Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube

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Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube

Part of: Wars of Liberation

Napoleon in action on the bridge over the Aube
near Arcis-sur-Aube

date	20th bis 21st March 1814
place	Arcis-sur-Aube , France
output	Coalition victory

Parties to the conflict
France	Austria Württemberg Bavaria
Commander
Napoleon Bonaparte	Karl zu Schwarzenberg Crown Prince Wilhelm
Troop strength
28,000 men	80,000 men
losses
3,000 dead and wounded	4,000 dead and wounded

The Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube was a battle of the Wars of Liberation and took place from March 20 to 21, 1814. At this point, Napoleon's situation was practically hopeless, as he was waging a multi-front war against Russia , Prussia , Great Britain and Austria . At Arcis-sur-Aube in Champagne , the French army with 28,000 men clashed with the numerically superior Bohemian Army under Field Marshal Schwarzenberg with 80,000 men.

prehistory

After the six-day campaign of February 10-14, 1814, in which Napoleon had inflicted four defeats in a row on the Silesian army under Blücher with far inferior forces ( Champaubert - Montmirail - Château-Thierry - Vauchamps ), the latter withdrew after March 1, 1814 to the north back behind Reims, in order to unite there at Laon on March 4 and 5 with the corps under Bülow and Wintzingerode, which had moved through Belgium. In Laon, the Silesian Army was attacked on March 9th and 10th by Napoleon, who followed it with selected troops. However, Napoleon could not achieve any decisive success and was repulsed. He then left the Marmont Corps and the Young Guard under Mortier as cover and moved south again. His intention was to attack Schwarzenberg's Bohemian Army in its individual units and to defeat it, as had been so successful in February with the Silesian Army .

The movements of the French troops

After the reconquest of Reims on March 13, 1814, Napoleon stayed in Reims for three days, reorganized his troops and recovered from a cold. Marshal Ney but already reached on 15 March 1814 about 6,000 men, including 800 horsemen of the honor guard , Chalons-en-Champagne , which he had once occupied.

On March 17, 1814, Napoleon marched with the "Old Guard", two cavalry divisions and the reserve artillery from Reims to Épernay , where he was enthusiastically received by the residents.

At dawn on March 18, 1814, the " Old Guard " marched on to Fère-Champenoise , which Napoleon and the other troops reached at 4 p.m. on the same day. There Napoleon learned that the Bohemian Army under Prince Schwarzenberg was already on the retreat to Troyes . He immediately decided to advance south beyond the Aube and Seine and pursue the coalition forces. Marshal Ney also led his troops south in the direction of Troyes to Mailly-le-Camp . On this day the French cavalry under Sébastiani was involved in a dispute with the Cossacks of the Russian general Kaisarow further west before Sézanne . Ney's cavalry clashed with General Frimont's Austrian lancers .

On the morning of March 19, 1814, the French guard cavalry advanced to the village of Boulages on the Aube. The foot troops and the artillery followed. Marshal Ney's troops advanced to Plancy via Herbisse and Champfleury . The French pioneers began to restore the bridge at Plancy as soon as possible. At 3 p.m. on March 19, 1814, Napoleon and his cavalry crossed the Aube near Plancy and hurried to Mery-sur-Seine . The bridge there was defended by the rearguard of the Württemberg people, but the French dragoons and lancers found a ford where they could cross the Seine, fell in the back of the Württemberg people and drove them to flight. Already in the dark the division of General Letort captured a valuable Russian pontoon train that was coming down from Pont-sur-Seine .

At 7 p.m. that day, all the corps of the Bohemian Army were in retreat on or behind Troyes with two exceptions: the Cossacks of Kaisarows and the rearguard of the Wrede Corps , which was still at Arcis-sur-Aube and was watching Plancy.

Napoleon returned that night with the guard cavalry to Plancy to join his infantry. Only the cavalry divisions under Letort and Berckheim remained at Mery-sur-Seine.

During the night in Plancy, Napoleon considered his strategy and wrote to his Minister of War in Paris the next morning, March 20, 1814, that he would move east via Vitry-le-Francois . It can be assumed that Napoleon did not expect to encounter coalition troops in this way.

On the morning of March 20, 1814, Napoleon's general staff issued the orders of the day and instructed all units to move east:

• Ney, Letort and Sebastiani, who the day before had driven Kaisarov's Cossacks over the Aube near Charny and pursued them as far as the village of Pouan, which went up in flames , were to advance on the south bank of the Aube to Arcis-sur-Aube and take positions in front of the city ,
• The honor guard, the old guard and the reserve artillery were to pass Arcis-sur-Aube on the north bank of the Aube and march on to Vitry.
• Marshal MacDonald , who was still standing with two corps at Villenauxe , was instructed to follow suit immediately.
• The corps under Marmont and Mortier were to advance via Châlons-en-Champagne.

The movements of the coalition forces

Napoleon was mistaken about his opponent's intentions. The Austrian commander-in-chief of the coalition troops, Prince Schwarzenberg , had received the first news on the afternoon of March 17, 1814 that Napoleon and his troops had taken Reims and wiped out the small corps under Saint-Priest . The news aroused consternation at the coalition headquarters, as it said that Napoleon's troops had by no means been decisively defeated in the Battle of Laon and that his troops were much closer than expected. Schwarzenberg immediately ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of the Bohemian Army to positions east of Troyes . On March 18, 1814, news of the approach of the French armed forces arrived. On the evening of that day Tsar Alexander drove from his quarters in Troyes to Schwarzenberg, who was in Arcis-sur-Aube and was bedridden from a severe attack of gout. Alexander arrived at Schwarzenberg's headquarters at 6 p.m. and expressed concern about the dangers posed by the approaching French troops and Napoleon's leadership. Schwarzenberg agreed with the tsar, and when he left again at 8 p.m., further orders were issued by Schwarzenberg, ordering an accelerated retreat behind Troyes to prevent Napoleon from pushing himself between the corps of the Bohemian Army with a bold thrust south could. The next day, however, March 19, 1814, Schwarzenberg realized that the Bohemian Army must be far superior to the approaching French troops, in particular that Schwarzenberg knew that MacDonald and his two corps were still some distance away. Aware of the clear superiority of his army, Schwarzenberg ordered his troops on March 19 at 3 p.m. to position themselves south of Arcis-sur-Aube in anticipation of a battle.

Topography of the battlefield

To the east of its confluence with the Seine, the Aube meanders in a wide, flat valley from east to west, accompanied on both banks by wide swamps and many tributaries. Arcis-sur-Aube is located on the south bank of the Aube. At the northern exit of the village there was a bridge over the main arm of the river, which was joined to the north by an approximately one kilometer long dam through the marshland. This dam itself contained five other small bridges over branches of the Aube. In the south the valley rises slowly to a ridge behind which wide flat land extends.

The river Barbuise , which flows west of Arcis-sur-Aube between the Seine and Aube from south to north, but then flows west to its confluence with the Aube ⊙ a little south of the Aube, was of particular importance . It was accompanied by a wide strip of swampy and very deep terrain, which artillery and cavalry could not pass and foot troops could only pass with great difficulty. These waters separated the enemy troops west of Arcis and prevented combat there.

Events on March 20, 1814

Plan of the battle from the atlas of Alison's History of Europe

At 9 o'clock in the morning Schwarzenberg issued the order of the day in which he ordered the evacuation of Arcis-sur-Aube, but by further instructing his troops in the positions for an attack on the French troops. In doing so, he demonstrated the wisdom of setting up the majority of his troops behind the southern hills, where they could not be seen from the city.

Napoleon had ordered his troops to move east from Plancy and take Arcis-sur-Aube. He renounced waiting for further troops, especially the Corps Macdonald, which was not used in the following battle with the exception of a division. The infantry under Marshal Ney marched on the north bank, the cavalry under Sébastiani advanced on the south bank and took Arcis-sur-Aube without resistance. The infantry crossed over to the south bank, occupied the city and took up further positions south of it.

Napoleon arrived in Arcis-sur-Aube at 1 p.m. There his marshals reported to him that they had observed strong contingents of enemy troops and suspected that Schwarzenberg's main army was in the immediate vicinity. Napoleon ignored this announcement because the coalition troops were not visible from Arcis-sur-Aube, with the exception of cavalry swarming around.

At 2 p.m. the battle began with a cavalry attack by coalition troops on the left, western wing of the situation. The advanced French riders were unable to cope with the enemy superiority, were driven back into the city, dragging the infantrymen with them, among whom panic spread. It is said to have been Napoleon himself who stood against the fleeing people at the bridge of Arcis-sur-Aube with a drawn sword and restored order. Then the Guard artillery could be brought into position, which took the attacking cavalry under fire. More infantry was brought across the bridge, which managed to repel the enemy cavalry and maintain Arcis-sur-Aube.

At the same time, coalition troops attacked the village of Grand-Torcy (now Torcy-le-Grand ) in front of Arcis-sur-Aube from the east and drove out the troops of Marshal Ney who were seated there. Again it is said to have been Napoleon himself who, at risk for his own life, led his troops back in order to regain lost ground. As a result, a tough, bloody struggle for this village developed, which lasted until late at night. Since both Arcis-sur-Aube and Grand-Torcy were set on fire, the burning houses provided the lighting.

Around 9 p.m., the French riders Sebastianis gathered again to make up for the defeat in the afternoon. 2,000 cavalrymen rode down the Russian Cossacks, who had already dismounted, and a Bavarian cavalry regiment that rushed to help. Only slowly did the coalition troops manage to lead their cavalry into another night battle. Finally it was possible to drive Sebastiani's rider back to Arcis-sur-Aube.

According to some sources, by the end of that day the losses of coalition forces were greater than those of the French.

Events on March 21, 1814

The bridge over the Aube today

During the night, scouts had reported to Schwarzenberg's headquarters that the French troops could see countless bivouac fires north of the Aube near Plancy. Schwarzenberg, who overestimated the number of Napoleonic troops by twice as much because of their fighting spirit, was impressed. It was not until 11 a.m. on March 21, 1814 that he issued the order of the day. There was nothing in it to read of the previous day's readiness to attack, but at least it was essentially instructing his troops to hold their positions and await a French attack.

Around 7 a.m. on the morning of March 21, 1814, reinforcements finally arrived for the French troops: on the one hand the infantry of the Lefebvre-Desnouettes division under the command of General Henrion , on the other hand the first division of Marshal MacDonald's corps under the personal command of Marshal Oudinot .

Late in the morning, around 10 a.m., Napoleon ordered Marshal Ney and General Sébastiani to attack south. When they reached the ridge of the southern hills under artillery fire, they saw for the first time the entire mass of the main army. They immediately asked the emperor to come and see him, so he could see for himself. Without the slightest hesitation Napoleon revised his plans and ordered the immediate withdrawal of all his troops to the north. This took place at 12 noon. Marshal Oudinot was briefly instructed to cover this retreat with 6,000 men. He was initially supported by the riders Sebastianis.

So that not all troops had to go over the narrow bridge in Arcis-sur-Aube, a temporary bridge was built to the north of it by 2 p.m., but it could only be reached over swampy terrain. Part of the cavalry was able to retreat through it before it was destroyed again by its own troops in front of the advancing enemy. Later, when the bridge at Arcis-sur-Aube was completely blocked by infantry, other parts of the cavalry tried to swim across the Aube with their horses and suffered heavy losses. Still other riders drove their horses northward so ruthlessly over bridge and dam that infantrymen were thrown down.

The coalition troops initially remained in their positions. The realization that the French were leaving was slow to take hold. Only when masses of infantry were seen withdrawing across the dam north of Arcis-sur-Aube did this become certain. At 2 p.m. the first contingents of the coalition troops dared to advance to Arcis-sur-Aube, which was defended brilliantly by the troops of Marshal Oudinot. For this purpose they had hastily brought in train wagons, behind which they found cover for some time.

The battle ended on the afternoon of March 21, 1814

At 3 p.m. Prince Schwarzenberg instructed General Wrede's corps furthest to the east to go further upstream across the Aube to stop the French troops. Since the French had destroyed or occupied all bridges and fords, most of the Wrede Corps had to go back to Lesmont to get across the river. Only the cavalry could use an unguarded ford near Ramerupt . The corps initially did not encounter French troops.

At 3:30 p.m. Prince Schwarzenberg gave the order to Crown Prince Wilhelm von Württemberg , who had distinguished himself as a prudent and hard-hitting military leader in recent weeks, to do the rest of the war business that day. The crown prince carried out the task rigorously: first he had the 80 available guns positioned in a wide semicircle around Arcis-sur-Aube and opened fire on the retreating French. They found no cover in the clogged streets of the half-burned city and suffered heavy losses. The guns reached as far as the dam that joined the bridge to the north. This action was already qualified as "human-murdering slaughter" in contemporary literature.

Next, Russian troops under Prince Eugene of Württemberg attacked Arcis-sur-Aube from the west and the Austrian corps Gyulay from the east. From both sides they penetrated the city, in which there was now an ongoing battle with the bayonet man against man. The defense concentrated on the accesses to the bridge, which they fought free again and again to allow their teams to withdraw. Here the French were led by General Chassé , who was known for his ruthlessness. Before all of his men had escaped to safety, he set the bridge on fire and also took away the first bridge in the dam. The French who remained in a hopeless situation had to surrender to the enemy's mercy. Several hundred were still captured.

The following days

Pursuit of the French troops

On the night of March 21, 1814 to March 22, 1814, around 10 p.m., the remaining 22,000 men of the French corps led by Marshal MacDonald arrived north of Arcis-sur-Aube. MacDonald met Napoleon that night, who explained to him that he was by no means planning a retreat, but on the contrary was going east to block the line of retreat for the coalition troops.

The next day, March 22nd, 1814, Marshal Oudinot and his division occupied the north bank of the Aube opposite Arcis-sur-Aube from Ormes in the west to Le Chène in the east. He let guns run along the entire shoreline, preventing the coalition troops from crossing the river and repairing the bridges.

The corps of the Crown Prince of Württemberg therefore marched east to Ramerupt , where it was able to cross the Aube to the north. The Rajewski corps followed him. In the afternoon the transition was completed and on the evening of March 22, 1814 both corps stood between Ramerupt, Dampièrre and L'huitre . The Wrede Corps stood between Corbeil , Breban and Le Meix-Tiercelin .

The bridge over the Aube could only be restored on the night of March 23, 1814 until 7:30 a.m. the next morning.

Marshal MacDonald had at this point gathered his troops between Le Chène and Dosnon to march. When she Trouans and Sompuis in Vitry-le-Francois zuzogen, they were first by the coalition forces of the Crown Prince of Württemberg, later of which General Wrede, observed. The whole day until 11 p.m. there was fighting between the different units. Nevertheless, MacDonald and his army escaped over the bridges over the Marne near Frignicourt south of Vitry, which Napoleon had built the day before, losing some baggage and several artillery pieces that Cossacks nailed to him. Marshal Ney supported him by occupying Courdemanges , which Wrede did not dare to circumvent.

Defense of Vitry

Vitry was occupied by over 5,000 Prussian and Russian troops who had 40 guns, including some heavy 12 pounders. They used the latter immediately when the French troops under Marshal Ney approached. This tried on March 22, 1814 and on March 23, 1814 to persuade the occupation of Vitry to surrender, threatening to shell the city. This threat posed a serious threat to citizens and the occupation as almost all of the town's houses were made of wood. Not even a single solid building had been found there suitable for storing ammunition. In the early afternoon of March 23, 1814, Gérard's division of Marshal MacDonald's troops arrived at Vitry. Marshal Ney withdrew with his own across the bridges at Frignicourt on the road to Saint-Dizier, without causing Vitry any great damage.

Napoleon's march to the east

Napoleon spent the night of March 22, 1814 in Sompuis . The next day he and his troops moved on to Vitry-le-François . Marshal Ney was instructed to occupy Vitry in order to secure the crossing over the Marne , while Napoleon crossed the Marne with the guards in Frignicourt on two quickly built temporary bridges and then turned to Saint-Dizier . Before Farémont , the French met a strong Prussian supply train, which was accompanied by two battalions of Prussian fighters. The first battalion was immediately driven to flight by the French, the second resisted more steadfastly. These hunters managed to burn 80 new pontoons before they withdrew. After all, a large amount of material fell into the hands of the French, including almost 500 young cavalry horses.

Napoleon spent the following night in Farémont. On the afternoon of the next day, March 23, 1814, he reached Saint-Dizier . From there he sent cavalry units in various directions, also with the order to disrupt the supply line of the Bohemian Army , which ran via Chaumont , Langres and Vesoul .

A number of things were done on the other side to prevent this: the Russian Field Marshal Barclay de Tolly , who commanded the Russian guards and reserves, sent his General Oertel to Bar-sur-Aube , where he and all of the Russian troops, sick or healthy Supplies, as far as they were transportable, first brought to Chaumont, where he provided adequate protection for his huge train and then went via Langres to Vesoul, where everything and everything remained.

The crew of Chaumont left the city on March 24, 1814 and arrived in Langres the following day.

Council of War in Pougy

On the afternoon of March 23, 1814, two despatches sent from Napoleon's headquarters were intercepted by coalition troops. From them it was clear that Napoleon was already in Saint-Dizier. This news was immediately brought to Prince Schwarzenberg, who had been with the Tsar and the Prussian King for two days in Pougy, southeast of Arcis. He immediately called a council of war, which met at 3 p.m. The news of Napoleon's rapid advance to the southeast caused panic among some staff generals. They considered an immediate retreat as far as Langres , Vesoul or even Basel to be necessary. The monarchs present remained more relaxed and it was agreed to wait for the upcoming union with Field Marshal Blücher's Silesian Army , which was expected from the north.

On that day Schwarzenberg commanded 100,000 men and Blücher 80,000, Napoleon at most 44,000. Nevertheless, the commanders of the coalition troops did not dare to attack the French emperor immediately in Saint-Dizier, only 60 km from Pougy.

After the council of war, Prince Schwarzenberg sent a dispatch to his Emperor Franz II of Austria, who was in Bar-sur-Aube , only 55 km south of Saint-Dizier, with all the important members of his cabinet, including Prince Metternich . He informed the Austrian emperor of the plans he had decided on and asked him to go to Dijon with his court immediately, as his personal safety would no longer be guaranteed in Bar-sur-Aube. In fact, Francis II left the next day, March 24, 1814, with his cabinet for Dijon and thus escaped the French troops who occupied Bar-sur-Aube and a few others on the morning of the following day, March 25, 1814 appoint delinquent envoys and councilors. This departure of the Austrian court was the most decisive event of the campaign, as Napoleon's father-in-law and his foreign minister now lost all influence on the events and Prince Schwarzenberg suddenly found new joy in fighting in the absence of his monarch.

Street name in Germany

In Munich , in the Maxvorstadt district, Arcisstrasse commemorates the battle in which Bavarian troops under the command of Wrede were also involved on the Allied side .

The Ukrainian town of Arzys also derives its name from this battle.

literature

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Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b c d} See Houssaye
2. ↑ See Damitz, Part III
3. ↑ See especially Sporschill and Damitz, but also Bogdanowitsch
4. ^ Oudinot was placed under the orders of MacDonald by Napoleon.
5. ↑ But it could also be just a ford that had been found - the information on this is not clear.
6. ↑ ^{a b} Cf. Bogdanowitsch.
7. ^ Friedrich Christoph Förster: History of the Liberation Wars 1813, 1814, 1815, Vol. 2 . G. Hempel, Berlin 1858, p. 919.
8. ↑ See MacDonald
9. ↑ Formerly Wittgenstein Corps . Wittgenstein was wounded in the battle of Bar-sur-Aube
10. ↑ Although these troops played no role in the few days until the end of the campaign, some authors consider the fact that MacDonald was able to escape with his army as the most blatant failure of Schwarzenberg in this campaign. Cf. in particular Houssaye, Damitz.
11. ↑ See Damitz
12. ^ See Beitzke, Damitz, Houssaye