Battle of Montmirail

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Battle of Montmirail
date February 11, 1814
place Montmirail , France
output French victory
Parties to the conflict

France 1804First empire France

Russian Empire 1721Russian Empire Russia Prussia
Prussia KingdomKingdom of Prussia 

Commander

France 1804First empire Napoleon Bonaparte

Russian Empire 1721Russian Empire Fabian von Sacken Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg
Prussia KingdomKingdom of Prussia

Troop strength
11,000-20,000 men 18,000 - 21,000 men
losses

2,000

4,000

Battles of the Wars of Liberation (1813-1815)
Territory of the Napoleonic six-day campaign

The battle of Montmirail was a battle of the six-day campaign of the Wars of Liberation . The battle took place on February 11, 1814 near Montmirail in Champagne between a French army commanded by Napoleon and two corps of the allied Silesian army . The result was a victory for Napoleon and the withdrawal of the coalition forces. The battle is considered to be one of the brilliant achievements of Napoleonic general art.

The Prussian contingent had a strength of over 18,000 men and was led by General Yorck . The Russian contingent , about the same size, was commanded by General Sacken . The French army initially consisted of only 10,500 men. This number rose in the course of the battle through reinforcements to 20,000 men and 36 cannons.

The allies lost 4,000 men, the French 2,000 men.

prehistory

Napoleon's actions

The French victory in the Battle of Champaubert against the Russians the day before had raised the confidence of the French troops again. So Napoleon was looking for a new target and turned against the nearby Russian-Prussian corps of Yorck and Sacken. Napoleon's aim was to isolate both corps from Blucher's main army and to push them between his army and the Marne . Napoleon took a great risk with his offensive, as he was numerically inferior to his opponents 2: 3.6. Napoleon could, however, trust that he would receive reinforcements in good time before the Prussian troops could intervene in the battle. In addition, his contingent consisted partly of veterans of the old guard . Napoleon divided his army so that part of his troops attacked the Sacken corps and the other part should stop the attacks of the Prussian contingent.

As early as the evening of February 10, 1814, Napoleon, who was always well informed about the movements of his opponents, took his first precautions in this regard: He placed a brigade of the Marmont Corps under the command of the Commander of the Guard Cavalry, General Nansouty , and gave orders this to leave before midnight for Montmirail , which was 18 km further west. He broke with the majority of his troops the next day at 5:00 am in the same direction.

At Champaubert he left a division of the Marmont Corps - under the command of the Marshal himself - and a large contingent of his cavalry. These were ordered to advance slowly on Étoges , which was 6 km further east, and to cover Napoleon's main power against the troops of Bluchers at Bergerés-les-Vertus .

Coalition Forces Movements on February 10th and 11th

Battle of Montmirail by Mikhail Mikeshin , 1857

Blucher’s dispositions

On February 10, 1814 at 7:00 a.m., Blücher had sent orders to the Sacken corps at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and York at Château-Thierry . So he instructed them to move through Montmirail and Étoges to Vertus , where Blücher was. These orders stood in contrast to the instructions given the previous day to pursue MacDonald's French corps, which that day were already at Meaux . The reason for this change in the disposition were incoming rumors that a French contingent would move northward on Sézanne , possibly under the leadership of Napoleon himself. On February 9, 1814, the Prussian Kleist Corps and the Russian Kapzewitsch Corps had arrived at Blücher's headquarters in Vertus. That same day at 9 p.m. Blücher sent an advance guard of these corps to march south to Fère-Champenois under Zieten . The bulk of both corps followed on the morning of February 10, 1814, and positioned themselves on the road to Sézanne after arriving at the village of Connantre west of Fère-Champenois. Blücher wanted to intercept the French troops at Sézanne. The fact that, in pursuit of this intention, he immediately relocated his own troops south and did not allow them to march via Champaubert in the west, corresponded to a wish of Field Marshal Schwarzenberg , who hoped it would provide better flank protection for his own Bohemian army . During the day (February 10, 1814) news of Napoleon's advance reached Blücher. At 2:00 a.m. he was informed that the French troops were already at Sézanne, and at 10:00 a.m. he learned that Napoleon himself had been in Sézanne the day before (February 9, 1814). Blucher, who had gone to Fère-Champenois himself, realized that advancing on Sézanne had become pointless and decided to march back to Bergerés-les-Vertus . His troops set out on a night march and reached their destination early in the morning of February 11, 1814, where they were able to pick up the remains of the Russian corps Olsufiev , which had been wiped out by Napoleon at Champaubert the day before. Blücher let the tired troops rest on February 12, 1814 and waited for the Sacken and Yorck corps to come.

The measures of the Prussian General Yorck

Victory Column in Montmirail

General Yorck had received Blücher's order to return to Vertus on February 10, 1814, and made his arrangements accordingly. However, Yorck faced a major problem if he wanted to obey the order: the road from Château-Thierry to Montmirail was only reasonably paved as far as the small village of Viffort , but it was in poor winter condition. Beyond Viffort the ground was deeply softened and the path could hardly be seen; Horses could only use the road with great difficulty, guns hardly at all. In accordance with his deliberate and cautious nature, Yorck left a considerable part of his troops with all heavy artillery in Château-Thierry with the order to build a second (ship) bridge over the Marne there. With the rest of his troops he made it to Viffort by 10:00 a.m. on February 11, about halfway from Château-Thierry to Montmirail. Since he could already hear the noise of the battle, he sent one of his adjutants ahead to get in touch with Sacken and to brief him on the difficulties of the Yorck Corps in the advance. The adjutant found Sacken in the village of Viels-Maisons and reported to him as instructed.

To understand the situation, it is good to know that Sacken was the senior of the two generals. He would have led a joint command.

The advance of the Russian Sacken Corps

Tête of the victory column

Blücher's order of the morning of February 10, 1814, had reached General Sacken in the course of the same day, since at that time the road via Champaubert and Montmirail had not yet been ruled by French troops. The bulk of the Sacken corps was at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. Sacken's cavalry under General Vasilchikov had already successfully brought French troops of MacDonald's Corps to the west at the Marne Bridge near Trilport , east of Meaux , and had to be recalled first. Then Sacken had the bridge over the Marne in La Ferté-sous-Jouarre demolished in order to keep the back of Marshal MacDonald's advancing French troops free. On the evening of February 10, 1814 at 9:00 p.m. his corps set out on a night march east along the cobbled road to Montmirail (now the D407 and D933). In the late morning of February 11, 1814, they reached the village of Viels-Maisons . This village is 13 km west of Montmirail, but less than 7 km from the junction of the road to Château-Thierry , on which the Corps Yorck was to approach. There at Viels-Maisons, Sacken's cavalry met Napoleon's first troops.

Topography of the battlefield

View of Montmirail today

Montmirail is located in the Petit Morin valleyon its north bank. The area is higher than the village, in particular the roads that run east and west from Montmirail rise in both directions up to the height of the watershed between the Petit Morin and the Marne, which runs closer to the Petit Morin. These roads were paved and paved. If you follow the road leading west to Paris, after 6.5 km of winding road you will come to the junction of the road that leads north to Château-Thierry (today D1). On the day of the battle this road was deeply softened and arduous for infantry and cavalry, hardly passable for artillery. Just south of this junction is the village of Marchais-en-Brie on a large forest through which a stream flows. Along the road to the west, the next villages are Haute-Épine and then Viels-Maisons , which is againnextto a forest. The entire area on both sides of the paved road was softened on February 11, 1814 and difficult to pass. Guns in particular could hardly be moved on it.

The course of the battle on February 11, 1814

Map of the course of the battle from the
"Atlas of Alison's History of Europe" from 1863

The course of the battle until 3:00 p.m.

At 10:00 a.m. on February 11, 1814, Napoleon reached Montmirail with most, but not yet all of his troops , when the Sacken Corps was already reported to him, which was marching on Viels-Maisons . Napoleon had his troops march through Montmirail and take up covert positions west of the town: Two divisions of the Young Guard at the Le Tremblay farms just east of the village of Marchais-en-Brie , the Ricard division . 1,800 young recruits before that The Guard Cavalry under Nansouty stood north of the road to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre ; Parts of it were advanced to the west until the Viels Maisons . Those units of the Imperial Guard who are not in the day before the Battle of Champaubert had participated, including the Division Michel and the Honor Guard (Gardes d'Honneur), were under the command of Marshal Mortier still on the direct route of 25 kilometers from Sézanne to Montmirail on the way. Napoleon held back these and other troops, as he had to reckon with the appearance of the Prussian Corps Yorck.

Shortly after 10:00, Sacken's cavalry under General Wassiltschikow met riders of the French Guards Cavalry at Viels-Maisons . The Russians were able to prevail and drove the French cavalrymen back as far as Montmirail, where they were reinforced by the main part of the French Guards cavalry standing there and were now able to drive back the Russians.

The Russian horsemen followed Sacken's first division under General Shcherbatov along the road, which quickly reached and occupied the village of Haute-Épine . From there the Russians saw Montmirail lying before them, deeper in the Petit Morin valley. Sacken, whose mission was to bring his troops via Montmirail to Blücher in Bergerés-les-Vertus , ordered them to leave the winding road and march directly on Montmirail. His cavalry general Vasilchikov immediately came to see him and urgently advised Sacken not to leave the paved road. At this point the riders had already made their experiences with the groundless terrain on both sides of the road. Sacken refused and confirmed his order. So the Russians marched across the soggy, muddy ground and came to the village of Marchais-en-Brie , where they first occupied the forest that was offshore and still further south. Then they attacked the village and took it by storm from the French Riccard division, which was supposed to defend it. This began a struggle for this one village that lasted almost five hours.

Scene from the battle

Napoleon immediately recognized the serious mistakes that Sacken had made: he dispatched Marshal Ney and placed regiments of the Old Guard and his four imperial body squadrons under his command, and asked him to drive all Russian troops off the road west of Montmirail. Ney did the job thoroughly and with flying colors; he drove all Russian infantrymen and their artillery into the swampy meadows south of the road and then attacked the second Russian division under Count Liewen south of Haute-Épine . At the same time, the French Guards Cavalry and the Russian Cavalry kept each other in check. As a result, the Russian divisions were separated from each other and driven into sodden meadows, while the French troops dominated the only paved road. Nevertheless, Napoleon could not use this advantage with full consistency, since he was still waiting for the Prussian Corps Yorck and had to keep a substantial part of his troops in reserve.

Next Napoleon sent the two divisions of the Young Guard , which were ready, to the village of Marchais-en-Brie to retake it. They also succeeded; in return they were thrown out again by the Russians. Napoleon now sent a first part of the Old Guard to the village. These drove the Russians out and were soon driven out again by the Russians, who now settled there for some time.

At 2 p.m. Napoleon was informed of the first troops of the Prussian Corps Yorck on the road from Château-Thierry , as well as the arrival of the last brigades of the Imperial Guard of Sézanne .

The course of the battle after 3:00 p.m.

Troop positions at around 3 p.m.

At 3 p.m. the Prussians were there, but it was only part of the corps, barely more than 3,000 men, and they had just brought eight guns with them. They hadn't managed more. Their first contingents lined up south of the village of Fontenelle-en-Brie and did not attack when they saw the substantial French contingents waiting for them. When Napoleon realized that the Prussians were not attacking decisively, he took advantage of this immediately, withdrew two battalions of the Old Guard and sent them under the orders of his best officers to finally occupy the village of Marchais-en-Brie . This was the fourth attempt and it was successful. The old guard prevailed - supported by the guard cavalry - and the Russians were driven out of the village. Napoleon immediately sent more cavalry into the battle south of the road, and the Russians, who had initially taken cover in the forest, retreated further and further west, their retreat taking on traces of flight. By dark they had been driven south of the road to Viels-Maisons and Napoleon's Polish Uhlans were already further west.

It was already dawn at 5:00 p.m. and Sacken drew the conclusions from the events. He prepared his retreat and sent a courier to Yorck, who brought him the request to finally attack the French in a committed manner in order to create the possibility of Sacken's corps to withdraw behind the Prussians on the road to Château-Thierry . In addition, the Prussians were supposed to cover the Russian withdrawal during the night. Yorck had to follow this request. The Prussians attacked with heavy losses and without adequate support from artillery and cavalry and gave the Sacken Corps space to withdraw by temporarily pushing the French back to the small village of Bailly , which for some time had even been occupied by the Russians. However, the Russians had to march long distances to reach the road to Château-Thierry. They could only switch to the north side of the road west of Viels-Maisons and then marched north over swampy meadows. Later, under cover of darkness, the Prussians were able to withdraw and march back the way they had just come from. The last of them started their way back around midnight.

The night of February 11th to 12th, 1814

Napoleon rides through the mud at Montmirail

Napoleon did not follow them immediately because he knew of the difficulty of traversing the baseless, muddy, wintry roads. The Russians, who had not rested for 36 hours, were facing the second night march, much more arduous than the one before. Again and again, entire squadrons had to dismount and surrender their horses to pull the guns out of the mud again. Exhausted troops camped along the way and lit their fires there, helping the others to find their way.

Sacken and Yorck met personally that night and reproached each other: Sacken accused Yorck of not having gone into the battle committed, Yorck rebuked Sacken for accepting the battle unprepared, without waiting for the Prussians. The exchange of words led to a rift between the two commanders that was to overshadow the rest of the campaign.

Napoleon sent his cavalry after them on February 12, 1814, which now taught the Prussians the losses which the Russians had suffered the day before.

Trivia

Napoleon spent the night after the battle on the farm Ferme Le Grenaux , which, like the neighboring farm Ferme Les Chouteaux, had been fiercely fought over. There alone 400 bodies had to be cleared away. The tiny access road there - barely 100 meters long - is still called Rue Napoléon .

Appendix: The troops involved before and in the battle

The French troops

  • Under Napoleon's personal command
    • Friant Infantry Division , Old Guard , 4,800 men
      • 1st Grenadier Regiment under Petit
      • 2nd Grenadier Regiment under Christiani
      • 1st and 2nd Chasseur Regiment under Cambronne
    • 4 squadrons of life guards
      • 1st Chevauléger-Lancier Regiment
      • Chasseur à Cheval de la Garde
      • Grenadiers à Cheval de la Garde
      • Empress Dragoon Regiment
    • Guards artillery, 1,460 men
  • Imperial Guard under Marshal Mortier
    • Michel Infantry Division , 3,880 men
  • Imperial Guards Cavalry under Nansouty
    • 1st Guards Cavalry Division Colbert , 950 horsemen
    • 2nd Guards Cavalry Division Guyot , 2,250 horsemen and 300 mounted artillery
    • 3rd Laferrière-Lévèsque Guards Cavalry Division , 2,230 riders
      • Lyon Cavalry Brigade
      • Letort Cavalry Brigade
  • Young Guard under Marshal Ney
    • Meunier Infantry Division , 4,130 men
    • Curial Infantry Division , 2,840 men
  • Honor guard under Defrance , 1,060 riders

The Russian troops

  • The Sacken Corps
    • Count Liewen Infantry Corps
      • Infantry Division Sass
      • Stzawitzki Infantry Division
    • Count Shcherbatov Infantry Corps
      • Tallisin Infantry Division
      • Bernodosov Infantry Division
    • Vasilchikov Cavalry Corps
      • Lanskoi Cavalry Division (Hussars)
      • Panschulitsew Cavalry Division (Dragoons)
      • Karpov's Cossacks
      • Mounted artillery

The Prussian troops

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Notes and individual references

  1. ↑ a b Chandler p. 973.
  2. ↑ Ollech
  3. ↑ This smaller corps was one of the divisions of the Russian corps Langeron , which was in charge of the siege of the Mainz fortress . From there it was forwarded to the Silesian Army .
  4. ^ The Ricard division was one of the two divisions of the Marmont Corps . It lost half of its men in the subsequent fighting and suffered the highest losses among the French troops. The rest of the Marmont Corps stood in the east and secured the French army there.
  5. ^ Chandler p. 971
  6. ^ Chandler p. 972
  7. ↑ cf. Hourtoulle
  8. ↑ These squadrons were under the command of General Gyot until February 1, 1814, who then had to replace the wounded General Lefebvre-Desnouettes . During the battle, the body squadrons were temporarily commanded by Marshal Ney
  9. ↑ Michel was seriously wounded in the battle; Christiani took over his command on February 12, 1814
  10. ↑ including the Polish Uhlans
  11. ↑ until February 2, 1814 General Lefebvre-Desnouettes
  12. ↑ This division was under the command of Marshal Marmonts near Vauchamp on the march to Étoges and did not take part directly in the battle of Montmirail
  13. ↑ It is mentioned that Shcherbatov was sick on the day of the battle, that Tallisin led the corps

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