Siege of Wittenberg (1813/14)

Siege of Wittenberg

Part of: Autumn Campaign 1813

Plan of the siege of 1813/1814

date	May 5, 1813 to January 14, 1814
place	Wittenberg
output	Prussia occupy Wittenberg

Parties to the conflict
France	Russia Prussia
Commander
Jean François Cornu de Lapoype	Ludwig Adolf Peter zu Sayn-Wittgenstein Bogislav Friedrich Emanuel von Tauentzien Leopold Wilhelm von Dobschütz
losses
	500 to 600 men dead and wounded

Civilians: 4 dead 16 injured

The siege of Wittenberg was a military conflict during the Wars of Liberation . As early as 1806 after the Fourth Coalition War , Napoleon recognized the strategic importance of Wittenberg as an Elbe crossing . The first French governor was General Lemarroi, who was replaced by General Chasseloup on October 21, 1806 . This was an engineer and expanded the fortress. In 1809 the Saxon government even temporarily evacuated the state treasure here. In 1812 the facilities were further improved. In 1813 the fortress was an important assembly point and supply depot for the French who fought in eastern Germany.

prehistory

Spring campaign of 1813

At the beginning of the campaign in 1813 , the Viceroy of Italy Eugène de Beauharnais was destined to defend the Lower Elbe with 35,000 to 40,000 men. Opposite him stood the Northern Army of the Russians and Prussians with 50,000 to 60,000 men under the supreme command of General Count Wittgenstein whose columns were getting closer and closer to the Elbe and on March 26th Wittenberg was observed by the head of the vanguard under Major General Baron Diebitsch . This observation was soon transformed into an enclosure on the right bank of the Elbe, and on March 5th Lieutenant General von Kleist took command of the Russian troops standing in front of Wittenberg.
While the allies were spreading more and more on the right bank of the Elbe, the viceroy also gathered his troops and took his headquarters in Magdeburg . The 2nd Corps (8,000 men) under Marshal Belluno was designated to occupy Wittenberg, Dessau , Roßlau and Aken .

The environment in 1813

On April 2, Lieutenant General Kleist, who in addition to the light Russian troops, 2 hunter regiments, 2 heavy foot batteries and some Cossack detachments (all under Major General Diebitsch), also investigated 6 battalions, 4 heavy hussars, 1 mounted and 1 foot battery Prussia under his command would have. He made the fortress more and more enclosed. Roßlau had been occupied earlier and arrangements were made to build a bridge, which was to be undertaken here later. At Elster above Wittenberg, however, a bridge was already being built on the 3rd. On April 4, 2 battalions, 1/2 mounted battery, 1 heavy hussars and 1 Cossack regiment were placed across the Elbe and these troops succeeded in occupying Dessau in order to cover the important bridge construction at Roßlau and to include Wittenberg on the left bank of the Elbe can.

On April 5th, General Winzingerode and his remaining troops (around 30,000 men) delivered a victorious battle to the viceroy, who was equally strong in his right flank, at Gommern, as a result of which the latter returned to Magdeburg.

Before Wittenberg itself, however, everything remained calm, and General Kleist's vanguard had kept its position in front of the fortress and the headquarters in Thießen unchanged. On the 6th, the brigade of the Russian Major General Helffreich crossed the Elbe, during which the bridge at Rosslau was completed and occupied the bridgehead raised on the other side. On the same day the French burned down part of the suburbs of Wittenberg. Since the viceroy, and with him Marshal Belluno, withdrew, but Wittenberg remained occupied.

However, General Wittgenstein crossed the Elbe near Roßlau on the 9th and 10th to establish communication with Generals Winzingerode and Blücher (the former arrived in Leipzig with his headquarters on the 14th ) behind the Saale . So General Wittgenstein had successfully completed a major part of his task. But the French still owned all of the Elbe fortresses. It was therefore urgently necessary, since Wittenberg and Magdeburg were included, to conquer one of these places in order to gain a firm foothold on the Elbe. The only other connections were the bridges at Elster and Roßlau.

First storm

There was neither material nor time for a formal siege, so one had to take refuge in attack and storm . General Wittgenstein wanted to personally lead the intended attack. He arrived at Wittenberg on March 16 and immediately set the attack for the following morning.

The preparations in and of themselves were exemplary, the men and officers ready. The mistake, however, was that General Wittgenstein was wrong about the fort's defensive capabilities and knew too little about the location.
The containment troops were formed into three columns and began the attack at 3 a.m. After a very violent and bloody battle, during which General Kasatschowski, who was standing on the left bank of the Elbe, shot at the bridgehead and unsettled the crew there, the attack columns finally succeeded in taking the suburbs and asserting themselves there. Probably the same would have been taken more quickly and with less effort, but the 3rd column under Lieutenant Colonel von Steinmetz was stopped. The column was supposed to advance via Reinsdorf , but unexpectedly came across 2 battalions under Brigadier General Oudinot at 4 a.m. in front of the so-called Eichbusch . After 2 a.m. the fighting stopped and the Allied forces retreated a little, but kept the conquered suburbs occupied.

General Wittgenstein saw this assault as a failure and had gained the conviction that even a repetition would not be successful. But the possession of Wittenberg was still important, so he decided to give it another try. On the night of 17/18 he had 4 batteries built and equipped with 2 guns. Before they opened fire, the fortress commander was asked to surrender by a parliamentarian . Since he did not want to enter into any negotiations, the bombardment began at 9 a.m. and continued on the 18th and 19th. The enemy answered only weakly from the walls and did not take any further action against the troops in the suburbs. But several attacks by the Russians under General Kasachkovsky on the bridgehead were repulsed by the French. General Wittgenstein now recognized that Wittenberg could not be taken without a formal siege. He therefore gave up all attacks, contented himself with occupying the suburbs and let the troops return to their former position of enclosure.

The French lost 2 officers and 126 soldiers in the battle on 17th. The loss to the attackers was, of course, more substantial.

Partial withdrawal on April 19th

Memorial plaque Napoleon I.

On the 19th the news reached General Wittgenstein's Dessau headquarters that Napoleon was approaching with large troops, intending to unite with the viceroy and, on the other hand, to separate the hostile armies. As a result, General Wittgenstein concentrated his troops and moved with the bulk closer to General Blücher's army. General Kleist, too, had received orders corresponding to this general advance. On the 20th and 21st the same were done.

To enclose Wittenberg under Major von Sjöholm only 2 battalions, 1 heavy hussars and 1 mounted battery of Prussia and a regiment of Cossacks remained, furthermore to occupy the bridgehead at Roßlau, 2 regiments of fighter and 1 heavy battery of Russians.

General Kleist went to Dessau with the rest of his troops. The Saale itself was heavily manned, and the viceroy made several advances against these troops, particularly on the 22nd, in order to cover up his march to the right by these movements. In front of Wittenberg, everything remained calm during the whole skirmish period.

But when General Kleist received the order to advance with his corps from Dessau to Halle on the 24th, the mounted battery and the squadron of hussars were called from Wittenberg, for which Lieutenant Colonel Sjöholm received half a battalion, two hunter companies and half a 12-pounder battery of Prussia were transferred. But Lieutenant Colonel Sjöholm soon followed his corps to Halle and was replaced by Major General Harpe's Russian brigade (2000-2500 men).

Bülow replaces Kleist

For the retreating General Kleist, General Bülow was charged with enclosing Wittenberg, with covering the bridgehead at Roßlau and defending the lower Saale. The general came from Magdeburg with the 7,000 to 8,000-strong corps and some Cossack detachments assigned to him.

The Bülow corps was replaced by a Russian corps under Lieutenant General Count Voronzow in front of the Magdeburg fortress. Bülow reached the area around Wittenberg in the last days of April. However, before Bülow could develop and the brigade of Major General Thümen , which was approaching from the conquered fortress Spandau , could unite with him, the battle of Großgörschen had already been fought on May 2nd . The Allies' defeat had consequences. Kleist then withdrew to Mühlberg and Bülow received the order to limit himself to the enclosure of Wittenberg and the occupation of the bridgehead near Roßlau. On the 7th, Kleist arrived on the right bank of the Elbe and burned down the bridge near Mühlberg. As for the corps of General Bülow, the vanguard of the same under Major General Oppen had a battle near Wettin (April 27).

When the Thümen Brigade reached Dessau on May 2nd, General Bülow left for Halle at 3 a.m. At the same time, Major General Borstell's 4,000-man brigade , which stood near Magdeburg until the 2nd , was moving up the Elbe. General Bülow hoped to be able to make a powerful appearance, but the events at Großgörschen forced him to return to the Elbe on the 4th. On the 5th, the Thümen brigade occupied the Roßlauer bridgehead in order to secure the retreat of the arms and dispatched 1 battery and 2 squadrons to reinforce the containment troops of Wittenberg. However, the crew remained very calm. On May 11th, General Bülow's whole corps went to Roßlau on the right bank of the Elbe, leaving only observation positions on the left. Like Wittgenstein, Bülow had the hope of being able to take the fortress by hand. So he undertook a violent advance against the fortress with the united Thümen Brigade (3 battalions, 1 hunter company, 5 squadrons, 1 battery and numerous Cossack detachments). However, it remained without consequences.

Advance by Ney against Berlin

Michel Ney memorial plaque

The position in front of and near Wittenberg was becoming more and more dangerous, because Marshal Ney was already on the march to Berlin with the 3rd, 5th and 7th French Army Corps from Torgau. General Bülow therefore decided to gather all the troops under his command. He wanted to prepare himself to cover with Russian troops and Prussian Landwehr near Berlin, Brandenburg behind the Havel and Spree. The meeting took place on the 19th near Baruth . There were now around 30,000 men in 6 brigades. The 6th of the brigade, under the orders of Colonel von Boyen, was destined for the further containment of Wittenberg. The colonel had set up 5 squadrons and 2 battalions of Kurmärk Landwehr under Major von der Marwitz right around the fortress . Except for a few Cossack detachments, there were no other troops in front of the fortress at that time. Even this small number was completely sufficient, because the enclosure really only had the purpose of observation. The left bank of the Elbe was free and the crew - with the exception of minor skirmishes - kept quiet. After the Battle of Bautzen , General Bülow withdrew more and more towards the Spree, Colonel Boyen also had to go back a little and therefore stood in the Jüterbog area on June 2nd . The above-mentioned 5 squadrons and 2 battalions, however, kept a close eye on Wittenberg and its surroundings. Major von der Marwitz even undertook a large foraging as far as the Torgau area on June 2nd . He obeyed the need, because the area had been plundered since the beginning of the campaign, so that there was now a lack of provisions and fodder for the horses. The besieged used the greater freedom they had been given to fill in the drainage ditches drawn by the containment troops, because they had led to a great lack of good drinking water in the fortress. On the 3rd, Colonel Boyen left the Jüterbog area on the orders of General Bülow and went with his brigade to Luckau. Before Wittenberg, only a weak detachment remained for observation.

The Pläswitz armistice had already been concluded on June 4 when the Bülow Corps. General Bülow found out about this on June 7th and had to go back behind the demarcation line and as a result of this movement the last observation posts had to be withdrawn before Wittenberg. So it stays calm until September before Wittenberg.

Autumn campaign 1813

After the allies under command of the Crown Prince of Sweden standing northern army victorious battle of Dennewitz Marshal Ney had gone with his very weakened and dissolved army at Torgau on the left bank of the Elbe. The Crown Prince, instructed by his earlier experience, immediately decided to enclose Wittenberg with a strong force and to have it formally besieged as soon as the missing material would allow.

Already on September 9th, Wittenberg was overrun by light troops under General Tschernischef and shot at to destroy the magazines if possible. The Bülow corps was reinforced with the corps of Major General von Hirschfeld and again provided for the siege of Wittenberg. At the same time, it should make preparations in order to be able to build bridges over the Elbe at Elster.

The formation of the siege corps on the 14th was as follows:

outpost

• 4th Brigade (Major General Thümen 8 1/2 battalions, 3 squadrons and a 6 pounder battery)
• Corps of Major General Hirschfeld (12 battalions, 8 squadrons and 1 and a half 6-pounder foot battery)

reserve

• 3rd Brigade (Prince Ludwig von Hessen-Homburg , 11 battalions, 4 squadrons, a 6-pounder battery)
• 6th Brigade (Colonel von Kraft , 10 battalions, 4 squadrons, 4 6-pounder batteries)

at Jessen and Annaburg

• 5th Brigade (Major General Borstel, 11 battalions, 4 squadrons, 1 6-pounder battery)

General von Bülow's headquarters were in Seyda .

The reserve cavalry under Major General Oppen consisted of 3rd Brigades or 30 squadrons with 2 mounted batteries. The reserve artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Holzendorf consisted of two 12-pounders, one 6-pounder foot artillery, one 6-pounder mounted battery and three ammunition columns. In addition, 2 field engineer companies and 4 Cossack regiments with 2 heavy mounted batteries were attached to the corps. Finally the Crown Prince had ordered that General Bülow be given 4 unicorns and that the approach of the siege artillery from Berlin and Spandau be accelerated as possible. General Bülow received the order to try everything possible to get possession of Wittenberg as soon as possible. With the arrangements made for the strength of the siege corps (35,000 men) and the activities of General Bülow, one could expect a favorable outcome with a certain degree of confidence. Also on September 14th General Tschernisches crossed the Elbe with 2,000 Cossacks and 4 guns at Aken to observe Wittenberg on the left bank of the Elbe and to occupy Dessau and Köthen , which he succeeded in doing. On September 30th the Cossacks reached Kassel , whereupon the Kingdom of Westphalia collapsed.

In Wittenberg at this time the division general Lapoype was in command . The garrison consisted of 2 French infantry regiments (No. 123 and No. 124) and the Polish Vistula region and numbered around 5,000 men. Provisions and ammunition were plentiful and the works were in good condition.

At the same time as Wittenberg, the Torgau bridgehead was enclosed by troops of the Northern Army on the left and Magdeburg on the right; bridges with bridgeheads were built at Aken and Roßlau and Dessau was occupied.

September 24th

Until September 24th, both the garrison of the fortress and the containment troops standing in front of Wittenberg kept quiet. General Bülow's orders primarily related to security and preparation measures. The first was the construction of a pontoon bridge with a bridgehead near Elster. The positions of the brigades were changed several times and on the 22nd a Prussian cavalry regiment went to the left bank of the Elbe. Finally, on the 24th, the siege train arrived, with the English missile battery of Captain Bogue in addition to the Prussian guns and the 4 Russian unicorns. So on the night of the 25th the first parallel could be dug and 3 batteries built at the same time. However, before the Prussian pioneers began their work, the French were thrown back into the city by Major General Hirschfeld's brigade and corps after a bloodless battle. The parallel lay on the left wing of the enclosure line from the Luther fountain on the Elbe to just about the village of Grünstraße. The English missile battery (3 guns) was in the middle and started its fire around noon, but without success, as the missiles were almost consistently too short. On the right wing of the parallel a Prussian launch battery (2 howitzers ) was built on the left a Russian dismantling battery (4 unicorns). Both started their fire at daybreak and the balls of fire ignited in several places in the city.

The siege corps held the following position on that day: the 4th Brigade reinforced by 4 1/2 battalions from the reserve on the left wing, the enclosure from the Elbe to Grünstrasse, still occupying this village; the 3rd Brigade, on the right wing from Grünstraße to the Elbe again; Major General Hirschfeld's corps at the Purtsberg pleasure palace not far from Coswig . The 3rd Brigade left Elster after the bridge had broken down and went to Piesteritz ; the headquarters and the reserves in Nudersdorf and the surrounding area. The defense artillery responded very weakly and the crew behaved very calmly, so that on the night of the 26th the first parallel of a second attack on the right wing between the execution and the road to Appollensdorf was excavated without loss and the construction of a battery began could be.

On the 26th, Marshal Ney, who had hitherto stood between Torgau and Leipzig, advanced with the 4th and 7th Corps to Dessau in order to drive out the troops of the Northern Army that had passed over to the left bank of the Elbe.

In front of Wittenberg, greater activity developed due to the fire of the defenders. A battery was built between Sandstrasse and Grünstrasse (villages that are to be regarded as suburbs of Wittenberg) and 6 12-pounder guns were set up in the left wing of the parallel at Luther Fountain. Marshal Ney advanced on the 27th, which is why the troops of the northern arm vacated the left bank of the Elbe and had to limit themselves to occupying the bridgeheads. On the night of the 28th the enemy threw troops into Wittenberg, which camped on the Anger . From 9 a.m. to 4 a.m., the attackers maintained such a lively fire of all the batteries that were finished that it burned very strongly in ten locations in the city. The English missile battery was particularly successful and the wooden Elbe bridge was even set on fire, but the fire was soon extinguished by the French. In contrast, all the explosive devices that had been floated against the bridge crashed. The fire from the fortress was weak because the crew was kept busy by extinguishing it. On the 28th and 29th, Marshal Ney made several attempts to gain the bridgehead at Roßlau, but was repulsed. Meanwhile, the mutual bombardment continued in front of Wittenberg. The Prussians built in Luthersbrunnen to cover the left flank of the Parallel one Flesche and it was a 12-pounder battery by Elster, to cover the bridge there again begun. On the 30th it stopped at Wittenberg.

October 1

On the night of October 1st, it was noticed that a large number of cars were crossing the Elbe bridge onto the left bank. Thereupon the fortress was shelled from 11 a.m. to 4 a.m., but less successfully than on the 27th. Furthermore, the besiegers led a connection line from the above-mentioned Flesche to Grünstraße. Until October 4th, almost everything stayed the same before Wittenberg. The bombardment was weak and the crew skirmished with the tranche guards. However, the besiegers began to dig the Trajuhn and Fleiher streams, which irrigate the trenches, drive the city mills and supply the city with good drinking water. However, after the Silesian army had forced the crossing at Wartenburg on the 3rd, General Bülow's 3rd Corps lifted the siege of Wittenberg. The corps went to Roßlau on the 4th, where the right wing of the Northern Army had already moved to the left bank of the Elbe. Only Major General Thümen and his brigade were left outside Wittenberg to enclose the fortress on the right bank of the Elbe. In order to fulfill this order, General Thümen took the following position: 3 battalions occupied the suburbs and tranches, they were relieved daily; at Trajuhn , where the headquarters were located, there were 3 battalions and 1 field battery, at Teuchel 2 1/2 battalions, in Euper 1 Landwehr cavalry regiment. On the 5th, the Cossacks who remained with the containment corps managed to set fire to the Elbe bridge and actually 2 pillars burned down. Since the brigade's battalions were very weak, the outpost lines were less manned. On the other hand, work was carried out on strengthening the tranches and fortifying the quarters, and building a closed plant for 200 men behind the executioner's house. Apart from small outpost skirmishes, friends and foe before Wittenberg behaved as before until the 8th. On the 9th, however, 200 men were transferred to the left bank to cut off the crew's connection with Torgau and Eilenburg .

Relief on October 11th

Memorial plaque Tauentzien

All the troops that were previously standing in front of Witterberg were drawn together for the great battle near Leipzig and set out on their way. Only the brigade of Major General Wobeser observed the bridgehead of Torgau and the corps of Generals von Tauenzien and von Hirschfeld, who were charged with guarding the lower Saale and defending the fortifications of the bridges at Roßlau and Aken, remained behind. The weak Thümen brigade therefore had a very strenuous duty in front of Wittenberg and the siege. Since no immediate support or even replacement was to be expected, the siege turned into an enclosure . This also had to be given up on October 11th.

Napoleon sent the 7th and 4th Army Corps again to Wittenberg and Dessau in order to force the Northern Army to retreat by threatening Berlin. These corps accelerated their march so much that General Tauenzien's advance troops did not manage to reach the right bank of the Elbe without loss. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the 7th Corps moved into Wittenberg, so that there were now 15,000 to 20,000 men in the fortress against whom the Thümen Brigade, which had only 500 men, could not possibly hold out. After the tranche guards had successfully stopped an attack by the French, which gave the battery on the left wing time to retreat, Major General Thümen assembled his brigade at Piesteritz and at 11 o'clock went back behind the defiles at Griebau. He united here with the troops set up by Count Tauenzien (3 battalions and 5 squadrons). Since the 7th Corps from Wittenberg was advancing on the right bank of the Elbe, the Thümen Brigade had to go further back, had the bridge at Roßlau demolished and arrived in Zerbst early on the 13th, always fighting .

So on October 12th the 3rd French Corps stood at Dessau and its vanguard as far as Coswig, Zerbst and Aken. The 7th Corps was at Coswig, the advance guard at Zerbst.

On October 27, 1813, all the captured ordinary soldiers (approx. 1000 men) were released from Wittenberg, but the NCOs and officers were not, as they refused to take an oath to stop fighting.

The siege resumes October 23

Commemorative plaque Dobschütz

The events of the campaign of 1813 followed quickly after October 13, and the battle near Leipzig (October 16–19) required the mobilization of all forces. Only on the 23rd was it possible for the Crown Prince of Sweden to have Wittenberg again included by the troops of the Northern Army. The troops used consisted of Major General Dobschütz (belonged to General Tauenzien's corps, who had stood there to cover Berlin until the 20th and had now received special orders to besiege the Oder and Elbe fortresses with the 4th Prussian Army Corps) and an infantry regiment from the corps of Major General von Hirschfeld. The latter served to enclose the bridgehead. But only after the surrender of Torgau on December 23, 1813, enough troops were available to begin the siege.

Major General Dobschütz used the long interim for preparatory work. He tried to wipe out the forces of the occupation by issuing alarms repeatedly daily and nightly and to control the terrain in front of the fortress. The division general Lapoype was in command in the fortress, but the crew had melted down to 3,000 men. General Lapoype used every means in his power to defend Wittenberg in the most obstinate manner, and the occupation also seemed to be inspired by the best will. Excellent it was the Covered Way , which you gave all the attention because after the loss of the same the ramparts even less hope afforded to a successful defense. There was no shortage of artillery, ammunition and provisions. After the reinforcements and the siege gun from Torgau had arrived in front of Wittenberg and General Tauenzien had set up his headquarters in Coswig, the first almost straight-line parallel and the corresponding communication trenches across the palace front were in the night of December 28th to 29th an average distance of 300 paces from the covered path and an extension of 700 to 800 paces.

The siege work was carried out by the engineer Colonel Plautzen, who commanded the entire engineering of the 4th Corps, and he managed to finish his work without loss. The crew of the fortress had been made safe by the earlier unsuccessful alarms and paid no heed to the movement and the noise that night. But no sooner did they notice the siege work at dawn than they opened violent gunfire. The expansion of the parallel as well as the installation and equipping of 3 batteries in the night of the 30th was therefore carried out with some losses. The siege artillery was commanded by Captain Bardeleben , and he had all the batteries relocated and sunk in the tranches. The first of these lay on the left bank of the Elbe and, by means of fire from two howitzers, protected the field entrenchments that the crew had built to close the space between the left corner bastion of the castle front and the Elbe. Battery No. 4 was on the left wing of the parallel and was manned by four 12-pound cannons and was intended to protect the right corner bastion of the attacked front of mobile battery No. 3. The middle of the parallel contained 4 10-pound mortars and pelted the defensive hospital , which served as a detached ravelin , was surrounded by parapets and palisaded trenches.
On the morning of the 30th, the fire on Wittenberg immediately began from the completed 3rd battery and under the protection of this fire, the parallel, as well as the connecting routes, could be completed and expanded. The enemy artillery was very active, so that even the mortar battery No. 3 had to remain silent for a while and the dismantling battery had almost no cover in the end. On the night of the 31st, the very damaged batteries # 3 and # 4 were restored and # 2 and # 5 terminated. No. 2, built for four 12-pound cannons, was on the right wing of the attack and was intended to dismantle the left wing bastion of the attack front. No. 5 was on the far left wing of the parallel, and, manned by 3 12-pound cannons, was to protect the entire front of the attack; the 12-pound cannons were to be replaced by howitzers as soon as possible. Furthermore, that night, to the left of battery No. 3, the parallel broke out and a boyou , 122 paces long and turning to the left, was completed.

September

On the 31st a large transport of artillery and ammunition arrived at the siege corps. This solved a major problem, because although the 5 batteries could start their fire, the same was of little effect, since the enemy artillery was superior to the assault artillery in both number and caliber. The enemy also took advantage of this excess weight and not only fired from all the walls that could only reasonably see the attack with 24- and 12-pound cannons, but had also built several projectile batteries. In addition, lighter artillery had hit the covered path and the wall surrounding the hospital, and its grape-shooting was very effective. The defenders also opened violent gunfire. On the night of January 1, 1814, the arrival of the transport allowed Battery No. 1 to be completely re-occupied with 3 10-pound howitzers and No. 4. No. 5 sold 1 12-pound cannon in exchange for 1 8-pound howitzer. A new No. 6 for 4 50-pound mortars was also built and stocked between Batteries No. 2 and No. 3. Finally that same night the pioneers and the workers assigned to them in the line brought about a croschett at the end of the boyous and from there, with the complete sap, made a 70 paces long retourboyou. This retourboyou formed part of the 2nd parallel and was aimed at the protruding corner of the Contrescarpe surrounding the hospital wall.

January 1814

The intensified fire of the besiegers was very successful on January 1st against the artillery of the garrison and in particular the palisades in the throat of the plant around the hospital were completely thrown down. In order not to give the enemy time to repair this damage, it was decided to storm this important work for the next night. One had to hurry up with the execution of this project, since the siege artillery still lacked grape-shot ammunition, so the enemy could not be effectively prevented from repairing his nicks or the destroyed palisades. The storm therefore happened around 7 o'clock and succeeded. However, the crew made a failure during the night and occupied the factory again, happily brought back the artillery and ammunition and finally left the factory to the Prussians, who attacked for the second time, in the morning. On January 2, the crew tried to take the lost outer works again. However, since in the meantime the 2nd parallel had come to the top of the Contrescarpe. So the Transcheewache successfully repulsed the attack and Colonel von Plautzen immediately had a barricade built in the throat and a communication ditch led there from the 2nd parallel. During the night of the 3rd not only this construction and communication were finished, but there was also time to traverse the 2 parallel. The enemy had established a howitzer battery in the cover works already mentioned between the Elbe and the fortress, which completely covered the two parallel lines. The work now became more and more difficult, for although the enemy cannon fire had been largely silenced, the throwing fire was still very annoying and the gun fire was violent. Furthermore, you had to work your way through the rubble of the suburbs that had previously burned down. The lack of trained pioneers was particularly noticeable, because of the 46 men who were present at the beginning of the siege only 28 men remained fit for duty. On the night mentioned, the artillery built a launch battery No. 7 to the left of battery No. 4 with 2 24-pound mortars and equipped it. The besieged, however, also proved to be very active and did everything possible to check the progress of the enemy. The fire of a covered battery for 2 48-pound mortars was particularly effective, as was well-entertaining and guided rifle fire and aimed rifle fire. On the other hand, he lacked the material to quickly repair nicks. A previous negligence was to blame for this, because the banks of the Elbe were covered with the best willow branches. In the meantime the lack of mills became noticeable, especially since the Roßmühle, built out of necessity, could not be adequately protected from the throwing fire of the besiegers. On the 3rd, a powder magazine was blown up in the right wing bastion of the attack front, preventing the mortar battery located there from firing for several hours. On the other hand, the enemy grape fire always remained very murderous. Since the besiegers still hadn't received grape ammunition, they could not return fire. On the night of the 4th the artillery built a mortar battery No. 8 for two 16-pound mortars on the far right wing of the 1st parallel, close to the old Elbe, to work against the adjacent works. On the part of the pioneers, the second parallel to the right was lengthened, the same to the left of the hospital was broken, and from there a boyou, 130 paces long, was led largely by means of the fleeting sap to the top of the covered path in front of the right corner bastion of the attack front. The second parallel was also provided with sandbags so that the gunfire could now be returned. In addition to the problems for the besiegers mentioned earlier, there was a severe frost since the night of the 4th and the full moon allowed the enemy to perceive everything. On the 4th, two powder magazines were blown up in the adjacent plants.

A new battery No. 9 for 3 12-pound cannons was built on the night of the 6th and opened its fire against the castle gate early that day. It was located between batteries No. 3 and No. 6. By the night of January 7th to 8th, the work progressed its steady but slow pace and the couronnement of the outgoing corner in front of the right Elbe bastion of the attack front began. The grape-shooting of some howitzers in the covered path was a particular obstacle to this progress, but it was not stopped by failures. The second parallel was closed at a distance of 150 paces to the right of the hospital and the connecting boyou to the couronnement was laid out and provided with sandbags. The artillery had manned battery No. 1 with 3 12-pound cannons and destroyed the palisade of the connection works with a violent fire from it, so that there was no longer any major obstacle in the way of a storm. On the night of the 8th, after a brief skirmish, the attacked tip of the covered path was taken by storm and the couronnement was carried out with the fleeting sap.

Request for handover

General Count Tauenzien ordered the fortress to be surrendered on the 8th. But he held a negative answer and the enemy continued to defend himself vigorously. His throwing fire remained particularly effective as before, so that the courtyard and the barriers in the captured area suffered greatly. He also succeeded in replacing the destroyed palisade of the connection works with an earth face defense and erecting the cannon behind it. On this day one also discovered the reason why the enemy throwing fire could not be silenced and why it could always enjoy a very favorable effect. The defenders had established a floating battery in the moat of the attacked front , which could change its location easily and quickly depending on the circumstances. On the night of 9 to 10 of Conronnements the room was recovered to a Breschebatterie for three 12-pfd cannons and on the right one on the left wing Descente completed after covered way. During this the artillery continued their fire and placed a new launch battery No. 10 for 2 10-pound mortars in the left wing of the connecting booth between the 2nd parallel and the couronnement. The enemy contented himself with continuing his throwing and gunfire. His cannon fire, on the other hand, was almost completely silent, since all the notches were destroyed. Since the besieged under the protection of the log house in the weapons area in front of the castle gate gradually set up 5 mortars in the covered path, the fire of which became more and more violent, the assault artillery found itself required on the 10th to add a launch battery No. 11 for 2 10-pound mortars to build. It was on the right wing of the 2nd parallel. On the night of the night of, a battery No. 13 for 4 12-pound cannons was also ready on the left wing of the 1st parallel, in order to use it to prevent the fire from the ravelin of the bastion and cavalier on the right side front, which was very obstructive in the construction of the breach battery to keep in check. As this succeeded, the breach battery was finally able to start its fire on the morning of the 12th and directed it first against the log house covered by a traverse, which defended the dam, which instead of a bridge led from the castle gate to the large arsenal .

Before the storm

Storming of Wittenberg 1814

It was noticed that the ice in the trenches was safe, so a storm was possible, on the other hand, the sapphire work on the couronnement made almost no progress due to the severe frost. Therefore, General Graf Tauenzien decided to venture into a storm, but had the commandant asked to surrender again beforehand. But the same refused any surrender, did not want to believe in the possibility of a storm and rather gave in to the hope that the extremely unfavorable weather and his stubborn defense would finally force the Prussians to withdraw. The commanding general, Count Tauenzien, gave the order at 4 a.m. on the night of January 12th to 13th, 1814 to storm the fortress. The siege artillery and the hunters fired the whole afternoon and until immediately before the storm, in order to conceal the movement among the troops from the garrison and to drive them as far as possible from the wall.

Towards evening 5 infantry regiments, 4 hunter detachments and 2 cavalry regiments gathered under the command of Major General Dobschütz and were partly used as a reserve in case of an unfavorable success, partly as strong guards, partly used for an immediate storm. The stormtroopers were divided into 4 columns and at the head of each one marched a section with tools and short scaling ladders . The storm itself began from the right wing and the columns on the left only attacked as soon as they heard the cheers of those standing next to them on the right. The 1st column (2nd Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment) threw itself on the bridgehead on the left bank of the Elbe. The 2nd column (3rd Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment) was intended to take away the connecting works on the Elbe (Angerschanze). The 3rd or main column (8th Reserve Infantry Regiment) was to storm the attack front. Colonel von Plauzen and Captain von Bardeleben were with her. It was divided into 4 sections and broke out of the tranches. It was preceded by Lieutenant von Pannewitz with 30 volunteers and built a fascine ramp from the ice level up to the storm poles 6 feet higher to make it possible to climb over them. This brave officer not only did his difficult job very well, but held out with his men for a whole hour until the storm column arrived. The 4th column (West Prussian Landwehr Regiment) was finally to climb the wall on the left of the attack front. Almost all of the time, the attack planning was carried out on time. The troops showed so much courage that shortly after 1 a.m. the wall had already climbed. But the crew, too, fought bravely and defended themselves particularly with heavy gunfire. After the wall was lost, part of the crew withdrew to the town hall, which had been expanded for defense. General Lapoype withdrew with another part into the likewise barricaded castle. The former came about at 2:30 and after 3 a.m. the governor opened the castle gates after a short but bloody battle and surrendered to mercy and disgrace .

The stormed Schlossplatz zu Wittenberg on January 13, 1814

The crew was still 75 staff and senior officers and 1,200 men. The Prussians found 96 artillery pieces , 2 flag eagles , a lot of papers, plans and maps and considerable ammunition and food supplies in the fortress .

The 11th Silesian Landwehr Regiment under Major General von Elsner remained as a garrison in Wittenberg. The remaining troops, as well as the siege train, went under Major General von Dobschütz via Magdeburg to Erfurt . The loss of the Prussians during the siege and the storm amounted to 500 to 600 men dead and wounded.

As a reward, General von Tauenzien was given the nickname von Wittenberg .

literature

• Militair-Conversations-Lexikon, Volume 8, p. 839.
• Karl von Plotho, the war in Germany and France in the years 1815 and 1814 Volume 3, Annex XXV. The diary of the siege of the Wittenberg Fortress (December 28, 1813 to January 13, 1814)
• Vogel, The sieges of Torgau and Wittenberg 1813 and 1814 , p. 69 ff.
• Lexicon of battles, meetings, skirmishes, skirmishes, Rencontres , p. 268 f.
• Johann Maass, The terrible tribulations of Wittenberg during the siege by the royal Prussian troops in 1813 and 1814

Individual evidence

1. ^ The sieges of Torgau and Wittenberg in 1813 and 1814, p. 157
2. ^ L von Plothow, The War in Germany and France in the Years 1813 and 1814 , Part 1,
3. ^ The war in Germany and France in the years 1813 and 1814, Volume 1, p. 76 f.
4. ↑ z. T. also Sicholm
5. ^ Friedrich Rudolph von Rothenburg, Battles, sieges and skirmishes in Germany and the neighboring countries. From January 1, 1813 to January 1, 1814 , p. 20.
6. ^ Contributions to the history of the year 1813, part 2, p. 143.
7. ^ Peter Feddersen Stuhr, The three last campaigns against Napoleon , Volume 1, p. 450.
8. ↑ Memory book for all who took part in the holy struggle for independence and freedom in the years 1813, 1814, 1815, p. 330.
9. ↑ actually Plauce , cf .: Dr. Bernhardt, Wittenberg fifty years ago , p. 48.
10. ^ The war in Germany and France in the years 1813 and 1814, Volume 3, p. 170 f.