smoke of the fire favored the French, who were able to advance further to form a line with the troops who had risen again from Ailles. They also managed to get 12 guns into position against the Russians. But now it became clear that this division of the “Young Guard” consisted almost without exception of recruits. Their artillerymen were insufficiently trained and their guns showed little effect against the well-trained Russian artillery. The French persisted in tenacious doggedness and suffered heavy losses. The destruction of this division prevented two events: first, the guns of two brigades of the Guards artillery advanced and brought relief, and secondly, Grouchy sent a dragoon brigade of the Roussel division into action, which cleverly used the protection of the edge of the forest, 12 Russian guns conquered. This success was short-lived: when two Russian infantry regiments attacked the bayonet, the guns were lost again. When Vorontsov also had an infantry brigade from the 3rd meeting line up against the Dragoons, they fled and dragged the nearest French infantry with them. Panic broke out among the French and Marshal Ney's men also rushed down the slope to the saving forest, while their Marshal tried to restore order with the sword thrashing around him. In total, Ney had to drive his men up to the plateau six times that day with great losses until they were able to establish themselves there in the late afternoon.

In the south, Nansouty's horsemen had finally reached the height of the plateau, drove out the few Cossacks there and messed up two Russian battalions, which quickly withdrew to the protection of a Russian reserve battery, whose bombardment brought the French to a standstill. When the Russians proceeded to counterattack, the French horsemen had to return to the heights of Vasogne.

The second attack by the French (March 7, 1814 3:00 p.m.)

The Vauclair monastery below the Craonne plateau after its destruction in the First World War

Napoléon now received requests for further support from all sides. At this time he had the 1st division of the "Old Guard" on the plateau at disposal. Since he used to spare them "more than himself" he waited until the Charpentier infantry division, other cavalry under Laferrière and the reserve artillery arrived on the plateau from 1:00 p.m. Laferrière and his horsemen undertook a bold attack on the Russian positions, which was quickly repulsed. This attack had given the artillerymen under Drouot the time to deploy a total of 72 guns against the Russians and use them.

The Christiani and Poret de Morvan divisions of the Mortier Corps also arrived on the battlefield at around 3:00 p.m. The command of the infantry on the plateau - with the exception of the "Old Guard" - took Charpentier, who was born and raised in Soissons. Napoléon said he knew the area best.

Nansouty's riders climbed the edge of the plateau from the south for the second time. Colbert's Uhlans of Mortier's corps found a mule track below the southern edge of the plateau, which allowed them to advance to the village of Paissy, protected from the Russian artillery.

A fierce battle was waged for hours around the village of Ailles below the northern edge of the plateau. The "Spanish Brigade" tried since the morning under the artillery fire of the Russians and with great losses to storm this village. That failed again and again. The Russians, however, still found an opportunity to bring new troops down to the village. They also managed to bring additional artillery down from the plateau and position them in Ailles. Only in the afternoon, when the Russians ran out of ammunition in the village, the Napoleonic troops were able to assert themselves here and bring Ailles under their control. This also ended the shelling from this place on those French troops who had repeatedly tried to climb to the southern edge of the plateau.

Napoleon ordered all units to advance again.

The withdrawal of the Russians (March 7, 1814 4:00 p.m.)

At 3:00 p.m. Sacken had sent Blücher's order to withdraw to Vorontsov for the first time. But Vorontsov wanted to wait for dusk as possible and prevent that he had to take his artillery out of action, even if only in part at first. Under the pressure of the significantly increased French troops, however, at 4 p.m. he gave the order to retreat en échiquier . The withdrawal was slow and in good order. The cavalry of the Sacken Corps under Vasilchikov supported Voronzov's infantry and, despite great losses - including officers - stopped the French cavalry from advancing further without being able to throw them back. Some Russian squadrons attacked eight times in an hour, others had to come to a complete stop again and again in order to leave room for the retreating infantry in the narrow area.

To the west of Cerny, Sacken had his artillery positioned: 64 guns stood in two lines on an east-facing slope: 36 light guns in the front, east, and 28 heavy guns behind it, on a gap and about 5 meters higher. After the Russian infantry had passed the position to the west, the guns opened fire on the advancing French. The cannonade lasted only 20 minutes, then the piles of dead and dying French were so high in the area that they were a sufficient obstacle for those who came after; all Russian guns could be withdrawn in peace and order.

When they arrived at Braye, some of the Russian troops headed north via Chevregny to prevent Marshal Ney's troops from occupying this crossing via the Ailette. To do this, they had to go down the steep slope into the river valley. This gave the French the advantage that the Russians had previously used: They could point their guns at the enemy hurrying away over a free field of fire, who suffered heavy losses as a result. Only in the valley of the Ailette did the Russians find relief from the artillery of the Langeron Corps, which had occupied the northern bank of the river. The rest of Vorontsov's infantry came out onto the Laon road at the end of the Chemin des Dames.

From the height of the plateau, Napoleon watched the masses of his enemies who were moving away on the road to Laon, and now at the latest he was certain that he had not fought against the entire "Silesian Army", but only against a small part of it. He spent the night in Braye, where Blücher had spent the night before.

What happened next

Napoléon was dissatisfied with the outcome of the battle. He couldn't help but see that he had lost 20% of his team, Blücher not even 5%. If the "Silesian Army" was three times superior before, it was already four times superior. Napoléon's private secretary François Fain notes:

"After this bloody day with all its dangers, surrounded by wounded and dying men, worn down by exhaustion, troubled by the fruitlessness of the battle, the hideous horror of war overcame him and defeated his combative disposition."

- François Fain

Napoleon took his displeasure out on the defenseless and ordered Russian prisoners of war to be shot, which was also done.

Disagreements spread in the “Silesian Army”: the Russians felt that the Prussian army command was poorly led and deprived of their success; but the Prussians blamed Wintzingerode for the failure. It was clear to everyone that Blücher and his general staff had failed to bring Napoléon's small army, which was still half a day's march apart, to the decisive battle in favorable terrain with the superior mass of their troops. Only 22,000 men from Blucher’s army had entered the battle, while the rest stood or wandered around in Picardy.

In addition, there were difficulties with food: The Prussian Corps Bülow had brought plenty of food with them from Holland and also set up supply stores there, but initially did not want to share. At least the Prussian soldiers of the other corps benefited from the retreat to Laon, because 12,000 new military boots had arrived there from home, which could replace the shoes that had been used on the previous marches.

There was little time for all of them: just 48 hours later , Napoléon attacked again off Laon in order to have the same experience as on the day of Craonne: that he could no longer assert himself against the mass of enemies.

The most important people of the event

The coordinates of the most important places of the event

The coordinates of the main rivers

Supplements and individual evidence

  1. ↑ see cook
  2. ↑ see Michailowski-Danilewski, these are the troops that came into action
  3. ↑ So roughly the course of today's Route National 44
  4. ↑ So roughly the course of today's Route National 2
  5. ↑ cf. Chandler, Campaigns ...
  6. ↑ Even today there is no thoroughfare there.
  7. ↑ The much larger part of the city lies south of the Aisne.
  8. ↑ cf. Damitz, Houssaye
  9. ↑ cf. Marmont 20th book
  10. ↑ cf. Damitz, where the original text (in French) is reproduced.
  11. ↑ Part of the corps was still standing on the north bank of the Aisne.
  12. ↑ a b cf. z. B. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky
  13. ↑ The route from Chavignon via Laon to Corbeny is 35 km, via Festieux 28 km and via the Chemin des Dames 27 km. Blücher would also have had the possibility of sending at least a few corps into battle around the plateau, especially since the Wintzingerode corps was already on the plateau. On the evening of March 5th, however, he and his general staff were not yet sure where Napoleon would cross the Aisne
  14. ^ The reports are printed by Damitz.
  15. ↑ a b c d e cf. Damitz
  16. ↑ cf. Damitz, Houssaye
  17. ↑ The command is given verbatim in Plotho.
  18. ↑ a b c cf. Beitzke
  19. ↑ cf. Müffling, War Events ... and Mikhailofsky-Danilefsky, A.
  20. ↑ It was really true that the general staff of the old hussar officer Blücher hadn't given any thought to the care of the more than 10,000 horses.
  21. ↑ The distance from Cerny to Festieux via Martigny on the old roads (not the new D967) is exactly 14 km; From Festieux it is still 12.5 km to the old Craonne from 1814. These figures suggest that Blücher's plan, which probably came from Gneisenau, made perfect sense and was feasible.
  22. ↑ cf. Koch, Houssaye, Damitz, Beitzke
  23. ↑ Koch and all authors who refer to him state that the Friant division belonged to the Mortier corps. All others state that this was the 1st Division of the Old Guard, which was already with Napoléon when he left Troyes on February 27th. It is certain that troops of the Old Guard were with Napoléon, as he praised them in a letter on the evening of the battle. Napoléon also had 4 Young Guard divisions with him.
    Mortier's corps was very small. When it was commissioned on February 13 to operate north of the Marne, it comprised only one infantry division. On February 28th, reinforcements were added. But where a third division should have come from cannot be explained.
  24. ↑ Divisions Boyer de Rebeval, Friant and Roussel, cf. Damitz, Houssaye
  25. ↑ The Wintzingerode Corps had 2 infantry divisions. The second commanded Stroganov. Vorontsov had the supreme command.
  26. ↑ cf. Hussaye, Damitz, cook
  27. ↑ cf. Damitz, Houssaye, Beitzke, Michailowski-Danilewski, Koch
  28. ↑ At this time Marshal Victor was wounded and had to leave the battle. Boyer de Rebeval took command.
  29. ↑ At this point both Grouchy and the commander of the Dragoons Sparre were wounded and sidelined. The dragoons were left without leadership.
  30. ↑ Quote from Houssaye
  31. ↑ General Laferrière himself was fatally wounded and died on the battlefield.
  32. ↑ Nansouty was badly wounded in battle and was taken away. He died in 1815 as a result of his wounding without having returned to service.
  33. ↑ Your commander Pierre Boyer was wounded and taken out of action.
  34. ↑ two Russian generals of the cavalry fell.
  35. ↑ cf. Michailowski-Danilewski, Alison Chap. 24
  36. ↑ without the corps of Mortier and Marmont, which soon separated from him.
  37. ↑ see Michailowski-Danilewski, Volume 2, Chapter 1 and Alison, Chap. 24. Mikhailovsky-Danilewski claims to have spoken personally to witnesses to this crime.
  38. ↑ cf. Müffling, The Warfare ...
  39. ↑ cf. Müffling.

literature

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Coordinates: 49 ° 26 ′ 28 ″  N , 3 ° 43 ′ 27 ″  E