Battle of Bar-sur-Aube
Map with all coordinates: 
Battle plan
| date | February 27, 1814 |
|---|---|
| place | Bar-sur-Aube on the Aube , Champagne , France |
| output | French retreat across the Seine |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
 |
 Ludwig zu Sayn-Wittgenstein Carl Philipp von Wrede |
| Troop strength | |
| 18,000 men | 35,000 men |
| losses | |
|
2,600 dead and wounded, |
1900, including 1,250 Russians, 400 Bavarians, 250 Austrians |
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Spring campaign 1813
Lüneburg - Möckern - Halle - Großgörschen - Gersdorf - Bautzen - Reichenbach - Nettelnburg - Haynau - Luckau
Autumn campaign 1813
Großbeeren - Katzbach - Dresden - Hagelberg - Kulm - Dennewitz - Göhrde - Altenburg - Wittenberg - Wartenburg - Liebertwolkwitz - Leipzig - Torgau - Hanau - Hochheim - Danzig
Winter campaign 1814
Épinal - Colombey - Brienne - La Rothière - Champaubert - Montmirail - Château-Thierry - Vauchamps - Mormant - Montereau - Bar-sur-Aube - Soissons - Craonne - Laon - Reims - Arcis-sur-Aube - Fère-Champenoise - Saint -Dizier - Claye - Villeparisis - Paris
Summer campaign of 1815
Quatre-Bras - Ligny - Waterloo - Wavre - Paris
The battle of Bar-sur-Aube took place on February 27, 1814 during the winter campaign of the Wars of Liberation between French troops and the Bohemian army of the coalition, on whose side troops from Russia , Austria and Bavaria intervened in the battle on that day .
prehistory
The withdrawal of the Bohemian Army
After the Battle of Montereau on February 18, 1814, the troops of the Bohemian Army had withdrawn to Troyes . On the evening of February 20, 1814, their corps were in line from Fontvannes to Malmaison . The Commander-in-Chief of the Bohemian Army , the Austrian Field Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg , seriously considered giving Napoleon's army a battle from this position. To this end, he called the Silesian Army under Blücher , which arrived with 48,000 men on February 21, 1814 in Méry-sur-Seine .
On the same day, however, Schwarzenberg's headquarters received unfavorable news from the south, where the Austrian troops had to withdraw without exception from Lyon after the French Marshal Augereau had assembled an army of 38,000 men there and had started to advance. Chambery was already in French hands again and Geneva was acutely threatened. However, the supply and retreat lines of the Bohemian Army were also endangered by the Burgundian Gate . Schwarzenberg responded by sending the Austrian Bianchi corps with a total of 30,000 men from Troyes via Dijon to the Rhone , where it was also to be used against the French army under Augereau. This departure significantly weakened the Czech Army .
There was also great concern at Schwarzenberg's headquarters about whether Napoleon himself would dare to break through with his army to the south via Dijon and to enclose the coalition troops from there.
Such considerations led to Schwarzenberg's order on February 22nd, 1814 to retreat beyond the Aube and give up Troyes.
On the morning of February 23, 1814, in the quarters of the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III. a general meeting was held in the presence of Tsar Alexander , the Austrian Emperor Franz II and his most important ministers and Prince Schwarzenberg. Schwarzenberg had to listen to violent accusations because of the continuing backward movement of the Bohemian Army , but was able to prevail with his arguments.
The advance of the French army under Napoleon's leadership and the battle of Méry
After Napoleon remained in Montereau on February 19 and 20, 1814, the French army under his leadership advanced south of the Seine to the east again on February 22, 1814, and by noon on February 22, 1814, the city of Troyes was in sight .
Napoleon himself wanted to take his quarters in Méry-sur-Seine , where he had directed Marshal Oudinot's corps . Moving up from the north, however, the Russian corps of General Sacken of the Silesian Army had already occupied Méry, which is mainly north of the river, while the Wittgenstein corps of the Bohemian Army had moved on to Villacerf .
After 2:00 p.m. on February 22, 1814, French troops coming from the south-west advanced against the Seine bridge at Méry and heavy gunfire broke out on the bridge and across the river. At the same time, the town of Méry caught fire, probably from Russian bivouac fires that had not been carefully extinguished. Smaller French units managed to cross the bridge, establish themselves on the north bank of the Seine and from there cause unrest among the troops of the Silesian army present until they were driven out again by a counter-attack by several battalions.
Napoleon took his quarters in the neighboring Châtres in the evening , while the gunfire across the river continued all night. The troops on both sides suffered palpable hardship during these days. There was a lack of food in the barren landscape as well as firewood to warm oneself in the cold nights. Many wooden houses of the poor rural population were burned down in just one night. The commanders of the troops had to have their quarters guarded at night so that they would not be torn off over their heads.
On February 23, 1814, the battle of Méry continued, except that the Russians in Méry were replaced by Prussian snipers, who managed to drive the French off the opposite bank. Both sides had lost a few hundred men on both days.
The capture of Troyes by the French army
Since the morning of February 23, 1814, the French army was advancing on the roads of Nogent and Sens towards Troyes, which was still held by the coalition troops of the Bohemian Army . At Fontvannes there was a brief skirmish between the Austrians of the Liechtenstein Light Division and French cavalry , but overall the Bohemian Army withdrew to the east behind the city of Troyes. At 4:00 p.m. the French reached the city walls and asked the coalition forces to surrender them, which was immediately rejected. Then the French took Troyes under artillery fire and several parts of the city caught fire. Three attempts to storm the city at night failed. Nevertheless, Troyes was left by the coalition forces by 2:00 in the morning on February 24, 1814; They moved east. At 3:00 a.m., the first French entered through the now open city gates. Napoleon, who had already spent the night on the outskirts, entered the city at 11:00 a.m. behind his imperial guard. The day before, by decree, he had given everyone who had worked with the coalition forces the death penalty .
On February 24, 1814 at 4 p.m. Austrian troops were attacked by the French guard cavalry near Montieramey and suffered slight losses.
Napoleon stayed in Troyes until the early morning of February 27, 1814, and took care of the organization, supply and reinforcement of his army. On the night of February 26th to 27th, 1814, Napoleon learned that the Silesian army of the coalition, under Blücher's command, had already left their positions on the northern bank of the Seine in the night of February 23rd to 24th, 1814 Norden had set out and had fought several skirmishes with the French corps of Marshals Mortier and Marmont in the time that had passed. That same night Napoleon made the decision to follow Blücher, issued the necessary orders and followed suit the next day with an army of more than 30,000 men from the Silesian Army .
He placed the French troops of Marshal MacDonalds , Oudinots and Gérards who remained behind on the Seine under MacDonald’s command.
The further withdrawal of the Bohemian Army
On February 25, 1814, the Bohemian army of the coalition withdrew further east: the Russian guards and reserves to Colombey-les-Deux-Églises , the other corps to the Aube . Here they were pursued by French troops that were very open. On the evening of that day, the Russian and Austrian emperors took their quarters in Chaumont , while the Prussian king stayed in Bar-sur-Aube .
On February 26, 1814, the Russian guards and cuirassiers returned to Chaumont, the other corps of the Bohemian Army crossed the Aube and took up positions behind it. From 10:00 in the morning the Prussian King and Prince Schwarzenberg were in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, where they had set up their quarters. Couriers arrived there at around 3:00 p.m. and reported the advance of the Silesian Army and that the bulk of the French army was still at Méry-sur-Seine and Troyes. Only two French corps under Marshal Oudinot and Marshal MacDonald had followed the Bohemian Army , the first along the road from Troyes to Bar-sur-Aube, the other along the Seine. Napoleon was not personally with either of the two subsequent French corps.
In response to these reports, Prince Schwarzenberg issued suitable arrangements for the following day, with the intention of putting the approaching French troops into action.
On the afternoon of February 26, 1814, a French division under Gérard reached the river at Dolancourt 10 kilometers northwest of Bar-sur-Aube, shot at the coalition troops holding the bridge with artillery and drove them away. Then the French cleared the blocked bridge and their cavalry crossed the Aube.
Also in the afternoon of that day, the Bavarian-Austrian corps under Wrede crossed the river in Bar-sur-Aube, moved through the town and took up positions along the roads that led up to the heights behind. Towards evening a division of the French corps approached Oudinot Bar-sur-Aube, where they also crossed the river and placed a strong garrison in the city. The bulk of Oudinot's corps advanced and stood west of the city in the evening. An attempt by the French to break out of the city to the west was answered by the Bavarian troops of the Wrede Corps with heavy artillery fire, which started some fires in the city, and the counter-attack by a Bavarian battalion, which managed to break open a city gate and penetrate into the city center , from where it was quickly driven out again. During the night the situation arose in which the French were stuck inside the city walls, but the Bavarians dominated the area in front of it.
The topography of the battlefield
The city of Bar-sur-Aube had about 4,000 inhabitants in 1814. It lay entirely on the right, eastern bank of the Aube and was at that time still surrounded by a city wall with three gates. The first gate went north on the road to Brienne , the second east on the road to Colombey-les-Deux-Églises , the third west to the bridge over the Aube and the road that led through Spoy to Troyes .
From the east as from the west mountain ranges come up to the city and river, in the west almost completely forested, while the slopes inclined to the west on the city side were still used for vineyards in 1814, framed with walls in the French style, which made it impossible to do so Terrain cavalry to unfold.
The battle of February 27, 1814 was to develop on the slopes east of the city, which were divided several times by valley cuts with marshy streams.
The positions on the eve of the battle
The positions of the French troops
The Oudinot corps had occupied the town of Bar-sur-Aube with a division . A second stood behind it on the western bank of the Aube.
A division of Gerard was still west of the Aube near Dolancourt to protect the bridge, all other units of his corps had crossed the river and had spread along the river valley to Bar-sur-Aube. Only the bridge at Delancourt was available for these troops to retreat, as it was not possible to retreat through the narrow streets of Bar-sur-Aube, which was surrounded by Bavarian troops in the east. Only the less determined leadership of the Russian troops made it possible for the French to escape from the right bank over the Aube on the evening of the battle.
A total of 30,000 French were ready with at least 60 guns, but not all of them came into action the next day. The need to feed these troops and to provide them with sufficient supplies had become so great that many more artillery pieces remained in Magny-Fouchard because the draft horses had to be sent to the few pastures there. So it happened that the French troops in the battle on February 27, 1814 in the front line could only use the mounted artillery of their cavalry for support, which was a clear influencing factor for the outcome of the battle.
Marshal MacDonald's corps stood much further south on the upper Seine as far as Essoyes with an advance guard in Fontette .
The positions of the coalition forces
(Little by little.) The Bavarian-Austrian Corps Wrede stood just east of the city in the west up to the city walls and in the east up to the valley cuts of the adjacent mountain ranges. Its strength comprised 24,000 men, a third of whom were Austrians, and 96 guns. Austrian troops from this corps held the bridge at Fontaine .
The Russian Wittgenstein Corps comprised 20,000 men and 52 guns. These had crossed the Aube in the early morning of February 26, 1814 before the Bavarians and Austrians, partly in Bar-sur-Aube, partly in Dolancourt, and on the night of February 27, 1814, they bivouacked on the heights east of the Aube partly to Colombey -les-Deux-Églises back.
The Württemberg corps had also crossed the Aube on February 26, 1814, partly in Bar-sur-Aube, partly in Fontaine, and then went back to Blessonville near Chaumont. But the Württemberg people also kept Laferte-sur-Aube and Châteauvillain occupied.
The Austrian Gyulay Corps stood at Arc-en-Barrois where it had marched from Gyé-sur-Seine the two days before.
The battle of Bar-sur-Aube on February 27, 1814
The battles until 4:00 p.m.
Prince Schwarzenberg's dispositions for the morning of February 27, 1814 provided that the northernmost divisions of the Wittgenstein Russian Corps should reach the Dolancourt bridge before dawn under cover of darkness in an arch extending to the north, so that the French troops on the right of the Aube would not be able to retreat there.
When the day dawned, a clear, bright early spring day arose, which encouraged Prince Schwarzenberg to observe the opening of the battle himself on horseback. Prince Schwarzenberg found the Russians at breakfast around 8:00 a.m. When one of Schwarzenberg's adjutants urged General Wittgenstein to hurry, the Russians tried to move forward. In the early morning light, however, their movements could be clearly seen by the French in the valley floor and the French reacted immediately. This part of Schwarzenberg's plan had already failed.
The battles from 10:00 a.m.
When the French generals realized that their troops were threatened with bypassing by the Russians, they responded in the aggressive way that was their way: they sent their men up the vineyards east of town to meet the Russians, and another strong contingent of 8 Guns moved into the town of Bar-sur-Aube. The French cavalry division Kellermann crossed the Aube in a ford below Bar-sur-Aube and soon threw itself on the Russians.
The French did not hesitate for a moment to attack the Russian troops of Wittgenstein's corps on the slopes above the Aube as soon as they had reached them. Their attack initially brought them success and so disrupted the Russians, who were not yet prepared for this, that they began to withdraw. Count Wittgenstein personally led a Russian cuirassier regiment into battle. The cavalry could not develop in the difficult terrain for the horses of vineyards, which were bordered with walls, and had to give way again.
At this time an incident occurred that would later have a major impact on the campaign: Count Wittgenstein was wounded on his right leg by a bullet. He quickly bandaged the wound and stayed at his post all day. This was no longer possible for him and a few days later he was replaced by Rajewski , who was the much more disciplined and assertive officer of the two.
It was Prince Schwarzenberg's Austrian staff officers who initially brought 2 heavy Russian guns, the fire of which inflicted heavy losses on the French, who remained without artillery support, and soon forced them to retreat. Two more guns helped to make room for the Russians and prevent a French counterattack.
A little later the French attacked further north-west of Ailleville against the heights of Levigny . Here, too, they could not penetrate in two attempts against fire from a total of 40 Russian guns. The French cavalry division Kellermann, which attacked here, lost 400 horses in gunfire.
In the meantime, Count Wittgenstein and Prince Schwarzenberg had changed their plans under the compulsion of events and ordered the Russian troops, who were still on the march to the bridge at Dolancourt , to turn back. Very soon these too were attacked by French troops between Arsonval and Vernonvilliers , who also lacked artillery here and who finally had to withdraw from the fire of Russian artillery.
The Russian division of Prince Eugene of Württemberg , which was involved in the battle at this point, did not have its own cavalry to support it. This circumstance enabled the French to make another attack, in which they were supported by a cavalry unit under General Saint-Germain . Again, it was the superior Russian artillery that made a major contribution to repelling this attack as well.
But when the Russian cavalrymen, who had advanced furthest north-west to Dolancourt under Count Pahlen as the vanguard of Wittgenstein's corps , had also returned, the Russians were able to advance for the first time from north-west to south-east, up the Aube . But they immediately met the French division Rottembourg , which prevented a further advance of the Russians.
Prince Schwarzenberg used the time and assigned a division of the Bavarian-Austrian Corps Wrede, which should support and strengthen the Russian troops. It was there until 4 p.m.
The battles from 4:00 p.m.
Around 4 p.m. Prince Schwarzenberg ordered his troops to attack: the Russian Wittgenstein corps, reinforced by an Austrian division, had to take action against the French lines east of the Aube and the Bavarian-Austrian Wrede corps against the town of Bar-sur-Aube.
The fighting on the right bank of the Aube
The French troops could not withstand the onslaught of the reinforced Wittgenstein corps. The guns at their disposal had been positioned along the road from Bar-sur-Aube to Arsonval, and their fire enabled most of the French to retreat across the bridge in front of Dolancourt.
When it was already dark, Count Pahlen and his Russian troops at Arsonval came within firing range of the French rearguard, among them Kellermann's riders. He had his mounted artillery open fire on the withdrawing French and then sent his cavalry after them. The French got into great disarray, attempted a weak counterattack, and then turned to flee. Those among them who no longer believed they could reach the bridge tried to swim across the river. Many of them drowned, many fell into the hands of the Cossacks. Count Pahlen was able to occupy the bridge at Delancourt and sent his riders after the French who were leaving in the dark on the road to Vendeuvre .
The battles for the city
The Bavarians under General Wrede attacked the city of Bar-sur-Aube resolutely from the east, but this was no less resolutely defended by the French. Some time of struggle passed before the Bavarians could storm one of the city gates and break open. Now the coalition troops penetrated the city, where a fierce house-to-house fighting broke out, in which the inhabitants of the city fought on the side of their troops.
Only when it became known that the French troops were withdrawing from the city via the Aube did the French occupation of the city begin their retreat across the river. Before she was able to escape over the only bridge, it was taken by storm by a Bavarian regiment and all French soldiers who were now stuck in the city had to surrender because there was no longer any possibility for them to escape.
The town of Bar-sur-Aube had suffered severe damage and many streets were devastated.
The movements of the other corps of the Czech Army on February 27, 1814
Since Prince Schwarzenberg did not exactly know the strength and position of the French MacDonald Corps, he had already ordered the day before, February 26, 1814, that the Austrian corps under Gyulay and the Württemberg corps advance in the direction of Bar-sur-Seine should to move against the said French corps.
The Movement of the Austrian Corps Gyulay
The Austrian Gyulay corps moved on February 27, 1814 from the Arc-en-Barrois area west to the upper Aube and occupied all the bridges of Gevrolles , Montigny-sur-Aube , Vexaulles-sur-Aube and Boudreville and the right bank of the river between these places. Gyulay sent one division down the river to Laferte-sur-Aube and another over the Aube to Riel-les-Eaux near the Ource to explore .
The movement of the Württemberg corps
The Württemberg corps also moved to the upper Aube and occupied the right bank of the river from Clairvaux to Laferte-sur-Aube . At the latter place the Württemberg people crossed the river and occupied the city. Then Crown Prince Wilhelm sent a strong troop of Cossacks at his disposal, further west to Fontette , where they met French riders from Milhaud's cavalry division . The French attacked immediately and the Cossacks had to retreat again.
The movements of the MacDonald French Corps
Marshal MacDonald ordered his troops to advance on Laferte-sur-Aube on the morning of February 27, 1814 . Even before entering the city, they met Württemberg associations, which, in view of the large French armed forces, continued to withdraw. Crown Prince Wilhelm did not want a battle with a river in his back and his troops consequently withdrew from the city over the Aube to the east and finally made the bridge impassable by removing the pavement from the bridge.
The French soon occupied Laferté under fire from the Württemberg artillery that had driven up on the other bank of the Aube. A stone bridge in Silvarouvres was also occupied by the French, but not destroyed.
MacDonald's Corps remained in its positions on the Aube until the next day. Its strength is given as 18,000 men. On the morning of February 28, 1814, Marshal MacDonald and his men wanted to advance north to Bar-sur-Aube on the left of the Aube, but they already encountered coalition troops of the Bohemian Army everywhere , from which Marshal MacDonald concluded that Bar-sur- Aube is occupied by these. He then tried to go with his troops via Vitry-le-Croisé to Vendeuvre , correctly assessing that Marshal Oudinot would have withdrawn there with his troops.
The fighting on February 28, 1814
On the morning of February 28, 1814, after waiting for a while, the people of Württemberg marched on the right of the Aube to Clairvaux and crossed the river there, because no other bridge was available to them. Then they lined up for battle in front of Champignol . A department of Württemberg had already reached Vitry-le-Croisé by this time. Therefore Marshal MacDonald saw the way to Vendeuvre blocked. He immediately orientated himself further south-west with his corps and now took up a favorable combat position between Saint-Usage and Fontette . So it came about that at dusk, people from Württemberg and France faced each other at a distance of 7 kilometers. But neither side dared an attack, only the Württemberg artillery shelled the French positions until late at night.
The Gyulay corps had been instructed to move north to the right of the Aube via the town of Créancey and to take up position opposite Laferté-sur-Aube , where the Württembergians had been standing that morning. The weather was bad and the paths softened, so that the Austrians made slow progress and only reached their position in front of Laferté at 2:00 p.m. At 4:00 p.m. Gyulay ordered the attack on the stone bridge of Silvarouvres . With significant losses, the Austrians had to clear the barriers from the bridge before they could storm the other, left bank of the Aube. From there they drove the French out into the woods beyond the village of Villars-en-Azois to the west.
An artillery duel had broken out in front of Laferté. When the Austrian artillery gained the upper hand, Gyulay ordered the storm over the wooden bridge that the Württembergers had covered the day before. The first Austrians had to balance on the bare long beam across the river until the troops who were advancing had put a covering on the bridge again, over which horses and guns could follow.
In the evening the Austrians had occupied Laferté and sent troops to make contact with the Württemberg people. Around this time MacDonald finally learned from couriers of the course and outcome of the battle at Bar-sur-Aube the day before. He immediately decided to withdraw and in the dark of night the French withdrew to Bar-sur-Seine . The people of Württemberg noticed the movement and sent their light cavalry after the French, who took prisoners among those who could not break away quickly enough.
Both sides lost about 600 men that day.
The next days
On March 1, 1814, the Württemberg Corps and the Austrian Gyulay Corps of the Bohemian Army moved further west to the Seine and occupied the right bank of the river across from the town of Bar-sur-Seine in a wide arc. During the night, Marshal MacDonald had all Seine bridges destroyed or made unusable, but this was not entirely successful, especially with the stone bridges.
On the morning of March 2, 1814, both the Austrians south of Bar-sur-Seine and the Württembergians north of the city were able to conquer a bridge and force the passage over the river. At that time Bar-sur-Seine was surrounded by a wall inside which the French under General Brayer had set themselves up for defense. The Austrians soon managed to blow up one of the city gates, whereupon the French troops turned to flee. Quite a few of them were still captured. Under cover of darkness, MacDonald's corps left the Seine for Troyes . The coalition troops had lost 500 men that day, the French more if you count the prisoners.
Marshal Oudinot had withdrawn with his troops in the days from February 27, 1814 to Troyes . On March 3, 1814, there was serious fighting over the bridges over the Barse . However, Marshal MacDonald, to whom Napoleon had transferred the supreme command, was sick these days, as was Marshal Oudinot, and decided to go back to Nogent-sur-Seine with his entire army, which comprised around 30,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry . MacDonald himself justified this decision with the fact that the connection to the French army under Napoleon in the north was threatened by the Bohemian army .
So it was that the coalition troops were able to move back into Troyes on March 4, 1814. Thereafter, Prince Schwarzenberg granted his Bohemian army a break of eight days until March 12, 1814, during which the corps no longer moved. During the period in which the Silesian Army under Blücher was fighting the bloodiest battles of the entire campaign in Picardy against the part of the French army led personally by Napoleon, the Bohemian Army remained motionless and no longer attacked the French.
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- François-Guy Hourtoulle: 1814. La campagne de France; l'aigle blessé . Éditions Histoire & Collections, Paris 2005.
- English translation: 1814. The Campaign for France; the wounded eagle . Éditions Histoire & Collections, Paris 2005, ISBN 2-915239-56-8 .
- Michael V. Leggiere: The Fall of Napoleon, Vol. 1: The Allied Invasion of France 1813-1814 . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, ISBN 978-0-521-87542-4 .
- Andrew Uffindell: Napoleon 1814. The Defense of France . Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley 2009, ISBN 978-1-84415-922-2 .