German participation in the war in Afghanistan

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Foreign missions of the Bundeswehr, as of March 7, 2013
Overview of the number of Bundeswehr soldiers deployed (source: Siegener Zeitung, December 18, 2015)

The German participation in the war in Afghanistan has been approved by the German Bundestag in two polls on 16 November to 22 December 2001 at the request of the of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder led (SPD) green red- decided the federal government. It included military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom and the ISAF mission to stabilize Afghanistan . In March 2011, Germany was deployed with around 5,300 soldiers due to a change of contingent. In addition, from March 2011, some AWACS-Crews moved to Afghanistan as part of the flexible reserve. The last ten-month mandate was approved on February 28, 2014. With the expiry of Resolution 2120 (2013) of the United Nations Security Council and the NATO Operations Plan (OPLAN), the legal basis for the ISAF mission will also expire. The NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan ended on December 31, 2014.

However, the Bundeswehr remained in Afghanistan as part of the NATO Resolute Support mission until June 29, 2021.

Legal basis

The Bundestag repeated, also on October 16, 2008, the continuation of the participation of armed German armed forces in the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) under the leadership of NATO on the basis of Resolution 1386 (2001) and the following resolutions, most recently resolution 1833 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council, approved with 442 votes in favor (77.5%) of 570 votes cast.

On February 26, 2010, the German Bundestag approved an extension of the Afghanistan mandate until the end of February 2011. In the roll-call vote, 429 of 586 MPs voted in favor of the new mandate, it was rejected by 111 MPs, and 46 MPs abstained. The mandate stipulates that the Bundeswehr contingent can be increased to up to 5,000 soldiers, plus 350 soldiers as flexible reserves for special requirements. On January 28, 2011, the mandate was extended for another year with a majority of 72.5% of the votes of all members of the Bundestag.

On January 26, 2012, in its 155th plenary session, the German Bundestag again approved an extension of the Afghanistan mandate for another year. For the application of the Federal Government to "continue the participation of armed German armed forces in the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) under the leadership of NATO on the basis of resolution 1386 (2001) and the following resolutions, most recently resolution 2011 (2011 ) of October 12, 2011 of the United Nations Security Council ”, 424 of 569 MPs (votes cast) voted in the roll-call vote; 107 MPs rejected it and 38 MPs abstained.

commitment

Germany had been responsible for the operation in the northern region since mid-2006. In his area of ​​responsibility, Germany provided the leadership of two of the five provincial reconstruction teams in Kunduz and Faizabad . These had the task of strengthening the authority of the central government in the area and helping to create a stable environment for civil reconstruction. In addition, Germany supported the establishment of the Afghan army and the police. Since February 15, 2002 there have been several hundred Bundeswehr incidents in Afghanistan .

Mercedes Wolf, side view with marking for Afghanistan mission

Some major military operations with German participation were:

Commanders of the German contingent

rank Surname Period
Brigadier General Bernd Kiesheyer August 2005 to April 2006
Brigadier General Markus Kneip April to October 2006
Brigadier General Volker Barth October 2006 to February 2007
Brigadier General Josef Blotz February to August 2007
Brigadier General Dieter Warnecke August 2007 to January 2008
Brigadier General Dieter Dammjacob January 9th to July 9th, 2008
Brigadier General Jürgen Weigt July 9, 2008 to January 10, 2009
Brigadier General Jörg Vollmer January 10th to October 3rd, 2009
Brigadier General Jürgen Setzer October 3 to November 29, 2009
(replacement for health reasons)
Brigadier General Frank Leidenberger November 30, 2009 to June 20, 2010
Major General Hans-Werner Fritz June 20, 2010 to February 24, 2011
Major General Markus Kneip February 24, 2011 to February 26, 2012
Major General Erich Pfeffer February 26, 2012 to February 21, 2013
Major General Jörg Vollmer February 21, 2013 to February 13, 2014
Major General Bernd Schuett February 13, 2014 to August 1, 2014

reception

In a representative survey in December 2009, a large majority of German citizens doubted that the federal government was providing comprehensive and honest information about the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan. 69% of those questioned were in favor of the German armed forces withdrawing as quickly as possible; 27% were in favor of continuing the military engagement.

The increasingly critical evaluation of the ISAF mission in the public discussion in Germany is based on the following findings: The extremely deficient structures of the war-torn Afghan state were not sufficiently taken into account in the conceptual design of the ISAF mission. In fact, a “state structure without a state” must be pursued. The goals of the mission were defined too high, “overloaded with hopes and illusions”. The planners were prepared for a hopefully waiting population, not for growing resistance. The military offensive by American and British forces in the south has led to insurgents moving to other parts of the country, especially to the north. The build-up of the Afghan army and police is proceeding much more slowly than planned. The German involvement in police training is insufficient. The restrictions on the use of German soldiers imposed by politics with the simultaneous existence of skill gaps meant that self-protection took precedence over security and the Bundeswehr was mainly concerned with self- protection. Civil-military interaction is only possible to a limited extent due to insufficient presence. In addition, the contribution of the ISAF is being viewed more and more critically among the soldiers of the US Army. Even in management circles, the reinterpretation “I Suck At Fighting” is common there.

The visits of German defense ministers to the German troops in Afghanistan helped to keep the issue in the public eye. During the Afghanistan mission, ministers were:

No. Surname Life dates Political party Beginning of the term of office Term expires
13th Peter Struck 1943-2012 SPD July 19, 2002 November 22, 2005
14th Franz Josef Jung * 1949 CDU November 22, 2005 October 28, 2009
15th Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg * 1971 CSU October 28, 2009 March 3, 2011
16 Thomas de Maizière * 1954 CDU March 3, 2011 17th December 2013
17th Ursula von der Leyen * 1958 CDU 17th December 2013 17th July 2019

Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg became Minister of Defense after the 2009 Bundestag election . After the change of government - end of the grand coalition (black-red), beginning of the black-yellow coalition - the government had new freedoms in its policy on Afghanistan.

At Christmas 2009 the then EKD Council Chairman Margot Käßmann said the sentence “Nothing is good in Afghanistan” in her Christmas sermon. This sparked a heated public debate.

In March 2010 Guttenberg broke a taboo on the subject of the Afghanistan mission: He admitted that one could speak of "war" in Afghanistan in colloquial terms. He started a discussion. At the same time, this international law classification of the deployment as a non-international armed conflict ensured more legal security for the soldiers deployed. For that he got a lot of approval. (More about Guttenberg's position here .)

history

prehistory

After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 which left Schröder government on 16th November 2001 at the Bundestag on the request deployment of German armed forces in support of the joint response to terrorist attacks against the United States vote and joined the coordination with confidence . The application was narrowly accepted. Germany thus participated in Operation Enduring Freedom , which included a German contribution in Afghanistan. With the vote of the Bundestag on December 22, 2001 on the application of armed German armed forces to participate in the deployment of an international security support force in Afghanistan on the basis of resolutions 1386 (2001), 1383 (2001) and 1378 (2001) of the United Nations Security Council , the Deployment of the German Armed Forces connected with the ISAF .

Germany's political contribution consisted, among other things, in organizing the so-called Petersberg Afghanistan Conference from November 27 to December 5, 2001. A donor conference was held in Tokyo in January 2002. Germany's contribution was 320 million euros, spread over the next four years, and the EU pledged 550 million euros for 2001.

Deployment in Kabul

On January 2, 2002, a German advance command arrives in Kabul and the camp warehouse is set up. From February 10 to August 11, 2003, Germany and the Netherlands will take over ISAF leadership from Turkey, with Norbert van Heyst as ISAF commander. Subsequently, the leadership of the ISAF passes to NATO, since no state is ready to do so. ISAF commander will be Götz Gliemeroth . During this time, Kabul Airport was also repaired and some new buildings were built.

On March 6, 2002 , the first Bundeswehr soldiers died while defusing an anti-aircraft missile . In the years to come there were more German soldiers killed and injured in accidents, mines and suicide bombings. The attack on June 7, 2003 on a bus in which German ISAF soldiers wanted to reach Kabul airport for their return journey to Germany attracted a great deal of attention in Germany. In 2007, an al-Qaeda video was made known that the suicide bomber was a Saudi from Jeddah . How unprepared the Bundeswehr was, was shown, among other things, by the fact that some of the soldiers injured at the time continued to argue for years about their military service damage with the military area administration. In May 2006 the Bundeswehr finally moved out of the camp warehouse.

Expansion of the ISAF mandate

On October 24, 2003 the Bundestag decided that the Bundeswehr in Kunduz should take over the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) from the Americans and start disarming the militias there. Another PRT followed in Faizabad in summer 2004 .

Camp Marmal in Mazar-e Sharif

From July 2004 to January 2005, the Kabul Multi National Brigade was under the command of the Franco-German Brigade , which was led by Brigadier General Walter Spindler at the time. After Germany assumed the role of Regional Area Coordinator North (RAC North) in July 2005 , the role of Regional Commander North (RC North) of the ISAF troops followed in June 2006 . In August 2006, Camp Marmal was set up in Mazar-e Sharif . On July 1, 2008, the German Armed Forces took over the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of the Northern Regional Command of Norway.

The Bundeswehr has been using Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) since 2006 to support the Afghan National Army with training.

On October 12, 2006, six German soldiers came under heavy fire from insurgents in a mountain valley. The US pilot Brian Erickson (75th Fighter Squadron) saved the lives of soldiers by providing close air support with an A-10 ground attack aircraft and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross with Valor Medal for special merits.

Increasing combat missions

German ISAF patrol with three ATF Dingo near Mazar-e Sharif
German sniper in action

Taliban attacks have been increasing in the Regional Command North since 2007. On March 9, 2007, the German government decided to expand the mission of the Mazar-e Sharif squadron and to relocate Recce Tornado aircraft to Afghanistan. The machines of the reconnaissance wing 51 were relocated back to Germany in November 2010.

Since 2009 there have been repeated operations to stabilize the Kunduz region. During Operation Oqab (Operation Adler) in July 2009, the Bundeswehr used light artillery (mortars) and armored personnel carriers for the first time in its history.

On July 2, 2009, the Bundestag decided to deploy Bundeswehr soldiers in NATO AWACS aircraft with very rigid rules of operation. Since the neighboring states had no overflight rights, the machines were never used. On March 25, 2011, the Bundestag decided again that Germany should participate in AWACS reconnaissance flights. 407 MPs voted in favor, 113 voted against and 32 MPs abstained. With the German participation in NATO's AWACS flights in Afghanistan, the Federal Government wanted to relieve the allies who were involved in the international Libya mission .

300 Bundeswehr soldiers are planned for the German AWACS mission. The previous Afghanistan mandate limit of 5,000 Bundeswehr soldiers plus the reserve of 350 soldiers should not be exceeded.

The air attack near Kunduz on September 4, 2009, in which, according to NATO estimates, up to 142 people, including many civilians, were killed and others injured, is unprecedented in the history of the Bundeswehr. Ultimately, it led to the resignation of the former Federal Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung , who was already sworn in as Federal Labor Minister, and to a committee of inquiry in the Bundestag. For the families of 91 dead and 11 seriously injured, Germany paid $ 5,000 each through the Kabul Bank as compensation . At this point in time, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was already Minister of Defense, who subsequently dismissed high-ranking generals, including Inspector General Wolfgang Schneiderhan.

In order to counter criticism from ISAF allies, the Air Force has participated in combat missions by the Royal Air Force in southern Afghanistan since December 2009 .

In a government statement on January 28, 2010, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the German government would like to intensify the training of the Afghan army and will increase the number of German police trainers from 123 to 200 this year. A development offensive is to be started in the north and to this end by 2013 [obsolete] , instead of the current 220 million euros, 430 million euros will be invested annually in civil reconstruction, mainly in rural areas. Some of the goals associated with this are increasing income and employment, building additional roads, improving access to energy and water, and training new teachers. The government will also provide the new international reintegration fund (“Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program”) with 10 million euros annually for the next five years. These followers should be offered jobs, for example.

On February 26, 2010, the Bundestag decided to increase the maximum number of soldiers from 4,500 to 5,350, with 350 men in the reserve. In December 2011, the upper staff limit, including the AWACS crew, was reduced from 5,350 to 4,900.

On March 17, 2010, a real-time capable reconnaissance drone of the Heron 1 type was used for the first time . In May 2010, three self-propelled howitzers were relocated to Afghanistan and, after their first use on July 10, 2010, were used repeatedly.

Since June 20, 2010, Hans-Werner Fritz , a major general in the Bundeswehr, has been the regional commander for the north. He is higher in military rank than the recently added US officer with around 5,000 US soldiers, and so the leadership role is formally increased to around 10,000 soldiers. The US special forces that have been active in the regional command since the summer of 2009, such as Task Force 373 , which operates under an OEF mandate , are not under the control of the German major general, as the latter is only responsible for ISAF soldiers.

In August 2010, the QRF association in the north was dissolved and transferred to two training and protection battalions , one in Kunduz and one in Mazar-e Sharif, each battalion consisting of around 1,200 German soldiers. These battalions are to go into action together with Afghan troops. In contrast to the past, people no longer want to show their presence on site by patrol from time to time, but rather stay on site with Afghan soldiers for weeks in certain priority areas. Local security forces are to be recruited and aid projects organized. The operation Halmazag in October / November 2010 was the first major bi-national deployment of these troops, which is heavy fighting in the district of Char Dara District , near Kunduz, came.

On May 18, 2011, an incident occurred in Taloqan , in front of the camp of the Provincial Advisory Team Taloqan .

Handover of responsibility for security

In the North Regional Command, the handover of security responsibility to the Afghan National Army with the provincial capital Mazar-e Sharif began on Saturday, July 23, 2011.

Federal President Wulff made a state visit to Afghanistan on October 16, 2011, and preparations were made for the December 2011 Afghanistan Conference on Bonn's Petersberg. In this context, Wulff made the statement to the Afghan President Hamid Karzai:

“Germany and the international community will not let your country down after 2014, Mr. President. My country will not shirk this responsibility. "

- Federal President Christian Wulff : Dinner speech at lunch at the invitation of President Karzai on the occasion of the state visit to Afghanistan on October 16, 2011

Then Wulff traveled on to Mazar-e Sharif and Kunduz to visit the troops. In Mazar-e Sharif he also met US soldiers who had repeatedly flown German soldiers out of dangerous combat situations by helicopter.

In January 2012, Afghans assumed security responsibility for Faizabad and several districts in Badakhshan Province . In October 2012 the warehouse was completely abandoned. Towards the end of 2011, the management of the PRT had already been handed over from the German Armed Forces to the German Foreign Ministry. The province of Balkh was also handed over to Afghan responsibility.

The base in Talokan in Tachar Province was disbanded on February 23, 2012, a few weeks earlier than planned, due to unrest in several Afghan cities. About 50 Bundeswehr soldiers were most recently stationed in the regional advisory team (PAT).

A Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed with Afghanistan on May 16, 2012. It was regulated how the support for Afghanistan should look like after the withdrawal of the Bundeswehr.

In December 2012, the German Armed Forces relocated the first two of a total of four Eurocopter Tiger combat helicopters to Afghanistan.

In October 2013, the Bundeswehr ended its withdrawal from the Kunduz military camp , with the transport of material and weapons in heavily guarded convoys to Mazar-e-Sharif being largely completed. Defense Minister de Maizière, Foreign Minister Westerwelle and the Afghan Defense and Interior Ministers celebrated the handover of the camp to the Afghan security forces in a small ceremony on October 6th.

In February 2014, the German government renewed the mandate in Afghanistan, which lasted until the end of 2014.

Miscellaneous

Police construction assistance

From spring 2002 Germany supported the training of the Afghan police . For this purpose, a police academy was set up in Kabul, the reconstruction of buildings was supported and the equipment supplemented. In August 2002, the first 1,500 recruits entered the academy. The training is intended for NCOs (Satanman) and officers (Saran). The German approach was later criticized for not training enough police officers. In 2005, training as an officer lasted three years at the academy plus two years extra-occupational and as a non-commissioned officer one year. In response to the criticism, the training period for training to become a sergeant was shortened and, under the direction of the USA, training for simple police service (Satunkai) was introduced, which can be completed in eight weeks. Since the summer of 2007, EUPOL Afghanistan has taken over the task from Germany, but German police officers are still active in Afghan police training. Since January 2009, Germany has also been participating in the Focused District Development (FDD) program in the North Regional Command. Among other things, it includes setting up so-called police mentoring teams (PMT) to assess the situation on site and then training the district police in two-month courses in a police training center.

The task of police training was contrary to the above. Information not taken over by Eupol AFG alone since 2007. It is correct that Eupol AFG was and is one of the training units of the ANP (Afghan National Police), the ABP (Afghan Border Police) and the ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police). At the locations of the German PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Team) Kunduz and Feyzabad, as well as in the area of ​​the Forward Support Base "Camp Marmal" / PRT "Northern Lights" (Sweden) in Mazar-e Sharif and in Kabul, the training of the Afghan police carried out by the German Police Project Team AFG (GPPT AFG) in the respective Police Training Center (PTC) or the ANPA (Afghan National Police Academy). At its weddings in 2010/2011, the GPPT AFG consisted of up to 200 German federal and state police officers. Following the closure of the Kunduz and Feyzabad PRTs and the change from a training to a mentoring mission, the GPPT was also downsized accordingly.

Police training was also carried out in particular by the American armed forces, among others. in the RTC Mazar-e Sharif (Regional Training Center).

Special Forces Command

With the Bundestag mandate for Operation Enduring Freedom, the deployment of a maximum of 100 soldiers from the Special Forces Command (KSK) in Afghanistan was included. It was suspected of being used in various operations in 2001 and 2002, including the allegations made by Murat Kurnaz . This mandate was canceled by the Bundestag on November 13, 2008, and since then the KSK can only be used in Afghanistan under the ISAF mandate. After the air raid near Kunduz, there was speculation in politics and the press that the KSK would be involved in this event. On May 5, 2013, the German Armed Forces announced that a KSK member was killed during an operation.

Talks between the BND and the Taliban

The magazine Der Spiegel reported in 2007 that there had been a secret meeting in July 2005 in Zurich between the Federal Intelligence Service and two representatives of the Taliban. The BND was interested in finding out whether the Taliban would part with al-Qaeda. The Taliban have expressed their interest in being recognized as a political force. The talks did not lead to any official negotiations, as the Taliban did not want to distance itself from al-Qaeda.

In the winter of 2011, the Taliban announced that they would set up a “foreign mission” in Qatar in order to “enter into a dialogue with the international community”. According to US information, negotiations between the Taliban and US representatives took place for ten months; they met about half a dozen times in Germany and Qatar.

In January 2012, according to Spiegel, three Germans from Peshawar were interrogated and then expelled from the Pakistani border town. The Germans are said to have been employees of the BND.

Afghan employees of the ISAF mission fear Taliban revenge after the end of the mission

Countries like the USA and Canada have extensive admission programs for their employees; Afghans who work for the US military are contractually assured that they will be allowed to live in the US after a few years. Around 1,600 Afghans work (as of spring 2013) for German institutions (of which around 1,350 for the Bundeswehr); many of them would like to have such an admission program.

In a direct comparison with the USA, a total of 1,500 Afghans were granted visas there between 2009 and 2013. In May 2017, Afghan lead applicants were granted an additional 2,500 visas under the Consolidation Appropriations Act . The Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program (SIV), which came into force on February 15, 2019, approved 4,000 additional visa quotas for primary Afghan applicants. A total of 18,500 American visas have been issued since December 2014.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Development refer to the Ministry of the Interior “responsible for immigration”. There it is said that the federal government is “aware of the special responsibility for the Afghan local staff ”. They are subject to the “care of their office” and can turn to them “at any time” “if they are concerned about their professional and personal future or even feel threatened by political extremist forces in their own country”.

The Afghan government protested against offering Afghan local workers asylum in Germany because that undermined morale. From mid-2015, however, German federal authorities increased the proportion of positive decisions, so-called "hazard notifications" by local staff, and allowed 68% of applicants for asylum in Germany. 1,800 such cases had been processed by February 2016, 75% of the cases had previously worked for the Bundeswehr. According to the Ministry of Defense (as of April 2021), 781 local staff have been hired in Germany since the start of this local staff procedure in 2013. In April 2021, around 300 local staff were employed by the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan.

Some private stakeholders in Germany are increasingly taking over the active assistance of former Afghan local staff. These associations support the former local forces of the Bundeswehr and focus on integrative measures in Germany and practical support on site. Some high-ranking representatives of the Bundeswehr support these organizations through active membership or as patrons . So who took over generals Volker Wieker and Eberhard anger as former and active Inspector General of the Bundeswehr , the patronage of the sponsorship network Afghan local staff eV

Long-term study: effects of the mission on veterans

In August 2014, the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences published a long-term study.

costs

In 2012, the German government put the cost of the Federal Armed Forces deployment in Afghanistan over the past ten years at 6.1 billion euros plus 1.7 billion euros for reconstruction and development.

The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) estimated the cost of German participation in a “realistic scenario” of a few more years of commitment at 26–47 billion euros. Should this increase further, however, the “war budget” would have to grow considerably. With a deduction in 2011, the institute considered a total of 18–33 billion euros to be realistic. According to the DIW, the wide range can be explained by “uncertainty factors” in the study's assumptions. The "uncertainty factors" are the follow-up costs of soldiers killed or injured in action, their psychological care, damage to their enemies in Germany, the logistical costs of withdrawal and equipment destroyed or damaged in use, as well as opportunity costs due to lack of success or investments in other areas such as the fight against drugs, Education and Research. If German participation were to last longer, the costs could rise by an additional 2.5–3 billion annually. In contrast, official figures put the costs at “only” 1,059 million euros for 2010.

Mission-related additional expenses of the Bundeswehr for ISAF

year Personnel
expenses
Preservation of
defense material
Military
procurements
Military
installations
Non-apportionable material
administrative expenses
Total
2001 0.1 million 0.4 million 3.6 million 0.0 million 1.2 million 5.3 million
2002 35.4 million 42.0 million 122.6 million 19.9 million 86.3 million 306.2 million
2003 66.5 million 56.4 million 137.2 million 10.6 million 112.6 million 383.3 million
2004 66.9 million 82.2 million 94.1 million 9.8 million 84.5 million 337.5 million
2005 68.2 million 75.3 million 101.8 million 27.2 million 104.8 million 377.3 million
2006 92.2 million 70.6 million 99.2 million 52.8 million 186.0 million 500.8 million
2007 112.8 million 102.1 million 86.8 million 56.2 million 157.4 million 515.3 million
2008 120.5 million 136.4 million 52.4 million 36.1 million 156.5 million 501.9 million
2009 157.7 million 184.9 million 101.8 million 51.6 million 172.3 million 668.3 million
2010 187.8 million 253.6 million 263.9 million 69.9 million 253.7 million 1,028.9 million
2011 213.1 million 256.9 million 356.6 million 51.6 million 335.6 million 1213.8 million
2012 219.6 million 290.8 million 204.7 million 39.8 million 377.0 million 1131.9 million
2013 190.5 million 153.5 million 82.4 million 39.7 million 339.1 million 805.2 million
2014 114.3 million 142.3 million 44.1 million 10.8 million 272.6 million 584.1 million
2015 49.5 million 113.5 million 11.9 million 0.3 million 251.2 million 426.4 million
2016 47.3 million 107.1 million 4.3 million 0.4 million 200.5 million 359.6 million
2017 46.6 million 48.8 million 4.9 million 0.1 million 208.6 million 309.0 million
2018 58.2 million 40.8 million 10.0 million 1.6 million 202.0 million 312.6 million
Total 1847.2 million 2,157.6 million 1782.3 million 478.4 million 3501.9 million 9767.4 million

Documentation

  • Die for Afghanistan. Germany at War (D 2010, editing: Stefan Aust / Claus Richter , broadcast on ZDF March 16, 2010, 9:00 p.m. - 9:45 p.m.).
  • The Afghanistan lie. The Soldiers, Politics and War (D 2010, directors: Mathis Feldhoff, Hans-Ulrich Gack , Andreas Huppert), broadcast on ZDF, April 8, 2010, 00: 35–01: 20.
  • War in Indian Country - The Bundeswehr in Kundus (D 2010, Director: Steffen Schwarzkopf, broadcast on N24 , May 27, 2010, 4:15 pm-5:00pm).
  • On the front lines (D 2010, editor: Ashwin Raman , broadcast on ARD , 23 September 2010, 00: 00–00: 45).
  • Our War (D 2013, directed by Michael Renz, Christian Deick, part 1 broadcast on ZDF, October 8, 2013, 8:15 pm - 9:00 pm).
  • The 13th year - The lost war in Afghanistan (D 2015, editor: Ashwin Raman, broadcast on ARD, March 2, 2015, 10:45 pm - 11:30 pm).
  • In the land of the Taliban (D 2018, editor: Ashwin Raman, broadcast on ZDF, September 20, 2018, 00: 50h-01: 20h).

Movies

See also

literature

  • Anja Seiffert, Phil C. Langer, Carsten Pietsch: The deployment of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Social and political science perspectives. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2012, ISBN 978-3-531-18301-5 . doi: 10.1007 / 978-3-531-93400-6
  • Sascha Brinkmann (ed.) With Joachim Hoppe and Wolfgang Schröder: Feindkontakt. Battle reports from Afghanistan . Verlag ES Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg 2013, ISBN 978-3-8132-0945-7 .
  • Rainer Buske: Kunduz. An experience report about a military deployment of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan in 2008. Miles-Verlag, Berlin 2015, ISBN 978-3-937885-79-7 .
  • Philipp Münch: The Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Military logic of action in international interventions (= latest military history . Volume 5). Rombach Verlag, Freiburg im Breisgau and others 2015, ISBN 978-3-7930-9827-0 .

Web links

Commons : German participation in the war in Afghanistan (2001–2014)  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Informing the public
  2. bundestag.de: Bundestag decides to deploy AWACS in Afghanistan
  3. tagesschau.de: Afghanistan mission: Bundeswehr flies out the last soldiers. Retrieved June 29, 2021 .
  4. Bundestag resolves to increase troops Spiegel Online, February 26, 2010.
  5. Bundestag extends deployment in Afghanistan . Stern, January 28, 2011.
  6. ARD-DeutschlandTREND - December 2009. Archived from the original on February 24, 2014 ; Retrieved February 19, 2014 .
  7. Michael Paul: Civil-military interaction in foreign deployments. In: From Politics and Contemporary History (APuZ 48/2009)
  8. Herfried Münkler
  9. Bente Aika Scheller, Heinrich Böll Foundation
  10. Ronja Kempin: "Years wasted in police training"
  11. Jens Borchers: The fairy tale of police building ( Memento from January 28, 2010 in the Internet Archive )
  12. Michael Paul: Civil-military interaction in foreign deployments. In: From Politics and Contemporary History (APuZ 48/2009)
  13. Confusion in dealing with the Afghanistan mission. Deutschlandfunk, March 14, 2010, accessed on February 1, 2012 .
  14. Guttenberg speaks of the war in Afghanistan. Spiegel Online, April 4, 2010, accessed February 1, 2012 .
  15. Guttenberg speaks of war. Focus Online, April 4, 2010, accessed February 1, 2012 .
  16. Guttenberg declares war. Spiegel Online, April 6, 2010, accessed February 1, 2012 .
  17. ^ Documentarchiv.de: Application of the federal government for the use of armed German armed forces in support of the joint reaction to terrorist attacks against the USA of November 7, 2001
  18. erwaertiges-amt.de: Participation of armed German armed forces in the deployment of an international security support force in Afghanistan on the basis of resolutions 1386 (2001), 1383 (2001) and 1378 (2001) of the United Nations Security Council
  19. Cf. Weibezahl, Tinko: Partly successful - provisional balance sheet after eleven years of military service in Afghanistan. In: KAS-Auslandsinformationen, accessed online on December 3, 2012.
  20. Spiegel.de: Donor Conference for Afghanistan - The first billions are ready
  21. Spiegel.de: Interview with Isaf boss von Heyst - "Don't duck your head"
  22. NATO Review: Interview with Lieutenant-General Götz Gliemeroth: Commanding General ISAF
  23. Wikileaks: LEAD NATION FOR KABUL AIRPORT, June 2003
  24. FAZ: Afghanistan - After the attack in Kabul, doubts grow
  25. Spiegel.de: Terror helpers present video of Bundeswehr assassins
  26. ^ Distinguished Flying Cross Recipient - Brian Erickson. Retrieved February 19, 2014 .
  27. Bundestag.de: Application by the federal government for the use of AWACS aircraft in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF (PDF; 63 kB)
  28. Spiegel: Black-Yellow wants to stop the Awacs mandate
  29. Bundestag decides to expand the Afghanistan mission Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 25, 2011.
  30. Stern.de: Tank truck attack in Afghanistan - compensation for the Kunduz victims is available
  31. Michael Smith: From Biggles goes bombing with the RAF. The Sunday Times (United Kingdom) , April 4, 2010, accessed April 17, 2010 .
  32. Bundesregierung.de: Government declaration on the Afghanistan concept of the Federal Government by Chancellor Merkel from January 28, 2010 ( Memento from November 24, 2010 in the Internet Archive )
  33. bundesregierung.de: Fewer German soldiers in Afghanistan from 2012 ( memento from February 3, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) , press release, December 14, 2011, accessed on February 25, 2012.
  34. Bundeswehr.de: Heron approaching
  35. welt.de: Interview with Major General Hans-Werner Fritz
  36. Focus: Westerwelle visits provincial capital before handover
  37. bundespraesident.de: Dinner speech at lunch at the invitation of President Karzai on the occasion of the state visit to Afghanistan, October 16, 2011
  38. n-tv: Wulff flies in the unrest province of Kunduz
  39. n-tv: responsibility goes to Afghans, January 25th
  40. FAZ: Bundeswehr withdraws prematurely from Talokan
  41. ^ Süddeutsche.de: Germany is supporting Afghanistan with 150 million euros
  42. n-tv: Bundeswehr sends out “Tiger”, December 13, 2012
  43. ^ Spiegel.de: Germans hand over Camp Kunduz , October 6, 2013.
  44. ^ Bundeswehr: Cabinet approves another Afghanistan mandate , Berliner Zeitung.
  45. BMI: Recruitment test of applicants for the 6-month training of the Satanmane Afghan National Police Academy (ANPA) in Kabul
  46. BMI: Questions and Answers on Focused District Development (FDD)
  47. stern.de: Bundeswehr remains in the fight against terrorism
  48. tagesschau.de: SPD chairman Arnold on the KSK mission - "The questions are now more pressing"
  49. zeit.de: German soldier killed in battle in Afghanistan
  50. spiegel.de: KSK soldier killed for the first time in Afghanistan
  51. ^ Spiegel.de: BND meets Taliban - secret date in Zurich
  52. Reuters: Exclusive: Secret US Taliban talks reach turning point, December 19, 2011
  53. ^ Spiegel.de: Pakistan closes German spy office, January 21, 2012
  54. The Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program on the Human Rights First website (accessed December 17, 2019)
  55. Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans - Who Were Employed by / on Behalf of the US Government on the DEPARTMENT of STATE - BUREAU of CONSULAR AFFAIRS website (accessed December 17, 2019)
  56. spiegel.de April 16, 2013: Local helpers of the Bundeswehr: Threatened in Afghanistan - undesirable in Germany
  57. Christoph Heinzle: "Bundeswehr sponsors for Afghan ex-colleagues" ( Memento from July 11, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) NDR from July 10, 2015.
  58. spo./AFP: "Germany takes on more endangered local workers" FAZ from February 9, 2016.
  59. ^ Troop withdrawal from Afghanistan: Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer wants to bring Bundeswehr helpers to Germany. In: Der Spiegel. Retrieved April 18, 2021 .
  60. General, the. In: Duden . Bibliographisches Institut GmbH, 2019, accessed on December 17, 2014 .
  61. General Inspector assumes patronage on the website of the sponsorship network Afghanische Ortschafts eV (accessed on December 17, 2019)
  62. ↑ Commitment , love, service and the family: Selected results of the long-term social science support of the 22nd ISAF contingent (PDF)
  63. spiegel.de: First Bundeswehr Veterans Study: What does the war do with the soldiers?
  64. Tagesspiegel.de: Afghanistan mission - costs of 8 billion euros in the last 10 years, February 13, 2012
  65. Afghanistan mission: Each additional year costs Germany three billion euros. Retrieved February 19, 2014 .
  66. ^ Tilman Brück, Olaf de Groot, Friedrich Schneider: A first estimate of the economic costs of the German participation in the war in Afghanistan. (PDF; 398 kB) German Institute for Economic Research, May 25, 2010, accessed on July 20, 2010 (weekly report of DIW Berlin No. 21/2010).
  67. Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from MPs Paul Schäfer (Cologne), Jan van Aken, Sevim Dağdelen, other MPs and the DIE LINKE parliamentary group. - Drucksache 17/1713 - Costs of the military intervention in Afghanistan. (PDF) December 2, 2010, accessed December 21, 2020 .
  68. Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from the MPs Dr. Alexander S. Neu, Tobias Pflüger, Heike Hänsel, other MPs and the DIE LINKE parliamentary group. - Drucksache 19/14225 - Costs of the military intervention in Afghanistan. (PDF) November 14, 2019, accessed December 21, 2020 .
  69. ^ Only temporary successes in FAZ of February 24, 2014, p. 8.