Armament dynamics

This article deals with the causes of military armament from a theoretical and historical perspective. For further meanings of the word armor, see armor (disambiguation) .

As arms dynamics refers to is political between two actors - usually States - unfolding process of obtaining or acquiring military instruments to organized violence leads. It is the goal of states to ensure their own security in the international system through military armament.

With a view to arms dynamics, colloquial language often speaks of uncontrolled armament , an "arms race" or even an "arms race" . The more precise political science concept of arms dynamics, on the other hand, takes note of the fact that the arms dynamics process, for example when arms control takes place, can be regulated and even partially include disarmament .

Above all, the scientific analysis of armament dynamic processes asks about the causes of armament. The development and course of armament dynamics are analyzed with the help of various theories of international relations (IB) in order to make the complexity and range of the armament dynamics processes manageable and to isolate crucial bundles of factors.

Theories of Armaments Dynamics

Arms dynamics should not be confused with “armaments madness”, as this term implies that the actors act irrationally. Therefore, theories in this context endeavor to investigate even supposedly absurd actions in the armaments process for their causes in order to be able to understand and explain this in a meaningful way. A good example of this is the arms race between the USA and the Soviet Union during the East-West conflict . The disproportionate accumulation of nuclear weapons, with the potential to destroy the enemy and the world several times, seems irrational, but is a logical consequence , assuming anarchy and the constant fear of the opposite. The political solution to the problems arising from such arms processes is the task of arms control.

Essentially, two theoretical currents can be distinguished to explain armament dynamics. According to Harald Müller and Niklas Schörnig, these are the theory of external and internal management. This separation can be traced back to the different theoretical levels of analysis as well as different understandings of the relationship between structure (international system) and actor (here: the state), as it is in the major theories of IB ( realism , neorealism , liberalism , neoliberalism , institutionalism and constructivism ) prevail.

According to the theories of external management, any influence on the actors takes place through the given structure, i.e. from outside. The level of analysis here is the international system and the focus is on the mutual relationship between states in the same. With a view to their specific foreign policy , internal processes are excluded, in other words: the states are treated as black boxes . In contrast, the theories of internal management emphasize the decisive influence of the “internal side of foreign policy”. According to this perspective, the military-industrial complex exerts influence on the formation of the interests of the state actors through lobbyism , the prevailing social opinion, the media as well as domestic organizations and institutions .

Theories of international relations in relation to the phenomenon of arms races

• Classical realism perspective

According to this theory of classical realism , political competition is traced back to the genetic origin of the drive to power (anthropological constant). States strive for dominance in the international system, weapons are the most important instruments and costs are irrelevant.

• Neorealistic perspective

The neorealism aims regarding arms dynamics exclusively on systemic and competitive aspects from. Thus, for every state it is a matter of survival in its own environment, in which there is no superior authority that guarantees peace and justice . This thesis is also based on the assumption of anarchy in the international system. This creates a dynamic balance of forces among the actors through arms races , as the following factors emphasize sensitivity to threats: uncertainty about the opponent's intentions, lack of transparency with regard to material factors, lack of measurability of the balance and geostrategic factors (location and environment as well as the nature of land and sea power of the state).

• Perspective of the technical imperative

This theory also presupposes international anarchy, but there is no compulsion to be dynamic; only a minimal level of defense is required. A dynamic follows from the urge to use modern and innovative technologies . The armaments sector is also affected and the effort to make innovations usable for military purposes. It is prepared with a view to the future.

External Line Theories

Action-response model

This scheme is based on the fact that the actions of the different actors are analyzed in detail by the opposite side and only there is a reaction. Because of this behavior, a constant cycle of action and reaction is formed. In this scheme, the main focus is on the defense policy of the individual countries . In terms of the action-reaction model, every armament policy decision by a country means an immediate armament policy reaction by the enemy. This constant acting and reacting is based solely on the fact that the opponent is never given a feeling of superiority. A certain basic conflict must be named as a prerequisite, without which this special reaction to precisely this one opponent would not even exist.

Prisoner's Dilemma or Security Dilemma

→ Main article : Prisoner's Dilemma

This theory to be presented is based on the assumption of a prisoner questioning , which is to be briefly presented as follows: Two suspects of an attack are interrogated. The act cannot actually be proven, so the public prosecutor makes the following offer:

• Both deny the act: each one year imprisonment for illegal possession of weapons ( Pareto optimum ).
• Both confess: "extenuating circumstances" each five years imprisonment ( Nash equilibrium ).
• One denies, one confesses: key witness free, another ten years imprisonment.

In this survey, it makes no difference (with the exception of the consideration of the “thief's honor”) whether the two prisoners collude or not. When interviewing without consultation, the so-called dominant or rational strategy is that both confess, since each has the hope of being able to betray the other in order to get free himself. When interviewing the respondents with agreements, the incentive only increases to betray the other, since there is hope of being released oneself, since the other will certainly “hold tight”.

Now the conversion to armaments dynamics: In the security dilemma, analogous to the prisoner's dilemma, there are states in the international system of anarchy , which also has no higher-level institution that could enforce international laws and agreements. No state can therefore rely on agreements with other states and must always assume that these will be broken. In order not to run the risk of losing one's own position of power and making oneself vulnerable by states, armaments are becoming the dominant strategy.

Assurance game

The assurance game is based on the strategic situation that actors mainly benefit from mutual cooperation. The theory is mainly based on Jean-Jacques Rousseau's description of the deer hunt : Two hunters have the option of either hunting a deer together or of hunting a hare individually when the opportunity arises. With the latter, however, the prospect of the deer would be gone. This results in the following options for action:

• Both hunters hunt the deer together and share the prey (4,4). ( Pareto optimum )
• One hunter breaks and secures a hare, while the other hunter cooperates and kills the deer. Since only the stag is shared, the first hunter has a relative advantage over the second (3.1).
• Both hunters do not try seriously to hunt the deer and instead try to kill a hare. In this case, both of them go home with the smaller prey and get the result (2.2). ( Nash equilibrium )

It becomes clear that for a successful deer hunt, the hunters must be able to guarantee mutual cooperation - hence the name of the insurance game. When applying to arms control , it is assumed that two countries are involved in cooperation on arms control, shown here in a simplified manner using a table:

	B limited armor	B is upgrading
A limited armor	4.4	1.3
A is upgrading	3.1	2.2

Here, too, two equilibria can be shown. On the one hand, if both defective and upgrade (2.2), on the other hand, if both cooperate and limit the armament (4.4). The prerequisite for the last option for action is that both cooperation partners derive the greater benefit from the arms restriction and secure this cooperation. Since a functioning arms control contributes to solving the security dilemma, the assurance game could be described as the ideal form of transforming the prisoner's dilemma. However, if interest in relative advantages grows, or if there is growing hostility among actors, the prisoner's dilemma can relapse . Another confounding variable is the so-called “virus of distrust”, which arises from the knowledge of the temptation and the opportunity of the other side to gain a relative status advantage and thus “infects” the assurance game.

Chicken game

→ Main article : Coward game

The so-called "Chicken Game" is also known in Germany as the fearful rabbit or coward game. This game by teenagers and young adults from the USA forms the basis for one of the theories on armaments dynamics. The basic idea in this game is that two cars are driving towards each other or in the direction of a cliff and the one who brakes or swerves first is the fearful rabbit or the "chicken". The same situation can also be projected very clearly onto the armament dynamics. In contrast to the two previous theories, it is not the superiority of the other as the “ worst case ” that comes first, but the nuclear war itself. The best case in an arms race between two states would be the simultaneous abandonment of armaments and thus the "preservation of both faces". Since the states in the international system can never rely on the other state, the mutual abandonment of armaments is not the dominant strategy and is therefore not carried out. Rather, it will happen that neither of the two states will quit, since unilaterally ending armaments would be viewed as a defeat. With “every round” the nervousness increases and the danger of a nuclear war increases. So the aim is not to let this spiral of confrontation get out of hand.

The Richardson model

As early as 1960 Richardson formulated a simple mathematical formula in which he attempted to present the problem of armament dynamics. The basic problem is that it is not clear where the dynamics come from. An arms race is finished in theory so that an armaments policy decision is made by a state and a second state counters, so that the balance is restored. Richardson's model takes the threat situation, costs of armament and existing hostilities into account as the central points. As further influencing factors, Richardson mentions the armament level, the perception of armor for others and the degree of mutual relationships. The formulas should enable a preview of the timing and, if possible, determine the form of the arms race, the danger and the question of armament intensity in relation to cost intensity in advance.

Inner leadership theories

The theories of the internal management deal with the domestic factors and conditions of arms policy decisions. Security policy issues that arise from technologies, geographical conditions and interstate constellations therefore offer several options for action in relation to the security challenges of the respective states. That is why states react differently and there are various attempts at explanation with the following theories.

Military-industrial complex

→ Main article : Military-industrial complex

The theory of the military-industrial complex deals with powerful, concentrated and assertive armaments actors as well as the corresponding balance of power within society. This complex is shaped by arms companies, armament- focused research institutions , corresponding departments of the Ministry of Defense and also affected individuals such as politicians with dominant armaments interest representatives in their own constituency. There are only barriers to enforcing armaments policy interests by reaching or exceeding the pain threshold of societal resources. The armament is driven by internal societal interest groups. The danger lies in the increasing political influence of large arms manufacturers on state armaments decisions.

Relationship between democracy, capitalism and armament dynamics

The origin of the specific characteristics of the armament dynamics in this group of theories lies in the properties of the different political and social systems. Democracies, for example, have a significantly increased propensity for peace , since all armaments-related expenditure is limited to what is absolutely necessary for the defensive, since overarming is viewed as a waste of social wealth. Autocracies, on the other hand, spend more on their armaments. Autocracies also have an increased propensity to start wars , since defeat in war means less loss of power than democracies. Arms dynamics are characterized by aggressive tendencies with superior attack options by non-democracies compared to the defense dispositive of the democracies. Capitalism strives for constant expansion, which also drives it to military expansion through wars.

In connection with this complex of topics, the “dual-use dilemma” should also be mentioned, which is based on the studies by Matthew Fuhrmann and Matthew Kroenig. This consists in the fact that atomic technology can be used both civilly and militarily and this fact seems to be apparently unconsciously or consciously ignored by the states that disseminate atomic technologies and materials. A special focus was also placed on the supposedly responsible behavior of democratic states with regard to the proliferation of nuclear technology and atomic materials. Fuhrmann and Kroenig base their analyzes on the thesis that almost any export of civilian nuclear technology and civilian nuclear materials promotes the development of military nuclear programs, whereby the states are primarily guided by strategic-political interests and less importantly by economic interests. In addition, Fuhrmann and Kroenig find in their analyzes that no distinction is made between autocratic and democratic states in the proliferation of atomic technology and atomic materials. The analyzes prepared by Fuhrmann and Kroenig, as the first in this field of research, have since been hotly discussed and criticized, especially with regard to the data used. It was possible to refute that states are primarily guided by short-term strategic-political interests, since economic interests are just as often in the foreground. The nuclear agreements between France and the countries of the Mediterranean region are an example of this . The two scientists' approach is also criticized. The results of the studies on the “dual-use dilemma” point to the fact that states striving for nuclear weapons are pushing civil nuclear cooperation agreements in order to lower the development costs of a military nuclear program, and not that civil nuclear cooperations induce states to do so initiate military nuclear program. With regard to the sense of responsibility of democratic states towards proliferation, they act more transparently than autocratic states. However, it was confirmed that even democratic states allow themselves to be guided by strategic, political and economic interests in the short term . More prudent action by the democratic states and comprehensive monitoring of goods by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the imported country are of the utmost importance here.

Power of Culture and the "Third Way"

These theories relate to the effects of cultural and ideological variables that characterize different armament behavior and national military doctrines . These doctrines describe the characteristics of the armed forces of a state at different levels . A national military doctrine comprises six different levels of warfare: the technical level (which weapons?), The tactical level (how should weapons interact?), The theater of war (how can which arena be narrowed down and determined?), The strategic level (coordination of different Operations for Success in War) and the level of grand strategy (political goals with military and non-military means of power). The manifestations of the individual aspects of the doctrine are decided by defense or offensive and attrition or movement strategy . Furthermore, objective factors (e.g. geographical location or armaments technology), subjective factors (e.g. ideology, tradition or experience) and organizational factors (e.g. relationship between civil and military leadership) describe the doctrine more precisely. The choice of doctrine thus also has a considerable influence on armament investments and consequently also on armament dynamics.

History of armaments dynamics

In the ancient

The phalanx was an effective battle formation in ancient times

The battles of antiquity were usually fought with weapons such as sword , lance and bow , the use of which was based on muscle power. Knowledge of making these weapons was widespread - so the superiority of the Roman legions was not due to a lead in weapon technology . The optimization of training, logistics and organization enabled the Roman Empire to secure its interests for centuries.

The development of the stirrup and the associated emergence of the cavalry broke this supremacy and led to far-reaching developments in the field of lances and armor .

From the Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution

The advent of the crossbow as an armor-breaking long-range weapon, as well as the adaptation of infantry armament with long-range spikes , led to the armor of knights becoming stronger and stronger. The use of massed longbows allowed numerically inferior English armies to win several victories in the Hundred Years War (see Battle of Crécy ). The long archers, however, do not represent the next level of a linear development. The elaborate and thus expensive training led, just a few years after the Battle of Azincourt in 1415, to the fact that more and more arquebusiers, later musketeers, were used whose training expenditure was significantly lower than that of longbowmen.

The appearance of gunpowder and with it the first firearms on the battlefields not only revolutionized weapon technology, but also led to radical changes in the army organization and the gradual change in the order of the battle . In order to be able to defend themselves against riflemen, the hand-to-hand fighters (such as pikiniers in a heap of violence ) arquebuses, and later more musket shooters, were placed at their side. The further improvement of weapon technology and tactics initially led (with the ever larger armies of the early modern era) to ever more refined battle orders (ordinances). With the introduction of the bayonet at the latest, the spear became obsolete as a weapon and linear tactics were introduced, which remained standard until the 19th century.

The introduction of cannon artillery , but the entire transformation of armies since the late Middle Ages, have far-reaching consequences. The expensive expenses for new bastions, artillery and larger armies gradually changed the whole of society and are ultimately a driving force of modern European states. An element of armaments or the military capabilities of a prince / state is always also its administration. It is not by chance that For example, at the end of the early modern period, France was both a leading (military) power in Europe and a leader in administration. The wars that Louis XIV waged in the 17th century , for example, could only be financed with efficient administration and taxation . During this period, military defeats were followed by comprehensive reforms, not just in relation to the military, such as the Prussian reforms .

In addition to the further development of the weapons systems known up to then, attempts were now also made to gain supremacy through structural improvements in Europe, which was characterized by a homogeneous distribution of power .

Around 1770, for example, a lighter and more mobile cannon was developed in France that could be used much more flexibly in a battle. In connection with the introduction of general conscription and the development of military organization, France created a disciplined mass army, which, coupled with Napoleon's leadership qualities, remained unbeaten until the Russian campaign in 1812.

In the industrial age

Automatic weapons , here a German MG 08

Panzer , here a German Panzer IV

Fighter aircraft , here the American B-17 Flying Fortress

In the course of the 19th century, the industrial revolution also found its way into the military sector. Newly developed weapons dominated the battlefield; Tanks and planes that support infantry combat are an integral part of today's army . (see Combat of Combined Arms )

army

The machine gun and the tank are important achievements for the army in the military development of the industrial age .

The MG was first used in the siege of St. Petersburg in 1864 and was able to kill numerous enemy infantry without major losses of its own. During the First World War , its deadly effect became apparent for the Europeans as well. The use of heavy machine guns and artillery claimed thousands of lives in the battle for the front shift. Independently of each other, one tried to spare one's strength and thus contributed to a long-term trench war .

The tank was first used in large numbers during the First World War in order to break through the enemy positions and thus to bring movement into the deadlocked fronts of the positional war. However, during the First World War, the tank remained a pure support weapon for the infantry, which the military strategists did not yet assign to its own decisive role in the war. A rethink in this regard did not take place until the Second World War , when the Germans, with the help of their highly mobile units, succeeded in taking Poland without significant resistance (see Blitzkrieg ). This victory also gave a whole new impetus to armaments dynamics.

marine

Another technical achievement of industrialization was the construction of the British battleship HMS Dreadnought . This newly developed type of ship is considered to be the forerunner of all modern warships of the 20th century. Equipped with steel armor and heavy artillery, the British high seas fleet ruled the sea. (cf. sea ​​battle at Skageraak )

air force

Developments in aviation gave the military the opportunity to develop groundbreaking strategies . The air superiority became a priority target to penetrate deep into the enemy territory and as its own ground forces by attacking Value Targets helping them to relevant advantage. The most important achievement is the introduction of strategic bombers , which through their long range (up to 4000 km) combined with the devastating destructive power were able to achieve the goals of the higher command. For the first time, far from the front line, it was possible to carry the horrors of war into the civilian population . The effects of such bombings are particularly evident in the examples of London and Dresden . This development is still relevant in terms of armament dynamics, because research into increasing the range of combat aircraft and missile technology as well as possible countermeasures result from it.

Chemical weapons

At the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, the military use of poison gas was banned, even though the threat was only hypothetical at the time. Although the German Empire signed the treaty, German troops used poison gas in the Battle of Ypres in 1915 . In response to this, the Allies also used gas, and research into chemical weapons began there at the latest when the USA entered the war. The decision of the USA to also use chemical weapons in response to the German use of poison and mustard gas was not opposed by its own population. On the contrary, it was then considered a necessary means of defense. Regardless of the benefits chemical weapons might have brought in warfare, they were not used in the major theaters of World War II . A reason for non-use can be found in the meanwhile establishment of a "chemical taboo". Due to the strong politicization and the stigmatization of the weapon, the use of chemical warfare agents only took place to a very limited extent. Therefore, no arms dynamics had established themselves after the First World War. With the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997, chemical weapons are now outlawed worldwide and subject to a strict arms control regime. The OPCW watches over the current destruction of existing stocks worldwide.

During the east-west conflict

Arms dynamics during the East-West conflict were significantly shaped by an arms race between the two great powers, the USA and the former Soviet Union. This process was driven not least by the strong ideological opposition on both sides. The internalization of communism from the American perspective and capitalism from the Soviet perspective as an enemy image considerably intensified the arms race between the two superpowers. Military and geostrategic imbalances among the adversaries contributed to the arms race process. On the one hand, there is the difference between the USA as a traditional sea ​​power and the Soviet Union as a land power and, on the other hand, both the military, purely quantitative superiority of the Soviet Union in Europe after the Second World War, as well as the geographical location of the Soviet Union (in the West, it is close to allies The inequality mentioned was most evident in the troop strengths of the USA and the Soviet Union in Western Europe after the Second World War. While the USA reduced the number of its divisions there from 69 to one between 1945 and 1950, the Soviet Union still had 40 divisions in 1947.

In the foreground of arms dynamics during the East-West conflict was the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers , after the Soviet Union sealed the end of the US nuclear monopoly with the first successful atomic bomb test in 1949 . In the course of the 1950s, NATO developed a strategy of “ massive retaliation ”, which also envisaged the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack. The 1960s and 1970s in particular were characterized by a mutual nuclear "swinging up" between the two great powers. With around 32,500 nuclear warheads, the US reached the maximum of its nuclear armament efforts in 1967. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, only managed to catch up in the mid-1970s.

W78 type warheads as multiple warheads ( MIRV ) re-entry vehicle Mk12A for an LGM-30G Minuteman III , photo 1985

The technical development of nuclear warheads also picked up speed, especially in the course of the 1970s and 1980s. The so-called MIRV technology (Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles) on the part of the USA made it possible to carry several warheads with one rocket. On the Soviet side, the so-called " SS-18 " - a missile that could be equipped with up to ten warheads - was first developed. The USA achieved this potential in the 1980s with the "mobile MX" (Missile Experimental). This MIRV missile was also able to transport ten warheads at the same time. Since the technological development on the defensive side could not follow this progress of the two opponents, "the project of a missile defense " came to a standstill for the time being. In the field of medium-range missiles , the development of the Soviet " SS-20 " - with this missile three targets in Western Europe could be attacked simultaneously - and the American " Pershing II " - a medium-range missile with a range between 680 and 1,800 kilometers - should be mentioned.

With the intention of establishing an effective missile defense system , the USA finally began in 1983 with its so-called " Strategic Defense Initiative " (SDI). "Star Wars" became the epitome of space-based defense against Soviet ICBMs . Both nuclear and conventional, the Soviet Union was no longer able to keep up with the high-tech developments that were being promoted in the USA. The reasons for this, which ultimately led to the end of the arms race between the two superpowers, lie in the economic decline of the Soviet Union and the change in Soviet policy initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev through " glasnost and perestroika ".

Current: the example of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

The term Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) gained increasing importance with the end of the East-West conflict. After the fall of the Soviet Union as a nuclear opponent of the Western allies and the associated change in the threat situation, the focus of nuclear armament shifted back to the use and development of conventional weapons, since the threat scenario called for means other than nuclear weapons. The importance of precision ammunition and weapon systems with stealth properties first became apparent in the Gulf War in 1990/91 and later in the Gulf War in 2003 and in Afghanistan. These conflicts have led to a greatly increased demand for conventional high-tech weapons and, more recently, especially for unmanned weapons systems such as armed drones  .

The US Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper drone : prominent example of an unmanned armed aircraft

The term Revolution in Military Affairs denotes fundamental changes in the military system that can take place on three levels: the technological, the organizational and the conceptual level. In order to be able to speak of a revolution, the change must extend on all three levels. It should be emphasized that military revolutions have always been part of human history. Examples are the above-mentioned developments of the stirrup and gunpowder as well as, nowadays, the development of unmanned systems that have completely changed the manner of warfare. The RMA during the First World War deserves a special mention here, as it shaped our understanding of war today like no other revolution. The beginning of the First World War hardly differed from the wars before, because it was only in the course of the conflict that the parties involved realized that they had to adapt their warfare to the changed framework conditions. This development was completed in 1917 and ended in a material and personnel battle. Particularly new here were the combined arms combat and the technical innovations listed above.

Technological level of the RMA - Military Technical Revolution

The main focus of the RMA lies in the technical development and introduction of novel weapon systems. This development is characterized by the concept of the Military Technical Revolution. The focus of rapid technological development is on making electronic systems usable for the military. The objectives and therefore central points of the armaments dynamics in the RMA are:

• the precision fight
• comprehensive education
• The networked data exchange: This is an integrative element of the RMA, as it connects all other aspects and is therefore the core element of the "revolution". The declared goal is to establish a "system of systems" that links all forces from individual soldiers on site to the top management in such a way that a comprehensive picture of the situation is created, information superiority is achieved and decisions and actions can be taken efficiently and in the shortest possible time .

In the German armed forces, this concept is reflected in the command information system of the army and the infantryman of the future.

Organizational and conceptual level of the RMA

Historical examples show the correlation between the introduction of new weapon systems and the need for reorganization and strategic or tactical reorientation of the armed forces in order to be able to use the new weapon systems profitably. The use of French tanks during the western campaign of the German Reich in 1940 is cited as an example of many. Accordingly, modern armed forces combine the introduction of new technologies with their conversion. The US armed forces are playing a pioneering role in this transformation process. The goal is the reorganization towards lighter, highly specialized and quickly deployable armed forces. Traditional divisions between the armed forces of the Army, Navy and Air Force lost in this process is becoming increasingly important and will be a doctrine of network-centric operations (Engl. "Joint ness") replaces that in the German armed forces, the concept of combined arms battle has produced .

US and World Defense Expenditure, 1988–2008 (in billion US $ from 2005).

Costs and downsides of RMA

As part of the RMA, the precision and effectiveness of conventional armed forces have been increased immensely. But the acquisition of high-tech weapons and the transformation of the armed forces require high investments. The RMA is thus one of the driving forces behind armaments spending, which has been rising again around the world since the end of the 1990s, with the USA taking the lone pioneering role in terms of armaments spending and the transformation of the armed forces. With the financial and economic crisis, the trend towards increasing arms spending in Europe and North America was temporarily dampened. Armaments spending is currently increasing in the Middle East and Asia, where an intense armament dynamic is developing in connection with the rise of China.

Defense spending by selected region, 2009–2013 (in billion US $ from 2013).

In addition to the costs, the RMA has other downsides in the eyes of critics. In some cases, communication with unmanned systems can only be guaranteed with the help of satellites , or precision weapons can be steered towards the target, turning satellites into military targets. In the future, space could be a potential arena for a future arms race and thus also require space arms control measures . Furthermore, with the ability to conduct high-tech warfare, wars are often decided more quickly militarily, but the resolution of the original conflict is not guaranteed. Another possible consequence of high-tech warfare, especially with unmanned aerial vehicles , is the reaction of the inferior state or non-state actor by means of asymmetrical warfare . Last but not least, it is criticized that the availability of unmanned aircraft due to the lack of risk for one's own armed forces is lowering the inhibition threshold for deployment and that political decision-makers may lose sight of non-military conflict resolution options more quickly.

The use of new technologies for the development of high-tech weapons increases the armament dynamics. This development and ways of limiting it were the subject of studies that were commissioned by the Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation of the German Bundestag to the Office for Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag (TAB) . From 1993 to 1996 the TAB examined the consequences of new technologies for armament dynamics and the possibilities of disarmament. Using the example of IuK technologies used by the military - C³I systems and information warfare - as well as non-lethal weapons, their military potential and ways of arms control were examined in more detail. 2001–2003 the military use of space and options for arms control were analyzed. In both cases, political options for arms control were developed for the respective technology areas.

literature

• Frank Sauer, Niklas Schörnig: Armaments and arms control . In: Sebastian Enskat, Carlo Masala (Ed.): International Security: An Introduction . SpringerVS, Wiesbaden 2014, ISBN 978-3-658-02369-0 .
• Harald Müller , Niklas Schörnig: Arms Dynamics and Arms Control: An Exemplary Introduction to International Relations . NOMOS, Baden-Baden 2006, ISBN 3-8329-1914-7 .
• Bernard Brodie, Fawn M. Brodie: From Crossbow to H-Bomb . Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington / Indianapolis 1979, ISBN 0-253-32490-4 .
• Anatol Rapoport: fights, games and debates . Darmstädter Blätter, Darmstadt 1976, ISBN 3-87139-037-2 .
• Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour: Game Theory and National Security . Basil Blackwell, New York 1988, ISBN 1-55786-003-3 .
• Jan Helmig, Niklas Schörnig: The Transformation of the Armed Forces in the 21st Century . Campus Verlag, Frankfurt / Main 2008, ISBN 978-3-593-38433-7 .
• Karl-Volker Neugebauer (Ed.): Basic course in German military history. The Age of World Wars 1914 to 1945 . Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2009.

Web links

• The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (web archive)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ H. Muller , N. Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . 2006.
2. ^ Rapoport : Battles, Games and Debates . In: Darmstädter Blätter . 1976, p. 37 ff .
3. ^ Jervis: Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma . January 1978, p. 167 f .
4. ^ C. Giersch: Attitudes towards risk in the international conflicts . Wiesbaden 2009, Table 7.6: Assurance game and arms control, p. 177 .
5. ^ C. Giersch: Attitudes towards risk in the international conflicts . Wiesbaden 2009, p. 176-182 .
6. ^ Brams, Kilgour: Game Theory and National Security . 1988, p. 38 ff .
7. ^ R. Mützenich: The dual-use dilemma. The responsibility of democratic states for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons . In: Journal for Foreign and Security Policy . No. 4 , 2011, p. 467-487 , doi : 10.1007 / s12399-011-0187-6 .
8. ↑ Brodie / Brodie: From Crossbow to H-Bomb . 1979, p. 17th ff .
9. ↑ Meyer: History of the cavalry warriors . 1982, p. 36 .
10. ↑ Geoffrey Parker: The Military Revolution. The Art of War and the Rise of the West 1500–1800 . Frankfurt / New York 1988, p. 38-45 .
11. ↑ Geoffrey Parker: The Military Revolution. The Art of War and the Rise of the West 1500–1800 . Frankfurt / New York 1988, p. 20-23 .
12. ↑ Wolfgang Reinhard: The history of the modern state. From the beginning to the present . Munich 2007.
13. ↑ H. Muller, N. Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . 2006, p. 26th f .
14. ^ Neugebauer: Basic course in German military history. The Age of World Wars 1914 to 1945 . Ed .: Karl Volker. Munich 2009, p. 36-48 .
15. ↑ Hugh R Slotten: Human Chemistry or Scientific barbarism? American Responses to World War I Poison Gas, 1915-1930 . In: The Journal of American History . No. 77 , 1990, pp. 476-498 .
16. ^ Richard Price: A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo. International Organization 49 . 1995, p. 73-103 .
17. ↑ ^{a b} H. Müller, N. Schörnig: Arms Dynamics and Arms Control . 2006, p. 74 .
18. ↑ ^{a b} H. Müller , N. Schörnig: Arms Dynamics and Arms Control . 2006, p. 76 .
19. ↑ H. Muller, N. Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . 2006, p. 79 .
20. ↑ H. Muller, N. Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . 2006, p. 80 f .
21. ↑ H. Muller, N. Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . 2006, p. 80 .
22. ↑ H. Muller, N. Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . 2006, p. 84 .
23. ↑ ^{a b c} Helmig, Schörnig: Transformation of the armed forces . 2008, p. 16 .
24. ^ ^{A b} Frank Sauer, Niklas Schoernig: Killer drones: The 'silver bullet' of democratic warfare? In: Security Dialogue , 43 (4), 2012, pp. 363–380, sdi.sagepub.com ( Memento of the original from August 17, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved September 1, 2012. 
25. ↑ H. Muller , N. Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . 2006, p. 97 .
26. ↑ Andrew N. Liaropolous: Revolution in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence - The Napoleonic and First World War Revolution in Military Affairs . In: The Journal of Military History . tape 70 , no. 2 , p. 363-384 .
27. ↑ H. Muller , N. Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . 2006, p. 100 .
28. ↑ H. Muller, N. Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . 2006, p. 101 .
29. ↑ Helmig, Schörnig: Transformation of the Armed Forces . 2008, p. 17th f .
30. ↑ Helmig, Schörnig: Transformation of the Armed Forces . 2008, p. 22 .
31. ↑ Frank Sauer: Boarding drones: For the German discussion about armed unmanned aerial vehicles . In: Journal for Foreign and Security Policy 7 . No. 3 , 2014, p. 343-363 , doi : 10.1007 / s12399-014-0411-2 .
32. ↑ Control criteria for the evaluation and decision regarding new technologies in the armaments sector. (PDF) In: TAB report, No. 45.Retrieved on February 16, 2015 . 
33. ^ TAB report no. 85: Military use of space and possibilities of arms control in space. Retrieved February 16, 2015 .