Battle of La Rothière

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Battle of La Rothière

Part of: Wars of Liberation

Plan of the battle at 1:00 p.m. and later

date	February 1, 1814
place	La Rothière , France
output	Withdrawal of French troops under Napoleon

Parties to the conflict
France	Prussia Russia Austria Württemberg Bavaria
Commander
Napoleon Bonaparte	Gebhard von Blücher Crown Prince Wilhelm Ignácz Gyulay Carl von Wrede Michael de Tolly
Troop strength
40,000 men	80,000 men

The battle of La Rothière took place on February 1, 1814, in the Aube valley south of Brienne . It was one of the first battles of the winter campaign in 1814 . In the battle, the French army under Napoleon faced a numerically far superior army of the coalition troops under the Prussian Marshal Blücher . After the battle, Napoleon retreated over the bridge at Lesmont to the west as far as Troyes . Although the coalition troops were under the orders of a Prussian commander, no Prussian troops took part in this battle except Blücher's staff guard and 2,000 horsemen under Prince Biron von Curland .

prehistory

The Battle of La Rothière is closely related to the Battle of Brienne , which was fought just three days earlier on January 29, 1814, and which ended with the withdrawal of the coalition troops under Blücher. On January 30, 1814, Blücher had returned his troops to more favorable positions in the vicinity of the town of Trannes south of Brienne. Blücher's Silesian Army had been weakened by the dispatch of the Prussian Corps Yorck to Saint-Dizier before the Battle of Brienne and needed reinforcements. This came from the Bohemian Army , which was advancing from the south, and from the associated Bavarian - Austrian corps Wrede, which approached from the east from Wassy via Soulaines-Dhuys.

On January 31, 1814 at 9:00 a.m., the commander-in-chief of the coalition troops and the Bohemian Army , Prince Karl Philipp zu Schwarzenberg , handed over the command for the expected battle to Field Marshal Blücher. With this he also subordinated the already arrived corps of Crown Prince Wilhelm von Württemberg and the Austrian corps under Giulay . Schwarzenberg, who was in Austrian service, took this step out of consideration for his sovereign Franz II , Emperor of Austria. Francis II was the father-in-law of Napoleon and grandfather of his designated heir to the throne.

The movements of the corps of the Bohemian Army until January 31, 1814

The Bohemian Army, under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg , used the 72 hours between the Battle of Brienne and the Battle of La Rothière to bring in additional strong troop contingents. From Vendeuvre in the south the remaining troops of the Gyulay corps were drawn in via Bar-sur-Aube . Your position in Vendeuvre was initially taken by the Corps Colloredo.

From the region between Langres and Chaumont the 40,000 men of the Russian-Prussian reserve, i.e. grenadiers, cuirassiers and guards, were brought up to the heights of Trannes .

In retrospect, the most important action was the approach of the strong Bavarian-Austrian corps Wrede from the east. Since this corps marched directly on Brienne, it threatened the French main body behind and its appearance was the decisive factor for the withdrawal of the French army.

The ways of the Bavarian-Austrian corps Wrede

After the battle at St. Dié on January 10, 1814, the 25,000-strong corps Wrede initially stopped in the Vosges, then on January 16, 1814, it occupied the Moselle valley from Épinal to Charmes and moved its headquarters to Rembervillers . On January 17, 1814 Bayon was occupied and the headquarters moved to Charmes . There Wrede learned that Nancy had been occupied by the Silesian Army on January 16, 1814 and that Blücher had relocated his headquarters there on January 17, 1814. This meant that no further advance northward made sense for the Wrede Corps. On January 18 and 19, 1814, it marched to Neufchâteau on the Meuse , where it initially stopped and in the course of the following days until January 22, 1814 occupied the valley of the upper Meuse as far as Clefmont .

Only after January 25, 1814 did the corps move again to the southwest and stood on January 27, 1814 in the area of Andelot on the road from Neufchâteau to Chaumont . There Wrede received instructions from the headquarters of the Bohemian Army to go to Joinville on the Marne in the north-west of his current position in order to attack French troops in and near Wassy . On January 30, 1814, the Wrede Corps was in execution of this instruction south of Joinville to Mussey-sur-Marne and Wrede took its headquarters in Saint-Urbain .

On the morning of January 31, 1814, both the vanguard of the Prussian corps Yorck and the Cossacks under Jlowaisky reached Wassy and discovered that the French had just left it and that they had withdrawn on the road via Montier-en-Der to Brienne . Wrede received news of this in Nomécourt on the march to Wassy and immediately decided independently to change the direction of the march and go to Doulevant . He informed Prince Schwarzenberg of this in detail by a courier. By the evening of the same day, i.e. the eve of the battle at La Rothière , his troops had reached the following positions: The Austrians in the area from Dommartin with their cavalry under Hardegg to Sommevoire , the Bavarian division La Mothe at Blumeray and Nully with advanced vanguard up to Trémilly and Soulaines-Dhuys , the Bavarian division Rechberg in Doulevant, where Wrede was also. There in the evening Wrede received from Prince Schwarzenberg approving confirmation of his decision to change the direction of march, and his request as to when he could be with Brienne the next day.

There were still 30 km from Doulevant to the battlefield, which the Wrede Corps covered the next day in very bad weather, in order to intervene decisively in the fighting there.

The movements of the other corps of the Czech Army in the summary

The movements of the Bohemian Army before the Battle of La Rothière

Unit	Troop strength	Position on January 29, 1814	on January 30, 1814	on January 31, 1814 in the evening or on February 1, 1814 early in the morning
Corps Gyulay (Austria)	15,000 (about 3,000 of these remained in Vendeuvre to block the road to Troyes)	from Vendeuvre to Bar-sur-Aube	Bar-sur-Aube	from Arsonval to Bossancourt
Corps of Crown Prince Wilhelm (Württemberg)	14,500	Bar-sur-Aube	from Maisons to Fresnay	Eclance
Corps Wrede (Bavaria, Austria)	25,000	Joinville	Joinville	Doulevant
Corps Colloredo (Austria)	15,500	Bar-sur-Seine	on the march from Bar-sur-Seine to Vendeuvre	Vendeuvre
The Russian grenadiers	11,500	Chaumont	Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises	Bar-sur-Aube
The Russian cuirassiers	8,500	Chaumont	Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises	Bar-sur-Aube
The Russian and Prussian Guards	20,000 (13,000 Russians, 7,000 Prussians)	on the march from Langres to Chaumont	Chaumont	Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises
Total combatable troops	110,000

The actions of the French army until the eve of the battle

By the evening of January 30, 1814, the individual corps of the French army had occupied the positions they had at the beginning of the battle: the Gérard corps had occupied Dienville, the Victor La Rothière corps and the villages of Petit-Mesnil, la Gibrie, Chaumesnil. Only the left, eastern wing was not yet occupied, since the Marmont corps had not yet arrived.

Immediately after the battle of Brienne on January 30, 1814, Napoleon ordered that the bridge over the Aube in Lesmont should be restored. This had destroyed the rearguard of the Russian Sacken Corps the day before. The restoration proved to be not easy and dragged on until the late evening of January 31, 1814. The bridge in Dienville and a much smaller and narrower bridge west of Brienne-la-Vieille were also available to the French army for a possible retreat over the Aube, but the latter appeared too small and the former was within range of the enemy guns . A retreat to the north or northeast was forbidden, since the Prussian Corps Yorck and the Corps Wrede and Wittgenstein of the Bohemian Army had already arrived there.

On the day before the battle, Napoleon inspected his troops in the afternoon and ordered a battalion of Corps Victor to occupy the Beaulieu forest south of La Giberie across from Eclance. Then Napoleon withdrew to the Château Brienne and waited for the Marmont Corps to arrive.

The approach of the French Marmont Corps

On January 29, 1814, the French corps was still in Saint-Dizier under the command of Marshal Marmont . When Marmont learned that Prussian and Russian troops were approaching, his corps left Saint-Dizier and moved south to Wassy, with the exception of several hundred men under General Lagrange who remained as rearguard . When the Prussian corps Yorck took Saint-Dizier the next day, Lagrange and his men also escaped to Wassy . The coalition troops moved up, however, so that Marmont and his troops had to withdraw to Montier-en-Der . On the morning of January 31, 1814, the corps marched on, leaving 400 horsemen in Montier-en-Der to hold the place. These were attacked in the course of the day by the Prussians who had followed them; 150 French were taken prisoner, the rest made their way via Lesmont to Pougy , where they met their corps again.

On January 31, 1814, the greatly shrunk Marmont Corps had only a few thousand men with them, but 40 cannons, which could not be transported over worn-out routes. The direct road to Brienne, on which the Napoleonic army had already moved on January 29, 1814, turned out to be unusable. So the corps took the detour via Soulaines-Dhuys . In Soulaines the French met Count Pahlen's horsemen , who they took to be Cossacks and who were on their way to their corps Wittgenstein , whose vanguard they were supposed to re-form. Count Pahlen's horsemen withdrew within sight, but this did not bring the French any security, as strong contingents of the Wrede Corps were advancing from the east. A heavy snowstorm and the falling darkness enabled the men of Marmont to move away from the road on forest paths to the west. At 1:00 a.m. on February 1, 1814, they reached Morvilliers , from where Marmont sent a courier to Napoleon at Château Brienne. The courier returned at 8:00 a.m. with detailed orders for the upcoming battle, which Marmont was never able to carry out.

The weather on the day of the battle

On February 1, 1814, there was heavy snowfall in the afternoon during the battle. This was at times so strong that the combat activities came to a standstill. Due to the unfavorable weather, the terrain was heavy and softened, with the result that both sides could only maneuver their guns with great effort. This initially hindered the attacking coalition troops. Later it meant that the French troops could not take back their guns quickly enough. The coalition troops captured more than seventy French guns that night (according to French data, 54 guns).

The damp weather also meant that the powder cartridges became damp and the rifles became unreliable as firearms. Therefore, there were many bayonet attacks and fights with cut and stab weapons in this battle.

Topography of the battlefield

The reservoir "Lac du Temple" near Dienville, which regulates the water level of the Aube today:
this lake did not exist in 1814.
It should be noted that the flood regulation in the 20th century has changed the landscape on the Aube significantly.

The Aube flows between Trannes and Perthes-lés-Brienne on the western edge of a wide and at that time very humid plain in a north-north-west direction. At Trannes , wooded heights approach the river from the east, and the valley is still narrow there, but then widens a lot as far as Brienne .

The main streets that can be found today already existed in 1814:

• The road from Brienne to the south via La Rothière and Trannes (today D396),
• the road from Lesmont to Brienne-le-Château and further south-east via Chaumesnil and La Chaise to Soulaines-Dhuys (today D960),
• the road from Brienne-le-Château directly south to Dienville (today D433).

At that time, these roads were partly over dams because of the damp ground.

The distance from Dienville eastwards via La Rothière to Petit-Mesnil is 4.5 kilometers, so the battlefield was quite extensive.

Between the villages of Eclance east of Trannes and La Giberie east of La Rothière was the Beaulieu forest.

There were bridges over the Aube in Lesmont, Dienville and Unienville and a smaller one to the west of Brienne-la-Vieille . The bridge near Lesmont was destroyed by the Russians on January 29, 1814 and had to be repaired by the French before each use. They did not succeed until the late evening of February 1, 1814.

The western bank of the Aube is higher south of La Rothière than the eastern bank, and therefore gave a superior position to the troops who could occupy it.

In the 19th century this region was marked by frequent floods. These can only be regulated and controlled since the 1970s.

The positions of the French army on February 1, 1814 at noon, at the start of the battle

Napoleon had concentrated his infantry in the villages, which were heavily occupied. The cavalry was supposed to cover the spaces in between. In the middle at La Rothière stood the troops of General Duhesme from the Corps Victor; a brigade had occupied the place, another stood north of it.

Closest to La Rothière was the other division of the Corps Victor under Forestier , two battalions each in the villages of Petit-Mesnil and Chaumesnil La Gibrie, one battalion advanced in the forest of Beaulieu north of Eclance , the rest of the division behind and in the tiny one La Giberie .

To the north-east of it stood Marshal Marmont's corps in the area from Chaulil to Movilliers.

On the right wing, General Gérard's troops held the village of Dienville and the bridge over the Aube there. Ricard's division in the village, Dufour's division behind.

The corps of Marshal Ney , who had handed over command of one of his divisions to Marshal Oudinot , who had just arrived, were ready in reserve .

The guard cavalry under Nansouty covered the area east from La Rothière to Petit Mesnil. The Milhaud cavalry corps stood north of Petit Mesnil and west of Chulyil up to the edge of the forest that bordered here to the north. Marshal Grouchy , who had previously joined the army, had taken over command from Marshal Victor.

The eight squadrons of light cavalry under Picquet covered the area between Dienville and La Rothière.

The French army before the battle of La Rothière

Unit	Troop strength - infantry	Troop strength - cavalry	Position at noon on February 1, 1814
Corps Gèrard	6900		with the Ricard division in Dienville and the Dufour division north of it
Corps Gèrard		650	the cavalry under Picquet covered the area as far as La Rothière
Corps Victor	6100	-	with the Duhesme division in La Rothière and the Forestier division in Petit Mesnil, Chaumesnil and la Gibrie
under the orders of Marshal Oudinot	4,900	-	with the Rothembourg division north of Dienville
Corps Ney	4800	800	with the Decouz and Meunier divisions between Brienne and Lesmont, the Meunier division stood further south and was still deployed in battle towards evening
Corps Marmont	4800	800	with the infantry under Lagrange and the cavalry under Doumerc between Morvilliers and Chaumesnil
Guard cavalry under Nansouty	-	2450	between La Rothière and Petit Mesnil
Milhaud Cavalry Corps under Marshal Grouchy	-	3100	north of Petit Mesnil to the edge of the forest
Riders of the honor guard under Defrance	-	1000	at the bridge in Lesmont
Total combatable troops	27,500	8,800

On the morning of February 1, 1814, Napoleon had ordered that Marshal Ney's corps should first retreat across the now restored bridge in Lesmont. This was the reason why their divisions were already moving away from the battlefield at the beginning of the battle and had to be recalled, which did not fully succeed.

Plan of the battle after Alison

The positions of the coalition troops on February 1, 1814 at noon, at the beginning of the battle

The center of Trannes was formed by the Russian Sacken Corps , reinforced by the much smaller Olsufiev Corps , which stood south of it. Even further south, near Bossancourt , the Austrian corps was under Gyulay . To the east stood the corps of Crown Prince Wilhelm von Württemberg near the village of Eclance . The Bavarian- Austrian corps approached Wrede from the east of Soulaines-Dhuys . The Russian grenadiers stood ready as reserves, and further south the Russian and Prussian guards, which were not deployed. The strength of the coalition troops was twice as large as that of the Napoleonic army.

The course of the battle

Bridge over the Aube near Unienville

The bridge over the Aube near Dienville is still in the same place today as it was in 1814

Position of the troops at 2 p.m. to Petre

On the morning of February 1, 1814, Prince Schwarzenberg with his staff, Tsar Alexander and the Prussian king had come from their quarters in Chaumont and took up their position on a hill near Tranne. Blücher was with his troops when they began to advance at 12:00.

The attack on La Rothière

Count Liewen's division of the Russian Sacken Corps moved along the road from Trannes to La Rothière ; To the right, east of it next to the paved road and therefore more slowly, the second division of Shcherbatov of the Sacken Corps marched. The Russian artillerymen discovered that their guns had sunk into the sodden ground the day before and frozen there overnight. They couldn't be moved and were so useless. The responsible general Nikitin asked Blücher for permission to advance only with half of his 72 guns, but to use all available horses. With the double clothing they made rapid progress, overtook the infantry, hurried ahead to gain time for the transport of the next cannons, took up positions in front of La Rothière next to the road and sent all the horses back around the other half of the corps' guns Catch up on sacks. Then the Russian artillerymen noticed that they were facing the French guard cavalry without clothing and without protection of their infantry. In order to prepare for the upcoming cavalry attack, the men of the gun crew spread their coats on the ground in the cold, wet winter weather and hurried to stack ammunition on top of them.

Twice the French guard cavalry attacked the gun emplacement and both times were stopped at a distance of 300 to 400 meters from the fire of the 36 guns and forced to retreat. There was no third attack, as the infantry of the Liewen division had now approached and took over the protection of the gun emplacement.

When the Russian infantry division Shcherbatov moved further east, the French guard cavalry between La Rothière and Petit Mesnil advanced to attack these infantrymen. The light cavalry of the Russian Sacken Corps, which rushed to support, was turned away by the French Guards cavalrymen, but when the 2,000 riders of the Russian heavy cavalry fell in their side, they were outnumbered and fled to Brienne-la -Voice back. The losses of these French cavalry divisions must have been considerable, for they did not appear on the battlefield for hours. But they left 4 batteries of their guns there, which the Russians immediately seized.

The Russian Liewen Division and half of the Shcherbatov Division attacked the village of La Rothière and drove most of the French soldiers of the Duhesme Division out of it. However, some French settled in individual houses in the village and offered tough resistance there for a long time.

The Austrian Gyulay Corps sent three more batteries of heavy 12 pound guns over from the west to support the Russian attack.

The attack on La Giberie

In the east, on the right wing of the coalition troops, the Württemberg corps had taken on the task of going north from Eclance, driving the French out of the forest and then attacking the small town of La Giberie. Implementation proved extremely difficult. To date there is no direct route from Eclance to La Giberie. Between these places there is a damp valley cut through by a stream, through which there was no paved path back then as now. The Württemberg Crown Prince Wilhelm sent his pioneers ahead to build stick dams on the most unfavorable stretches of the road to bring horses and artillery through the forest. The Württemberg people had already left the heavy artillery behind in Bar-sur-Aube because of the bad weather and the unpaved roads.

It took a long time until a significant number of Württemberg troops were through the forest. Although they succeeded in driving all the French out of this area, they then gathered in La Giberie. As soon as the Wuerttembergians reached the northern edge of the forest in front of La Giberie, they came under the artillery fire of French artillery, which stood northwest of the place on the road to Petit-Mesnil. Since Crown Prince Wilhelm could not wait and gather his troops at the edge of the forest, he was forced to attack La Giberie with the few battalions of the advance guard. The attack succeeded and the French were pushed out of the place, but a little later reinforcements from Petit-Mesnil arrived for them: all available teams of the Forestier division were sent to La Giberie and largely recaptured the place.

Tsar Alexander had sent a high officer from his staff to see Crown Prince Wilhelm about whom he was concerned. The reason was that Crown Prince Wilhelm was a cousin of the Tsar. This Russian staff officer then went to the tsar and asked for support for the Württemberg people. Tsar Alexander then ordered, without further consultation, but with the knowledge of Prince Schwarzenberg, that the Grenadier Division Tschoglikow had to support the Württemberg people. This grenadier division failed because of the bad roads and did not reach La Giberie in time to intervene in the battle there.

The attack on Dienville

The left, western wing of the coalition troops, which was formed by the Austrian Gyulay Corps, was moving towards Dienville: To this end, the Austrians first marched behind the Russians on the main road to La Rothière and then turned left towards Unienville. There one noticed immediately that this place, which lies on the western bank of the Aube, was occupied by French and other French troops were on the left of the Aube on the march from Dienville. The Austrian Fresnel division, supported by light cavalry and a battery of artillery, crossed the river, captured the village of Unienville and occupied the western high bank of the Aube. But then the Austrians and the French, who were advancing from Dienville in large numbers and soon fought violently, entered into a battle that dragged on for a long time. The Austrians did not reach Dienville on both sides of the Aube until around 5:00 p.m. and immediately afterwards received an order from an adjutant to Prince Schwarzenberg to take this village.

This turned out to be difficult, as the French of Ricard's division had well fortified their positions. The Boudin Brigade had erected barricades on the bridge and the second Pelleport Brigade stood in the village to the right of the Aube with the defiant church in the center of their positions. Again and again Fresnel let his Austrians storm against the bridge, and could also conquer it. The few Austrians who reached the barricades lost their lives in the enemy gunfire.

The intervention of the Bavarian-Austrian corps Wrede

The corps Wrede the Bohemian army had continued at 10:00 am his march on Brienne, reaching around 13:00 first, the location in the forest La Chaise . A French post who had taken up a position there was driven out. When the troops of Corps Wrede came out of the forest, they met the French Corps Marmont, which was holding Morvilliers with the Brigade Fournier of the Lagrange division, and Chaumesnil with the Brigade Joubert. The French cavalry under Doumerc caused unrest between the places. Although this French corps was weak in terms of men, it had 40 cannons alone, which it used effectively, even though one of its batteries was captured by Austrian Uhlans at the beginning of the fighting before it could fire a cannon.

First, the Bavarian La Mothe division conquered the Beauvoir farm , 2 km east of Chaumesnil, and the Austrians under Hardegg occupied Petit Morvilliers to the north, supported by Bavarian infantry . After that, the fighting turned into an artillery duel for some time.

General Wrede consequently decided next to attack the village of Chaumesnil, on the road to Brienne, the capture of which would open the way to the rear of the Napoleonic troops. Chaumesnil was captured a little after 4 p.m. after the rest of the Wrede Corps had arrived on the battlefield. The French who had held the place tried to escape to Morvilliers further north. During the pursuit, the Bavarians and Austrians were initially stopped by attacks by the French cavalry under Doumerc, and then noticed that Morvilliers had already been abandoned and that the French Marmont corps had withdrawn from there.

The conquest of La Giberie and Petit-Mesnil by the Württemberg people

With the retaking of La Giberie by the French Forestier division of the Victor Corps, the Wuerttembergians were in an unfavorable position. Although they outnumbered the French, they could not bring their teams quickly out of the impassable valley floor in front of La Giberie into the battle. In particular, apart from a weak mounted battery, they lacked artillery entirely, while the French behind La Giberie on the road to Petit-Mesnil were able to use a large number of guns effectively. When more of the Württemberg infantry approached, the battle for the small village began again.

Blücher had sent his personal adjutant Nostitz to the Wurttemberg people , also to reassure the Tsar . This met the 2,000 Prussian horsemen of Prince Biron von Curlan south of Petit-Mesnil , whom he asked to silence the French artillery firing from there in a direct attack on the road to La Giberie. This attack was carried out immediately with success and brought the Württemberg people the necessary relief. At around 4 p.m., after a two-hour battle, La Giberie was again completely in the hands of the Württembergians and the French infantry withdrew from there to Petit-Mesnil. The Crown Prince of Württemberg also immediately attacked this village, and at 5:00 p.m. this place was also taken by the coalition troops.

The French counterattack

The Napoleonic troops, the bulk of which stood around La Rothière, were now in danger of being trapped. Napoleon personally led the counterattack to get rid of this situation. He led the Meunier Division of the Young Guard and the Lefebvre-Desnouettes cavalry division against Chaumesnil and tried in vain to regain the place. At the same time he moved the French cavalry so that the cavalry corps Milhaud under the command of Marshal Grouchy should protect the positions north of the road to Brienne, the rest of the guard cavalry under Nansouty the positions at Petit-Mesnil and La Rothière.

At the same time, Napoleon ordered another attack on La Rothière: the Rottembourg Division of the Young Guards advanced there under the command of Marshal Oudinot . Oudinot ordered Marguet's brigade to penetrate the place with three spikes, two of which reached the center of the village, where they met the Russians of Olsufiev's corps and were quickly pushed back again. At this time, Oudinot also sent the second Charrière brigade to the town, and hours of bloody house-to-house fighting ensued until the night lit by the fire of the burning houses, which was not decided in favor of the coalition troops until around 7 p.m. when the second Russian grenadier division finally arrived under Paskiewitsch and the Austrian brigade Grimmer of the Gyulay corps arrived for reinforcements, and the cavalry of the Württemberg, Bavarian, Austrian and Prussian troops succeeded in pushing back the French between Chaumesnil and Petit-Mesnil and conquering many of their artillery. Another successful cavalry attack on French artillery of the Marmont Corps was made by Bavaria and Württemberg north of Chaumesnil.

Position of the troops at 8:00 p.m. to Petre

At 9:00 p.m. Napoleon himself left the battlefield and went back to Brienne Castle.

The capture of Dienville

Late in the evening the situation outside Dienville, which the French troops had stubbornly and successfully defended, was still unchanged. Prince Schwarzenberg was so impressed by this that he sent a courier to the Austrian General Colloredo in Vendeuvre with the order that the next day his corps immediately marched north on Dienville for support .

Around midnight, however, Gérard's troops left Dienville on the orders of Napoleon and retreated to Brienne-la-Vieille . General Gyulay learned of this from the observations of his men who were patrolling along the Aube and saw how the retreating French soldiers tried to take their wounded with them, but stopped when they saw the proximity of the Austrian troops. After midnight, Dienville could now be captured and occupied by the Gyulay Corps.

The next day

The withdrawal of the French army

Memorial column for the battle in La Rothiere

Memorial stone for the battle in La Rothière

Napoleon had retired to the Château Brienne at 9 p.m. and ordered the withdrawal of the French troops. He ordered that they should cross the Aube over the bridge in Lesmont and then withdraw in the direction of Troyes . The makeshift restoration of the Lesmont bridge had just been completed.

Napoléon's private secretary Agathon François Fain reports on the condition of the French emperor:

“Napoleon was not without fear that the enemies would take advantage of them, attack and hinder the retreat. Every moment he made anxious inquiries and stood by the window, where he had a superior view of the rows of bivouac fires. "

- Agathon François Fain

At 11 p.m. - before the Austrians captured Dienville - couriers carried Napoleon's orders to retreat to the French corps. Gérard's Corps was to be the first to withdraw. The Ricard division, however, was the only one to cross the small bridge west of Brienne-la-Vieille , which was to be destroyed after it had passed. Next was the Ney corps with the Curial and Meunier divisions. As a third contingent, the Victor Corps had to retreat with the Rottembourg division. The guard cavalry under Nansouty had to secure the retreat , the remaining heavy artillery should be concentrated to protect the crossing at the bridge of Lesmont.

Separate routes were only provided for Marshal Marmont's corps , which was furthest to the east.

The French troops began to withdraw that night. The coalition forces did not follow them that night. The next morning, however, the corps of Crown Prince Wilhelm of Württemberg , General Wrede of Bavaria, and General Gyulay of Austria were instructed to search for the French.

Gyulay led his troops along the right, eastern bank of the Aube on Brienne-la-Vieille, where they met the first French, who withdrew without further resistance. Soon after, the Austrians also occupied Brienne and the abandoned Château Brienne.

From 8:00 a.m. on February 2, 1814, Crown Prince Wilhelm brought a large contingent of cavalry from his and Bavarian corps of at least 24 escadrons and mounted artillery to Brienne-le-Château . There there was an immediate duel between the guns and the French rearguard, who again had great difficulty pulling their guns out of the heavy ground and had to leave some of them behind.

In the meantime, the Coalition troops also noticed the Marmont Corps, which had initially set up at Perthes-lés-Brienne and now withdrew to the north, where at Rosnay it had to go over the Voire , a stately river that followed through very damp, swampy terrain Flowed west towards the Aube. At that time this river often branched out and formed two arms at Rosnay that had to be crossed on a double bridge. After the Corps Marmont had crossed over, the French pioneers largely removed the wooden bridge covering, so that this bridge was initially unusable for cavalry and artillery.

The battle near Rosnay on February 2, 1814

The Voire at Rances a little above Rosnay

When a first overview of the movements of the French army was obtained at the headquarters of the coalition troops, Field Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg ordered that the troops pursuing them were to be divided: Wuerttemberg and Austrian troops should follow on Lesmont, but the Bavarian corps Wrede over the French corps Marmont the Voire follow.

The Wrede Corps then got into trouble, despite great numerical superiority. Marmont had cleverly positioned the artillery and his troops still available to him and so successfully rejected attempts by the Bavarians and Austrians under Wrede's command to cross the Voire with strong troop contingents at Rosnay that they suffered considerable losses. The French benefited from the fact that Rosnay is north of the river and its houses, especially the church, offered them protection and cover. Further attempts by Bavarian infantrymen to bypass the bridge in Rosnay over the Voire failed completely. The thin ice on the damp terrain deceptively simulated solid ground where the men collapsed, but they sank deep into the swampy ground. Of those who made it to the Voire, not a few drowned in the river.

A small bridge downstream of Rosnay, west of Rosnay, had remained undamaged, but the French soldiers under the personal guidance of Marmont were able to push back the troops of the Wrede corps and prevent any further passage by fire from six cannons. The battle was fierce from both sides of the river and was so unfortunate for the coalition troops that Schwarzenberg and the monarchs of Russia and Prussia went to the scene in person without being able to reach a decision first.

Finally after 4:00 in the afternoon, already at dusk, the Austrian Uhlans found a ford through the river further east at Rances , then threatened the French troops from the north and began to enclose them. Marmont immediately ordered the retreat, which was carried out in such an orderly and rapid manner that the pursuing coalition troops soon found no traces of the French in the beginning snowstorm. But that night they came to Dampierre on the way to Arcis-sur-Aube .

The actions of the Austrian corps Gyulay and the Crown Prince Wilhelm von Württemberg

The corps of Crown Prince Wilhelm was also hampered by a new, heavy snowstorm. At around 3:00 p.m. it was standing in front of Lesmont and there came into strong French artillery fire, which forced it to withdraw temporarily. Crown Prince Wilhelm decided to wait for the Austrians under Gyulay, who approached around 4:00 p.m. But then it was found that the French had used the hour to retreat completely to the left, western side of the Aube and then set the bridge on fire. The French maintained this bank until dark and used gunfire to prevent the coalition troops from approaching any further and extinguishing the burning bridge, the destruction of which would cause considerable problems for the corps of the Bohemian Army in the next few days. Those parts of the Napoleonic troops who had crossed the Aube at Lesmont reached Piney that night on the way to Troyes.

The further movements of the coalition forces

Around 10:30 am on the morning of February 2, 1814 met a courier at the headquarters of Prince Schwarzenberg on the Château Brienne one, which reported that the bulk of the corps Colloredo on the left side of Aube of Vendeuvre coming in Dienville had arrived in the Strength of 29 battalions and 12 cavalry escadrons. Schwarzenberg decreed that this corps had to march on Troyes and, after successful objection by Colloredo, who found the direct route too difficult, allowed him to march back to Vendeuvre for this purpose on the same route as it had come.

On the same day, however, the Russian and Prussian guards, who were still standing at Ailleville without being used , first marched back to Bar-sur-Aube , where they crossed the Aube, and then also on to Vendeuvre, where they joined the following night the Corps Colloredo met and overpopulated the small town.

The Russian cuirassier divisions were found at Eclance, and they were looking in vain for a way north. It was not known who had sent them there.

The Russian grenadiers, who were joined by the cuirassiers, marched independently and without coordinating with the other corps over the bridge at Dienville and on to Villiers-le-Brûlé on the road that leads via Piney to Troyes. These were the coalition troops who came closest to Napoleon.

The conference at the Château Brienne

Château de Loménie de Brienne, built between 1770 and 1778

After the battle at Rosnay, the monarchs, Prince Schwarzenberg and Field Marshal Blücher went to Château Brienne to discuss the situation. The castle was in a pitiful state: it had suffered badly from the fighting and its occupiers. Hardly a window was not broken. But the greatest damage suffered was the valuable library and its old manuscripts. Parts of it had been burned in the chimneys, others thrown out the windows to supply the guards with material for their bivouac fires. These losses were final.

The generals of the coalition agreed that the Silesian and Bohemian armies should separate again. A key argument for this was the poor supply situation for the troops. The Bohemian Army was to advance along the Seine , the Silesian Army after unification with all its corps further north along the Marne and south of it against Paris . This separation meant that neither of the two armies was able to prevail against the Napoleonic Army in the following weeks.

Blucher did not set out on the march with the Sacken and Olsufiev Corps of the Silesian Army until late in the day, crossed the Voire at Rosnay, where the French had withdrawn, and took up his quarters for the night in Braux .

Prince Schwarzenberg, the Tsar and the King of Prussia returned to their quarters in Bar-sur-Aube .

The state of the French army

The French troops led by Napoleon withdrew over the next few days to Troyes , which was reached on February 3, 1814, and where two guard divisions and one cavalry division under the command of Marshal Mortier were already located. The battle of February 1, 1814, was felt by the French soldiers, among whom were very many young recruits, as a definite defeat. After the battle the supply of the troops failed and the men had to starve. The consequence of all this was massive desertions from the French army. All along the roads to the west lay discarded equipment: guns, cartridges, and helmets whose owners had run away. Those of the deserters, who were either less inhibited or more hungry, raided the farms away from the streets and pressed food from the farmers, who knew no excess in this poor region.

Napoleon reacted immediately and without understanding for the situation of his soldiers: he had troops of 20 military policemen put together to arrest any man who had left the troops without legitimation, even if he had stayed behind because of exhaustion. One in ten of the arrested had to be shot dead. This order was read out in front of the troops.

This measure had little success, the unwilling had already run away.

The mood in the Czech and Silesian armies of the coalition

Tsar Alexander was satisfied with the outcome of the battle and praised Blücher and his generals. The Austrians were more cautious and pointed out the coming problems that supplying such a large army would bring.

Blücher, on the other hand, was in a euphoric mood - he believed the campaign would soon be decided and Napoleon at the end:

"The big blow has happened, yesterday I hit the Kaizer napoleon ufs main, he is in complete retreat to Paris, while you can look forward to a spherical peace that he can no longer offer us the sticks."

- Field Marshal Blücher in a letter dated February 2, 1814 to his friend Bonin

Trivia

Relief on the anniversary column on the Schloßplatz in Stuttgart , erected for the 25th anniversary of the government and the 60th birthday of King Wilhelm I of Württemberg

On the anniversary column on Schloßplatz in Stuttgart , one of the reliefs on the base describes the contribution of the Württemberger to the success of the coalition troops in the battle.

Appendix: The troops involved before and in the battle

The French troops

infantry

• The Young Guard under Marshal Ney
  • Meunier Infantry Division
    • Lacoste Brigade
    • Rousseau Brigade
  • Decouz Infantry Division
    • Petit Brigade
    • Bigarré Brigade
  • Rottenbourg Infantry Division under the command of Marshal Oudinot
    • Brigade Marguet
    • Charrière Brigade
• The Corps Victor
  • Duhesme Infantry Division
  • Forestier Infantry Division

• The Gérard corps
  • Dufour Infantry Division
  • Ricard Infantry Division
    • Brigade Boudin de Roville
    • Pelleport Brigade
  • Brigade Picquet Light Cavalry

• The Marmont Corps
  • Lagrange Infantry Division
    • Joubert Brigade
    • Fournier Brigade
  • Doumerc Cavalry Division

cavalry

• The Milhaud Cavalry Corps under the command of Marshal Grouchy
  • L'Héritier Cavalry Division
    • 2 Dragoon Brigades
  • Briche Cavalry Division
    • 2 Dragoon Brigades
  • Rosnyvinen Light Cavalry Division
    • a mixed brigade of hussars and chasseurs

• Imperial Guards Cavalry under Nansouty
  • 1st Guards Cavalry Division Colbert
  • 2nd Guards Cavalry Division Lefebvre-Desnouettes
  • 3rd Laferrière-Lévèsque Guards Cavalry Division

• The riders of the honor guard under Defrance

The Austrian troops of the Bohemian Army

• The Gyulay Corps
  • Hohenlohe-Bartenstein division
    • Brigade Pike
    • Brigade Spleny
    • Grimmer Brigade
  • Fresnel division
    • Pfluger Brigade
    • Brigade Czollich

The Württemberg troops of the Bohemian Army

• The corps of Crown Prince Wilhelm of Württemberg
  • Cavalry Division Adam von Württemberg
    • Walsben Brigade
    • Jett Brigade
  • Koch Infantry Division
    • Doering Brigade
    • Hohenlohe Brigade
  • Franquemont Infantry Division
    • Stockmayer Brigade
    • Misany Brigade

The Bavarian-Austrian troops of the Bohemian Army

• The Wrede and Frimont Corps
  • The Austrian Corps Frimont
    • Hardegg Cavalry Division
    • Spleny Infantry Division
  • The Bavarian Corps Wrede
    • Rechberg division
    • Beckert division
    • La Mothe Division

The Russian troops of the Bohemian Army

Under the supreme command of Grand Duke Constantine , the tsar's brother, the Russian troops and Prussian guards were led by General Barclay de Tolly and Count Miloradowitsch . The reserve artillery, engineers and pontooners were directly subordinate to them .

The Guard Grenadiers

• The Guard Grenadier Corps under Rajewski
  • Choglikov Grenadier Division
  • Grenadier Division Paskievitsch

The Guard Cuirassiers

• The Guard-Cuirassier Corps under Prince Golitzyn
  • Cuirassier Division Depreradowitsch
    • Prussian Guard Cavalry in brigade strength
  • Kretow Cuirassier Division
  • Duca Cuirassier Division
  • Oscherowski Light Cavalry Division

The Russian and Prussian Guards

• Guard Corps under Yermolov
  • Russian Guard Division Baron Rosen
  • Prussian Guard Division Alvensleben
  • Russian Guard Division Udom I

The Russian troops of the Silesian Army

• The Sacken Corps
  • Count Liewen Infantry Corps
    • Infantry Division Sass
    • Stzawitzki Infantry Division
  • Count Shcherbatov Infantry Corps
    • Tallisin Infantry Division
    • Bernodosov Infantry Division
  • Cavalry Corps Vasilchikov
    • Lanskoi Cavalry Division (Hussars)
    • Panschulitsew Cavalry Division (Dragoons)
    • Mounted artillery

• The Olsufiev Corps
  • Infantry Division Udom II
  • Karnielow Infantry Division

The Prussian troops of the Silesian Army

• The cavalry corps of Prince Biron of Curland
• The Blucher staff guard

literature

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• Karl von Damitz: History of the campaign from 1814 in eastern and northern France to the capture of Paris. As a contribution to recent war history . Mittler, Berlin 1842/43 (3 vol.).
• Friedrich Christoph Förster : History of the Wars of Liberation 1813, 1814, 1815, Vol. 2 . G. Hempel Verlag, Berlin 1858.
• Ludwig Häusser : German history from the death of Frederick the Great to the establishment of the German Confederation . Salzwasser-Verlag, Paderborn 2012, ISBN 978-3-86382-553-9 (reprint of the Berlin 1863 edition).
• Heinrich Ludwig Beitzke : History of the German wars of freedom in the years 1813 and 1814, Vol. 3: The campaign of 1814 in France . Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1855.
• Joseph Edmund Woerl: History of the wars from 1792 to 1815 . Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, Freiburg / B. 1852.
• Carl von Plotho : The war in Germany and France in the years 1813 and 1814, part 3 . Amelang, Berlin 1817.
• Johann Sporschill: The great chronicle. History of the war of the allied Europe against Napoleon Bonaparte in the years 1813, 1814 and 1815, vol. 2 . Westermann, Braunschweig 1841 (2 vol.).
• Karl von Müffling : On the war history of the years 1813 and 1814. The campaigns of the Silesian army under Field Marshal Blücher. From the end of the armistice to the conquest of Paris . 2nd edition Mittler, Berlin 1827.
• Karl von Müffling: From my life. Two parts in one volume . VRZ-Verlag, Hamburg 2000, ISBN 3-931482-48-0 (reprint of the Berlin 1851 edition).
• Karl Rudolf von Ollech : Carl Friedrich Wilhelm von Reyher , General of the Cavalry and Chief of the General Staff of the Army. A contribution to the history of the army with reference to the wars of liberation of 1813, 1814 and 1815, vol. 1 . Mittler, Berlin 1861.
• Theodor von Bernhardi : Memories from the life of the kaiserl. Russian Generals von der Toll . Wiegand, Leipzig 1858/66 (4 vol.).
• Alexander Iwanowitsch Michailowski-Danilewski : History of the Campaign in France in the Year 1814 . Trotman Books, Cambridge 1992, ISBN 0-946879-53-2 (reprinted from London 1839 edition; translated from Russian by the author).
• Jacques MacDonald : Souvenirs du maréchal Macdonald duc de Tarente . Plon, Paris 1821.
• Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de Marmont : Mémoires du duc de Raguse de 1792 à 1832 . Perrotin, Paris 1857 (9 vols.).
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• Antoine-Henri Jomini : Vie politique et militaire de Napoleon. Racontée par lui-même, au tribunal du César , d ' Alexandre et de Frédéric . Anselin, Paris 1827.
• Guillaume de Vaudoncourt : Histoire des campagnes de 1814 et 1815 en France . Castel, Paris 1817/26.
  • German translation: History of the campaigns of 1814 and 1815 in France . Metzler, Stuttgart 1827/28.
• Alphonse de Beauchamp : Histoire des campagnes de 1814 et de 1815, Vol. 2 . Édition Le Normand, Paris 1817.
• Frédéric Koch : Memories pour servir a l'histoire de la campagne de 1814. Accompagnés de plans, d'ordres de bataille et de situations . Maginet, Paris 1819.
• Maurice Henri Weil: La campagne de 1814 d'après les documents des archives impériales et royales de la guerre à Vienne. La cavalerie des armées alliées pendant la campagne de 1814 . Baudouin, Paris 1891/96 (4 vol.).
• Henry Houssaye: 1814 (Librairie Académique). 94th edition Perrin, Paris 1947 (EA Paris 1905).
  • German translation: The battles at Caronne and Laon in March 1814. Adapted from the French historical work "1814" . Laon 1914.
• Maximilian Thielen: The campaign of the allied armies of Europe in 1814 in France under the supreme command of the Imperial and Royal Field Marshal Prince Carl zu Schwarzenberg . Kk Hofdruckerei, Vienna 1856.
• August Fournier : Napoleon I. A biography . Vollmer, Essen 1996, ISBN 3-88851-186-0 (reprint of the Vienna 1906 edition).
• Archibald Alison : History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution to the restoration of the Bourbons in 1815, Vol. 11: 1813-1814 . 9th edition Blackwood, Edinburgh 1860.
• Francis Loraine Petre: Napoleon at Bay. 1814 . Grennhill, London 1994, ISBN 1-85367-163-0 (reprint of the London 1913 edition).
• David G. Chandler : Campaigns of Napoleon . Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1998, ISBN 0-297-74830-0 (reprint of the London 1966 edition).
• David Chandler: Dictionary of the Napoleonic wars . Greenhill, London 1993, ISBN 1-85367-150-9 (EA London 1979).
• Stephen Pope: The Cassell Dictionary of Napoleonic Wars . Cassell, London 1999, ISBN 0-304-35229-2 .
• Gregory Fremont-Barnes: The Napoleonic Wars, Vol. 4: The Fall of the French Empire 1813-1815 . Osprey Publ., Oxford 2002, ISBN 1-84176-431-0 .
• Franç-Guy Hourtoulle: 1814. La campagne de France; l'aigle blessé . Histoire & Collections, Paris 2005.
  • English translation: 1814. The Campaign for France; the wounded eagle . Histoire & Collections, Paris 2005, ISBN 2-915239-55-X .
• Michael V. Leggiere: The Fall of Napoleon, Vol. 1: The Allied Invasion of France 1813-1814 . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, ISBN 978-0-521-87542-4 .
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Notes and individual references

1. ↑ Soulaines-Dhuys in the French language Wikipedia
2. ↑ The letter is reproduced in Damitz
3. ^ Bernhardi, Thielen, Damitz, Petre. The information in the literature varies greatly. Since the crossing of the Rhine, considerable troops had remained behind to enclose the fortified places.
4. ↑ Bois de Beaulieu
5. ↑ Förster p. 622 ff, Saalfeld p. 269 ff, Damitz p. 478 ff and also Pretre, Bernhardi, Thielen and Sporschill
6. ↑ At that time called Bois d'Ajou
7. ↑ cf. Koch, Bogdanowitch, Bernhardi
8. ^ Jean-Marie Defrance in the French language Wikipedia
9. ↑ Förster p. 622, Saalfeld p. 269, Damitz p. 478 ff
10. ↑ 10 horses for the heavy guns, 6 horses for the light guns and 5 horses for the powder wagons
11. ↑ There are catch basins for flood regulation today
12. ↑ Two years later he also became his brother-in-law when he married his widowed sister.
13. ↑ cf. Bernhardi, Sporschill, Thielen
14. ↑ cf. Bernhardi, Sporschill, Thielen, Damitz
15. ↑ This does not correspond to the representation of all old maps, but to the predominant representation in the literature.
16. ↑ The French General Marguet, fell in the course of the battle
17. ↑ cf. Sporschill
18. ↑ Some references report that the Austrians attacked Dienville in a brilliant manner. What is certain, however, is that Napoleon's courier to Gèrard left Château Brienne, which is only 5.5 kilometers away, at 11:00 p.m. It can therefore be assumed that the presentation by the Austrian Sporschill is correct.
19. ^ Marmont, 19th book
20. ^ The Schwarzenberg Uhlans
21. ↑ cf. Bernhardi
22. ↑ cf. on this, Petre
23. ↑ cf. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky
24. ↑ cf. Uffindell
25. ↑ This written order from Napoleon was in the French National Archives and was documented in its printed matter.
26. ↑ Original quote: Blücher was not able to write German, cf. Tim Klein (Ed.): The Liberation 1813 1814 1815, documents reports letters . Munich 1913
27. ↑ cf. Hourtoulle, Bogdanowitsch, Bernhardi, Plotho
28. ^ Hugues Alexandre Joseph Meunier in the French language Wikipedia
29. ↑ Guillaume-Charles Rousseau in the French language Wikipedia
30. ↑ Decouz had already been wounded on January 29, 1814 and was then wounded a second time in the battle of La Rothière. He died of the consequences 18 days later in Paris
31. ^ Jean Martin Petit in the French language Wikipedia
32. ↑ Auguste Julien Bigarré in the French language Wikipedia
33. ^ Jean Joseph Marguet in the French language Wikipedia
34. ↑ Marguet fell during the attack on La Rothière that evening
35. ^ Charrière in the French language Wikipedia
36. ^ François Louis Boudin de Roville in the French language Wikipedia
37. ^ Cyrille Simon Picquet in the French language Wikipedia
38. ^ Joseph Antoine René Joubert in the French language Wikipedia
39. ↑ Samuel Lhéritier de Chézelles in the French language Wikipedia
40. ^ André Louis Elisabeth Marie Briche in the French language Wikipedia
41. ↑ including the Polish Uhlans
42. ↑ Guyot from February 2, 1814
43. ^ Jean-Marie Defrance in the French language Wikipedia
44. ↑ The Bavarian divisions were mixed, they comprised one cavalry and two infantry brigades
45. ↑ Russian Gregori Wladimirowitsch Rosen, also given as Rosen II
46. ↑ This Kops was an independently operating part of the Langeron Corps at the time .