Bavarian diversion in the War of the Spanish Succession
The catchphrase Bavarian Diversion is the militarily and diplomatically equally committed departure of the Bavarian Elector Max II. Emanuel from the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation during the War of the Spanish Succession from 1700 to 1714. The conflict rightly appeared in the contemporary German press as "Bavarian-German War" .
The goal of building a Bavarian kingdom on German soil with the help of France and against imperial law failed not only because of the courageous intervention of the sea powers England and Holland, but also of the empire. In a unique, joint military operation, they defeated Max Emanuel in the second battle of Höchstädt in 1704 and drove him out of Germany. His country was henceforth managed imperial and it was imperial ban imposed. Only in 1715 did he return to Kurbayern.
Concept and research
The application of the term diversion to the Bavarian case to be described here goes back to an article by the historian Bernd Wunder published in 1974 . It is therefore a research term in the true sense that has been widely adopted, but whose roots lie in the early modern period itself.
The term diversion (literally: diversion) is borrowed from contemporary military language and meant the distraction of the enemy from his war aims by opening up further theaters of war. As early as the 17th century it was customary to underpin this primarily military “diversion” with diplomatic support.
But Louis XIV in particular went one step further during his long reign (1661–1715): In the struggle for hegemony in Europe, he tried, by means of military pressure and diplomatic promises, individual imperial estates from the empire and, above all, from its head Emperor Leopold I from the House of Habsburg to separate.
In fact, during the "Second Thirty Years War" 1667–1697 (Johannes Burkardt), individual imperial estates repeatedly opposed the emperor and the empire and deployed their troops against imperial interests - and several times also against imperial law - in favor of the imperial enemy France. In the age of the Sun King there were several “diversions” in the empire that originated in France, even if Louis XIV never succeeded in completely separating emperor and empire.
Thus, the Bavarian case at the beginning of the 18th century appears to be one of many, albeit of particular importance, since Max Emanuel II of Bavaria is not only one of the most powerful princes of the empire, but also one of the secular electors, to whom the concern for the Reich should have been a responsibility in a special way.
Nevertheless, at least in the Bavarian case, the term diversion does not seem appropriate, because it views the phenomenon from the wrong side. The active part of this diversion in spa Bavaria did not come primarily from France, but from the Bavarian elector himself. The plan to oppose the emperor and empire in order to get a royal crown with the help of France came from Max Emanuel himself.
The term diversion also obscures two further aspects: On the one hand, the aim of the war must be mentioned here. Max Emanuel's goal was the establishment of a sovereign Bavarian state independent of the Reich at the rank of a kingdom. Therefore, one could just as easily describe the Bavarian diversion as a failed attempt at a war of independence or a war of secession.
But even these terms do not really hit the core of the matter: the war that Max Emanuel waged against the Reich was largely a breach of the fundamental laws of the Reich and therefore illegitimate. Military attacks on other imperial estates were violations of the Eternal Peace of the Land and the alliance with France also violated imperial law at the latest since the declaration of imperial war by the Perpetual Reichstag in Regensburg in 1702.
The so-called Bavarian diversion was therefore so an empire betrayal of the first order, to which the imposition and execution of the imperial ban followed. If you take a look at contemporary magazines, you will find at least for the period 1702 to 1704 the simple and yet precise term of the "Bavarian-German" war for Bavarian diversion.
Causes of the "Bavarian-German" War
With the Peace of Westphalia concluded in 1648 , the concept of a peaceful coexistence of sovereign states with equal rights was generally recognized. However, this “Westphalian system” was still fragile, because, on the one hand, the membership of the 'new' state system had not yet been finally identified, and on the other hand, the reduced universal powers kept falling back.
For the German electors in particular , the increasing establishment of the European state system meant a step backwards: if they had traditionally claimed and enforced the same rank as the European crowns as imperial electors and co-regents of the empire before 1648, this was no longer possible. The “electoral states” were not independent states, because their masters, like the other imperial estates , were bound by the fundamental laws of the empire and therefore not sovereign, like the European kingdoms.
But in such a rank-conscious age this was unacceptable in the long run. Therefore, the secular electors strove for sovereign crowns beyond the empire, whereby they were quite successful: Elector Friedrich III. of Brandenburg became King of Prussia as Friedrich I in 1701, Elector August of Saxony in 1698 as August II. King of Poland and Georg of Hanover in 1714 even as George I, King of England. But for a long time the Bavarian Elector Max Emanuel had the best prospects for a sovereign empire:
As early as the 1860s, Europe had been counting on the death of the childless Spanish King Charles II from the Spanish line of the House of Habsburg. The main contenders for the Spanish succession were the French royal house of the Bourbons, headed by Louis XIV, and the Austrian line of the Habsburgs, headed by Emperor Leopold I. But with the marriage of Max Emanuel to the Emperor's daughter Maria Antonia and the birth of Crown Prince Joseph Ferdinand (* 1692), a compensation candidate was the obvious choice to avoid an inheritance conflict.
King Charles II of Spain (Habsburg)
Emperor Leopold I (Habsburg)
King Louis XIV of France (Bourbon)
Prince Elector Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria (Wittelsbach)
The maritime powers England and Holland, which tried to avoid the hegemony of the Bourbons or the Habsburgs in Europe, favored the succession of the Bavarian electoral prince. The other hereditary potentates should be settled. The Spanish Council of State, which ruled for Charles II, approved this solution and King Charles' will of 1698 actually designated Joseph Ferdinand as the sole heir. Max Emanuel saw himself as king, but then everything turned out differently: Joseph Ferdinand died on February 6, 1699. The Spanish empire with its royal crown, which had come within reach since 1692, was irrevocably lost for Max Emanuel.
Even the sea powers no longer wanted to stand up for the Wittelsbacher. In the secret partition contract between Ludwig XIV. And Wilhelm III. from March 2, 1700 there was no longer any talk of Max Emanuel, rather the inheritance was to be divided between Bourbon and Habsburg. But the elector was firmly convinced that he would still receive a part of the Spanish monarchy. That is why he had already turned down the candidacy for the Polish throne after his marriage to his second wife, the Polish king's daughter Therese Kunigunde . In Schleissheim he began to build a royal palace complex in the baroque style.
The pre-war phase (1700–1702)
Bavarian diplomacy in the prewar phase (1700–1702)
On November 1, 1700, King Charles II of Spain finally died at the age of 39. In his will, he did not appoint Archduke Charles of Austria as his successor , as everyone expected, but the Duke of Anjou Philipp , the second son of the heir to the French throne. The Spanish monarchy was to remain undivided under him, but was never to be united with France. For Max Emanuel, the will finally seemed to be the end of his royal dreams. But the omens were pointing to war: while the Sun King accepted the unexpected inheritance in the name of his grandson, Leopold I, for whom the will amounted to the disinheritance of the German branch of the House of Habsburg, protested massively. But the emperor alone was hardly prepared for a war against the highly armed France. No help was to be expected from the imperial estates or the other European powers. But when Louis XIV finally began to take action against imperial territories and expressly confirmed the successor of his grandson on the French throne, this attitude broke out. The formation of the great anti-Bourbon Hague alliance between the sea powers, Portugal, Denmark, the emperor and the empire cast its shadow.
Max Emanuel II first recognized Philip as the new Spanish king in order to save his governorship in the Spanish Netherlands, which had been conferred by Charles II in 1692 , but was also well aware that his well-armed army and, above all, the situation of Spa Bavaria would be beneficial to Louis XIV. and was of great interest to Leopold I when it came to war. Max Emanuel was determined to play both parties against each other in order to achieve his goal of a royal crown. First he offered France an offensive alliance and demanded, in addition to substantial subsidies, lifelong governorship over the Spanish Netherlands and hereditary sovereignty over two Dutch provinces. But Louis XIV was not prepared to fragment the Spanish monarchy out of consideration for his grandson in Spain. Thereupon Max Emanuel II pledged himself against the guarantee of his home countries only to neutrality in the empire.
At the beginning of March 1701, the Viennese court also submitted an offer to the elector: Max Emanuel was guaranteed lifelong governorship over the Spanish Netherlands. However, Max Emanuel did not attach much importance to the imperial promise, which was already too small, and instead let negotiations continue with Versailles. In an additional article of April 15, 1701, Max Emanuel undertook to ensure that the neutrality alliance formed by the Swabian and Frankish imperial circles would remain neutral even in the event of war. In return France provided him with the payment of subsidies for the maintenance of an army of 15,000 men. The previous assurances by France would not have brought the Bavarian elector a sovereign crown, even if successful. Therefore, in the following months, Max Emanuel tried not only to become master of the Swabian-Franconian alliance, but also of all the Upper Imperial Circles, which were to be combined in a neutral association , in order to be able to demand more from Versailles. But this attempt ultimately failed because of the clever strategy of the circles to hold back, which more and more got behind the real motives of the Wittelsbacher.
The failure of his policy of neutrality brought Max Emanuel back to the question of which of the two camps he should go to. Even remaining neutral did not seem to make sense to him, because his goals, the expansion of territory and a sovereign crown, could not be achieved. At the end of January 1702, the elector again turned to the French court and offered to convert the existing neutrality alliance into an offensive alliance. And this time Max Emanuel knew exactly how to get Louis XIV on his side: He offered nothing less than to start a war in the middle of the empire, with which Leopold I's military forces were initially bound. The elector planned to annex the Principality of Palatinate-Neuburg , the Lower Palatinate , Tyrol and other Habsburg areas in Upper Austria , as well as the imperial cities of Augsburg , Ulm , Nuremberg and Regensburg . In view of the thus enlarged Bavaria, he demanded recognition of the royal dignity for his house by the European powers. If he did not succeed in conquering the imperial territories or even losing spa Bavaria, the elector demanded hereditary sovereignty over the Spanish Netherlands or alternatively the Duchy of Milan . He also agreed to swap Bavaria for the Kingdom of Naples-Sicily .
Versailles only refused the barter plan and agreed to talk about everything else. The negotiations with France dragged on for months, also because Vienna had managed to arouse Max Emanuel's interest in a change of alliance. Max Emanuel demanded from Leopold I the immediate cession of the Margraviate Burgau and several dominions in Tyrol as well as the concession of the royal dignity, but above all the Duchy of Milan or the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily in exchange for spa Bavaria. The Viennese negotiator, Count Schlick, knew how to give the elector hope in all these matters. But the answer from Vienna was not due to arrive until August 17, 1702. Leopold I rejected all of Max Emanuel's demands and reminded him of his duties as prince . The elector then concluded the alliance with France that had already been negotiated.
The Perpetual Reichstag in the pre-war phase (1700–1702)
For a long time in research, the Perpetual Reichstag , the central, pre-parliamentary decision-making body of the Old Reich, around 1700 was considered blocked, paralyzed and ineffective. In a way, this may apply to the period between 1697 and 1701, because in fact hardly any resolutions were passed during that time. When the Spanish War of Succession then cast its shadow and the French troops first crossed the border, the previously crippling disputes were stopped relatively quickly in order to be able to deal with warfare.
Hardly anything was learned at the Reichstag from the alliance negotiations between Kurbayn and France, but one or the other one could observe that Max Emanuel's envoy took the side of Louis XIV. The first public scandal occurred in the summer of 1701 when Emperor Leopold I expelled the Burgundian envoy Neuveforge from the Reichstag. Max Emanuel protested against this and allowed the diplomat to stay at will in his Bavarian states. The magazines in the Reich soon reported on this French partisanship. The mood against Kurbayern gradually began to change.
And yet one could not imagine that Max Emanuel would pursue his connection of whatever kind with Louis XIV if it came to an imperial war against the Bourbons. After the imperial declaration of war against France on May 15, 1702, discussions began in Regensburg on the imperial declaration of war to be drawn up. On September 10, news from southern Germany triggered an alarm in the Reichstag. Max Emanuel had attacked the Swabian imperial city of Ulm and thereby obviously committed a breach of the peace . Although the Bavarian representative at the Reichstag Zündt tried hard to convince his colleagues that the occupation had only taken place to protect Ulm and to preserve the peace, the breach of the basic Reich laws was obvious.
A day later, the Reichstag decided to warn Max Emanuel first, and asked him to put the city of Memmingen in a prior statum cum omni causa […], or one would find oneself denied, all constitutional means against it from the entire Reichswegen To push forward . And the end also formulated what that could mean: inclusion of the elector in the imperial declaration of war that has yet to be drawn up. This followed on September 30, 1702. Max Emanuel's breach of the law was confirmed and the Reich War officially started against Kurbayern.
The war phase (1702–1704)
On September 10, 1702, Max Emanuel's army opened the “Bavarian-German war” against the Reich with an attack on the imperial city of Ulm , which lasted almost two years. Shortly after the attack on Ulm, Memmingen and Dillingen also fell into the hands of the Bavarian elector. After that he turned to Tyrol according to his plans for conquest , where he failed because of the notorious national defense. Back in southern Germany, Max Emanuel threatened other cities and territories in the Swabian and Franconian areas, including Neuburg an der Donau and Augsburg , and finally even Regensburg , the city of the Perpetual Reichstag, itself.
The Reichsarmee , appointed by the Reichstag and often scolded as ineffective by research , prevented further attacks by the Bavarian elector and, for example in league with imperial contingents, a planned storm with its "self-limitation on defense while waging the little war" (Max Plassmann) on Nuremberg . Although the Imperial Army was unable to prevent Max Emanuel from flowing French troops from Alsace several times in 1703, France only succeeded in doing this with high marching and combat losses. Likewise, the elector hardly succeeded in taking care of himself at the expense of the Swabian region; the conquests, as it were, thinned out his field army. But these advantages could only gradually affect the empire.
Only with the so-called Second Battle of Höchstädt could the activities of the Bavarian elector be put to a definite end. It is noteworthy that this was only possible because the troops of the sea powers, the emperor's army, the imperial troops and imperial estates' troops worked in an exemplary manner for the common goal. The glory of victory is then not only attributable to the leader of the Anglo-Dutch army, the Duke of Marlborough , but also to Prince Eugene of Savoy as captain of the imperial contingents and Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden as leader of the imperial troops, some of which during the battle The main Bavarian fortress of Ingolstadt was besieged and so Bavarian supplies were suppressed.
After the battle of Höchstädt, which ended so unfortunate for Max Emanuel, the remaining French-Bavarian troops fled to Alsace. The elector himself unreasonably went into exile in the Spanish Netherlands , where he hardly played a major role in the next few years. In many cases he was only an observer of the War of the Spanish Succession. His Bavarian ancestral lands were administered imperially over the next few years .
The consequences of the failed war from 1704 to 1711
The imperial administration of spa Bavaria
After the defeat of the Bavarian Elector near Höchstädt and his flight into exile, rule over Kurbayern and the other Bavarian-Wittelsbach possessions temporarily passed to the Electress Therese Kunigund, who had been left behind. But on November 7, 1704, the Treaty of Ilbesheim was dictated to the Electress by Emperor Leopold I. All fortresses still occupied by Bavarian troops had to be handed over to the imperial family. After approval by the Reichstag, the imperial administration took over the administration of the spa region of Bavaria with all the sovereign rights. The Electress only had control of the residential city and the Munich Rent Office and a guard of only 400 men. Leopold's successor Joseph I finally occupied Munich in 1705, breaking the Ilbesheim Treaty.
The economic power of the Bavarian states served the imperial administration for further warfare: This did not affect the Bavarian estates , which had always rejected the anti-imperial policies of Max Emanuel and to whom the emperor had confirmed all their rights. Rather, the measures of the imperial government affected the common people. Imperial troops were billeted in the cities, which had already been affected by the war, and taxes were drastically increased. The imperial recruitment policy based on the Austrian model triggered the greatest displeasure. In the autumn of 1705 a compulsory eviction was finally ordered throughout the electorate. The soldiers of the imperial administration proceeded extremely brutally, from which the rural population in particular suffered.
As a consequence, there were first uprisings and acts of violence in the Upper Palatinate, Lower Bavaria and the area around Tölz, which were sharply condemned even by the distant Elector Max Emanuel (→ Bavarian popular uprising ). The intervention of the imperial troops could not prevent the revolts against the authorities from spreading further. Now officers, nobles, civil servants and craftsmen increasingly took over the leadership of the rebels. Burghausen and Braunau were conquered relatively quickly in December 1705. In Braunau even a popular representation formed from below, the " Braunau Parliament ". After further victories at Schärding and Kelheim , the rebels concluded a ten-day armistice with the imperial family.
Now the royal seat of Munich was also to be wrested from the imperial troops. But this attempt failed. On Christmas Day 1705, the imperial contingents - by now informed of the insurgents' plans - stopped the advance near Sendling. It came to the notorious Sendlinger Murder Christmas . After that, the uprising collapsed relatively quickly.
No matter how much the Sendling massacre is written into the Habsburgs' black book, the reaction to it was relatively moderate:
In Munich, the imperial administration ordered an investigation into the events. Only two lieutenants and two citizens were publicly beheaded on January 29, 1706, and a few remained in custody. The officials involved in the conspiracy were dismissed from office or fined. The imperial administration of spa Bavaria was now generally more moderate, the forced recruitment was stopped and the tax claims were lowered, so that Bavaria could at least recover somewhat in the next nine years under imperial rule.
The imposition of the imperial ban on Max Emanuel
After Max Emanuel's defeat at Höchstädt in 1704, the Elector of the Palatinate, Johann Wilhelm, pushed harder at the imperial court in Vienna to impose an imperial ban on Max Emanuel and, in the event of his ostracism, demanded that the Upper Palatinate and the Cham county be in Bavaria. In principle, the chances were not bad, because Max Emanuel and Johann Wilhelm both belonged to the Wittelsbach family .
But the secret conference in Vienna rejected the exaggerated claims of the Wittelsbacher that spa Bavaria should be administered imperially for as long as possible. At least Johann Wilhelm managed to get Emperor Leopold to ask the Electors for their consent to the Eighth Declaration. Within a few weeks, positive votes were received from Mainz , Trier and Düsseldorf, while Brandenburg and Saxony insisted on discussing the matter in the Kurkolleg at the Reichstag. There could be very different opinions about the question of whether collegial advice was necessary. Imperial law was not clear here.
On December 27, 1704, the emperor himself finally ended this dispute and handed the matter over to the representative of the Imperial Chancellor in Regensburg. According to the will of the emperor, a decision should first be made on the imposition of the eight - what should be done with the territories of Max Emanuel should be clarified later. But the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony also turned against this approach. Their motives, however, were quite different: Saxony pushed for more practical considerations, Friedrich I wanted to push up the price for his approval in the Electoral Palatinate.
It was only after a Brandenburg-Palatinate settlement was negotiated in November 1705 that an expert opinion from the electoral representatives at the Reichstag came about. About Max Emanuel, the imperial ban was imposed on his younger brother, the Cologne Elector Joseph Clemens the privation . On April 29, 1706, Emperor Joseph I carried out the judgments in the Knights' Hall of the Vienna Hofburg in a vivid manner, tearing up the feudal letters of the two former electors and having them thrown out of the window. Even contemporaries noticed this ceremony in words and pictures.
Now Max Emanuel was also officially and in accordance with the procedure provided for by the imperial laws, all of his imperial territories, his sovereign rights and his rights as elector and imperial estate withdrawn. No member of the Reich was allowed to grant Max Emanuel protection or even support him. Max Emanuel's reaction to this step was downright sobering in advance. Undeterred, he made it clear in a manifest: "I have not committed anything against the laws of the Reich." When the news of the imposition of the Reichsacht reached him, he remained calm. Regardless of his highest city defeat and his condemnation, he believed in a bright future. The decision about his future role in the European concert would be made in the peace negotiations with the naval powers, where he believed he was sure of the support of Louis XIV.
Max Emanuel's restitution - victory or defeat?
After the victory of the empire on the battlefield of Höchstädt over Max Emanuel and the liberation of the occupied neighboring Bavarian territories, no peace negotiations took place between 1704 and 1711 with the Bavarian elector who had fled to Brussels, because on the one hand he made no move to renounce his alliance with Versailles On the other hand, as a non-sovereign member of the empire, the Wittelsbacher was not at all a legitimate warlord who had to be treated under international law .
Max Emanuel relied entirely on the fact that at the peace congress of the European powers that ended the War of the Spanish Succession his cause - a sovereign part of the Spanish inheritance with a royal crown - would be discussed and that his supporter, Louis XIV. Would stand up for his interests. But the negotiating position of France itself became weaker and weaker, especially after 1708/09 as a result of increasing military setbacks, so that France had to save itself in a peace in which the French interests came first.
Serious peace negotiations between the European powers had been going on in Utrecht since January 1712 . It was not until the spring and summer of 1713 that most of the states involved in the War of the Spanish Succession concluded the Peace of Utrecht . The Spanish monarchy was finally divided: the heartland and the overseas territories went to the grandson Louis XIV. Philip of Anjou, who ruled from then on as Philip V. The Spanish sub- lands largely went to the Habsburgs. Many were considered, but Max Emanuel received nothing. Louis XIV had only inadequately represented his Bavarian ally in Utrecht, who had no longer been able to fight war since 1704.
In the short term, hope may have arisen again with Max Emanuel, because Emperor Charles VI. (since 1711), and with it the empire, did not recognize the peace of Utrecht. The fighting continued against France on the Upper Rhine until finally the two commanders-in-chief, Prince Eugene and Marshal Villars, concluded the Rastatt peace between the Emperor and France. It was largely agreed to restore the pre-war state. Max Emanuel's concerns were finally discussed in Rastatt Castle. An agreement was reached on the restitution of Max Emanuel (and Joseph Clemens) in the empire, which was finally confirmed at the Imperial Peace Congress of Baden in 1714.
However, Max Emanuel was not rewarded with a royal crown and a sovereign state: Versailles could not enforce at international level that the Wittelsbacher would also be rewarded for the injustice he had committed. Max Emanuel did not return to Kurbayern financially until 1715. From then on he was forced to adopt a policy that was more friendly to the Reich, as his class colleagues looked at him with skepticism for years. But in secret, Max Emanuel never gave up the "dream" of a royal crown. Years after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, he let his ministers search for new inheritance claims, but they could not be realized. It was not until 1806 that the Kingdom of Bavaria was established under different auspices, but again in league with France ( Napoleon I ) . The attempted but unsuccessful conquests of Max Emanuel in Swabia and Franconia in the years 1702–1704 seem almost as an anticipation of the later development.
swell
- Karl Maria von Aretin: Chronological index of the Bavarian state treaties from the death of Duke George the Rich (1503) to the Frankfurter Territorial-Receß (1819). Passau 1838.
- Philipp Röder von Diersburg (ed.): War and state writings by Margrave Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden on the War of the Spanish Succession. From the archives of Karlsruhe. 2 vols., Vienna / Paris 1850.
literature
- Karl Otmar von Aretin : The politics of the elector Max Emanuel and the European powers. In: Hubert Glaser (ed.): Elector Max Emanuel. Bavaria and Europe around 1700. Vol. 1 On the history and art history of the Max Emanuel period. Munich 1986, pp. 35-50.
- Max Braubach : The politics of the Elector Max Emanuel of Bavaria in 1702. In: Historisches Jahrbuch 43 (1923), pp. 53-92.
- Johannes Burkhardt: The Peacelessness of the Early Modern Age. Foundation of a theory of the bellicity of Europe. In: Journal for historical research 24 (1997), pp. 509-574.
- Johannes Burkhardt : Completion and reorientation of the early modern empire 1648–1763. In: Gebhardt: Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte , 10th, completely revised edition, Stuttgart 2006.
- Susanne Friedrich: Turntable Regensburg. The information and communication system of the Perpetual Reichstag around 1700 (= Colloquia Augustana 23). Berlin 2007.
- Ludwig Hüttl: The politics of the Bavarian Elector Max Emanuel in the light of the French and Austrian sources. In: Journal for Bavarian State History 39 (1976), pp. 693–775.
- Marcus Junkelmann : Theatrum Belli. The battle of Höchstädt 1704 and the castles of Schleißheim and Blenheim (= Arte & Marte. In Memoriam Hans Schmidt. A memorial from his group of students. Volume 1). Herzberg 2000.
- Christoph Kampmann: Reichstag and Reich Declaration of War in the Age of Louis XIV. In: Historisches Jahrbuch 113 (1993), pp. 41–59.
- Reginald de Schryver: Max II. Emanuel of Bavaria and the Spanish inheritance. The European ambitions of the House of Wittelsbach 1665–1715 (= publications of the Institute for European History Mainz, Department Universal History 156). Mainz 1996.
- Reginald de Schryver: The dynastic principle. Max Emanuel's ambitions for the Spanish heritage, territorial expansion and the royal crown. In: Johannes Erichsen and Katharina Heinemann (eds.): The battle of Höchstädt. Focus of Europe 1704. Ostfildern 2004, pp. 12–25.
- Anna Sinkoli: France, the Empire and the Imperial Estates 1697–1702 (European University Writings 652). Frankfurt / Main 1995.
- Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger : Honores regii. The royal dignity in the ceremonial system of signs of the early modern period. In: Johannes Kunisch (Ed.): Three hundred years of the Prussian king's rise. Berlin 2000, pp. 1–26.
- Bernd Wunder : The Bavarian Diversion of Ludwig XIV in the years 1700–1704. Spa Bavaria, Swabia, and Franconia between Habsburg and Bourbon at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession. In: Journal for Bavarian State History 37 (1974), pp. 416–478.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Sr. Churfl. Passed through from Bavaria Manifesto, including its answer / or some remarks about the causes listed therein / how one tries to assert the justice of one's weapons., Frankfurt am Mayn 1706.